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Τοῖσι γὰρ μήτε ἄστεα μήτε τείχεα ᾖ ἐκτισμένα, ἀλλὰ φερέοικοι ἐόντες 
πάντες ἒωσι ἱπποτοξόται, ζῶντες μὴ ἀπ’ ἀρότου ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ κτηνέων, 
οἰκήματά τε σφι ᾖ ἐπὶ ζευγέων, κῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν οὕτοι ἄμαχοι τε καὶ 
ἄποροι προσμίσγειν;
For when men have no established cities and fortresses, but all are 
house-bearers and mounted archers, living not by tilling the soil 
but by cattle-rearing and carrying their dwellings on waggons, 
how should these not be invincible and unapproachable?
Herodotus, History, IV 46.
…
Pogibosha aki obre; ikh zhe nest’ plemeni ni nesled’ka.
‘They perished like the Avars.’ Neither race nor heir of them 
remains.1
Tale of Bygone Years, an old Rus’ proverb.
…
Considering the natural environment in which they [nomads] 
lived, and the related peculiarities of culture, they occupied 
an extremely important place on the ethnographic map of the 
European barbaricum.
Lech Leciejewicz 2000, 175.
⸪
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Introduction
At the beginning of his now classic monograph on the Avars, first published in 
German in 1988, Walter Pohl asked if these people were ‘marginal Europeans’ 
(schlechte Europäer).1 This same question could be posed in relation to every 
nomadic ethnos that has ever migrated to the European continent. It is also 
possible to broaden the question and ask whether nomadic peoples, which are 
migratory by definition, can be considered Europeans at all? This problem is 
not a new one. Herodotus, who described the Scythians without biases and at 
times even wrote sympathetically about them, seems to have had his doubts 
about their Europeanness. The author of Histories believed the Scythians 
belonged to Europe geographically, because this is where they ultimately based 
themselves. He said their roots, however, were in Asia, over which they once 
briefly ruled. As enemies of the Persian Empire, they have also been historically 
placed on the side of Europe. The definitional problems faced by Herodotus 
remind us of an extremely important fact – namely, that the nomadic groups 
he describes arriving on the European continent were all essentially products 
of the so-called Great Steppe, whose landforms and ecosystems defined the 
basic elements of their cultures. Their nomadic lifestyle and the values associ-
ated with it clearly distinguished these nomads from the agricultural commu-
nities whose settlements neighboured the plains of the European steppe. This 
made it easy for nomads to be seen as ‘Others’ and, ultimately, to be erased 
from the continent’s cultural landscape.
Despite the insights provided by new studies, this tendency continues to 
appear in contemporary research, and is reinforced by the total absence of 
nomadic communities in modern-day Europe. The continent’s last indepen-
dent nomadic groups, located in Russia, had ceased to exist by the end of 
the eighteenth century. Not long afterwards, as a result of Russian economic 
expansion and the anthropogenic changes this brought, the steppe plains – 
the natural habitat of nomadic populations – vanished from the European 
continent. A researcher studying the history and culture of European nomads 
today must therefore try to recreate a world that not only disappeared long 
ago, but, above all, is also acknowledged by few in modern-day Europe. One 
symptom of this situation is that in historical studies of the Old Continent, 
nomadic communities generally appear only at moments of great drama, or 
even crisis. We all know of the Huns, whose arrival marked the beginning of 
the Migration Period, which is still portrayed today as one of the main causes 
1 Pohl 1988, 1–4; 2018, 1–5.
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of the fall of the Ancient World. Another nomadic group in public awareness 
is the Mongols, whose expansion in the mid-thirteenth century significantly 
altered the political map of Eastern Europe and brought the ‘Mongol Terror’ 
(Timor Tartarorum) to much of the continent. Both of these events initiated by 
steppe dwellers were undeniably of great significance to Europe, as they gave 
shape to a new political and, more broadly, cultural order on the continent. Yet, 
reducing the presence of nomads in Europe to their roles in these events casts 
them as inherent enemies of European civilization who appeared suddenly 
and unexpectedly, like a natural disaster, wreaking death and destruction, only 
to disappear just as suddenly. Such a perception of these communities, ones 
which have been present in Europe since the Eneolithic Period (3rd and 4th 
millennia BCE) is clearly based on misconceptions. It is not easy, of course, to 
incorporate these migratory steppe peoples into the continent’s cultural land-
scape, because these groups continued to undergo constant change as succes-
sive waves of nomadic peoples arrived in Europe from Central Asia. However, 
ignoring their presence or reducing it to a single dimension – the violence 
associated with it – limits our understanding of the political and socio-cultural 
processes taking place in medieval south and eastern Europe.
Nomadic communities were an important part of these processes. In the 
early Middle Ages (more precisely, the 10th and 11th centuries), Europe’s atten-
tion was drawn to the Pechenegs, a nomadic people with roots in Inner Asia. 
Unlike the Huns, Khazars, or Mongols, they were not the founders of great 
empires, but during the period under discussion they made their mark on 
the history of the countries and ethnicities neighbouring them. A lack of par-
ticularly spectacular political successes should not obscure the fact that the 
Pechenegs were an extremely interesting ethnic organism that existed for 
roughly 300 years, if we trace their origins back to Asia. They therefore existed 
as an independent group longer than many steppe empires, upon which the 
scholarly community has focused so much attention. I am convinced that a 
detailed analysis of the Pechenegs’ history, the main elements of their culture, 
and their relationship with the outside world will provide us with a better 
understanding of the place of nomadic communities in the political and cul-
tural landscape of medieval Europe.
1 Written Sources
There exists a very diverse collection of written sources on the history and 
culture of the Pechenegs, including a corpus of some 60 texts produced by 
a number of sometimes quite different cultural traditions. The Pechenegs 
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were written about or mentioned by Byzantine, Latin, Muslim, Rus’, Syrian, 
Armenian, Hebrew, and even Tibetan authors.2 In most cases, these are merely 
brief mentions that allow us to establish no more than basic facts about 
these people.
Like the vast majority of nomads, the Pechenegs did not produce their own 
written sources. We learn about their past through the accounts of foreign 
authors, many of whom were negatively disposed towards nomads, and few of 
whom understood the specifics of the culture of the people they were describ-
ing. These ethnographic digressions were often written on the basis of descrip-
tive motifs borrowed from previous authors. A related tendency is found in 
the works of Byzantine writers who used ancient ethnonyms (e.g. Scythians, 
Cimmerians, Getae, Myrmidons, Mysians, Dacians and others) in place of the 
ethnic names of present-day ‘barbarians’.3 It should also be noted that exten-
sive ethnographic descriptions are rarely found in these written sources. They 
are usually limited to reporting key political events, such as wars or alliances 
with nomads, or to recording information that is useful for diplomatic pur-
poses. Texts from this last category are common among works of Byzantine 
historiography, the most numerous group of sources available to us. These 
ancient authors considered war to be the main subject of history.4 To some 
extent, the information contained in Byzantine sources on the culture of the 
Pechenegs is complemented by other authors, most of whom are Muslim, who 
are less interested in political issues.
In spite of these weaknesses, without this data from works by authors 
belonging to the Byzantine literary tradition, our knowledge of steppe peoples 
would be extremely limited. We will thus begin our survey of written sources 
with materials produced by this group. The author of what is probably the most 
important of these sources is Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, who 
is considered to have played a major role in the intellectual renaissance that 
2 A basic reference guide to Byzantine sources is found in the foundational works of Gyula 
Moravcsik: 1983 I, 225, 234, 256–257, 270–272, 295, 324–328, 334, 335–340, 340–341, 344–348, 
350–352, 354–355, 399–400, 427–429, 430–432, 437–441, 443–444, 445–447, 448, 453–454, 
455–456, 467, 500–502, 512–515, 522–528, 537–539, 540–544, 552–553, 556–557; 1983 II, 247–
249. Other lists of written sources are found in: Kurat 1937, 266–268; Göckenjan 1972, 207–211; 
Tryjarski 1975a, 485–492; Golden 1990, 466–470; 1995, 290.
3 Moravcsik 1983 I, 198–199.
4 According to Arnold J. Toynbee, around 4/5 of all ancient Greek historical writing deals with 
the history of warfare. It should be assumed that in Byzantium this ratio was essentially the 
same. Toynbee 1924, 21. Despite its profound importance, Byzantine historiography has never 
been characterized by ‘ethnographic sensibility’. Cf. Kaldellis 2013, IX, 44–81; Paroń 2011; 2014; 
2018.
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took place in the Empire during the rule of the Macedonian Dynasty (867–
1056).5 His political legacy, however, was not worthy of acclaim. Having been 
crowned as a young child, he had no real influence on the course of events in 
the state during the first 31 years of his reign. He did not begin to rule autono-
mously until early in 945, after the deposition of first Romanos I Lekapenos 
and then his sons, Stephen and Constantine.6 Constantine VII’s long absence 
from politics provided him with ample free time to pursue his scholarly pas-
sions. His activity in this area was two-fold, as he not only promoted and orga-
nized scientific work, but also wrote his own scientific treaties.7
Among the works that appeared under the name of Constantine VII, of par-
ticular importance was one known by its Latin title, De administrando imperio,8 
written in 948–952.9 The work was most likely originally untitled in Greek, 
but the manuscript begins with the dedication Πρὸς τὸν ἴδιον υἱὸν ῾Ρωμανὸν τῶν 
θεοστεφῆ καὶ πορφυρογέννητον βασιλέα. This indicates that the work’s addressee 
was Constantine’s son Roman, to whom he wished to leave a set of instruc-
tions on how to conduct the affairs of the state. The work’s structure leads us 
to assume it was written in two stages and not subjected to particularly careful 
editing. This is indicated by the repetitions and conflicting dates provided for 
the same events in different parts of the text.10
Constantine VII writes extensively about the Pechenegs, mentioning them 
in seventeen chapters and providing information about their history, politi-
cal order, and relations with neighbouring groups. He writes about them in 
a matter-of-fact manner, though his writing is not devoid of the biases typi-
cal of Byzantine elites.11 He sees the Pechenegs as a potential political partner, 
a point he returns to repeatedly. The language Porphyrogenitus used in writ-
ing this work is free of archaisms, and he deliberately refrains from using a 
high style in an effort to make his message more clear.12 However, he does not 
hesitate to use foreign ethnonyms and toponyms, thanks to which his work 
has preserved individual words from the Pecheneg’s language, albeit in a cor-
rupted form.The learned emperor is also credited with writing a handbook on 
Byzantine court ceremony. The addressee of the work, whose Latin title was 
5  Lemerle 1971, 267–300; Toynbee 1973, 575–605; Hunger 1978, 361; Jurewicz 1984, 168–170; 
Kazhdan 2006, 134; Rosenqvist 2007, 74–78; Treadgold 2013, 153–165.
6  Ostrogorski 1967, 224–228, 231–232, 237–238; Runciman 1988, 47–62, 65–67, 232–234; 
Belke, Soustal 1997, 42–45; Kazhdan 2006, 133–134.
7  Krumbacher 1897, 252; Hunger 1978, 361–362.
8  DAI; Litavrin, Novosel’tsev 1989; Belke, Soustal 1997.
9  Bury 1906, 522f.; Hunger 1978, 362; Aleksei Shchavelev suggests a little later datation (after 
952 and before 959) of De administrando imperio (2019, 686–688).
10  Bury 1906; DAI-Com., 2–5; Hunger 1978, 362–363; Belke, Soustal 1997, 46–59.
11  Cf. Paroń 2005; 2007.
12  DAI I 8–15 (p. 48/49).
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De cerimoniis aulae Byzantinae, was again his son Roman, the chosen successor 
to the throne.13 We find some extremely interesting and important informa-
tion about the Pechenegs in the sections where he details the legal and politi-
cal relations between the imperial court and this nomadic folk.
Constantine VII also commissioned and oversaw the writing of a chronicle 
that a modern publisher gave the title Theophanes Continuatus. In the origi-
nal version, the work’s authors, men gathered around the Emperor, described 
themselves as Οἱ μετὰ Θεοφάνην or ‘Those after Theophanes’, which indicates 
that this work was a continuation of the Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor. 
The chronicle’s six books contain a description of events that took place 
between 813 to 963. The work is known from a version that ends in the year 
961, with the final section, covering the end of Romanos II’s reign, having been 
lost.14 This chronicle is valuable in relation to the Pechenegs because it con-
firms information contained in De administrando imperio. Moreover, the rela-
tive faithfulness to chronology typical of the chronicle genre helps in dating 
events.
Valuable information about the relationship between the Pechenegs and 
Byzantium in the first half of the tenth century is also contained in the chron-
icle of Simeon the Logothete. All we know about this author is that he was 
associated with the court in Constantinople during the times of Romanos I 
Lekapenos and Constantine VII and received the above-mentioned title from 
the latter. His work has been preserved in two editions. The first (A) was written 
before 948. Entries from it also appear in the chronicle of Leo Grammaticus. 
The second edition (B) dates back to the year 963. A close relationship has been 
demonstrated between it and the chronicle known as the Chronicle of George 
the Monk. In contrast to the followers of Theophanes and John Skylitzes, 
Symeon writes critically about the Macedonian dynasty, while the chronicler’s 
treatment of Romanos I Lekapenos is a great deal more sympathetic.15
A short reference to the Pechenegs can be also found in the writings of Leo 
the Deacon, an author born in the mid-tenth century, and who described events 
spanning the years 959–975 in ten volumes. Leo mentions the Pechenegs in a 
description of the death of the Rus’ prince Sviatoslav I Igorevich, where he 
provides a brief characterization of them.16
13  DCB I–II. Cf. Bury 1907, 209–227; Hunger 1978, 364–365; Kazhdan 2006, 135.
14  Th.Cont. Cf. Hunger 1978, 339–343; Kazhdan 2006, 137–152; Rosenqvist 2007, 71–72; 
Treadgold 2013, 188–196.
15  Sym.Magist.; LeoGram.; Georg.Mon. Cf. Hunger 1978, 354–357; Kazhdan 2006, 162–170; 
Rosenqvist 2007, 72–73; Treadgold 2013, 203–217.
16  LeoDiac. IX 12 (p. 157); Loretto, Ivanka 1961, 144, 189; Kopylenko, Siuziumov, Ivanov 
1988, 82, 214; Talbot, Sullivan 2005, 200; Hunger 1978, 367–371; Kazhdan 2006, 278–294; 
Rosenqvist 2007, 73–74; Treadgold 2013, 236–246.
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Much more information about the Pechenegs was provided by John 
Skylitzes, a Byzantine chronicler who wrote in the latter half of the eleventh 
century. He held both the high court office of curopalate (κουροπαλάτης) and 
one of the highest-ranking judicial positions in the Empire (δρουνγάριος τη̑ς 
βίγλας). This last fact indicates that he was also a lawyer. He wrote a legal trea-
tise at the behest of Alexios I Komnenos in 1092, and probably died in the 
early twelfth century. His Synopsis of Histories (Σύνοψις ἱστοριω̑ν), conceived 
as a continuation of the Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor, covers the years 
811–1057 and represents a special case of chronicle writing. While the work 
retains many features typical of the chronicle genre (especially in terms of its 
structure), it stands out from standard chronographic writing in its style and 
insightful criticism of its sources. The chronicle begins with a review of works 
devoted to the history of the Byzantine Empire, the vast majority of which 
Skylitzes felt treated their subject matter in a superficial and cursory manner. 
He then set for himself the ambitious goal of writing a textbook of history that 
would be error-free,17 a lofty aim he seems not to have realized.18 Nevertheless, 
Skylitzes’ chronicle possesses tremendous value, especially as a source on the 
history of the Pechenegs in the mid-eleventh century. Manuscripts of his work 
have survived in a version that extends to 1079. Entries from after 1057 have 
traditionally been considered to be the work of an anonymous author and 
are collectively known as the Scylitzes Continuatus. However, there is grow-
ing acceptance today of the idea that this last part of the chronicle may have 
been written by John Skylitzes as well. It too contains information about the 
Pechenegs during their turbulent presence in the Byzantine Empire.19
Michael Psellos (1018–c.1080), an eminent Byzantine statesman, provides 
a number of interesting facts in his most well-known work, usually titled by 
publishers as Chronographia.20 In its content and style it bears little resem-
blance to most chronicles, nor does it fit the definition of other genres typical 
of ancient historiography. It is rather more a kind of diary in which special 
emphasis is placed on descriptions of the achievements of the author and 
other chosen individuals, especially the Emperors, who Psellos knew person-
ally. He pays little attention to the traditional themes of historiography, such 
as wars or foreign policy. In spite of this, he does report on the course of an 
17  Io.Scyl. Cf. Hunger 1978, 389–393; Rosenqvist 2007, 107; Treadgold 2013, 329–339.
18  Krumbacher 1897, 366.
19  Scyl.Cont.
20  MichPsell.; Cf. Hunger 1978, 372–382; Mango 1980, 245–246; Rosenqvist 2007, 100–105; 
Treadgold 2013, 271–281, 289–308.
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expedition by Isaac I Komnenos against the Pechenegs during the summer 
of 1059. In the course of his account, he provides a characterization of these 
nomads which, in spite of its biases, is nonetheless extremely interesting.
Valuable information on the Pechenegs is also contained in The History 
of Michael Attaleiates (c.1028–1085), an imperial judge close to court circles, 
who held the offices of both Judge of the Hippodrome and Senator. This work, 
which describes events from 1034 to 1079/80, is written with a strong emphasis 
on the achievements of Emperor Nikephoros III Botaneiates (1078–1081), but 
it also contains much information about the nomads who had been migrating 
to the Byzantine Balkans since the mid-eleventh century.21
Also worthy of note is Material for a History (Ὕλη ἱστορίας), whose author, 
Nikephoros Bryennios (c.1062–1136/7), was an educated soldier who had an 
excellent family lineage. His father was the duke of Dyrrachion who revolted in 
1077 and was proclaimed Emperor by the army of the West. He ultimately lost 
his struggle for the throne at Constantinople and was subsequently blinded as 
punishment. The Bryennios family later returned to favour under the rule of 
Alexios I Komnenos, as evidenced by the marriage between Anna Komnena 
and the young Nikephoros in 1097. Bryennios’s historical work was conceived 
as a sort of chronicle of the Komnenos family, with a particular emphasis on 
Alexios. Its title was intended to convey the exceptional modesty of the author 
and emphasize that his primary aim was to provide source materials for future 
historians. Bryennios never finished his history, though he managed to com-
plete four books covering the period from 1070 to 1079. He based his work on a 
number of oral and written sources, ranging from the works of Michael Psellos 
and Michael Attaleiates, to accounts from those within the Komnenos court, 
which had a strong oral tradition.22 For our purposes, Bryennios’ accounts of 
the Pechenegs’ invasions of the Balkans and their involvement in conflicts 
within the Byzantine Empire in 1077 and 1078 are of particular relevance.
The work of Nikephoros Bryennios was continued by his wife, Anna 
Komnena (1083–c.1155), the oldest child of Emperor Alexios I. After the death 
of her father (1118), she attempted with the support of her mother, Empress 
Irene Dukaina, to take the throne. She ultimately lost this struggle to her main 
rival, her brother John, and was forced to leave the court and take residence 
in the Convent of Mary Full of Grace in northwestern Constantinople. She 
devoted her time there mainly to literary activity, and most likely some time 
21  Mich.Att. Cf. Hunger 1978, 382–389; Rosenqvist 2007, 106–107; Treadgold 2013, 312–329.
22  Nic.Bryenn. Cf. Hunger 1978, 394–400; Rosenqvist 2007, 127–128; Treadgold 2013, 344–354.
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around 1136 began to write The Alexiad, a historical work covering the years 
1069–1118.23
The Alexiad was based on a solid foundation of written sources. Anna 
Komnena had access to state documents, was familiar with her father’s official 
correspondence, and had read all the golden bulls and numerous treaties. She 
was also familiar with the accounts of various eye-witnesses to events. All the 
historical materials she obtained by these various means were used to achieve 
a single goal: praising the achievements of Emperor Alexios I. For this reason, 
The Alexiad reads more like an epic poem written in prose than a history writ-
ten in the same form and spirit as the works of Thucydides or Procopius of 
Caesarea. It is nevertheless of great value for studying the last period in the 
history of the Pechenegs, because it is the only source that describes in detail 
the war of 1087–1091, which immediately preceded their destruction.
Data from eleventh- and twelfth-century authors about the Pechenegs 
is confirmed and in some cases supplemented by John Zonaras’ Epitome of 
Histories (Ἐπιτομὴ ἱστοριω̑ν), which chronicled history from the creation of 
the world to the death of Alexios I Komnenos in 1118. The exact dates of the 
author’s birth and death are unknown. We know that he died as a monk in the 
mid-twelfth century. He had previously held important court functions, includ-
ing that of protoasecretis (πρωτοασηκρήτις), head of the imperial chancery. 
Unlike Anna Komnena, he did not write an encomium in praise of Alexios I, 
which thereby allows us to obtain from it a more nuanced picture of Alexios’ 
reign.24 Information about the Pechenegs is also contained in another twelfth-
century world chronicle (Βίβλος χρονική) of Michael Glykas (died c.1200), who 
like Zonaras was a court official. In his work, Glykas writes extensively about 
the steppe, though he tends to repeat information from earlier authors.25
The last mentions of the Pechenegs come from John Kinnamos (c.1143– 
c.1200) and Niketas Choniates (1155/57–1217). The first was imperial secretary 
to Emperor Manuel I Komnenos (1143–1180) and the author of a book devoted 
to the history of Byzantium from 1118 to 1176. The main protagonist in this work 
is Manuel I.26 Niketas Choniates held a number of high state offices, and at 
the height of his career, held the position of Grand Logothete and sat in the 
Senate. His political legacy, however, was less than impressive, and he seems 
not to have been a particularly influential person. The case is different with 
23  An.Kom. Cf. Buckley 2014; Hunger 1978, 400–409; Rosenqvist 2007, 128–131; Treadgold 
2013, 354–386.
24  Io.Zon.; Trapp 1986. Cf. Hunger 1978, 416–419; Rosenqvist 2007, 131–132; Treadgold 2013, 
388–399.
25  Mich.Glyc. Cf. Hunger 1978, 422–426; Rosenqvist, 2007, 134–135; Treadgold 2013, 403–407.
26  Io.Cinn.; Brand 1976; Treadgold 2013, 407–416.
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his historical writing. He is considered, alongside Anna Komnena, one of the 
greatest names in Byzantine historiography of the Komnenian era. He men-
tions the Pechenegs at the beginning of his Chronological Narrative (Χρονική 
διήγησις).27
Some very interesting data is also provided to us by Byzantine authors 
who were not concerned with historiography. A testimonial to the state of 
mind of the Byzantine elite during their conflict with Simeon I (889–927), 
ruler of Bulgaria, is found in the epistolary writings of Nicholas Mystikos, 
Patriarch of Constantinople from 901 to 907 and from 912 to 925.28 In three 
letters, he provides interesting details on the significance of the Pechenegs 
to Bulgarian-Byzantine relations and the perception of nomads by imperial 
elites.29 We can also supplement our knowledge on this last topic by read-
ing the statements of the eleventh-century rhetoricians John Mauropous 
(c.1000–c.1080),30 Metropolitan of Euchaita, and Theophylact (c.1050–after 
1126),31 archbishop of Ohrid. In a speech usually dated to April 1047, the first 
of these religious figures referred extensively to events that coincided with the 
migration of the Pechenegs (winter of 1046/47). Theophylact of Ohrid praises 
a short-lived peace concluded with the nomads by Alexios I in late 1087. A 
few, mostly harsh remarks about the Pechenegs are found in Kekaumenos’ 
Strategikon (c.1020/24–c.1080).32 In it the former Byzantine military com-
mander left practical instructions for his sons, including how to wage war 
against nomadic groups. To illustrate his recommendations, Kekaumenos uses 
campaigns carried out against the Pechenegs in the mid-eleventh century, that 
is, shortly after their arrival onto the territory of the Byzantine Empire. Finally, 
Gregorios Pakourianos, another high-ranking commander active early in the 
reign of Alexios Komnenos, wrote a typikon (a book of rules and rubrics) for a 
monastery he founded, in which he mentions his victory over the Pechenegs. 
This event is usually dated to the end of 1083.33
A great deal of extremely important information about the Pechenegs 
comes from sources in the Muslim world. The sphere of interest of these 
authors differs from that of the Byzantines described above. While the latter 
focused mainly on political events, Muslim writers devoted more attention to 
27  Nic.Chon.; Magoulias 1984. Cf. Hunger 1978, 429–441; Rosenqvist 2007, 140–143; Treadgold 
2013, 422–456.
28  Nic.Mist. Cf. Kazhdan 2006, 66–75.
29  Letters no. 9, 23 and 183.
30  Io.Maur. 182 (p. 142–147); Lefort 1976, 265. Cf. Rosenqvist 2007, 98–99.
31  Theoph.Achr. 222–227. Cf. Rosenqvist 2007, 112–113.
32  Cat.Cec. Cf. Rosenqvist 2007, 108–110.
33  Georg.Pak.; Jordan 2000, 507–563.
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issues that today we would describe as geographical and ethnographic. This 
state of affairs is beneficial for us, because it allows us to see the Pechenegs 
from a broader perspective. It also provides use with sources that come out 
of a completely unrelated literary tradition, making it possible to verify the 
Byzantine historiographic data.
The most important source of information we have on the Pechenegs is the 
so-called Anonymous Account of the Countries and Peoples of Inner Asia and 
Eastern and Central Europe. Described by Josef Marquart as the oldest known 
description of these regions of the world, the work exists but in fragmentary 
form today.34 The information it contains comes from the latter half of the 
ninth century,35 to a work considered to have been lost, The Book of Routes 
and Kingdoms, attributed to Abu Abdallah Jayhānī (al-Jayhānī), a vizier of the 
Samanid dynasty. The latest research indicates that the first edition of this work 
dates back to somewhere between 903 and 913. It is assumed, however, that 
the text was reworked between 922 and 943.36 Scattered fragments of Jayhānī’s 
work have survived to our times in scientific treatises written by Persian, 
Turkic, and Arab authors between the tenth and seventeenth centuries.37
One of these is The Book of Precious Gems, written by Abu Ali Ahmad ibn 
Umar ibn Rusta. We know little about him except that he was of Persian origin 
and lived in Isfahan. The work was written no earlier than in 903, but no later 
than in 913. Only one volume of The Book has survived to our times. Apart from 
information taken from merchants and travellers, the author also made use of 
the writings of al-Jayhānī. This treatise was to be the basis for the section of Ibn 
Rusta’s book concerning the Magyars, Khazars, Burtas, Volga-Kama Bulgars, 
and, most importantly, the Pechenegs. Unfortunately, despite the fact that the 
information from the Anonymous Account contained in the above-mentioned 
work is among the most reliable, the book’s author omits a great deal of key 
information about Turkic peoples, including the Pechenegs.38 Also belonging 
to the Jayhānī tradition is an anonymous work of geography written in 982 
entitled Regions of the World (Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam). Unfortunately, the information 
it contains poses serious interpretive challenges because the author attempted 
to update its contents by adding new information to old, often making use 
34  Marquart 1903, 24–26.
35  Marquart (1903) dated it to 874–883; Cf. Lewicki 1977, 12. Other proposals for dating 
Anonymous Account: 842–847, 870–892 or 870–895. Cf. Lewicka-Rajewska 2004, 34–35; 
Zimonyi 2016, 32.
36  Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 12–28; Zimonyi 2016, 32.
37  Lewicki 1977, 12; Lewicka-Rajewska 2004, 35; Zimonyi 2016, 18–26.
38  Lewicki 1977, 7–9; Lewicka-Rajewska 2004, 33–36; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 34–35; 
Zimonyi 2016, 18–19, 27.
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of more recent sources in the process. As a result, the information he com-
piled is often confusing.39 Almost as valuable as the information provided by 
Ibn Rusta is that contained in the chronicle of al-Gardīzī, complied between 
1050 and 1052. In the ethnographic chapter of his The Ornament of Histories, 
based on the work of al-Jayhānī, we find a whole new set of details omitted by 
Ibn Rusta concerning Turkic peoples (including the Pechenegs).40 In 1086, The 
Book of Routes and Kingdoms was completed by Abu Ubayd al-Bakri (al-Bakrī), 
a native of Andalusia and one of the most famous geographers of the Muslim 
West. It contained information on the peoples of Eastern Europe, including 
the Pechenegs, based in part on the Jayhānī tradition, but also on accounts 
taken from other, later works which have been lost.41 Finally, a great deal of 
interesting information, also taken from the work of the Samanid vizier, is pro-
vided by Sharaf al-Zamān Tāhir al-Marwazī (Marwazī) in his book The Natural 
Properties of Living Beings, written some time after 1120.42
The five sources presented above provide information mainly about the early 
history of the Pechenegs, i.e., before their migration to the Black Sea steppes. 
However, accounts exist by Muslim authors from which information about 
the Pechenegs’ later history can be extrapolated. One such work, entitled sim-
ply Kitab (Book), was written in 922 by Ahmed ibn Fadlan. Some researchers 
regard him as an Islamicized foreigner, perhaps a Greek. At the turn of 921/922, 
he was commissioned by al-Muqtadir, the Caliph of Baghdad, to undertake a 
diplomatic mission to the Volga-Kama Bulgars. His path took him through the 
Volga region, where he encountered many different Turkic peoples, among 
them some impoverished Pechenegs. Based on his observations, he produced 
a thorough description of the customs of the peoples of the steppe, including 
their lifestyle, beliefs and many other elements of nomadic culture.43 The value 
of Ibn Fadlan’s account is enhanced by the fact it was based on his personal 
experiences. Another tenth-century writer was Abu Hasan Ali ibn al-Husayn 
al-Masudi (al-Masʾūdī) (c.893–956), who was born in Baghdad and died in 
Egypt. Around 947 he wrote Meadows of Gold, which he continued to revise 
39  Minorsky 1937; Lewicki 1977, 13–14; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 35; Lewicka-Rajewska 2004, 
49–51; Zimonyi 2016, 19, 267.
40  Lewicki 1977, 14; Martinez 1982; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 36–42; Lewicka-Rajewska 2004, 
52–53; Zimonyi 2016, 19–20.
41  Кunik, Rozen 1878; Lewicki 1977, 14–15 (he dates the work somewhat earlier, to the year 
1067/8); Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 43–45; Lewicka-Rajewska 2004, Zimonyi 2016, 20–23.
42  Minorsky 1942; Lewicki 1977, 15–16; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 45–46; Lewicka-Rajewska 
2004, 54–65.
43  Ibn Fadlan, 165–169; Togan 1939, VII–XXXIV; Kovalevskii 1956; Lewicka-Rajewska 2004, 
36–39; Frye 2005, 1–21.
12 Introduction
until his death. It is a historical work containing a great deal of information 
of importance to researchers of the peoples of southern and eastern Europe, 
including the Pechenegs.44 The value of al-Masudi’s accounts, however, is lim-
ited by his tendency to often uncritically relate sensationalized information. 
Moreover, he is rather inexact in his chronology, at times providing different 
dates for the same event or simply stating that he cannot remember exactly 
when an event took place. There is also reason to suspect that al-Masudi some-
times combines several events into one. Ibrahim ibn Yaqub also makes a small 
but valuable mention of the Pechenegs, dating back to the year 965/6, when 
the author made a journey through Europe.45 Information on the culture 
and language of the Pechenegs is also provided in Compendium of the Turkic 
Dialects, written by Mahmud al-Kāshgarī, an eleventh-century Islamicized 
Turk who was an outstanding lexicographer and encyclopaedist.46 Ali ibn al-
Athir (al-Athīr, 1160–1232/3) mentions the Pechenegs several times in his The 
Complete History, a world history that dates back to 1230. The book contains 
original information on the Pechenegs in the section covering events in the 
eleventh century.47 A brief mention of the Pechenegs can be found in an exten-
sive geography compiled during the High Middle Ages by Ibn Sa ʾid al-Maghribi 
(1213–1275 or 1286), a poet, scholar, and traveller born near Grenada.48 Al-Fida 
(1273–1331), a Syrian emir from the Ayyubid dynasty, repeats almost exactly the 
same information. His work, opinions on the value of which vary, is a typical 
compilation combining older accounts with more recent ones. The credibility 
of the information about the Pechenegs provided by these last two authors 
is doubtful.49
Latin sources comprise quite a large corpus of texts containing references 
to the Pechenegs. These are mostly chronicles and gesta written by authors 
belonging to the western, Latin, part of Christianitas. In the vast majority of 
cases, these works contain only snippets. Mentions of the Pechenegs are also 
found in the Chronicle of Regino (d. 915), the abbot of the monastery in Prüm. 
The work provides an account of events spanning from creation to the year 
44  al-Masʿūdī, Les Prairies; al-Masʿūdī, Kitāb; Pellat 1962; Khalidi 1975; Swoboda 1990, 228; 
Lewicka-Rajewska 2004, 43–46; Krauss-Sánchez, Waines 2010, 1090.
45  Ibn Yaqub, 38–43; Mishin 1996, 191–199 (Mishin widens this date range somewhat and 
assumes that Ibn Jakub remained in Europe for several years – namely, between the years 
962 and 965); Lewicka-Rajewska 2004, 46–49.
46  al-Kāšgarī; Tryjarski 1993, 7–17.
47  Richards 2002.
48  Konovalova 2009, 7–75.
49  Abu-l-Fida; Gibb 1986, 118–119; Konovalova 2009, 76–166.
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906;50 however, its chronology was largely produced ex-post, leading some 
researchers to question it. Regino dates the arrival of the Pechenegs to the Black 
Sea steppes to the year 889, which evokes legitimate scepticism.51 Thietmar 
(975–1018), Bishop of Merseburg, a well-educated representative of the Saxon 
aristocracy, began writing a chronicle in the early 11th century. This work pro-
vides very valuable information on the history of Central Europe at the turn of 
the 10th and 11th centuries. Thietmar writes about the Pechenegs twice, both 
times while relating events associated with Bolesław Chrobry’s expeditions to 
Rus’ (1013, 1018).52 An extremely original and valuable account was left to us 
by St. Bruno from Querfurt, a schoolmate of Thietmar. In 1008, Bruno spent 
time with the Pechenegs as a missionary. He made a brief account of his pas-
toral work among the steppe-dwellers in his Letter to King Henry II.53 Another 
interesting reference work containing valuable information on the perception 
of nomadic people by those in the Latin world is found in the 17. scholion con-
tained in the Gesta Hamburgensis Ecclesiae Pontificum, written by the canon 
Adam of Bremen (c.1052–after 1081).54 Interesting information about the 
Pechenegs is also contained in The Life of Lietbertus, Bishop of Cambrai, written 
c.1099/1100, though there are doubts about the credibility of this source.55 Its 
author, Raoul (Rodulphus), was a monk in the abbey of the Holy Sepulcher in 
Cambrai. In 1054 he accompanied Lietbertus on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, 
during which the bishop and his companions were attacked in the Balkans 
by ‘Scythian robbers’ (latrunculi Sciticae gentis), who can be identified as 
Pechenegs. Single mentions of the Pechenegs are also found in the writings of 
Otto of Freising (c.1114–1158). They are mentioned both in his Chronicle and in 
a work completed by his pupil Rahewin, The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa.56 
A short reference to the Pechenegs is also made by Gallus Anonymus in his 
description of Bolesław Chrobry’s second expedition to Rus’.57
Among Latin sources, those written by Hungarians comprise a distinct 
group. Most of these are chronicles and gesta written during the High and 
Late Middle Ages. It is assumed, however, that despite their late date of origin, 
50  Regino, 131, 132.
51  Györffy 1975, 284–287.
52  Thietmar, VI 91 (p. 383), VIII 31–33 (pp. 529–532); cf. Holtzmann 1935; Jedlicki 1953, 
XLIX–LII.
53  Bruno, 98–100.
54  Ad.Brem., scholion 17 (p. 80).
55  V.Liet., XXXIII–XXXIV (pp. 854–855).
56  Ott.Fr., Ott.Fr.-Rah; cf. Matthews, s. 1174–1175.
57  An.Gall., I 7 (p. 23).
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they contain information taken from earlier, lost chronicle monuments.58 
Understandably, in these sources the Pechenegs are mentioned mainly in 
the context of relations between the steppe peoples and the Arpadian king-
dom. Interesting mentions of the history of the Pechenegs in the tenth cen-
tury are also provided in what is considered the oldest known Hungarian 
chronicle, the Gesta Hungarorum, produced in the first half of the thirteenth 
century. Its author is anonymous, although he describes himself as ‘P who 
is called magister, and former notary of King Béla’.59 In the 1280s, Simon of 
Kéza, chaplain to King Ladislaus IV the Cuman (1272–1290), compiled his 
own gesta. There are doubts however as to the value of the information it 
contains about the Pechenegs.60 Very valuable data, in turn, is found in the 
Hungarian Fourteenth-century Chronicle Composition. It was produced, as the 
name suggests, quite late, but the information it contains was taken from ear-
lier chronicles.61 Two chronicles were also prepared in the fourteenth century 
by Heinrich von Mügeln, an influential figure from Meissen, whose activi-
ties included not only chronicle writing, but also the composition of poetry, 
which he wrote in Middle High German. Both of the above chronicles pro-
vide information on the history of the Pechenegs in the 11th century, although 
these are usually things already known from other sources.62 An abundance 
of information regarding the Pechenegs is contained in the chronicle of 
Johannes de Thurocz (János Thuróczy, c.1435–c.1489).63 The author, however, 
generally repeats information found in earlier sources, especially the Chronicle 
Composition. Individual mentions of the Pechenegs are also contained in 
Hungarian works of hagiography, with valuable information being found in 
both versions of The Legend of King Saint Stephen.64
It is hard to overestimate the value of the information found in Rus’ chron-
icles for the study of the history and culture of the peoples of the steppe. 
The earliest information about the Pechenegs is contained in The Primary 
Chronicle (also known as Tale of Bygone Years), generally considered the oldest 
chronicle of ancient Rus’. The original manuscript has not been preserved, but 
its contents are known from later codices, the oldest of which dates back to the 
1370s. The authorship of The Tale is usually attributed to Nestor, a monk of the 
Kiev Pechersk Lavra who is said to have written the initial part of the chronical 
58  Spychała 2011, 21–33 (includes an extensive bibliographic reference guide).
59  G.Ung; cf. Veszprémy 2010, 102.
60  Sim.Kéza; cf. Veszprémy 2010a, 1362–1363.
61  Chr.Hung.; cf. Spychała 2010, 348.
62  Chr.Müg.; Chr.Ryth.Müg.; cf. Kottmann 2010, 761.
63  Joh.Thur.; cf. Kopár 2010, 1429–1430.
64  Leg.St.
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compilation between 1113 and 1116. Some scholars, however, assume that the 
oldest entries in the work were made as early as the 1070s. Nestor probably also 
had continuators who complemented and revised parts of the work. Entries 
in the Primary Chronicle date back to 1117, with the Pechenegs appearing regu-
larly throughout the book (the last entry dedicated to them is found under the 
year 1116).65 The Hypatian Chronicle comprises a form of continuation of the 
Primary Chronicle. Its second part, known to researchers as the Kiev Chronicle, 
covers the years 1118–1199. In it, we find information about the late history of 
the Pechenegs, primarily their presence in Rus’ as part of the Cherni Klobuci 
union.66 Another important source is the Novgorodian First Chronicle,67 whose 
data sometimes supplements information from the Primary Chronicle. It is 
based on the annual records from Veliki Novgorod (Novgorod the Great) com-
piled between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries. Significantly less important 
for our purposes are statements contained in the Nikon Chronicle. It was com-
piled later (in the sixteenth century) and the credibility of the information it 
contains has been questioned by contemporary scholars.68
Important information about the Pechenegs is also contained in two chron-
icles written within the milieu of Middle Eastern Christians. The first of these 
is a work by Matthew of Edessa (Uṛha) (c.1070–c.1137), an Armenian who lived 
in northern Syria. The chronicle covers the years 952–1129. After the author’s 
death, additional entries up to 1162/63 were added by an otherwise unknown 
monk named George. Also worthy of note is information provided by Matthew 
from Edessa regarding the history of the Pechenegs in the eleventh century.69 
Other interesting information is found in a historical work by Michael the 
Syrian (1126–1199), patriarch of the Jacobite Church. He produced a compre-
hensive chronicle of the world dating down to 1195, written in the Syriac lan-
guage. The data of interested to us in this work concerns the late period of the 
Pechenegs’ history.70
Their turbulent history also left traces in extant copies of some very exotic 
ancient writings. Of the greatest relevance is a short mention in a Tibetan 
manuscript addressed to the ruler of the Uyghurs. This text is a kind of report 
whose five authors provide information about the peoples and kingdoms of 
the north. They briefly mention the Be-ča-nag people, who are in conflict with 
the ‘Hor state’, meaning the Uyghurs. This information, dated to the latter half 
65  PVL.; cf. Sielicki 1968; Gippius 2010a, 1228–1229; Wójcicka 2010, 108–131.
66  Ip.Let.; cf. Wójcicka 2010, 131.
67  NPL.; cf. Guimon 2010, 1158–1159.
68  PNL; cf. Gippius 2010, 1150; Melnyk 2013, 151–158.
69  Mat.Ed.; cf. Dostourian 1993; Andrews 2010, 1091; 2017, 1–45.
70  Mich.Syr.; cf. Weltecke 2010, 1110–1111.
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of the eighth century, is the oldest known reference to the Pechenegs.71 Quite 
laconic, but valuable information on them is also contained in Khazar docu-
ments written in Hebrew. These were discovered at the end of the nineteenth 
century in the Genizah of the Ben Ezra Synagogue in Cairo. We have Norman 
Golb and Omeljan Pritsak to thank for the detailed analyses they carried out 
on these texts.72
2 Archaeological Sources
Archaeological sources are of particular importance for learning more about 
the material culture of nomads. They provide data on a mass scale, which the-
oretically allows for more a precise picture of the processes that took place 
within a given steppe community, e.g. the cultural and social changes affect-
ing it and its migration patterns. Several key factors, however, provide cause 
for researchers to dampen their enthusiasm. First, what we know about the 
vast majority of Eurasian nomadic cultures comes from analyses of burial sites. 
The specific nature of such material compels scholars to ask themselves how 
it reflects on the nomads’ cultural universe as a whole and the changes that 
took place within it. It is known that some elements of a funeral ritual typical 
for a given community could persist even after it had adopted a semi-settled or 
settled lifestyle.73 In recent decades there has been a significant increase in the 
amount of archaeological material attributed to the Pechenegs. In the area of 
the Black Sea-Caspian steppes, from the Emba River to the lower Danube, sev-
eral hundred locations have been discovered containing nomadic burial sites 
that are believed to belong to the Pechenegs.74 It is impossible to provide an 
exact number not only because of the dispersed nature of the research (con-
ducted by researchers from several countries, ranging from Kazakhstan to the 
71  Bacot 1956, 137–153; Clauson 1957, 11–24; Senga 1992, 504.
72  Golb, Pritsak 1982; 1997.
73  Cf. I. Melyukova’s comments on changes in the burial traditions of the Scythians: 
Melyukova 1990, 109–110.
74  A large part of these are so-called ‘secondary’ graves, dug into the embankments of earlier 
burial mounds (kurgans). Occasionally, several such graves are discovered on one site. Cf. 
Garustovich, Ivanov, 2001, 128–131 (maps), 162–209 (other previously unpublished archae-
ological finds are also discussed here). Other archaeological studies in which informa-
tion can be found on the Pechenegs include: Bálint 1989, 71–73, 142–144; Fedorov-Davydov 
1966, 134–144; Diaconu 1970; Dobroliubskii 1986, 47–61; Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 9–38; 
Pletneva 1958, 153–226; 1973; 1981, 213–223; 1982, 23–26, 61–64, 134–135; 1988, 35–46; 1990; 
Spinei 1986, 84–91, 100–104; Bisembaev 2003, 73–120; Kruglov 2003, 13–82; Postică 2007, 
Atavin 2008, 71–107; Ioniţă 2010, 115–134; 2013, 115–150.
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Republic of Moldova and Romania), but also due to serious challenges faced 
by researchers trying to accurately date a given find and determine its ethnic 
origin. In this archaeological material, it is particularly difficult to distinguish 
those items belonging to the Pechenegs from those close belonging to the cul-
turally similar Oghuz (Uz) people.75 Another problematic phenomenon is the 
archaeological invisibility of the Pechenegs in the Balkans. There is no doubt 
that a very large group of Pechenegs, most likely the core of the ethnos, moved 
into this region in the mid-11th century. Yet there are only faint archaeological 
traces of the former presence of these steppe dwellers in today’s Dobrudja and 
north-eastern Bulgaria.76
Despite these reservations, it is impossible to recreate a picture of the 
Pechenegs’ culture and to define their place on the cultural and political land-
scape of Europe without taking into account archaeology.
3 The State of Research. Proposed Research Procedure
Both a great deal and very little has been written about the Pechenegs. This 
paradox is due in part to the nature of steppe dwellers themselves. An eth-
nos which in its history travelled from today’s eastern Kazakhstan, through the 
Volga region and the Black Sea steppes to the Balkans and Pannonia by neces-
sity must have come into contact with many communities and written itself 
into their histories. This means that the author of every major study devoted 
to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe in the tenth and eleventh cen-
turies had to mention the Pechenegs. Every study dealing with the Khazar 
Khaganate Byzantium, Rus’, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and even Poland in 
the above-mentioned period had to contain more or less extensive mentions 
of them. A similar state of affairs makes it nearly impossible to carry out a 
detailed overview of studies made on the Pechenegs by modern and ancient 
scholars. Such an endeavour would require writing a thick monograph dedi-
cated solely to this topic. Such an enterprise would be pointless, as well, since 
75  Some researchers do not even attempt to define this precisely. See Dobroliubskii 1986. The 
author is willing to state that the nomadic archaeological finds discovered in the western 
part of the Black Sea steppes and dated to the end of the ninth to the twelfth centuries are 
Pecheneg-Uz, although both peoples had been separate ethnic and political groupings for 
most of their history. The same applies to: Bisembaev 2003; Atavin 2008.
76  Until recently, archaeological evidence for the presence of the Pechenegs south of the 
Danube was a cemetery attributed to them in Odărci. Dončeva-Petkova 2005; 2007, 643–
660. Today, however, the connections between this necropolis and the Pecheneg people 
are questioned. Cf. Curta 2013, 143–202; Fiedler 2013, 249–285.
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in the vast majority of such studies, the Pechenegs feature as a subject of minor 
importance in comparison to the primary topic of discussion. Far fewer works 
deal with them extensively. If we put aside a few short encyclopaedias and few 
book chapters, we can say that in modern-day research, just three (sic!) studies 
have been written in which the authors attempted to present a comprehensive 
profile of the Pechenegs’ history and culture.
Nearly 80 years ago, a monograph titled History of the Pechenegs was pub-
lished by the Turkish scholar Akdes Nimet Kurat.77 The contents of the study 
corresponded to the title. In ten chapters, the scholar described the history of 
the Pechenegs, starting from their presence in the Volga region to their defeat 
in the Battle of Lebounion, which ended their existence as an independent 
people. The researcher made use of almost no archaeological materials, bas-
ing his considerations mainly on written sources. For understandable reasons, 
Kurat’s study is no longer of much relevance to scholars. Moreover, having 
been written in Turkish, it was never readily available to a wider public.
Forty years later, a monograph devoted to the Pechenegs was published by 
Professor Edward Tryjarski, a long-time employee of the Institute of the History 
of Material Culture of the Polish Academy of Sciences (now the Institute of 
Archaeology and Ethnology of the Polish Academy of Sciences).78 Although 
this eminent Polish Turkologist did not completely ignore the history of the 
steppe dwellers, his primary focus was on presenting particular aspects of 
their culture. He did so against the broad comparative canvas of the cultures 
of other Turkic Eurasian peoples. He also devoted a separate chapter to the 
relations between the Pechenegs and Poland. Though written in a language 
not commonly used in academia, Edward Tryjarski’s study remains a basic ref-
erence work widely cited in studies devoted to nomadic peoples.
In the last years of the twentieth century, Victor Spinei wrote an extensive 
chapter on the Pechenegs that was included in a book devoted to the migra-
tion of nomadic peoples in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.79 The eminent 
Romanian historian and archaeologist used a method of presentation similar 
to Tryjarski’s, with the main difference being that he described elements of 
both the culture and history of the Pechenegs to an equal degree.
In addition to the work of the three researchers mentioned above, there are 
quite a few studies by historians, archaeologists, and oriental philologists that 
77  Kurat 1937.
78  Tryjarski 1975a, 479–625.
79  Spinei 1999, 88–151; 2003, 93–159.
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have focused on a selected part of the history of the Pechenegs or a specific 
aspect of their culture.80
Of all the research methods presented above, I consider those used by 
Edward Tryjarski and Victor Spinei to be the closest to my own. Like both of 
these scholars, I intend to make a full characterization of the history of the 
Pechenegs, while at the same time reproducing an image of their culture, and 
especially those elements that most strongly determined the relationship of 
these nomads with the outside world. The nomadic lifestyle and the cultural 
patterns that grew out of it, on one hand, shaped the perception of steppe 
dwellers by their settled neighbours, while, on the other, they also defined the 
true needs and behaviours of nomads in their dealings with outsiders. It is 
within the very specific cultural universe of steppe dwellers, one that arose out 
of a need to adapt to very specific natural conditions, that one finds the guid-
ing forces which shaped their attitudes towards neighbouring communities.
This book consists of three parts. Chapters one to three are introductory. 
They show the natural conditions in which nomads lived, the history of the 
Black Sea and Caspian steppes before the arrival of the Pechenegs, and the 
earliest history of this ethnos. The second part is an extensive chapter four, 
devoted to the main elements of steppe culture. This break in my historical 
discourse to reflect upon the structures and forms of Pecheneg life is justified 
by the previously mentioned fact that these structures to a large extent deter-
mined the relations between these nomads and the outside world. The third 
part, which also includes three chapters, contains reflections on the politi-
cal history of the Pechenegs and their place in the political balance of power 
that prevailed in Eastern Europe. The material in chapter seven describes the 
Pechenegs’ situation after they started living on the territories of the states 
neighbouring the steppe. It shows how the survival strategies adopted by par-
ticular nomadic groups differed in fundamental ways, although these strate-
gies generally led them towards acculturation and ultimately resulted in the 
disappearance of their former nomadic values and means of existence.
80  Early history of the Pechenegs: Senga 1992, 503–516; Romashov 1999, 21–35; Zimonyi 
2013, 99–113. Pechenegs and Byzantines: Vasil’evskii 1908, 1–175; Malamut 1995, 105–147; 
Kniaz’kii 2003; Dudek 2007a, 83–124; Meško 2012; 2013, 179–205. Pechenegs on the lower 
Danube: Diaconu 1970; 1975, 235–240; Mănucu-Adameştanu 2001, 87–112. Pechenegs and 
Bulgaria: Bozhilov 1973, 37–62; Dimitrov 2011, 195–247. Pechenegs in Hungary: Györffy 
1990, 94–191; Göckenjan 1972, 89–114; Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 7–38. Pechenegs and Rus’: 
Golubovskii 1884; Rasovskii 1933, 1–66; Mavrodina 1983; Tolochko 1999, 53–79; Morgunov 
2010, 62–75. On the language of the Pechenegs: Németh 1921–25, 219–225; 1930, 27–34; 
1932; 1971, 1–51; Menges 1944–45, 256–280; Shcherbak 1959, 362–389; Vörös 2002, 617–631.
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chapter 1
Black Sea-Caspian Steppe: Natural Conditions
I shall begin with a description of the natural conditions of the Black Sea- 
Caspian steppe for reasons other than merely fulfilling expectations about 
what a typical academic monograph should contain. Geographical factors have 
been determinants in the development of all human societies – both those in 
the past and those of today – and steppe-dwellers are certainly no exception. 
This does not mean, however, that I promote the notion of geographical deter-
minism or assume that the history of a particular community is a priori deter-
mined by the natural conditions of the area(s) where it resides.
Yet in this respect the case of nomads of the steppes of Northern Eurasia is 
a special one. Their existence was closely linked to a unique geographical envi-
ronment, and it was changes to this environment caused by anthropogenic fac-
tors that resulted in the disappearance of nomadic communities in Europe in 
the early 19th century. From at least the beginning of the first millennium BCE, 
up until the late eighteenth century, when the western extremes of the Great 
Steppe came under the political domination of the Russian Empire, this region 
was the shared home of often quite diverse nomadic communities. Today, the 
term ‘steppe’ applies to the lands north of the Black and Caspian Seas more 
in historical terms than in relation to their physical geography. This region’s 
steppe and forest steppe zones have been subjected to the most far-reaching 
anthropogenic change of all the biomes in Northern Eurasia. It is estimated 
that more than 60 percent of the steppe area in Europe has been converted 
into arable land. The natural forests in the forest-steppe zone have been 
almost completely eliminated. With the exception of small areas that have 
been turned into nature reserves (e.g., the Askania-Nova biosphere reserve in 
Ukraine), the biogeography of the European steppe and forest steppe zones is 
therefore more cultural than natural in character. The Asian part of the zone 
has been less affected by anthropogenic change. However, here too, mainly 
in western Kazakhstan and southern Siberia, there were intensive efforts in 
the 1950s to develop ‘virgin lands’ into cultivated fields, which fundamentally 
changed the region’s natural landscape.1
It is therefore necessary to provide here a general characterization of the 
natural environment typical of nomads and how it determines the culture 
specific to these communities and the lifestyle associated with it. It is also 
1 Chibilyov 2002, 248, 258–60; Makohonienko 2011, 24.
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necessary to recall descriptions of the Black Sea-Caspian steppe written over 
23 centuries (from the 5th century BCE to the late 18th century CE). These 
authors immortalized the landscape of steppelands that today no longer exist.
1.1 The Great Steppe. General Comments
A vast steppe once stretched across the interior of the Eurasian continent, 
from the northern shores of the Black Sea to Manchuria. Its northern bound-
ary was a humid forest steppe zone that separated it from a long, continuous 
belt of deciduous and mixed forests farther north. The steppe ran from the 
Hungarian Plain in the west through the northern regions of today’s Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan to the southern ends of the Western Siberian Highlands and 
Mongolia.2 To the south, it was bordered by a belt of semi-arid steppe with short, 
dry grass or semi-desert features. In the west, this semi-arid belt extended from 
the Caspian Plain and to the plains of Xinjiang and Gansu, reaching southern 
and north-western Mongolia. Both transitional belts combine the natural con-
ditions of the zones they separate.3 The steppe zone, despite the fact that it 
stretches over such a large area, is characterized by its relative homogeneity. 
It has a continental climate with cold winters and quite long and hot sum-
mers. The average January temperature varies between -12° and -23°C.4 The 
eastern part of the steppe is markedly colder. In the coldest parts of Mongolia, 
the average temperature in January, as measured in Ulan Bator, is -27°C. From 
October to March the average temperatures are always negative.5 In July, the 
average temperature of the steppe zone remains in a range from 19 to 24°C. It 
should be noted, however, that summer is much longer in the European part 
of the zone.6
Average precipitation in the steppe ranges from 250 to 500 mm, which, 
due to a relatively high degree of evaporation, results in a humidity deficit. 
However, major rivers largely satisfy the ecosystem’s need for water, especially 
in the western part of the steppe.7
2 Taaffe 1990, 33; Chibilyov 2002, 248.
3 Taaffe 1990, 34; Cf. Chibilyov 2002, 248–9.
4 Taaffe 1990, 35; Chibilyov 2002, 248–9.
5 Taaffe 1990, 35.
6 Taaffe 1990, 35.
7 Taaffe 1990, 35; Makohonienko 2011, 24, 26–27. In the western part precipitation is more 
abundant and the growing season is longer (about 190 days, compared to 160–175 days in the 
east).
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The predominant soil types are black and chestnut soils, on which under 
natural conditions various types of grasses usually grow, in particular, ‘ostrich 
grasses’ (Stipa). These are an excellent source of feed for animals.8 However, 
the steppe is not completely devoid of trees. In fact, although they are quite 
rare in the watershed, in areas with higher humidity (river valleys, topograph-
ical depressions, ravines) a number of species can be found, including oak, 
linden, maple, ash, elm, poplar, alder, fir, and birch. The composition of for-
ests changes as you move from west to east. Oaks are typical for the European 
steppe, while east of the Urals, birch, poplar, aspen, and fir dominate. A typi-
cal feature of steppe flora is the presence of shrubs, including dwarf cherry 
(Prunus fruticosa), blackthorn (Prunus spinosa), almond trees, Siberian pea-
shrub (Caragana arborescens), Spiraea, and wild roses.9
Most species of steppe fauna are distributed over a number of differ-
ent zones, and thus, there are far fewer species endemic to the steppe than 
to forest and desert areas. This is due to the wide variety of steppe habitats, 
which range from marshes to semi-deserts and from forests to sandy and rocky 
steppe. The animal population of the steppe is also highly varied, both in terms 
of the number of species and the natural variation among individuals within a 
given species. Ungulates and rodents dominate among vertebrates. The steppe 
was once home to herds of ungulates capable of travelling across large areas in 
search of food (e.g., the Saiga antelope, a species typical of the southern Urals 
and Kazakh steppes). Wild horses and kulans (a species of asiatic wild ass) 
also lived in large herds, usually numbering 50–100 individuals. As a result of 
human activity, most ungulates had disappeared from the steppe by the begin-
ning of the 19th century. Today rodents are dominant among steppe mammals, 
most of which live underground in colonies, allowing them to move about eas-
ily over a fairly large area.10
The Great Steppe is characterized by a relative lack of contours in its terrain 
relief. The mountain ranges occurring here mostly run parallel to one another 
(Altai, Tien-Shan).11 An exception are the Urals, whose northern ranges, which 
extend beyond the steppe, are both very high and relatively inaccessible.12 
The area of greatest interest to us is a vast, expansive plain with by a relatively 
monotonous landscape.13 This lack of surface features facilitated both the 
8  Taaffe 1990, 36; Zamotaev 2002, 114–117; Chibilyov 2002, 248, 249–251; Makohonienko 2011, 
28–31.
9  Chibilyov 2002, 256–7; Makohonienko 2011, 24.
10  Chibilyov 2002, 257–258.
11  Shahgedanova, Mikhailov, Larin, Bredikhin 2002, 314–319; Merzlyakovan 2002, 377–381.
12  Shahgedanova, Perov, Mudrov 2002, 287–290.
13  Taaffe 2002, 37.
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migration of nomads and the creation of huge steppe empires, which some-
times spanned the entire European continent.
1.2 Black Sea-Caspian Steppe. Physical Geography
Of particular importance for our considerations are the western regions of the 
Great Steppe, stretching from the Volga region to the lower Danube and along 
the arching belt of the Carpathian Mountains. This is where the best docu-
mented and most important events in the history of the Pechenegs took place.
At the easternmost extreme of this geographical area is the Volga region, 
which straddles both sides of the Volga River. In terms of its natural conditions, 
the region can be divided into three distinct zones: forests, forest-steppe, and 
steppe. The first of these zones stretches to the Kama estuary on the left bank 
of the Volga (the Transvolga), and on the right bank includes the areas between 
two of the Volga’s tributaries: the Sura and the Sviiaga. In terms of topogra-
phy, it is a flat lowland dominated by alluvial and sandy soils, though marshes 
and peat bogs are also common. Bordered to the north by the Northern Ridge 
(Northern Uvaly) and extending southward is the marl and limestone Viatka 
Upland, which is a drainage basins for this right-bank tributary of the Kama. 
The Volga Valley, lying south of where Nizhny Novgorod is located today, con-
tains the forest-steppe zones of the Volga region. On the right bank of the 
Volga the Volga Upland extends southwards across the forest steppe, dropping 
steeply towards the Volga and forming cliffs along its bank. The Volga Upland 
has a more humid climate and contains a wide variety of soils. It is dominated 
by deciduous forests. The left bank of the Volga is low and flat like the river’s 
northern section. On the lowlands of this side of the river, forests are found 
only in the north. The climate here is much drier, and the area is predomi-
nantly steppe. South of the Penza-Kuibyshev line lies the Volga Steppe, which 
becomes a semi-arid plain as it gently descends towards the Caspian Sea. The 
Caspian Plain is an undifferentiated flat plain covered with a layer of marine 
sediments. The Volga, which is the axis of the geographical region below the 
Kama estuary (near today’s Kazan), reaches a width of 2–4 km. However, dur-
ing spring floods it sometimes spills over onto an area extending out 20–40 km. 
The Akhtuba, a branch of the Volga that splits from it near Volgograd, 500 km 
from its mouth, follows a separate course into the Caspian Sea. The Volga Delta 
is among the world’s richest areas in terms of fish stocks.
The climate of the Volga region is distinctly continental. Tens and even 
hundreds of square kilometres of the Caspian Sea are ice-covered in winter. 
In the southern part of the region, winters last three months and summers are 
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generally hot. Precipitation decreases as one moves south (from 500 mm to 
150 mm in Astrakhan). Rainfall is most abundant in summer, while in winter in 
the extreme south there is sometimes a complete lack of snow cover. So-called 
‘dry winds’ (sukhovei) and ‘dry fogs’ are both common, with the latter occur-
ring most often in July.
Both of these atmospheric phenomena have a lethal effect on vegetation, 
which varies significantly throughout the Volga region. The northern area 
reaches into the taiga zone, which is covered in coniferous forests dominated 
by spruce. More to the south, the taiga transitions to mixed forests (spruce, 
oak). In the central Volga region’s forest-steppe zone, deciduous forests (oak 
mixed with linden) occur alternately with steppe vegetation. In the lower 
part of the region, various types of forest are found, depending on the soil. 
Where black soils dominate, feather grass (Stipa) grows, chestnut soils cover 
the ‘wormwood steppe’, and finally, the southernmost areas with their loamy-
sandy soils are classified as solonchak steppe. Vegetation is sparse, and both 
salt lakes and loose sands can be found here. From the latter, blowing winds 
form crescent-faced barkhan dunes. In the Caspian Lowland, semi-arid areas 
begin to appear.14
To the west of the Volga region, along the central course of the Don on the 
river’s right bank is a plateau called the Donets Upland. Its north-western 
extreme borders the Central Russian Upland, while in the southeast it reaches 
the area where the Don Valley nears the Volga. The plateau is made up of lime-
stone and sandstone, and is crossed by deep river valleys and balkas (arroyos), 
and by wide, gently sloping valleys, which were most likely once river channels. 
At higher elevations in the steppe of the Donets Upland both individual and 
clusters of kurgans are found.15 South of the lower reaches of the Don, start-
ing from where the river makes a sharp turn to the south-west, the Zadonets 
Steppe begins. The course of the rivers in this lowland area is rather slow, and 
its valleys sometimes contain brackish lakes. Almost all of these rivers feed 
into the Don River system, in which the water levels are generally low outside 
of the spring season. The Don flows into the Sea of Azov through a delta that 
extends out as the water nears Taganrog Bay. The lower reaches of the Don, 
like the bay itself, abound in fish.16 The Zadonets Steppe is dominated by black 
earth and chestnut soils, and frequently occurring solonchak steppe, which 
makes this region in terms of its natural conditions, a transition area to the 
Caspian Lowland, which neighbours it to the east. The climate has continental 
14  Czefranow 1953, 158–165.
15  Cf. below the accounts of William of Rubruck and Jan Potocki.
16  Cf. below the observations of Strabon and Rubruck.
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characteristics: average annual precipitation in the western part of the steppe 
is 400 mm, while in the eastern part it is 300 mm. Rainfall occurs mainly in 
the summer in the form of violent torrential rains. In the spring and summer, 
the Zadonets Steppe is subject to dry wind (sukhovei) from the west, and in the 
winter it is prone to blizzards and snow storms. The vegetation is dominated by 
steppe grasses, while forested areas occur very rarely, mainly in river valleys.17
The North Caucasus is a geographical region located south of the Zadonets 
Steppe and the Caspian Lowland. Its central part consists of an upland area 
(Stavropolskaia Upland) that divides the region into a western half, with natu-
ral conditions similar to the Black Sea steppe, and an eastern half, resembling 
the steppes and deserts near the Caspian Sea. The North Caucasus abounds 
in rivers, the largest of which, the Kuban River, drains into the Black Sea; the 
smaller Terek River originates in the Caucasus Mountains and flows into the 
Caspian Sea drainage basin. In the lower reaches of the river, there is a dense 
network of lakes. The climate here is continental, with short but harsh win-
ters (from -20 to -25°C), and spring arriving in late February, quickly followed 
by a hot summer. Precipitation increases from east to west and from north to 
south as we approach the Caucasus Mountains. Most of the North Caucasus 
is steppe. Trees (mainly deciduous) and shrubs grow only in river valleys. The 
western area, where black earth dominates, is largely feather-grass steppe, 
while the east contains salt and wormwood steppe, though loose sands are 
also commonly found. In this part of the North Caucasus one also finds bitter- 
salt lakes.18
The central part of today’s Ukraine is occupied by the Black Sea Plate 
(Ukrainian Plate), stretching from the northwest to the southeast. At its west-
ern extreme it reaches a height of 470 m above sea level. It gradually falls as one 
moves eastward, reaching its lowest point in the Lower Dnieper region, where 
it splits into the Ukrainian Plate (proper) in the west, and the Azov Massif in 
the east. In the north, the plate falls steeply towards the Polesie Lowland, while 
in the east it is bordered by the Donets Upland. The western part is comprised 
of crystalline rock (granite) covered on watersheds with younger sediments. In 
some places the rivers cut into the hard ground, forming canyon-like ravines, 
while in others, they course through crystalline rocks (the Boh,19 Dnieper), 
17  Czefranow 1953, 137–138.
18  Czefranow 1953, 141–143.
19  This river is also called ‘Southern Bug’ or ‘Southern Buh’. I will use the name ‘Boh’ to dis-
tinguish it from the Western Bug, a tributary of Narew River. The latter one is called ‘Bug’ 
in this study.
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creating foaming rapids (porohi) that break the water’s smooth surface.20 The 
landscape here is interspersed with numerous ravines. The eastern part of the 
Black Sea Plate gently transitions into the Dnieper Lowland, which is an unvar-
iegated, flat plain covered with loess and dotted with shallow depressions that 
hold water for long periods in the spring. The river valleys here have uneven 
slopes, with one rising steeply and the other ascending gently towards the 
watershed. The course of the rivers is relatively slow and calm. In spring, due 
to the rapid melting of snow, they spill over onto large areas, only to have the 
riverbed narrow again significantly in the summer. In the south, the Black Sea 
Plate gradually slopes towards the Black Sea Lowland, which stretches along 
the northern coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and is crossed by 
numerous river valleys and dry balkas. The seacoast, toward which the low-
land gradually falls, is often steep, worn down and broken up by wave action. 
The Black Sea Lowland is supplied with water mainly by the Dnieper, Boh and 
Dniester Rivers. Their estuaries take the form of a liman, separated from the 
open sea by sand bars.
The climate in the region is continental, as in the neighbouring regions 
described above. However, the level of variation is much less distinct. The 
areas to the east of the Dnieper are cooler, although thaws occur here during 
the winter. Summer, especially in the south, is hot, while autumn is dry with 
long periods of beautiful weather. In the west, spring arrives earlier and is lon-
ger and warmer. In the south, the steppelands often suffer periods of drought. 
The lack of mountain barriers to protect against the influx of cold arctic air 
makes the winters throughout the region very cold.21 On the north-western 
coast of the Black Sea, in the environs of Odessa, the temperature drops to 
–30°C. The cold makes the sea freeze, even as far as a few kilometres out from 
the shore. The same is true of the lower reaches of the rivers flowing into it.22
In terms of vegetation, Eastern Europe includes three zones: forest, forest-
steppe and steppe. The first of these zones extends south to a line formed by 
the cities Rivne – Zhitomyr – Kiev – Konotop – Briansk – Tula.23 Deciduous 
trees dominate here, including oak, maple, ash, and linden, as well as horn-
beam in the west. The area’s wetlands are predominantly reed marshes 
dotted with numerous clumps of shrubby vegetation. To the south is the forest-
steppe zone, with its border formed by the line running through Chișinău – 
20  Hess, Rychławski 1967, 81. Cf. below the accounts of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, 
Erich Lassota von Steblau and Guillaume Levasseur de Beauplan.
21  Cf. below the accounts of Herodotus, Pseudo-Hippocates and Beauplan.
22  Cf. the accounts of Herodotus, Strabon and Giovanni da Pian del Carpine.
23  Szymański 1973, 25.
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Pervomaisk – Poltava – Chuhuiv – Pavlovsk.24 Deciduous forests grow here 
mainly on the high banks of the rivers, while the watersheds are dominated by 
steppe vegetation, mainly feather-grass steppe, typical of the local black earths. 
Characteristic of this area are river valleys known as levady, densely populated 
with alder, willow, sallow, and poplar. They are surrounded by lowlands and 
riverbanks that overflow in the spring, as well as oxbow lakes with backwa-
ters and lakes scattered among them. In the southernmost belt, feather-grass 
steppe dominates.25
Crimea is connected to the continent through the Isthmus of Perekop. 
Its eastern end, the Kerch Peninsula, and the Taman Peninsula across from 
it divide the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, which are linked by the Strait of 
Kerch. Almost the entire northern and north-eastern coast of the Crimea, as 
well as the continental coast across from it, are dotted with a complex network 
of shallow bays, low-lying spits, limans and straits. The area is known as the 
Sivash (Rotten Sea). It is separated from the Sea of Azov by a sandy spit which 
is joined to the continent in the north. The steppe occupies 75% of the pen-
insula, and in terms of natural conditions resembles the Black Sea Lowland. 
The Crimean steppe is generally level, rising slightly toward the south, and is 
almost completely devoid of water. In the summer, the mountain-fed Salhir, 
the largest river on the peninsula, does not even reach the Sivash, where it 
has its mouth in other seasons. The water deficit is lessened in part by ponds 
formed from melting snow. To the south of the steppe, a small strip of land 
130 km long and 50 km wide is occupied by a line of mountains, extending 
to the southwest and the northeast. The limestone slopes of the Crimean 
Mountains fall gently to the north and rise steeply to the south. The ridge of the 
main range comprises a curving, grassy area, whose width varies from several 
dozen meters to 7 km. The provide summer pasture grounds known as yayla, 
which can also refer to the entire mountain range. The Crimea Mountains do 
not reach even 1500 m at their highest point. The mountain slopes are covered 
with dense forests, with beech trees predominating on the northern slopes, 
mixed forests dominating on the southern slopes (mainly oak and dogwood 
(Cornus) in the understorey), and pine forests at higher elevations. The flora 
growing on the yayla are a combination of steppe species (ostrich grasses) 
and high mountain vegetation (Crimean Edelweiss). The individual ranges 
are broken up by lowlands, which makes it easier to cross the mountains to 
reach the coast. On the southern coast of the Crimea, a narrow strip of land 
(2–8 km) separates the mountains from the sea. In terms of climate and 
24  Szymański 1973, 25.
25  Szymański 1973, 26; Hess, Rychławski 1967, 81–82.
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vegetation, it differs significantly from the rest of the peninsula, bearing a 
closer resemblance to Mediterranean regions. Winters in the south of Crimea 
are mild and rainy, with the temperature in January averaging 4°C. Some snow-
fall occurs, but it melts quickly. Summers are hot and dry.26
West of the Black Sea Plate is a fairly high elevated plateau, extending from 
the Dniester to the Prut in the west. This is the Moldavian Plateau (Pokutian-
Bessarabian Upland), which slopes downward to the north and south. In the 
north it becomes a hilly, treeless lowland with black earth, forming an exten-
sion of the Black Sea Plate. In southern Bessarabia it turns to steppe. The 
climate of this geographical region is relatively mild, with only the southern 
regions showing continental influences. In the highlands, the average temper-
ature in January varies from –2 to 4°C, while in July it ranges from 20 to 22°C. In 
the spring, the area is plagued by cold northern winds that bring late frosts. The 
vegetation of Bessarabia consists mainly of oak and hornbeam forests, though 
steppe flora is found in its southern parts.27
In general, the natural conditions of the areas along the lower Danube (espe-
cially Dobrudja) display a great deal of similarities with those of the steppe 
zone. These include a continental climate, and a topography and vegetation 
typical of the steppe.
1.3 The Landscape of the Black Sea-Caspian Steppe in the Accounts of 
Travellers and Geographers. From Herodotus to Jan Potocki
The earliest fully preserved description of the Black Sea steppe dates back to 
the middle of the 5th century BCE. Its author is Herodotus from Halicarnassus. 
His description is part of an extensive ethnographic excursus devoted to the 
Scythians, who inhabited the region in question at the time. The author pro-
vides a relatively precise description of the boundaries of their lands, indicating 
which of the peoples north of the Black Sea should be regarded as Scythians. 
The Scythia of Herodotus was square in shape. Its western side was the lower 
Danube, which, according to the Greek historian, flowed in its final section 
not from west to east, but from north to south, ending in an estuary in the 
Euxine Sea (Black Sea). Its shoreline formed its southern boundary, while ‘the 
Maeotis’, i.e. the Sea of Azov, and the ‘Tanais’ (Don) flowing into it demarked 
its eastern side. Its northern border was delineated by a swath of lands stretch-
ing from west to east inhabited a number of independent ethne, including 
26  Czefranow 1953, 129–134. Cf. also the observations of William of Rubruck.
27  Czefranow 1953, 126–127; Hess, Rychławski 1967, 85.
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the Agathyrsi, Neuri, Androphagi, and Melanchlæni. The Crimea (Tauris), of 
which Herodotus knew relatively little, was inhabited by the Tauri. Finally, 
beyond the Don lived the Sarmatians (Sauromatæ).28 The last two ethne 
were treated as groups distinct from the Scythians. Herodotus also gives the 
dimensions of this Scythian square. Travelling from Istros (Ister, today Lower 
Danube) to the Borysthenes River (Dnieper) required a 10-day journey, and 
going from the Borysthenes to the Maeotis also took 10 days, while travelling 
from Lake Maeotis to the settlements of the Melanchlaeni required 20 days. 
Herodotus estimated a one-day journey to be the equivalent of 200 stades 
(stadia), which yields an overall distance of 4000 stades.29 It is very difficult 
to convert these measures of length into those used today because the author 
never mentions what type of stade he had in mind.30 However, we do not need 
such calculations to state that the boundaries and scale of Scythia proposed 
here were highly schematic. According to modern-day research, only the size 
of the southern border of Scythia, which runs along the coast of Pontos, is com-
parable to the actual size of the Scythians’ lands.31 It should also be noted that 
Herodotus unnaturally changed the course of the Istros, which in its lower sec-
tion does not run north-south, but east-west. The historian from Halicarnassus 
also enlarged the size of Maeotis, as did many other authors from the ancient 
Greek world.32 The picture he gives of the size and shape of Crimea (Tauris) 
is also far from reality. His comparison of Scythia to Attica and of Crimea to 
Cape Sounion both provide clear evidence of this.33 The true boundaries of the 
lands inhabited by the Scythians probably coincided more or less with those 
given by Herodotus, though they certainly did not form a square.
Like many other authors writing about the Black Sea steppe, Herodotus 
drew attention to the regions’ large and numerous rivers and described them 
as a distinguishing feature of these lands.34 According to him, there were as 
many of these rivers as there were canals in Egypt.35 His description of the 
rivers clearly indicates36 that the Greeks were much better acquainted with 
the western areas of Scythia, i.e. those between the Danube and the Dnieper 
28  Hdt. IV 99–101 (p. 300, 302, 304).
29  Hdt. IV 101 (p. 302, 304).
30  Although Herodotus gives the length of one stadion as equal to 600 Greek feet (podes), 
the length of the foot varied in different parts of the Greek world. For more on this, see 
Engels 1985, 298–311.
31  Łowmiański 1964, 105.
32  Thomson 1948, 59.
33  Thomson 1948, 59; How, Welles 1912, 426; Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella 2007, 650–652.
34  Hdt IV 82 (p. 284). Cf. How, Welles 1912, 321.
35  Hdt. IV 47 (p. 246).
36  Hdt. IV 47–58 (pp. 246–256).
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(Borysthenes). Herodotus mentions eight large rivers, of which those flow-
ing through the western part of the region are conclusively identified. Istros 
(Danube), the largest of the rivers known to Herodotus, was the first to be 
described. Its large size was said to result from the numerous tributaries that 
fed it. The author gives the names of 16 such rivers, five of which flowed through 
Scythia. These were the Pyretos, Tiarantos, Araros, Naparis, and Ordessos, iden-
tified with today’s Prut, Olt, Siret, Ialomița, and Argeș Rivers, respectively.37 
Herodotus also mentions another northern tributary of the Istros, which he 
calls the Maris River (usually identified with modern-day Mureș River) flow-
ing from the lands inhabited by the Agathyrsi.38 The second river in Scythia 
is the Tyres, understood to be the Dniester,39 and the third is the Hypanis, today 
the Boh. Both rivers are said to flow from lakes. The fourth river described is 
the Borysthenes (Dnieper), which according to Herodotus was the largest river 
in Scythia after the Istros, as well as the most important in terms of its use.40 
Not only were the lushest pastures for grazing cattle found on the Borysthenes, 
the river was also abundant in fish (including antakai [sturgeon], said to be 
boneless),41 its waters the clearest and cleanest to be found, the farmlands sur-
rounding it able to produce the highest yields, and its mouth a good site for har-
vesting salt. Herodotus did not know what springs fed the Dnieper. He states 
only that it took 40 days to sail the length of the river from its mouth to reach 
a land called Gerros. He probably did not know anything about the rapids on 
the Dnieper, otherwise he would have compared them to the cataracts of the 
Nile. The Borysthenes was said to mingle with the Hypanis near the sea, with 
the two ‘issuing into the same marsh’.42 The next river in Scythia, located some-
where between the Dnieper and the Tanais, is an unresolved mystery for con-
temporary researchers. The Pantikapes, Hypakyris and Gerros were mentioned 
as the fifth, sixth and seventh rivers. It is doubtful that the real equivalents for 
these will ever be found.43 This is least likely in the case of the Gerros, whose 
case should be considered a geographical curiosity. According to Herodotus, 
it was said to flow from the Borysthenes and enter into the Hypakyris.44 The 
final, eighth Scythian river was the Tanais, today’s Don.
37  Łowmiański 1975d, 105; Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella 2007, 617.
38  Łowmiański 1975d, 105; Piskozub 1998, 200–201; Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella 2007, 617.
39  Łowmiański 1975d, 105; Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella 2007, 619.
40  Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella 2007, 621–22.
41  How, Welles 1912, 324.
42  For more on the Dnieper: Piskozub 1999, 59–61.
43  Cf. Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella 2007, 620–621.
44  The Greek scholar may have been referring to the phenomenon known to modern sci-
ence as river bifurcation.
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Five rivers in Scythia had their sources in lakes; apart from the previously-
mentioned Dniester and Boh, these were the Pantikapes, Hypakyris, and Don. 
Herodotus’ description fits in the case of the Tyres (Dniester), though here, 
too, the lake is not large in size. The historian most likely sought to break with 
the well-established and extremely long-lived view that all rivers flowing south 
had their origins in the Riphean Mountains, which were said to run along the 
interior of the continent. While, it was undeniably a well-reasoned choice to 
point out that the origins of the Borysthenes were not known, his own concept 
turned out to be not much more in line with reality, and bears the hallmarks 
of a contrived theory.45 The course of these rivers was sketched out very sche-
matically, with some seeming to flow straight from north to south. Another of 
the rivers in the western area of the Great Steppe known to Herodotus may 
have been the Volga (Oaros), but he erroneously believed it flowed into the 
Maeotis.46 He knew about the existence of the Caspian Sea, the actual drain-
age basin of the Volga, but, like most ancient geographers, he sometimes 
confused it with the Aral Sea. This is evidenced by his claim that the Araxes 
(Aras) flowed into the latter,47 though he most probably meant the Syr-Darya. 
Nevertheless, unlike many later scholars of antiquity, he correctly considered 
the Caspian Sea to be a closed body of water with no contact with any other.48
Herodotus speaks about the flora and fauna of Scythia, as well as its 
climate.49 He states that its terrain was flat, and that it was well supplied with 
water, and had lush grasslands.50 There were no trees, with the exception of 
Hylaea (the Woodlands), located by the sea, east of the Borysthenes.51 The 
Scythian climate was extremely harsh. The harsh winter lasted eight months, 
during which there was no rain (like in Greece) or thunder. The cold was so 
severe that when water was poured onto the ground it froze immediately 
rather than form mud. The sea was covered with ice so thick you could cross 
the Cimmerian Bosporus (the Kerch Strait). During the four months of sum-
mer there was constant rain and thunderstorms. It is clear that Herodotus was 
comparing the climate of Scythia with that of his homeland, which he con-
sidered the optimal natural environment.52 This explains to a certain extent 
45  How, Welles 1912, 426.
46  Hdt. IV 123–124 (pp. 322, 324). For a discussion on the possible identification of the Oaros 
River: Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella 2007, 661–662.
47  Hdt. I 202 (p. 254). Cf. Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella 2007, 213.
48  Hdt. I 202 (p. 254), III 115 (pp. 140, 142), IV 45 (pp. 244, 246).
49  Hdt. IV 28–31 (pp. 226–230).
50  Hdt. IV 47 (p. 246).
51  Hdt. IV 19 (p. 218).
52  How, Wells 1912, 427; Müller 1972, 125–127; Asheri, Lloyd, Corcella 2007, 602–603.
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why some characteristics are clearly exaggerated, while other elements of 
his description, especially information on the sea freezing over, corresponded 
to reality.
Herodotus’ attention was also drawn to the horses of the steppe, which 
seemed (unlike elsewhere, i.e., in Greece) able to endure difficult climatic con-
ditions, especially the piercing cold.53 Donkeys and mules, on the other hand, 
fared poorly in the bitter cold. According to Herodotus, these low tempera-
tures were said to be the reason the cattle of the Black Sea nomads had small 
horns.54 However, this latter hypothesis had little in common with the truth, as 
evidenced by the case of reindeer.
Herodotus’ comments, while containing gross errors, is of fundamental 
importance for an understanding of the historical geography of the Black Sea 
steppe. Their particular value lies in the fact that they come from an author 
who based his research on what he himself witnessed as well as information 
from relatively reliable sources.55 The works of later scholars added only mod-
estly to his legacy. In many respects, they were even a step backwards in terms 
of their knowledge of areas north of Pontos. Herodotus’ relatively accurate 
description of the area of ‘ancient Scythia’ (ἀρχαίη Σκυθιή) and his labelling its 
inhabitants Scythians gave way to an older tendency to call all regions north 
of the Pontos Euxeinos (Black Sea) Scythia and their inhabitants Scythians.56 
This was probably the dominant view in Ionic chorography, the most famous 
representative of which was Hecataeus of Miletus (6th century BCE).57 It also 
prevailed in the historical geography of the Hellenistic era, supported by works 
by Ephorus of Cyme and Eratosthenes.58 Their point of view was shared by 
Strabo, who wrote in the first century CE.59 Moreover, in terms of research 
methods, the place of personal observation and direct interview, so important 
for Herodotus, was taken by “library erudition”. Geographical works were more 
and more a compilation of both new and old, outdated information. The result 
was an image that represented the author’s personal vision, and which often 
had little in common with reality.
In some cases, such as the anonymous treatise On Airs, Waters, and Places, 
the contents allow us to deduce certain facts about Scythia, even though the 
description was provided to serve a different function. The unknown author 
53  Hdt. IV 28 (pp. 226, 228).
54  Hdt. IV 29 (p. 228).
55  Müller 1972, 103.
56  Kretschmer 1921a, 943.
57  Harmatta 1941, 57–61.
58  Zwolski 1984, 17.
59  Strabo I 2.28 (p. 124); VII 3.13–17 (pp. 214–222); VII 4.5 (pp. 238–242).
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of the above work, once commonly identified with Hippocrates, lived around 
the turn of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE,60 chronologically close to the 
time of Herodotus. However, unlike the historian from Halicarnassus, he con-
sidered the Sarmatians, who inhabited the lands close to the Maeotis, to be 
Scythians.61 He devoted a short description to them and their land, which 
though it concurs in some points with the information supplied by Herodotus, 
is essentially aimed to demonstrating the influence of the environment on the 
characteristics of different races. He describes the Scythian desert (ἡ Σκυθέων 
ἐρημίη), as he calls the lands under discussion, as a high-lying steppe with 
abundant meadows and an ample water supply provided by large rivers.62 The 
climate there was very harsh. The summer were extremely short, lasting only a 
few days, while during the rest of the year winter prevailed. The reason for this 
constant cold was said to be the flat terrain and geographic location of Scythia. 
Farther north, there was a broad plain unprotected by any mountain range, 
which exposed the land to cold northern winds; meanwhile, warm southern 
winds were extremely rare. In addition, the entire region was shrouded in 
dense fog.63 This harsh climate was said to shape the physical condition of the 
people and animals that lived there. The inhabitants of Scythia were therefore 
not a very fertile people. Due to their physical weakness, they could not per-
form work that required strong effort.64 They bred sheep, horses and cattle, 
and lived in wagons pulled by hornless oxen. This lack of horns was said to be 
an anomaly caused by the cold that prevailed in Scythia, a point on which this 
writer shared the views of Herodotus.65 The few wild animals that lived in the 
region were very small. Nearly all of these creatures lived in underground bur-
rows, both as a means of shelter from the bitter cold and due to the barrenness 
of the landscape.66
Against this backdrop, Strabo’s Geography (1st century BCE–1st century CE) 
makes a somewhat better impression, as apart from its fairly high level of eru-
dition, it also contains a considerable amount of information derived from var-
ious travels.67 However, Strabo does not add much in his writings to the picture 
painted earlier by Herodotus. The Sarmatians residing on the Black Sea steppe 
are called by him “Scythians”. The last of the known Scythians are the Roxolani, 
60  Müller 1972, 137–145.
61  Hippocr. XVII (p. 116).
62  Hippocr. XVIII (p. 118).
63  Hippocr. XIX (pp. 120, 122).
64  Hippocr. XIX (p. 122).
65  Hippocr. XVIII (p. 118).
66  Hippocr. XIX (p. 120).
67  Müller 1980, 107–111; Strzelczyk 2000, 228–234.
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a nomadic group whose encampments lay between the Borysthenes and the 
Tanais.68 However, the Sarmatians and Scythians also had settlements beyond 
the Maeotis, neighbouring so-called “Scythians of the East” (sic!).69 Strabo also 
considered the people we know as the Tauri to also be Scythians.70 However, 
he knew nothing about the lands stretching north of the Sarmatians. He could 
not say if there were any other peoples living north of them, or if the lands of 
the Sarmatians extended to the Northern Ocean. In general, we can say that 
Strabo considered all the peoples of the north to be Scythians.
Somewhat fuller data is available on the Black Sea steppe’s fauna. Strabo 
mentions that the horses bred there are small, while the sheep can be large 
in size.71 He repeats earlier reports about the hornless Scythian cattle, adding 
that some specimens have their horns sawed off because it is allegedly the part 
of the body least resistant to cold.72 Strabo lastly discusses the hunting of vari-
ous animals. Deer, roe deer and wild pigs are the species targeted by hunters 
in marshy areas (Crimea, estuaries), while in the steppe the onager (ὁ ὄναγρος, 
literally ‘wild ass’) and saiga antelope (ὁ κόλος) are hunted.73 The term onager 
is also used in reference to the kulan (or jigitai), a subspecies of the Asian don-
key (Equus hemionus).74 In the case of the saiga antelope Strabo provides a 
detailed and essentially accurate description.75
Strabo provides little new information on the climate. He stresses that win-
ters on the steppe are very harsh, especially in the area between the Borysthenes 
and the Maeotis. Like Herodotus, he mentions the freezing of Lake Maeotis as 
proof of the exceptional cold. He cites an interesting story about how coastal 
dwellers fished under the ice for antakaios (sturgeon), whose size he compares 
to that of a dolphin.76
68  Strabo VII 3.13–17 (pp. 214–222).
69  Strabo I 2.28 (p. 124).
70  Strabo VII 4.5 (p. 240).
71  Strabo VII 3.18 (p. 224).
72  Strabo VII 3.18 (p. 224).
73  Strabo VII 4.8 (p. 248).
74  Cf. Malinowski 2003, 76; see also the accounts of William of Rubruck and Maciej of 
Miechów cited below.
75  ‘And among the quadrupeds there is what is called the “colos” [κόλος]; it is between the 
deer and ram in size, it is white, is swifter than they, and drinks through its nostrils into its 
head, and then from this storage supplies itself for several days, so that it can easily live in 
the waterless country’ (Strabo, III 249). The only fantastic element in this information is 
that about the Saiga antelope storing water in its head. Malinowski 2003, 133.
76  Strabo VII 3.18 (pp. 224, 226).
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Neither Pomponius Mela’s De situ orbis libri III, the first Roman work of 
geography,77 nor Pliny the Elder’s encyclopaedic Naturalis historia78 provide 
much new information about the region under discussion. Both works are 
largely compilations of material from previous authors. Like the above-men-
tioned works by other Romans, the Geographia of Ptolemy (2nd century CE), 
the last great ancient work of chorography, was a product of library study.79 
In the regions under discussion, Ptolemy places two Sarmatias: one European, 
the other Asian. The former stretches from the Vistula River in the west to the 
Maeotian Swamp and Tanais River in the east.80 The latter begins in European 
Sarmatia and ends on the Rha (Volga) River,81 which marked the beginning 
of Scythia, which stretched to the east to Serica (probably China). Ptolemy 
divides Scythia into two parts, ἡ ἐντὸς Ἰμάους ὄρους Σκυθία “before the Imaos 
Mountains” and ἡ ἐκτὸς Ἰμάους ὄρους Σκυθία “beyond the Imaos Mountains”,82 
which are usually identified with either the Altai Mountains or some imaginary 
extension of the Himalayas.83 In Ptolemy’s Geographia, these vast areas were 
populated by a multitude of peoples, most of whom are unknown to us, giving 
rise to the suspicion that the names are fictitious.84 There was also a number 
of peoples on Ptolemy’s map, who in reality either no longer existed or who 
were moved by the author quite arbitrarily to the peripheries of the known 
world. For example, he claimed the existence of the fictitious Hyperboreans, 
the Abioi and Hippemolgoi of Homer, and the Androphagi of old Ionian lore.
In the Middle Ages, the appearance of new peoples, both on the Black Sea 
steppe and in their hinterland, resulted in a significant increase in geographi-
cal knowledge. This was mainly due to the active political and trade contacts 
maintained between the Rus’ state and Byzantium. The functioning of a trade 
route running ‘from the Varangians to the Greeks’ led to an improved knowl-
edge of the central and upper reaches of the Dnieper River. The first compre-
hensive description of the route, including information on hitherto unknown 
rapids, was compiled in the mid-tenth century. It was part (Chapter 9) 
of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus’ De administrando imperio.85 The work, 
77  Müller 1980, 123–137; Strzelczyk 2000, p. 244.
78  Plinius IV 82–95 (pp. 180–192). Cf. Müller 1980, 137–150; Strzelczyk 2000, 263–266.
79  Müller 1980, 167–175; Strzelczyk 2000, 297–301.
80  Kl.Ptol. III 5.1–6 (p. 298).
81  Kl.Ptol. V 9.1 (p. 530); VIII 18.2 (p. 848).
82  Kl.Ptol. VI 14–15 (pp. 656–669).
83  Kretschmer 1921a, 943–946; Łowmiański 1975d, 113.
84  Łowmiański 1975d, 114–115; 1975c, 66–70.
85  DAI IX (pp. 57–63). Cf. Kuryłowicz, Kowalenko 1961, 349–350; DAI – Com., 38–43, 45–53; 
Piskozub 1999, 65.
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which is predominantly devoted to political matters, also contains a geograph-
ical description of the lands north of Byzantium (Chapter 42). The description 
of the region is quite concise: it begins with Thessaloniki, moves on to Belgrade, 
and then describes the area around Dristra on the lower Danube, the Black Sea 
steppe (then controlled by the Pechenegs), and the Khazar fortress Sarkel on 
the Don, before finally ending with the western Caucasus. The style and con-
struction of the description is not very sophisticated, and in many respects 
resembles an itinerary, with distances given between successive stages of the 
route. It is worth noting that the author’s attention is drawn to the numerous 
rivers flowing through the Black Sea steppe, the largest of those mentioned 
being the Dnieper (Δάναπρις) and Dniestr (Δάναστρις) Rivers.86
Some remarks on the Black Sea-Caspian steppe are included in the Ystoria 
Mongalorum of Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, Pope Innocent IV’s envoy to the 
Great Khan. Carpine travelled through the region between February 26 and 
April 4, 1246. It was still winter on the steppe at that time. Comania (land of 
the Cumans), as Carpine calls it, is completely flat and has four large rivers: the 
Dnieper, Don, Volga, and Yaik (Ural). Each of them is used as a base by a differ-
ent Mongol leader. The author mistakenly stated that all the rivers flowed into 
one “great sea”. One can assume from the overall account that the mistake was 
probably due to an excessive enlargement of the Black Sea. More important, 
however, is that according to Carpine, during his journey, all the rivers, as well 
as the sea, were frozen solid. The cold had frozen the seas waters as far out as 
three leagues (leucas) from the shore,87 which allowed it to be used as a route 
for travellers. According to the author, all the rivers, especially the Volga, were 
rich in fish.88
Friar Benedict, known as Benedict the Pole (Benedictus Polonus), travelled 
with Carpine as a translator. He was a Franciscan monk like the leader of the 
mission, and had joined the envoy in Wrocław.89 Benedict’s relation is much 
shorter, so the information found in it on the Eastern European steppe is more 
sparse. The author gives the name of the Dnieper and Don, mentions a meeting 
with the Batu Khan on the Itil (Volga), but wrongly identifies it as the Tanais.90 
He also states elsewhere that Comania was ‘once called Pontus’.91 This term is 
probably used in reference to the Black Sea-Caspian steppe. Benedict makes 
86  DAI XLII (pp. 183–189). Cf. Obolensky 2000, 24–41.
87  A measure of distance that ranges in practice from 2 to 3.5 km. Cf. Schmieder 1997, 152 
(note 202).
88  di Carpine IX 13 (pp. 309–10).
89  Ben.Pol. I (p. 135).
90  Ben.Pol. IV (p. 136).
91  ‘[…] hec terra olim dicebatur Pontus […]’. Ben.Pol. IV (p. 137).
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the same mistake as Carpine, significantly increasing the size of the Black Sea, 
into which the Dnieper, Don, and Itil (Volga) are all said to flow. This mistake is 
confirmed by the fact that during the next stage of the journey leading through 
Asia, Benedict was said to see ‘the Maeotis’,92 which in fact could have been the 
Aral Sea, and ‘to the left’, the Caspian Sea,93 which should probably be identi-
fied as Lake Balkhash. What is valuable here is the information provided by 
Benedict about the great amount of wormwood growing in Comania.94
Less than a decade after Carpine and his entourage, another Franciscan 
clergyman, William of Rubruck, travelled deep into Asia and described 
the journey in his Itinerarium. His expedition was also diplomatic in nature, 
but this time the mandate for the mission was issued by the King of France, 
Louis IX. Rubruck eventually reached the court of Möngke Khan in Karakorum, 
having met earlier with Batu Khan, ruler of the Golden Horde. He began his 
journey in Constantinople, from where he sailed to Sudak in the Crimea, then 
set off for the steppe in the summer of 1253. His account is to a large extent 
confirmed by the observations of his religious brethren, mentioned above. One 
important difference, however, is that he saw the Black Sea-Caspian steppe in 
summer and autumn. He was struck by the seemingly endless expanse of the 
steppe plains, which he compared to a huge sea.95 The monk’s attention was 
also drawn to the area’s large rivers, especially the Tanais and Itil (Volga). The 
first one he compared in terms of size to the Seine; the second one is said to be 
four times wider than the Parisian river.96 Like Carpine, he was captivated by 
the abundance of fish in the Don, Volga and other rivers flowing through the 
steppe.97 Unlike Pope Innocent’s IV envoy, he noted that the steppe dwellers 
were not able to catch them and were not particularly interested in them. They 
consumed only the largest specimens, the meat of which could be eaten just 
like that of a sheep.98 In terms of the fauna, Rubruck’s attention is drawn to the 
large number of species of mice living on the steppe. Some were consumed 
by the nomads themselves, others were given as feed to the birds they bred.99 
The French ruler’s envoy also saw other rodents, most probably marmots,100 
92  Ben.Pol. VIII (p. 138).
93  Ben.Pol. VIII (p. 139).
94  Ben.Pol. VI (p. 137).
95  Rubruck XIII 3 (p. 195); XXII 2 (p. 222).
96  Rubruck XIII 7, 10 (pp. 196–198); XIV 2 (p. 199); XVI 5 (p. 205); XVIII 4 (pp. 212–213).
97  Rubruck XIII 10 (p. 197); XXXVII 12 (p. 316).
98  Rubruck XIII 10 (p. 197).
99  Rubruck V 1 (p. 180).
100 Rubruck V 1 (p. 180). Anastasius van den Wyngaert (p. 180, note 1) identified the animal 
described by Rubruck as a souslik (Spermophilus), referred to in Turkish as a sour. Mikołaj 
Olszewski, author of the Polish translation of Itinerarium (Olszewski 2007, 84) concurs. 
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which the locals called sogur, and a creature he describes as a rabbit with a 
long black-and-white-tipped tail like that of a cat.101 The marmots were said 
to live in colonies of 20–30 individuals and – due to the fact they hibernated 
for six months a year – constituted easy pickings for the nomads who hunted 
them. According to Rubruck, the steppe was home to many other edible ani-
mals. Although he did not see any deer and saw very few hares, he speaks of 
seeing numerous gazelles and herds of wild asses, which reminded the monk 
of European mules, though they surpassed them in terms of speed.102 Rubruck 
also mentions a creature he calls an arcali.103 The description and the name 
itself both match that of the wild sheep argali, though there is reason to ques-
tion whether he really saw such creatures on the steppe, especially in the region 
under discussion. Rubruck also confirms the presence of camels,104 which were 
used as draft animals, and game birds, including hawks and falcons.105 In the 
Itinerarium there is also an interesting description of the Crimea,106 which the 
authors says is largely a vast plain, five days’ journey across. It is separated from 
the southern end of the peninsula by a mountain range, the northern slope 
of which gently transitions into a beautiful forest, filled – according to the 
author – with springs and streams. At the peninsula’s northern end there is 
said to be something like a vast levee, stretching from one sea to the other. 
William of Rubruck also noted the presence of salt-bearing lakes at the far 
ends of the peninsula, the exploitation of which was said to bring considerable 
income to the Mongolian rulers.
A number of descriptions of the steppes of western Eurasia were writ-
ten by Muslim authors in the Middle Ages. These relations have a particular 
value and colour, because unlike Latin or Byzantine writers, their authors 
were less concerned with political matters and paid more attention to eth-
nographic and geographical issues. An interesting description of Khwarazm, 
the Transvolga steppe and Volga Bulgaria can be found in Ahmed ibn Fadlan’s 
work. The author, an envoy of the Caliph al-Muqtadir, left Baghdad on 21 June 
921 on a diplomatic mission to the ruler of Volga Bulgaria,107 finally reaching 
P. Jackson and D. Morgan state that the original Turkish name of the animal was soghur/
sughur, a term used to refer to a marmot (Jackson 1990, 84 (note 2)).
101 Rubruck V 2 (p. 180). Olszewski identifies the animal as a gerbil (2007, 84 (note 44)).
102 Rubruck V 2 (p. 180); XXII 3 (p. 222). Rubruck provides the Mongol name, though in a 
distorted form, as culam.
103 Rubruck V 2 (p. 180).
104 Rubruck II 3 (p. 173); II 5 (p. 174).
105 Rubruck V 3 (p. 180).
106 Rubruck I 12–13 (pp. 170–71).
107 ibn Fadlan, 190/191; Kmietowicz, Lewicki 1985, 87; Frye 2005, 26; Kovalevskii 1956, 121. 
Cf. Togan 1939, 5: April 2, 921.
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his destination the following spring. His journey led him through Khorasan 
(Merv), the Karakum desert, Transoxania (Mā warā’ an-Nahr) to Khwārazm, 
where he spent the winter (September 5, 921–March 2, 922).108 He described 
the terrible cold he experienced in that land. The Amu Darya River was cov-
ered with a sheet of ice 17 spans thick,109 and the inhabitants of Khwārazm had 
to cover their water-containers with sheepskins to prevent them from freezing 
and breaking.110 By the middle of February a thaw began,111 so the Caliph’s envoy 
was soon able to continue his journey, which took him through the Ustyurt 
Plateau and the steppelands between the Emba and Ural Rivers, to Bashkiria 
and finally Volga Bulgaria. In the first half of the 10th century, the region was 
inhabited by Turkish peoples, the characteristics of which are described by 
Ahmed ibn Fadlan.112 The envoy wrote less about the natural conditions, but 
here his attention was drawn mainly to the numerous rivers in today’s western 
Kazakhstan that he had to cross. As a result of the spring thaw, they were all of 
considerable size, though the largest and most powerful of those he saw was 
the Ural (Yaik, Arabic H.ğ).113 Its strong current made it very difficult for the 
travellers to cross the river without suffering considerable losses. After 70 days 
of travel from Khwārazm, Ahmed ibn Fadlan finally arrived in Volga Bulgaria. 
Here he was particularly fascinated by the extraordinary shortness of the sum-
mer night.114
Another memorable work by an Arab author is the description of the so-
called Kipchak Steppe (Desht-i Qipchaq) written by a famous Moroccan travel-
ler (born February 24, 1304 in Tangier) Ibn Battuta.115 It is part of an extensive 
work that translators and publishers have often given the title The Travels 
of Ibn Battuta.116 During his 25-year expedition, the Moroccan visited lands 
108 ibn Fadlan, 190–201; Kmietowicz, Lewicki 1985, 87–90; Togan 1939, 5–14; Kovalevskii 1956, 
121–124; Frye 2005, 26–32.
109 ibn Fadlan, 196/7; Kmietowicz, Lewicki 1985, 90; Togan 1939, 13; Kovalevskii 1956, 123; Frye 
2005, 30.
110 ibn Fadlan, 198/199; Kovalevskii 1956, 124; Frye 2005, 31. Cf. Togan 1939, 15; Kmietowicz, 
Lewicki 1985, 90: in German and Polish translation “well” instead of “container”.
111 ibn Fadlan, 198/9; Kmietowicz, Lewicki 1985, 90–91; Togan 1939, 15, 17; Kovalevskii 1956, 
124, 125; Frye 2005, 31.
112 ibn Fadlan, 200–217; Kmietowicz, Lewicki 1985, 92–98; Togan 1939, 18–39; Kovalevskii 
1956, 125–131; Frye 2005, 32–43.
113 ibn Fadlan 214/215; Kmietowicz, Lewicki 1985, 97, 149; Togan 1939, 34 (note 1); Kovalevskii 
1956, 192 (note 311); Frye 2005, 42.
114 ibn Fadlan, 222–225; Kmietowicz, Lewicki 1985, 102; Togan 1939, 54–55; Kovalevskii 1956, 
135; Frye 2005, 50.
115 Gibb 1958, X; Zajączkowski 1962, VIII.
116 Zajączkowski 1962, XIII.
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ranging from the Maghreb to Sumatra. In the early 1330s (before 1333), he also 
reached the lands controlled by the rulers of the Golden Horde.117 Starting 
from Crimea, Ibn Battuta travelled through the eastern part of the Black Sea 
steppe and the Caspian steppe to Astrakhan. He also visited, or at least so he 
claimed to visit,118 Volga Bulgaria, but his information on this area is meagre 
and not particularly original.
The Kipchak Steppe enchanted Ibn Battuta, much as it had the other authors 
discussed above, primarily with its natural landscape. His relation begins 
with the following observation: ‘This place where we landed was in the wilder-
ness known as Dasht-i Qifjaq (dasht in the language of the Turks means ‘wil-
derness’). This wilderness is green and grassy, with no trees nor hills, high or 
low, […].’119 The author adds that a lack of wood for fuel forced the nomads to 
use dried animal dung for this purpose. The natural conditions of the steppe, 
he said, were especially favourable for animal husbandry. This was due to the 
excellent quality of the grass, which could be used like barley as animal feed. 
Therefore, the herds there were very well-fed and reproduced abundantly with-
out any particular effort on the part of their owners. The animals most com-
monly raised were horses, camels and cattle.120 Ibn Battuta devoted special 
attention to the breeding of horses, which generated the most income for the 
nomads, who had earned an excellent reputation far beyond their country’s 
borders (e.g. in India).121 During his stay in Astrakhan, Ibn Battuta witnessed 
the freezing over of the Volga. This allowed him to convey the interesting infor-
mation that the local ruler had ordered an area of the frozen river to be covered 
with straw in order to facilitate the movement of caravans across the ice.122
The beginning of the modern era (16th–17th century) brought a decisive 
increase in geographical knowledge. This also applies to that of the Eastern 
European steppe. In 1517, Treatise on the Two Sarmatias: European and Asian 
was published. The book’s author, who made clear references to the work of 
Ptolemy, was Maciej of Miechów, a professor at the Jagiellonian University in 
Kraków. In the book, the scholar sought to combat some of the unfounded 
beliefs about the geography of Eastern Europe. The book provided an interest-
ing description of the region and its inhabitants, including the peoples living 
117 Gibb 1958, XI–XII; Zajączkowski 1962, XI.
118 Some scholars have doubts about whether Ibn Battuta ever travelled to Volga Bulgaria. 
Gibb 1958, XII; Ibn Battuta, 356.
119 ibn Battuta, 111; Gibb 1959, 470.
120 ibn Battuta, 113; Gibb 1959, 473.
121 ibn Battuta, 115; Gibb 1959, 478.
122 ibn Battuta, 124–125; Gibb 1959, 497.
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on the Black Sea-Caspian steppe. He described the land of the Transvolga 
Tatars as a flat plain without mountains, forests or trees, but abundant in 
grasses and wild animals, including deer, roe deer, wild goats and Saiga 
antelope.123 He also described the Volga, which before it ran into the sea, 
divided into 25 large branches, each of which was supposed to be equal in size 
to the Tiber or Vistula. Maciej of Miechów erroneously assumed, however, 
that the Volga flowed into the Black Sea.124 The rivers of European and Asian 
Sarmatia were said to be extremely abundant in fish. There were so many in 
the Volga that the Tatars were ostensibly able to spear them with their sabres 
from the shore.125 The Don River valley was covered with numerous fruit trees, 
mainly apple trees. There were hives of wild bees in the oaks, and in smaller 
numbers on the pines, growing along the river.126 Unlike most of the authors 
mentioned above, Maciej of Miechów described the steppe, especially its 
European part, as a land extremely rich in fertile soil, home to a great num-
ber of animals, and rich in mineral resources, including chalk and salt.127 
A similarly enthusiastic vision of the ‘Wild Fields’ was produced by Michael 
the Lithuanian, who in the mid-sixteenth century also pointed to the incred-
ible fertility of the local land, and the abundance of game animals and water-
fowl and the many fish in the rivers.128
Much valuable information on the Black Sea-Caspian steppe is contained in 
the diaries of members of 16th-century diplomatic missions. The steppe formed 
a buffer zone between Russia, the Turkish Sultanate, and the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. It is therefore no surprise that its inhabitants often became 
caught up in the political dealings of neighbouring states. The two relations 
analyzed below were produced as a result of missions the authors carried out 
as political envoys.
Andrzej Taranowski was a diplomat in the service of Zygmunt August. 
Between spring and winter of 1569 (he returned to Warsaw on December 24) 
he carried out a mission for the Polish king that led him from Constantinople 
123 Math.Mie. I 1.6 (p. 141).
124 Math.Mie. I 1.7 (p. 142), II 2.1 (pp. 191–192).
125 Math.Mie. I 1.7 (p. 143).
126 Math.Mie. I 1.7 (p. 142).
127 Math.Mie. II 1.1 (pp. 172–174).
128 Mich.Lit. IX (p. 33); Khoroshkevich 1994, 96–97. Michael the Lithuanian cites several 
examples of the rich fauna of the steppe zone and the forest-step zone of today’s Ukraine. 
He states, for example, that in the Transdniestrian region, bison, deer and wild donkeys 
were hunted mainly for their hides. Only the tenderloin was used as meat. Dogs were fed 
venison and fish.
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to the Tatar Khanates on the Black and Caspian Seas.129 We do not know the 
exact purpose of his mission, but that is not of major consequence. What is 
important, rather, is that as a result of this journey, during which the author 
travelled to Astrakhan, a concise report was produced, known as a Short 
Description of the Route from Poland to Constantinople. In it, Taranowski 
described his journey through the steppe, starting with his departure from 
Constantinople (August 14). The envoy of the last of the Jagiellonian kings 
journeyed along the following route: Constantinopole – Kiliya (on the lower 
Danube) – Akkerman (Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi, at the mouth of the Dniester) – 
Ochakiv – Azaq (Azov, at the mouth of the Don) – Astrakhan. He arrived in 
the Astrakhan at the end of September, then returned to Bilhorod by the route 
previously travelled, and from there headed north to Poland. A number of 
Taranowski’s observations confirm the information found in previous descrip-
tions. Zygmunt August’s envoy wrote in more detail about the steppe east of 
the Dnieper River. Like many other writers, he stated that the area he travelled 
through was flat, with grass as the predominant vegetation.130 The countryside 
was woodless, with small but dense oaks and some sloe trees growing along 
the Mus River (today’s Mius), which flowed into the Sea of Azov.131 Due to a 
lack of wood, the Tatars used grass to light the fire when they wanted to cook 
a meal.132 Among the animals raised on the steppe, dominant were sheep, 
horses, cows, steers and camels.133 Grass was, of course, the basic feed for these 
animals all year round. The Perekop Tatars tended to overwinter on the Sea of 
Azov between the Gruzsky Elanchik, Mokry Elanchyk, and Mus Rivers. This is 
where the grasses were highest, allowing the cattle to pull it up from under the 
snow in winter. There was also a bounty of wild animals, especially roe deer, 
deer, wild horses and pigs. Finally, the rivers mentioned above were abundant 
in fish.134 Among the wild fauna on the steppe there are many different species 
of birds. Taranowski mentions eagles, vultures, ravens, and kite, adding that 
there are many other species living there, as well.135 Foxes and wolves lived 
on the Zadonets Steppe, but there were also many snakes, about which the 
author writes:
129 Taranowski, 203; Tardy, Vásáry 1974.
130 Taranowski, 206 et passim.
131 Taranowski, 207.
132 Taranowski, 210.
133 Taranowski, 206, 209.
134 Taranowski, 207.
135 Taranowski, 209.
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We found many vile reptiles, snakes as thick as a human leg, and very 
long. And in some places, when we found ourselves by the lake, we could 
see so many snake skins that the grass was white from them, and we were 
afraid to look, but from a distance it looked as if it had been covered with 
a cloth.136
Taranowski also mentions the climate of the steppe. In October cool winds 
blew and icy rain fell intensively for extended periods of time (three days). At 
night there were severe frosts that even killed people.137 During this time of 
the year, the Tartars would go with their herds to their wintering grounds. Both 
Perekop Tatars and the Nogai Tatars overwintered by the Sea of Azov. The lat-
ter made their winter encampments between the Don and Kagalnik Rivers.138
A concise but very valuable description of the Dnieper was included in 
the diary of Erich Lassota von Steblau. The author visited Ukraine in 1594 as 
a diplomatic agent of the Habsburgs, most probably tasked with the job of 
recruiting Cossacks. In his diary he included a brief, but accurate description 
of the rapids on the Dnieper River. He mentioned there were 13 of them, but 
pointed out that if you did not include Voronova Zavora, there were only 12. 
These rocky obstacles stretched on the river for seven miles. The author briefly 
described each of the rapids and the road down the river.139 It is worth not-
ing that this description corresponds closely with the information provided by 
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus.
Guillaume Levasseur de Beauplan’s account provides an excellent supple-
ment to the accounts of the two previous authors. Beauplan was not a diplo-
mat, but an engineer who built a number of fortifications in Ukraine. He was 
also a cartographer. In the mid-17th century, as a supplement to a set of maps 
he had produced, he wrote a work entitled Description d’Ukranie. This work 
is of special value because it came from the pen of a researcher who relied 
mainly on his own observations of a land he had come to know very well. 
Beauplan spent a total of 17 years in the borderlands of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth.140 In his work, he gives us a very interesting description of the 
Dnieper. Although he does not list the names of all 13 rapids, contenting himself 





140 Beauplan, 1–6; Wójcik 1972, 38–41.
141 Beauplan, 52–53.
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he does recount other aspects of the river’s natural environment in a detailed 
and skillful manner. He describes the islands on the Dnieper River, enumerates 
the tributaries in its lower reaches, and lists the fords and other river crossings. 
He also makes brief mentions of the vegetation on the river’s islands (e.g., the 
oaks on Khortitsa).142 Next, he characterizes the north-western and western 
shores of the Black Sea up to Varna. He then describes the estuaries of the 
major rivers (Boh, Dniester, Danube), and the landscape along the coastline.143 
He also describes the natural conditions on the Crimean peninsula.144 We can 
clearly see here that Beauplan had a much better knowledge of the western 
part of Ukraine, the western shores of the Black Sea, and Crimea. He was not 
able to provide much information about the eastern, Transdnieprian part of 
the Black Sea Steppe.
Beauplan devotes significant attention to steppe fauna. He mentions the 
annoyance caused by the local flies and mosquitoes and how to protect against 
them. Locusts, which also plague the region,145 swarm into the Ukrainian 
steppe from the southeast (mainly from the Caucasus).146 He characterizes the 
bobak marmot, a steppe rodent, in great detail in terms of both its habits and 
appearance.147 According to Beauplan, it was most commonly found between 
the Sula and Supoi Rivers. In terms of birds, he mentions quails,148 and notes 
that pelicans and cranes live along the banks of rivers.149 In the so-called “Wild 
Fields”, the areas along the Dnieper rapids are home to Saiga antelope, deer, 
wild goats, huge wild boars, and herds of wild horses numbering 50–60 indi-
viduals. Beyond the Dnieper River there were buffalo, white hares and wild-
cats. Finally, in the Transdniester Region one could find rams.150 The author’s 
observations about the climate confirmed the information contained in earlier 
accounts. Spring in western Ukraine begins in mid-April, the summer is mostly 
dry, and winter very harsh. For Beauplan, who came from a country with a mild 
climate, the severity of the winters was cause for worry, as evidenced by the 
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The last of the accounts worth mentioning here is Travel to the Steppes of 
Astrakhan and the Caucasus, written in French by Jan Potocki, a scholar, trav-
eller and writer living at the turn of the 18th and 19th century. He wrote his 
account following an expedition that took place in 1797–1798. Particularly note-
worthy is the information provided on the trans-Don steppe and the eastern 
part of the North Caucasus. The steppeland, which begins beyond the Khopior 
River, struck Potocki with its seeming unboundness.152 The Zadonets Steppe, 
both near the Medveditsa River and between the bends of the Don and Volga 
Rivers, is described as a dry and sandy plain exposed to gusty winds,153 which 
gave him the impression of a completely lifeless desert. Barren, dry soil was 
said to show through from beneath low, yellowed grass. The grass displayed a 
green hue only in ravines and places sheltered from the wind. In some places, 
Potocki wrote, springs flowed and trees grew at the bottom of deep ravines. 
On the open steppe there were no trees at all.154 South of Tsaritsyn (today’s 
Volgograd), the steppe changed colour, taking on a blue-green hue due to the 
wormwood growing there.155 Finally, in the eastern part of the North Caucasus, 
in the region of the Nogai Steppe, only thin, sparse tufts of grass grew. There 
were also areas called kum (‘sands’) by the locals; in summer they were cov-
ered with yellow flowers and grass that made good, healthy fodder for cattle. In 
spring and winter, these were ideal sites for encampments.156 Potocki’s atten-
tion was also attracted by the Volga, which he travelled on from Sarpeta to 
Astrakhan during the spring flooding (on May 26, 1797). The river presented 
an incredible view at that time. Within its flooded riverbed, archipelagos of 
islands were formed, between which forests jutted out from below the waters, 
with the trees making it difficult to sail down the river.157 In the trans-Don 
region, Potocki saw bobak marmots, which he thought looked like giant alpine 
marmots.158 In this region he also observed a great number of ground squir-
rels (sousliks) and packs of wild dogs.159 Mosquitoes plagued both people and 
animals in the area.160 Saiga antelope and eagles were found in the environs 
of Tsaritsyn,161 while in the Volga region, there were pelicans, cormorants and 
152 Potocki, 287–288.
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water snakes.162 The steppe of the Caspian Depression was perfect for breed-
ing camels, which are very fond of wormwood.163 Here, too, Potocki saw jer-
boa (Jaculus jaculus),164 and noted the presence of pheasant on the Nogai 
Steppe.165




© Aleksander Paroń and Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology Polish Academy of 
Sciences, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004441095_004
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
chapter 2
Black Sea-Caspian Steppe: Outline of Ethnic and 
Political Relations to the End of the Ninth Century
2.1 Era of the Dominance of Iranian Nomads
The accounts described in the previous chapter, despite having been written in 
various epochs by authors from different cultures, display a high degree of uni-
formity in their descriptions of the natural environment of the Black Sea and 
Caspian steppe. In these accounts we find explicit and implicit expressions 
of the belief that this region constituted an ideal natural habitat for nomadic 
peoples. According to available sources, pastoral communities have domi-
nated the steppe since the dawn of history. It was on the Pontic steppe, for 
example, that the ancients placed the home of the Galaktophagoi (milk eaters) 
and the Hippemolgoi (mare milkers),1 whom they identified as Cimmerians,2 
a people mentioned in the Odyssey. It is difficult to say whether this identifica-
tion is correct. If the Cimmerians had indeed established settlements on the 
Black Sea steppe at that time, they would be the first nomadic group known 
(i.e., identified by name) to have inhabited this region.3 At present, however, 
there is controversy surrounding the group’s link to archaeological remains 
of the Chernogorivka and Novocherkassk cultures (10th–7th centuries BCE), 
whose people inhabited vast stretches of the Black Sea-Caspian steppe. Some 
scholars associate these cultures with a separate group of Iranian nomads, said 
to have been forerunners of the Agathyrsi, who are mentioned by Herodotus.4 
Others believe that the Cimmerians may have never settled as far west as the 
Black Sea steppe,5 and question the credibility of claims, most often based on 
Herodotus’ account in Histories, that they inhabited this region.6
1 Hom.Il. XIII 5–6 (p. 1).
2 Hom.Od. XI 15–20 (pp. 123–4). The Cimmerians were said to milk mares by Callimachus 
of Cyerene (Hymn III (to Artemis), verses 252–254: Call., 82, 83), which, according to some 
researchers, is supposed to prove their identification by the Hellenic poet with Homer’s 
Hippemolgoi. Cf. Chochorowski 1993, 10. Other ancient authors identified the Hippemolgoi 
and the Galaktophagoi with the Scythians. Cf. Fr.Hes. 150; Strabo VII 3.7 (pp. 196–198), 3.9 
(pp. 204–208).
3 Chochorowski 1993, 10; Harmatta 1970, 7–8; Czeglédy 1983, 28.
4 Olbrycht 2000a, 102–105.
5 Olbrycht 2000, 71–99.
6 Hdt. IV 11–12 (pp. 210–213).
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The first clashes between the Cimmerians and Scythians took place when 
the first group still inhabited lands on what Herodotus calls the ‘southern 
sea’, identifiable as the Caspian Sea. These conflicts, most likely the result of 
migratory pressures, triggered a further wave of resettlement in the region. 
The defeated Cimmerians were driven from the lands they inhabited, with 
some resettling in the South Caucasus. By the end of the 8th century BCE, the 
Cimmerians had developed an active presence in West Asia, with settlements 
most likely having been established earlier on the Kura River (in today’s south-
ern Georgia). From these areas, they regularly carried out raids that filled the 
inhabitants of the Middle East with fear.7
The Cimmerians are known from Assyrian diplomatic sources as the 
Gimirrai, and are referred to in the prophecies of Ezekiel as the Gomer people.8 
Around 715 BCE Rusa I, the ruler of the Urartu state, attempted to wipe them 
out. A battle that took place near Cappadocia (Kappadokía) ended in victory 
for the Cimmerians.9 Assyrian documents mention the Gimirrai again around 
680 BCE, when they fought against Assyria alongside the Medes. This alliance 
ended badly for the Cimmerians, whose forces were defeated by Esarhaddon 
in ca. 677 BCE. Some of their fighters then passed into the service of the 
Assyrian ruler, while others fought under Midas, King of Phrygia, though they 
later shifted their allegiance and joined the side of the Urartian king Rusa II.10 
We read about the Cimmerians once again when they join forces with the 
Treri, a Thracian tribe, around 660 BCE in an attack on Lydia in Asia Minor. 
The Lydian King Gyges was killed in combat (ca. 654 BCE), and was succeeded 
by his son Ardys, who rebuilt the kingdom and pushed back the Cimmerians, 
who suffered a definitive defeat at the hands of the Assyrian king Ashurbanipal 
in 637/636 BCE, after which they ceased to be a threat. They settled in 
isolated groups in Asia Minor, where they were eventually assimilated into 
other groups.11
The defeat of the Cimmerians, however, did not necessarily mark the end 
of the history of this South Caucasian tribe. In fact, whether they maintained 
a continued presence on the Black Sea steppe remains an open question. It is 
generally assumed today that they first appeared on the steppe at the begin-
ning of the first millennium BCE.12 Their area of settlement overlapped the 
7  Chochorowski 1993, 11–12; Christian 1998, 133.
8  Chochorowski 1993, 11–12; Smirnow 1974, 34.
9  Chochorowski 1993, 13.
10  Chochorowski 1993, 13–14.
11  Chochorowski 1993, 14–15. Cf. Olbrycht 2000, 90–92; Chochorowski 2004, 92.
12  Chochorowski 1993, 14–15; J. Harmatta 1970, 7–8.
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territories later inhabited by the Scythians, i.e., the region situated between the 
Don, Lower Danube, and the Carpathian Mountains.13 Important questions 
remain unanswered about the nature of their presence on these lands. Did 
the Cimmerians inhabit the northern Pontic Steppe or did they merely exert 
political control over this area? If we accept the latter view, it can be assumed 
that the Cimmerians were based at some point in the North Caucasus, which 
also explains their activity in West Asia. Some groups may have been forced 
by Scythian migration in the first half of the 7th century BCE to migrate 
to the Black Sea steppe, while others lived in isolated communities in the 
South Caucasus.14
The migration of the Scythians was probably part of a larger wave of ethnic 
displacements. We can infer this from the accounts of Herodotus, who writes in 
the mid-5th century BCE that the Arimaspoi, a people living in the far reaches 
of the ecumene known to the Greeks (beyond them lived griffins who guarded 
treasures of gold), attacked the Issedones and forced them from their homes, 
which led the latter to do the same to the Scythians, who then seized the lands 
of the Cimmerians.15 However, Herodotus had earlier written that the cause of 
the Scythians’ migration was the Massagetae, who drove them away from the 
Araxes River (Syr-Darya or Volga).16 The contradiction here is reconciled by 
Henryk Łowmiański, who claims the Issedones were attacking the Scythians 
from the north, while the Massagetae blocked their path to the south.17 In 
describing the struggle between these two peoples, Herodotus stated that dur-
ing the Scythians’ pursuit of the Cimmerians, the Scythians lost their way and 
marched along the northern and eastern ridge of the Caucasus into Media, 
where they defeated its inhabitants and gained control of West Asia. The 
Scythians’ short rule (28 years) proved extremely harsh for the entire region. 
The Scythians plundered both Syria and Palestine, and one of their invasions 
even reached the borders of Egypt.18 Some of the information from Herodotus’ 
Histories appears to be worthy of trust. The Scythians were known in Assyrian 
and Babylonian sources as the Iškuzai/Ašguzi.19 In addition, their presence 
13  Chochorowski 1993, 10.
14  Chochorowski 1993, 14.
15  Hdt. IV 13 (pp. 212–215).
16  Hdt. IV 11 (pp. 210, 211).
17  Łowmiański 1975d, 104.
18  Hdt. I 15 (pp. 18. 19), 103–106 (pp. 132–139), 130 (pp. 168–171), IV 1 (pp. 198, 199).
19  Chochorowski 1993, 11; Łowmiański 1975d, 102; Melyukova 1990, 99, 435–440 (bibliography 
of the most important works); Christian 1998, 133–134.
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in West Asia and the Caucasus is confirmed by archaeological evidence.20 
However, it is questionable as to whether their expansion in this region can 
be explained by their pursuit of the Cimmerians. The latter, as we have seen 
above, appeared in the South Caucasus (Transcaucasia) several decades before 
the Scythians, and moreover, the period of the supposed Scythian domina-
tion of West Asia falls in the last quarter of the seventh century BCE,21 when 
the Middle East was inhabited by rich and highly developed societies, whose 
wealth was likely to draw steppe-dwellers and their raids. The prospect of 
attaining such rich booty was sufficient motivation for the Scythians’ expan-
sion in the region. Their presence may therefore not have taken the form of 
permanent control over the region, but rather an extended period of looting 
expeditions.22
Scythian domination of the Black Sea steppe therefore begins in the mid-7th 
century BCE. Ethnically, the Scythians, like their predecessors, the Cimmerians, 
and their successors, the Sarmatians, were Iranian peoples.23 Until the end of 
the 7th century BCE, these people played an important political role through-
out West Asia. Their military presence in the region came to an end at the 
hands of Cyaxares, the king of the Medes.24 The remnants of the Scythian army 
returned to the Black Sea steppe no later than the early 6th century BCE. Here, 
according to the accounts of Herodotus, the nomads had to fight their own 
rebellious slaves.25 Perhaps this story, in which folk tale elements predomi-
nate, is a distant echo of some real uprising by the Scythians’ subjects,26 as the 
nomads had indeed subjugated numerous settled communities. This state of 
affairs appears to be confirmed most clearly by the ethnonyms of the Scythian 
tribes provided by Herodotus. These seem to indicate that the western part 
of ‘Old Scythia’ was inhabited by agricultural communities: Scythian-tillers, 
Scythian-farmers, the Alazones, and the Callippidae.27 In the case of the 
20  The long presence of the Scythians in the northern Caucasus is supposedly evidenced by 
their invasions in West Asia, which lasted throughout the 7th century BCE. Their contacts 
with the North Caucasus ended only in the fifth century. Murzin 1979, 20; Vinogradov 
1972, 234; Il’inskaia, Terenozhkin, 1983, 14, 19, 33, 77; Harmatta 1990, 123–127; Makhortykh 
1991, 102–111.
21  Harmatta 1990, 119–120; Chochorowski 1993, 11.
22  Ivantchik 1999, 497–520 (He questions the fact that the Scythians attained political domi-
nance over West Asia, although he assumes their military presence in the region). Cf. 
Murzin 2005, 34.
23  Melyukova 1990, 99; Kretschmer 1921, 923–926.
24  Melyukova 1990, 100; Harmatta 1990, 119–120; Chochorowski 1993, 15.
25  Hdt. IV1 (pp. 198, 199), 3–4 (pp. 200–203).
26  Melyukova 1990, 100. Cf. Ivantchik (1999, 506).
27  Hdt. IV 17 (pp. 216–219).
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last two tribes, Herodotus adds that they were Hellenic Scythians, i.e., most 
probably closely integrated with the Greek population. Apart from the tribes 
mentioned above, the inhabitants of Scythia also included nomad Scythians 
and Royal Scythians. According to Herodotus, the latter group dominated, and 
considered the other Scythians to be their slaves.28 From Royal Scythians most 
likely arose a triad of rulers who led all Scythian ethnos. A political organism 
of this type was credited with withstanding an invasion by Darius, the ruler of 
Persia, in ca. 513–512 BCE.29
During the period of their domination on the Pontic steppe, the Scythians 
most likely maintained good contacts with the Greeks. This does not mean, 
however, that there were no tensions between the two sides.30 In general, 
however, the nomads’ interest in trade with the Greek colonies on the Black 
Sea and Sea of Azov in all certainly required them to keep their bellicosity in 
check.31 From the Scythians, the Hellenes mainly purchased grain, for which 
there was a great demand in Greece. Another object of trade were Scythian 
slaves, whose presence in cities such as Athens is confirmed extensively in 
Greek literature of the classical era (5th–4th century BCE).32 It cannot be ruled 
out that the Hellenes also purchased traditional nomadic products (milk, ani-
mal skins, horses, cattle, etc.).33 Among the Scythians, and among many other 
nomadic peoples, luxury goods produced in Greek craftsmen’s workshops 
were highly prized. Judging by the content of the graves of the Scythian aristoc-
racy, articles produced by Greek goldsmiths were particularly popular.34 The 
Steppe-dwellers also took advantage of the fact that an important trade route 
28  Hdt. IV 19–20 (pp. 218–221).
29  Hdt. IV 1 (p. 198, 199), 83–93 (p. 284–295); 97–98 (p. 298–301); 118–142 (p. 316–343). Many 
researchers share the opinion that this expedition is a historic fact: Smirnow 1974, 102–105; 
Melyukova 1990, 101; Christian 1998, 135. However, since the end of the 19th century there 
have been a number of critical voices: Bury 1897; Harmatta 1990, 128–129; Łowmiański 
1963, 121–122; Nenci 1958, 147; How, Wells 1912, 430–433; Hartog 1988, 191–226; Asheri, 
Lloyd, Corcella 2007, 573–574, 649–650, 661–669.
30  What is particularly interesting is the rather positive, though not idealized image of the 
Scythians in Herodotus. This may have been a consequence of his perspective as a his-
torian from Halicarnassus and of his focus on describing events in world history. In the 
everlasting war between East and West, the Scythians, as enemies of the Persians, like 
the Greeks, belonged to the latter faction. And from within such a broad perspective of 
history, smaller conflicts were probably not mentioned. Cf. Paroń 2012, 79. The existence 
of short-lived tensions in relations between the inhabitants of the steppe and the Greeks 
seems, however, almost certain. Vinogradov 2008, 15.
31  On Greek-Scythian economic relations: Christian 1998, 152–155.
32  Jacob 1928, 53–78; Hall 1989, 138–139.
33  Melyukova 1990, 105.
34  Kubczak 1978, 76–125, 140; Melyukova 1990, 105.
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connecting the Black Sea coast with Inner Asia ran through their territory. The 
Scythians benefited greatly from the trade in goods. Archaeological sources 
indicate that the nomadic aristocracy was most affluent in the 4th century 
BCE. This was the period to which the most opulent and most numerous 
archaeological finds attributed to the Scythians are dated.35
Both constant contact with Greek culture and the influx of great wealth 
must have brought significant changes to the socio-cultural and political life of 
the steppe-dwellers. The strong influence of Hellenistic culture in the 6th and 
5th century BCE is confirmed by Herodotus.36 Relatively early on, there was a 
fascination with Greek culture among Scythian elites. More widespread cul-
tural change is noticeable among the Scythians at the end of the 5th century 
BCE, when an intensifying process of sedentarization can be observed among 
some nomadic groups. They settled mainly in eastern Crimea and the Taman 
peninsula, later on the Lower Dnieper, at the mouth of the Dniester, and finally 
(from the 4th to the early 3rd century BCE) in the Don Delta.37 Despite these 
changes, nomads still dominated in terms of numbers. Their expansion even 
reached the forest steppe zone, as demonstrated by barrows discovered in the 
Kiev region dating back to the 4th and 3rd centuries BCE.38
According to many scholars, manifestations of power, expressed mainly 
through the consumption of luxury goods and special funeral rites (in par-
ticular, barrows from the 4th century BCE) testify to the Scythians’ creation 
of state structures.39 Greek and Latin sources credit the Scythian king Atheas 
with creating this steppe empire, which stretched from the Don to the Lower 
Danube.40 However, in 339 BCE he was killed at the age of 90 in a battle with 
the Macedonian King Philip II, who took as spoils 20,000 captives (women 
and children) and enormous herds of cattle and horses. This battle took place 
in the Lower Danube region.41 This fact, along with the nature of the spoils 
that fell to Philip, is said by some scholars to prove that the Scythians were 
35  Khazanov 1975, 240; 1978b, 429; Melyukova 1990, 101, 105; Murzin 2005, 34–35; Olbrycht 
2000a, 109.
36  Hdt. IV 76, 78–80 (pp. 274–283). The stories of Anacharsis and the Scythian King Skyles, 
who died at the hands of their own brothers for their cultural apostasy.
37  Khazanov 1975, 239; Melyukova 1990, 104; Christian 1998, 155.
38  Khazanov 1975, 240; Kubczak 1978, 107–125; Melyukova 1990, 104.
39  Khazanov 1975, 218f.; 1978b, 427 (According to Khazanov, the so-called First Scythian State 
had already been established during the period of the alleged domination of nomads over 
West Asia. The Second Scythian State was created on the Black Sea steppe); Melyukova 
1990, 105; Smirnow 1974, 109; Christian 1998, 149–152.
40  Khazanov 1975, 238–246; 1978b, 429.
41  Ius.-Trog. IX 2 (pp. 60–61); Strabo VII 3.18 (p. 226). Cf. Khazanov 1975, 245; Christian 1998, 
136; Murzin 2005, 38.
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then in retreat from the Sarmatians, who were attacking them from the east.42 
This leads to the question: Did the death of Atheas lead to the breakup of the 
Scythian state? Those researchers who believe that his death did not lead to 
its sudden fall would appear to be correct. The fact that the Scythians later 
defeated Zopyrion, one of Alexander the Great’s commanders, in the Siege of 
Olbia, testifies to their still considerable strength.43 Yet the Scythians’ military 
activity in the Lower Danube area does indeed raise questions. In 313 BCE, they 
invaded the lands south of the Ister, but were beaten back.44 Not long after-
ward (309 BCE), they were engaged in fighting in the Bosporan Kingdom.45 
Both of these areas were very close to the territories over which the Scythians 
continued to maintain control. It thus seems that the final disintegration of 
the Scythian empire on the Black Sea steppe can be tentatively dated to the 
turn of the 4th and 3rd centuries BCE. The cause of its demise – simultaneous 
pressures from Thracian and Celtic tribes to the west, and the Sarmatians to 
the east.46
Following the fall of Great Scythia, in its place there arose two new political 
organisms, known collectively as the Lesser Scythias. The first was created in 
the area of modern-day Dobrudja by a group of Scythians who settled on the 
right bank of the Danube and remained there until the 1st century BCE.47 The 
second inhabited the mountainous and steppe regions of Crimea. During its 
height, its rulers also controlled the lands of the Lower Boh and Dnieper. This 
time of prosperity falls in the latter half of the 2nd century BCE, when the 
Lesser Scythia in Crimea was ruled by Skilurus. The Greek colonies recognized 
his sovereignty, a fact reflected in their minting of coins bearing the Scythian 
ruler’s likeness. Skilurus held control over all of north-west Crimea. The main 
source of his vast wealth was trade, which was now being carried on without 
the Greek cities acting as intermediaries. During the reign of Palacus, the son 
and successor of Skilurus, Crimean Scythia declined in importance. This was 
mainly due to the intervention of Mithridates VI Eupator, King of Pontus. His 
involvement in this region was welcomed by the Black Sea Greeks, who hoped 
to free themselves from the burdensome tutelage of the Scythians. An inva-
sion led by one of Mithridates’ military commanders, Diophantus, brought 
about the final defeat of Scythians and ended their control of the Greek colo-
nies, although the Scythian kingdom in Crimea survived until the invasion of 
42  Harmatta 1970, 16.
43  Ius.-Trog. XII 1 (p. 78). Cf. Harmatta 1970, 17; Melyukova 1990, 106.
44  Diod. XIX 73.4 (pp. 35, 36). Cf. Olbrycht 2000a, 118.
45  Diod. XX 24 (pp. 206–207).
46  Khazanov 1975, 245–6; Melyukova 1990, 107; Olbrycht 2000a, 118.
47  Khazanov 1975, 247–8; Melyukova 1990, 107.
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the Goths, i.e., until ca. 230. The final disappearance of the Taurian Scythians 
occurred during the Migration Period (Völkerwanderung).48
The abandonment by many nomads of the natural environment of the 
steppe resulted over time in changes in their lifestyle and means of support. 
In their late period (2nd century BCE–3rd century CE), the Scythians became 
a settled people. Their rulers did, however, make efforts to maintain their old 
traditions, traces of which can be found in the royal burial sites discovered in 
Scythian Neapolis.49
The Sarmatians became the political heirs of the Scythians. A series of events 
at the turn of the 4th and 3rd centuries BCE began a period of domination of 
the Black Sea steppe by this new group of Iranian tribes. Unlike the Scythians, 
the group described by ancient authors as the Sauromatians or Sarmatians 
was not a homogeneous political organism, but rather a collection of tribes 
that migrated into the area in successive waves. From a cultural point of view, 
these tribes can be regarded as homogeneous in the context of their nomadic 
lifestyle; there were, however, significant differences among them.50 The 
Sarmatians, like the Scythians, are considered by some scholars to be descen-
dants of the so-called ‘Timber-grave’ (Srubnaia) culture of the late Bronze 
Age.51 These researchers also tend to share the conviction that these two peo-
ples were closely related. Such a view was expressed in ancient times, beginning 
with Herodotus. He cited a legend according to which the Sauromatians were 
said to be descendants of Scythian men and conquered Amazons whom they 
had pardoned.52 Their language was also close to Scythian, being an ‘impure’ 
form of it, because the Amazon wives of the young Scythians never managed 
to learn to speak the language of their husbands well.53 Their joining forces 
to repel Darius’ invasion also points to friendly contacts existing between the 
Sarmatians and Scythians.54
However, some doubts are raised by the differences in the names used to 
refer to these people. In the case of older authors (Herodotus, Hippocrates) 
they appear under the name Sauromatians (Σαυρομάται). We hear about the 
Sarmatians (Σαρμάται) for the first time in the writings of the Greek historian 
48  Khazanov 1975, 248–251; Melyukova 1990, 107–108; Smirnow 1974, 113–119; Harmatta 1970, 
20–21, 23–24.
49  Melyukova 1990, 109–110.
50  Sulimirski 1970, 22–25; Christian 1998, 136–137.
51  Melyukova 1990, 99.
52  Hdt. IV 110–116 (pp. 308–317).
53  Hdt. IV 117 (pp. 316, 317).
54  Hdt. IV 119 (pp. 318, 319).
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Polybius, in his accounts of events dating back to 179 BCE.55 Later writers 
(Strabo) use both ethnonyms interchangeably or have a very vague idea of the 
relationship between them (Pliny the Elder).56 Thus, the question arises as to 
whether we are dealing with two, perhaps related, but nevertheless separate 
ethnic groups. The majority of modern researchers favour the recognition of 
both names as lections of the same ethnonym. The main argument for this 
is the names given to the Alani, which in Ptolemy’s work has been preserved 
as Alaunoi (Ἇλαῦνοι).57 The older ethnonym continued to be used in archaeol-
ogy only as a conventional device for separating the early stage of the develop-
ment of Sarmatian culture (the Sauromatic period, 7th–4th century BCE) from 
later phases.58
Some researchers, however, go further, distinguishing two spheres of culture 
‘provisionally labelled Sarmatian’.59 The first encompassed the area between 
the Don and Volga, while the second area lay between Samara and the Ural 
mountains. The Don-Volga region is said to correspond to the nomadic settle-
ment area of Herodotus’ Sauromatians, whose relations with the Scythians 
were generally good. For this reason, when Sauromatian tribal groups began 
moving west of the Don in the late 5th century BCE and settled in the area 
of the Maeotis,60 this migration did not cause a deterioration in the relations 
between these two peoples.61 Such a state of peace lasted until the expansion 
of the Samaran-Ural group, who, according to some researchers, comprised 
the bulk of the Sarmatians.62 Around the 4th–3rd century BCE, a portion 
of the population of the southern Urals moved to the Lower Volga Region, 
conquering the Sauromatians living here. As a result, new ‘Sarmatian’ tribal 
groups formed, which in the 3rd century BCE then began an invasion of the 
Black Sea steppe.63 These observations appear to be confirmed by informa-
tion supplied by Diodorus Siculus, a writer from the 1st century BCE, who 
claimed that the Sauromatians came to Europe from Media and settled to the 
east of the Maeotis and the Don.64 As the years passed, he says, their numbers 
grew (auksethentas – the use of this phrase may indicate that the population 
55  Polyb. XXV 2.13 (p. 176). Cf. Łowmiański 1975b, 56; Harmatta 1970, 17–18, 43.
56  Plinius IV 80 (p. 178), VI 16 (p. 348), VI 19 (p. 350). Cf. Łowmiański 1975b, 56.
57  Łowmiański 1975b, 56.
58  Łowmiański 1975b, 56.
59  Melyukova 1990, 110.
60  Hippocr. XVII (p. 116). Cf. previous chapter.
61  Melyukova 1990, 111.
62  Melyukova 1990, 112.
63  Melyukova 1990, 112.
64  Diod. II 43.6 (pp. 28, 29).
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increased as a result of migration) and they ravaged large part of Scythia 
and turned most of the land into a desert.65 Some scholars have argued that 
archaeological data does not indicate that a direct link existed between the 
Sauromatians and the Sarmatians in the 3rd century BCE.66 In light of such 
claims, it seems necessary to establish the exact relationship between these 
two ethnonyms. Even if the two peoples were closely related, this does not 
mean they should be identified as a single group.
Due to the scarcity and fragmentary nature of available sources, this chronol-
ogy of Sarmatian-Scythian conflicts is somewhat speculative. Some research-
ers have expressed their conviction that the first clashes between these two 
peoples occurred as early as the 4th century BCE. The above-mentioned actions 
of the Scythian king Atheas in the Lower Danube region were prompted by 
his loss of the eastern Black Sea steppe to the Sarmatians. His efforts were an 
attempt to compensate for the territories his people had lost and to acquire 
new lands from which to continue to defend themselves against incursions 
by the Sarmatians.67 However, the failure of Zopyrion’s attack, as well as the 
rich artefacts found in Scythian burial mounds, most often dating back to the 
4th century BCE, seem to indicate that in the last decades of that century 
the Scythian state still possessed considerable vitality. Its fall probably did 
not occur until the next century and, as noted above, was not brought about 
solely by the Sarmatians. The Scythians’ migration was also a result of changes 
in the policies of the new Hellenic rulers of Iran towards steppe-dwellers in 
Central Asia at the end of the 4th century BCE.68 A series of nomadic inva-
sions and subsequent retaliatory expeditions by the Seleucides are believed 
to have triggered ethnic displacements which led the Sarmatians to resettle in 
the North Caucasus area. The first mentions of their inhabiting the Black Sea 
steppe date back to the 3rd century BCE. Valuable information is found in the 
so-called “Decree of Protogenes”, an epigraphic source from Olbia. We learn 
from it that the inhabitants of the Greek colony were forced to pay tribute to 
Saitaphernes, ruler of the Saioi, usually identified with the Royal Sarmatians 
65  Diod. II 43.7 (pp. 28, 29): τούτους [Sauromatians – A.P.] δʼ ὕστερον πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν αύξηθέντας 
πορθη̑σαι πολλὴν τη̑ς Σκυθίας, και τοὺς καταπολεμηθέντας ἄρδην ἀναιρου̑ντας ἔρημον ποιη̑σαι 
τὸ πλεισ̑τον μέρος τη̑ς χώρας. Cf. Olbrycht 2000a, 110–114.
66  Melyukova 1990, 112.
67  Harmatta 1941, 52; 1970, 16; Sulimirski 1970, 101 (He claims that Atheas was not the ruler of 
all the Scythians, but only of the western elements that took refuge in Dobrudja).
68  Olbrycht 1979, 44; 2000a 118–119.
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described by Strabo. He mentions two other new peoples, considered by schol-
ars to be Sarmatians: the Thyssamatae and Saudarmatae.69
In the 2nd century BCE, the Sarmatians were a significant force on the Black 
Sea steppe. This is evidenced by references to the Sarmatian king Gatalos 
in a peace treaty signed in 179 BCE by Farnaces, King of Pontus,70 as well as 
an appeal by the Sarmatian queen Amage (ca. 165–140 BCE) to the Crimean 
Scythians to halt their attacks on Greek cities.71 All of these facts indicate 
that in the 3rd and 2nd century BCE a strong tribal confederation, led by the 
Royal Sarmatians, dominated the Black Sea steppe. This included the Iazyges, 
who lived along its western frontier, the Urgi, and the Roxolani, who inhab-
ited the area between the Dnieper and the Don.72 This tribal confederation’s 
control extended over the Black Sea steppe from the Danube to the Don. The 
Greek Pontic cities also fell under its authority for a time, until Mithridates VI 
Eupator, King of Pontus wrested control of them from the Sarmatians. This 
was followed by an agreement that led to a kind of political equilibrium. This 
alliance allowed the Sarmatians to begin expanding their political control over 
the Lower Danube area, where for a time they ruled over the Triballi.73
The death of Mithridates VI (63 BCE) and the disintegration of the Sarmatian 
confederation (ca. 61 BCE) led to the collapse of this political order. Greek 
Pontic cities came under Roman rule, while in the western part of the Black 
Sea steppe, the Dacians, headed by King Burebista, continued their expansion 
into the area. In ca. 50 BCE Burebista conquered and methodically weakened 
Olbia, which never regained its former glory.74 However, the changes described 
here did not signal the definitive fall of the Sarmatians, though some tribes 
did indeed disappear from history; this is especially true of the so-called Royal 
Sarmatians. Moreover, no supra-tribal Sarmatian political power would ever 
again come into being. The Iazyges and Roxolani, however, survived this period 
of weakness and re-established themselves around the close of the century. The 
first group resettled on the Lower Danube, and their attacks in this region are 
mentioned by Ovid (early 1st century).75 Soon, however, the Iazyges migrated 
69  IOSPE I 32 (pp. 43–56). Cf. Harmatta 1970, 10–12; Łowmiański 1975b, 57; Sulimirski 1970, 
131–132; Olbrycht 2000a, 120; 2004, 333.
70  Polyb. XXV 2.13 (p. 176). Cf. Harmatta 1970, 19; Sulimirski 1970, 132–133; Olbrycht 2000a, 121; 
2004, 334.
71  Harmatta 1970, 16–17; Sulimirski 1970, 135. Other researchers date Amage’s intervention 
earlier, to 3rd century BCE: Rostovtzeff 1931, 16; Olbrycht 2000a, 120; 2004, 333.
72  Strabo VII 3.17 (pp. 220–222).
73  Harmatta 1970, 12–34, 39–40; Olbrycht 2004, 337–340.
74  Harmatta 1970, 29–31; Sulimirski 1970, 133–134.
75  Harmatta 1970, 41; Sulimirski 1970,134; Melyukova 1990, 113.
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onto the Hungarian Plain. Their path probably ran south through Oltenia and 
Banat.76 The Iazyges were persuaded to relocate their settlements by Roman 
diplomats, who used them to create a buffer zone between the territories of 
the empire and the warlike Dacians.77 A no less important reason for this shift, 
however, was the ethnic displacements taking place on the Caspian steppe in 
the early 1st century. Acting as a rearguard for the Sarmatians were the Alani, 
who subjugated two Sarmatian tribes living between the Volga and the Don: the 
Aorsoi and the Siraces.78 The Roxolani, in turn, under pressure from the Siraces, 
filled the space left by the departure of the Iazyges.79 The most active group in 
the 1st century, however, was the Alani, who terrorized the South Caucasus 
(Transcaucasia) and West Asia with their invasions. In 68 CE their presence 
was also affirmed on the steppe of the northern Azov region.80 The Roxolani, 
who attacked the Danube provinces of the Roman Empire, were also highly 
active.81 In the late 2nd century, they began to leave the Black Sea steppe, and 
migrated in a series of waves to the Hungarian Lowlands, where they brought 
the Iazyges under their control. The migration of the last Roxolani groups was 
probably accelerated by the arrival on the Pontic steppe of the Goths.82 This 
event marked the end of the Sarmatians’ political domination in the western 
areas of this steppe. The eastern part (to the east of the Don) remained in the 
hands of the Alani, whose rule there ended with the arrival of the Huns.83 Some 
independent Alani groups remained in the Caucasus,84 while others travelled 
west to reach Gaul and Spain during the Great Migration,85 while still others 
chose to become subjects of the Huns.86
76  Harmatta 1970, 41.
77  Harmatta 1970, 42.
78  Harmatta 1970, 42; Sulimirski 1970, 142. The much more powerful Aorsi are sometimes 
associated with the An-ts’ai/Yen-ts’ai people, known to Chinese sources. Olbrycht 1998, 
135; 2000a, 125. Another view is represented by K. Czeglédy (1983, 50–51, 53), who identi-
fies Yen-ts’ai with the Alani and believes that they originally belonged to the Aorsi fed-
eration, which controlled vast steppe areas from the Don to the lower reaches of the 
Syr Darya. After the fall of the Aorsi (around 50 CE), the Alani assumed control of the 
federation.
79  Harmatta 1970, 48–49; Sulimirski 1970, 137, 139.
80  Harmatta 1970, 48–49 (The Alani did not reach the Danube in the 2nd century CE). 
Sulimirski 1970, 142–143; Melyukova 1990, 113; Olbrycht 2000a, 126–128.
81  Sulimirski 1970, 137.
82  Harmatta 1970, 45–49; Sulimirski 1970, 167–168.
83  Sulimirski 1970, 162; Melyukova 1990, 113.
84  Sulimirski 1970,198–201; Melyukova 1990, 113.
85  Sulimirski 1970, 186–188.
86  Sulimirski 1970, 188–194.
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The Sarmatians, although related to the Scythians, never reached their level 
of development. Some researchers believe that they also failed to create their 
own state.87 Thanks to their control of the Black Sea steppe, Sarmatian tribal 
unions were able to develop trade relations with Greek cities on the coast of 
the Pontos, as well as with West Asia (mainly with Parthia).88 In the 1st cen-
tury we can see a marked influx of Sarmatian immigrants from all social strata, 
including the aristocracy, into the cities on the northern coast of the Black 
Sea.89 The Sarmatians also actively participated in the political life of the 
Bosporan kingdom, founded at the beginning of the 5th century BCE, backing 
a succession of candidates to the throne.90 The Sarmatians possessed strong 
cultural formation skills, as testified by their role in the development of the 
Cherniakhov and Saltovo-Maiaki cultures.91
2.2 Gothic Episode
As noted above, the 3rd century brought sweeping changes to the Black Sea 
steppe, as the political domination of Iranian nomadic groups in the region 
came to an end. The expansion of their successors, the Goths, into the area 
came from an unusual and thus surprising direction: the northwest. According 
to Jordanes, who wrote in the mid-6th century, they migrated from the leg-
endary island of Skandza,92 which he called a “hive of races” and a “womb 
of nations”.93 They were ruled by King Berig, who settled with his people in 
a region known as Gothiscandza.94 According to some researchers who gen-
erally accept Jordanes’ account, this region was located at the mouth of the 
Oder River.95 At some point, the Goths began a march through Pomerania 
toward the lower Vistula River, where Germanic settlement consolidated and 
stabilized.96 Their settlement of this area was supposedly noted by Claudius 
Ptolemy, who stated that the area south of the Vistula Veneti, on the right bank 
87  Melyukova 1990, 116. For another opinion: Iatsenko 1993, 83–88; 2003, 88–99 (in terms of 
social and cultural development, the Sarmatians were almost equal to the Scythians).
88  Harmatta 1970, 34–39; Olbrycht 1998, 221–231.
89  Melyukova 1990, 115–116.
90  Sulimirski 1970, 123.
91  Sulimirski 1970, 170, 201–202.
92  ‘Insula magna, nomine Skandza’. Iord. 16 (p. 58).
93  ‘[…] Skandza insula quasi officina gentium aut certe velut vagina nationum […]’. Iord. 25 
(p. 60).
94  Iord. 25–26 (p. 60).
95  Strzelczyk 1984, 66; Kokowski 2008, 26–36.
96  Strzelczyk 1984, 66–67.
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of the lower Vistula, was the seat of the Gythones,97 whom most scholars iden-
tify as Goths. Material traces of their presence in this region includes sites of 
Wielbark culture.98
However, during the reign of King Filimer, the fifth successor to Bering, the 
decision was made to leave the ethnos’ current area of settlement. According 
to Jordanes, this was due to overcrowding among the Goths.99 When Filimer 
reached Scythia, he established his rule over a land known as Oium,100 the 
name of which has been translated as ‘meadow’ or ‘pasture’ (German Aue).101 
Archaeological data indicate that during the 2nd and 3rd centuries, a close-
knit group of peoples, distinct from those around them, migrated over time 
from the region of eastern Pomerania through Mazovia, Podolia, Volhynia and 
Ukraine towards the Black Sea.102 This migration is usually identified with 
what Jordanes called “the march of the Goths”.103 However, the course of this 
journey was longer and more complicated than he imagined, and most likely 
spanned the reign of more than a single ruler.
Once the Goths reached the Black Sea steppe, they came into contact with 
the Sarmatian tribes who were the dominant force in the region. The Goth’s 
territorial ambitions in Oium inevitably led to clashes with those living there. 
Scattered references to these battles are found in traditional sources. Jordanes 
states, for example, that the Goths first defeated the Spali (this is implied by 
the logic of his narrative), and then marched victoriously, occupying all of 
Scythia, until they reached the Pontic Sea.104 In reality, however, the course of 
events was certainly not as clear-cut as Jordanes claims. It is difficult to state 
with certainty when the first Goths reached the Black Sea steppe, when their 
migration into the area ended, or how these newcomers conquered and ruled 
over these lands. The terminus ante quem for their arrival is usually given as the 
date of the first Gothic invasion of the Roman Empire, i.e., the attack on Histria 
(Istros) at the mouth of the Danube in 238 CE. The Goths made this attack with 
the support of the Carpi, a Dacian people with whom they had formed a loose 
alliance. The Carpi withdrew their forces, however, after the Romans agreed 
97  Kl.Ptol. III 5.20 (p. 304).
98  Strzelczyk 1984 66; Wolfram 1990, 50; Kokowski 2008, 39–67.
99  Iord. 26 (p. 60).
100 Iordanes, 27 (p. 60).
101 Zwolski 1984, 95; Łowmiański 1963, 261; Wolfram 1990, 52.
102 Strzelczyk 1984, 64; Heather 1996, 35–39.
103 Strzelczyk 1984, 66; Kokowski 2008, 71–97, 159–174.
104 Iord. 28 (pp. 60–61).
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to pay them an annual tribute, leaving their discontented allies alone on the 
battlefield.105
There are no reports of further military activity by the Goths in the northern 
limes of the empire over the course of the next decade. The first group of Goths 
arrived in Scythia before 238 CE.106 It can logically be assumed that additional 
Gothic groups migrated to the Black Sea steppe over the course of the decade 
separating the two previously-mentioned attacks on Rome.107 During this 
period, the Goths completed their conquest of the region. The Greek colonies 
on the Black Sea coast (Tyras, Tanais) apparently held off their attacks some-
what longer, because they first began to serve as sea bases for further invasions 
only after ca. 250 CE.108 It is difficult to say which of the Sarmatian tribes were 
the first to be conquered by the Goths, and how seriously to treat Jordanes’ ref-
erences to the Spali. The existence of such an ethnos is confirmed by Pliny the 
Elder, who wrote in the 1st century CE, but he places them on the banks of the 
Maeotis.109 There is no way of knowing for certain whether they had still occu-
pied settlements in the area in the first half of the 3rd century CE.110 However, 
if this were the case, it would mean that the Goths began the conquest of their 
future homeland from its eastern edge, which is hard to imagine. It is also 
unclear why the Gothic tradition distinguishes this particular group,111 as it is 
very likely that all of the lands east of the Danube and west of the Maeotis and 
the Don were under the control of Gothic tribes.
Having imposed their rule on the peoples of Scythia, and most likely bol-
stered by waves of Germanic migration, the Goths resumed their attacks on 
the Roman Empire. Up until the mid-3rd century, their main area of pen-
etration was the Danube provinces,112 but in the latter half of the century, 
a wave of Gothic invasions was aimed at securing lands along the Black Sea 
coast. These incursions were probably launched from port-towns of the for-
mer Bosporan Kingdom. Control of these ports, along with an alliance with 
105 Łowmiański 1963, 264; Strzelczyk 1984, 59, 88; Kotula 1994, 71–72; Wolfram 1990, 54; 
Heather 1996, 40, 47.
106 Strzelczyk 1984, 87; Kotula 1994, 71. Goths’ incursions may have led to an earlier crisis and 
the fall of Olbia during the reign of Severus Alexander (222–235 CE).
107 Łowmiański 1963, 264.
108 Strzelczyk 1984, 87, 90; Wolfram 1990, 58–59; Kotula 1994, 77.
109 Plinius VI 22 (p. 352).
110 Some researchers tended to locate the Spali to the west of the Don (Łowmiański 1963, 
260), or between the Don and the middle Dnieper (Sulimirski 1970, 163).
111 Herwig Wolfram (1990, 53) states that their name in Slavic means ‘giants’, which is a com-
mon term for outsiders.
112 Strzelczyk 1984, 88–90; Wolfram 1990, 54–58; Heather 1996, 40.
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the local population (the Borani tribe, based along the coast of the Maeotis, 
was noted to have taken part in one of the first invasions) allowed the Goths 
to transport their forces and launch attacks by sea.113 Their invasions reached 
ever more distant shores on the Black Sea. After an initial unsuccessful attack 
on the city of Pithyus (255 CE) in the western Caucasus, a succession of attacks 
gradually penetrated ever further along the eastern and southern shores of the 
Pontos Euxeinos (Black Sea), ultimately reaching the waters of the Propontis 
(today’s Sea of Marmara). The next target of the Goths’ attacks were cities of 
Bithynia (257 CE).114 Fierce attacks by the Goths and other allied peoples con-
tinued between 260 and 269. In 267, the Herules (Heruli), perhaps assisted by 
the Goths, crossed the Propontis and sailed with a fleet of 500 ships into the 
Aegean Sea to attack Greece. Athens, Sparta, Argos, Corinth and Olympia were 
all taken and plundered.115 However, an unsuccessful invasion in 269 and fur-
ther military defeats at the hands of Rome116 led to a sharp decline in attacks by 
Goths on the cities of the Mediterranean world. The year 270 marked a reversal 
of the Goths’ fortunes. They were defeated by the forces of Claudius Gothicus 
and his successor Aurelian. This marked the beginning of a period of peace 
on the empire’s Danube border that lasted for a century with only intermit-
tent interruptions. Some scholars are inclined to assume that the conciliatory 
attitude of the Goths at this time was also due to upheavals taking place within 
the ethnos itself. According to Herwig Wolfram, a combination of events, 
including defeats in battles with the Romans and the evacuation of Roman 
Dacia ordered by Aurelian, severely tested the unity of the Goths and acceler-
ated the process of their splitting into the Visigoths (Tervingi) and Ostrogoths 
(Greuthungi).117 There were already two distinct Gothic sub-groups in the year 
291, when the Romans first noted the existence of two Gothic ethne.118 The 
Ostrogoths, the dominant group of the two, were credited with defeating the 
Alani and Urugundi on the Don basin. As inhabitants of the Black Sea steppe, 
the Ostrogoths are also the group of primary interest to us, though the history 
of this people, who lived farther away from the borders of the Roman Empire, 
113 Strzelczyk 1984, 90–91; Wolfram 1990, 58–59; Kokowski 2008, 165–166.
114 Strzelczyk 1984, 90–91; Wolfram 1990, 59–61; Heather 1996, 40–41.
115 Strzelczyk 1984, 92; Wolfram 1990, 62–63; Heather 1996, 41. The last two authors date this 
expedition to the spring of 268. Cf. Kotula 1994, 79–85.
116 Still in 268, the Goths suffered a significant defeat in the Battle at the Nessos River (on the 
border of Thrace and Macedonia). The following year, they suffered a devastating defeat 
to Claudius II Gothicus on the Naissus (today the Niš). Kotula 1994, 85–112; Strzelczyk 
1984, 92–94; Wolfram 1990, 64–65; Heather 1996, 41.
117 Wolfram 1990, 65–66. Cf. Strzelczyk 1984, 94–95.
118 Strzelczyk 1984, 95; Wolfram 1990, 67.
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is less well known than that of the Visigoths. We know for certain that power 
within the group was held by the Amali royal family. They created what Herwig 
Wolfram describes as a military kingdom, unlike the Visigoths, among whom 
power rested with an aristocratic oligarchy.119
The Goths’ conquest of the Black Sea steppe brought the region’s ethnically 
diverse population under their rule; they thereby replaced Iranian nomadic 
groups – i.e., Sarmatian and Sarmato-Scythian tribes – as the dominant force 
on the steppe.120 A political system headed by the Amal clan was created in 
the area controlled by the Greuthungi. It was physically manifested in the 
rise of Cherniakhov culture, a highly developed culture that was dominant 
throughout the steppe and forest steppe regions, and extended in some places 
to forested areas. The peoples living within its borders supported themselves 
primarily from farming and cattle breeding. Its artisans produced high-quality 
handicrafts, including metalwork in both iron and non-ferrous metals, and 
specialized in the production of pottery and glass. It should be noted that 
despite the Goths’ political dominance, Iranian groups played a significant 
role in the formation of the Cherniakhov culture, as did Geto-Dacian in its 
western extremes.121 A process of ‘Scythianization’ can even be seen among the 
Greuthungi, especially in spheres related to the art of war. Following the exam-
ple of the Sarmatians, the Ostrogoths are said to have created mounted units 
armed with lances and swords.122 These forces could cover large distances eas-
ily, which helped the Amali to maintain order among the peoples under their 
rule. In addition to its steppe elements, the influences of provincial Roman set-
tlements are also clearly visible in Cherniakhov culture.123 These cultural influ-
ences, especially those of the peoples living within the Ostrogothic Kingdom, 
were conducive to the formation of a distinct ethnic amalgam. The material 
benefits derived from incursions against the Roman Empire and the peoples of 
the northern Black Sea steppe further strengthened this process. The invasion 
of the Huns can thus be seen as interrupting the formation of a new ethnic 
culture.124
This Goth-dominated political structure’s period of greatest splendour came 
under Ermanaric (Ermanaricus), ‘the noblest of the Amali’,125 whose reign 
119 Strzelczyk 1984, 68; Wolfram 1990, 95, 123.
120 Szymański 1973, 27; Sulimirski 1970, 170.
121 Szymański 1973, 26–27; Sulimirski 1970, 170; Magomedov 2001, 113–132; Kokowski 2008, 
199–217.
122 Wolfram 1990, 123; Kotula 1994, 68.
123 Szymański 1973, 27; Kokowski 2008, 199f.
124 Strzelczyk 1984, 61; Magomedov 2001, 140–147.
125 ‘Hermanaricus nobilissimus Amalorum’. Iord, 116 (p. 88).
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dates back to the mid-4th century.126 According to Ammianus Marcellinus, 
Ermanaric was ‘dreaded by the neighbouring nations because of his many 
and varied deeds of valour’.127 Additional information comes from Jordanes, 
who claimed that through his conquests he came to rule all the peoples of 
Germania and Scythia.128 He says the first victims of his conquests were 13 
ethne: the Golthescytha, Thiudos, Inaunxis, Vasinabroncae, Merens, Mordens, 
Imniscaris, Rogas, Tadzans, Athaul, Navego, Bubegenas, Coldas.129 The identi-
fication of these groups remains under discussion today. The first two peoples 
are usually mentioned in combination and described as: ‘the golden peo-
ples of the Urals’, with the suffix scytha- being considered a gloss by a later 
copyist.130 Somewhere in this vicinity lived the Imniscaris. The Vasinabroncae 
were the ‘inhabitants of a flat country with lush grass, rich waters and swamps’. 
The next two ethnonyms probably refer to the Mari and Mordvins, Finno-Ugric 
tribes that inhabited the Volga region in the Middle Ages. The Imniscaris 
(In Old Rus’ Mescera means ‘beekeepers’) belonged to the same ethnic group. 
The next two names, when merged, give *Roastadjans, i.e., ‘inhabitants of the 
Volga coast’. This was most likely a group living on the river’s left bank, opposite 
the Mordvins.131 There remains uncertainty as to the identity of the last four 
ethnonyms.132 Later victims of Ermanaric’s expansion included the Herules, 
who lived on the Maeotis; the Venedas, a large but not particularly warlike 
Slavic group; and finally the Aests (Aesti), who inhabited the coast of the 
Germanic Ocean (Baltic Sea).133 The military successes described by Jordanes 
indicate that the lands under the rule of the Ostrogoth king stretched across 
the European continent from the Black Sea in the south to the Baltic Sea in the 
north, and from the Dniester and Vistula Rivers in the west to the Oka, Volga 
126 Szymański 1973, 27; Strzelczyk 1984, 68; Magomedov 2001, 141–143.
127 Amm.Marc. XXXI 3.1 (pp. 394, 396).
128 ‘[…] idem ipse prudentia et virtute subregit omnibusque Scythiae et Germaniae nationi-
bus ac si propriis lavoribus imperavit’. Iord. 120 (p. 89).
129 Iord. 116–117 (p. 88).
130 Wolfram 1990, 96. Other possible interpretations are offered by Jerzy Strzelczyk (1984, 70). 
The Golthescytha were hypothesized to be the Goliad’, a Baltic people who lived on the 
upper Oka in the early Middle Ages. The Thiudos were supposed to a term for the Chud, 
an ancient Rus’ name for Finnish tribes.
131 Strzelczyk 1984, 69, 71; Wolfram 1990, 96.
132 The Finnish scholar Jooseppi Mikkola has suggested that peoples from the Rogas to the 
end of Jordanes’ list should be located on the foothills of the Caucasus. His reasoning 
was based on an old Armenian geography by Movses Khorenatsi (8th century). Mikkola 
also suggests (probably correctly) that Ermanaric conquered well-developed areas 
(Kulturgegenden), which were located along major trade routes. Mikkola 1922, 56–66; 
Łowmiański 1963, 399–400 (critical on Mikkola’s findings); Strzelczyk 1984, 71.
133 Iord. 117–120 (p. 88–89).
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River basin and Urals in the east. It is hard to believe that Ermanaric was able 
to create such a vast, unified political organization. Some of the ethne under 
his rule inhabited lands two thousand kilometers from the Goths’ core settle-
ments. Scholars have justifiably concluded that Ermanaric’s ‘empire’ can be 
divided into two parts. The first was a core area, limited to the lands inhabited 
by people of the Cherniakhov culture. The second consisted of lands under the 
Amali king’s protectorate.134 These lands included important trade routes used 
since early antiquity as a link between the Mediterranean, the Baltic Sea region 
and Central Asia, which in part explains the Ostrogoths’ motives for seeking 
to control them.135 The political system created by ‘the noblest of the Amali’ 
resembled the Pax Chazarica four centuries later,136 which had at its centre a 
strong and well-organized state (the Khazar Khaganate), to which numerous 
tribes pledged their allegiance. One of the reasons that this Khazar ‘empire’ 
was established was to protect and control the key trade routes that ran along 
the Volga River. This both provided the Khazars with guaranteed revenue from 
trade and allowed them to develop a rational, organized system for exploiting 
the resources of the region’s inhabitants. It cannot be ruled out that Ermanaric, 
was also interested in moving beyond plundering and securing a steady source 
of income from trade. However, the political system he created covered an 
area much larger than that of the Khazars. Its vast scale is confirmed by the 
active contacts maintained between the Black Sea Goths and the peoples liv-
ing within the Baltic Sea zone137 and in the Mediterranean area. The relatively 
long presence of the Ostrogoths on the Black Sea steppe provided them with 
a good understanding of the region’s political and economic importance and 
its links with the interior of the continent. In addition, defeats in battles with 
Rome in the late 260s and early 270s and the subsequent disintegration of a 
unified Gothic political structure ultimately determined the direction of the 
Greuthungi expansion. While Ermanaric is traditionally considered the cre-
ator of this Ostrogoth ‘empire’, it cannot be ruled out that his predecessors had 
134 Wolfram 1990, 96–97.
135 Wolfram 1990, 96. The fact that the Goths occupied an area of such great trade impor-
tance is widely accepted: Skarzhinskaia 1960, 266 (note 367); Łowmiański 1963, 400–401; 
Strzelczyk 1984, 74–75. However, the possible consequences of this fact are interpreted in 
various ways. Skarzhinskaia believes that the Goths maintained purely commercial rela-
tions with the people on Jordanes’ list. Henryk Łowmiański assumes that trade was also 
accompanied by Gothic invasions, though these did not result in the imposition of politi-
cal control. Jerzy Strzelczyk hypothesizes there existed some form of tributary or military-
political dependence (forced alliances).
136 The author of this term, although he uses it in a slightly different sense, is Ananiasz 
Zajączkowski (1947, p. 77).
137 Urbańczyk 2000, 115.
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expressed similar aspirations. However, he was the one who managed to fully 
realize these intentions and to give the primitive raiding attacks of his fore-
bears a more purposeful and rational form.138
2.3 Period of Dominance of Turkic Nomads
The political structure Ermanaric created proved to be quite fragile. Its col-
lapse was brought about by the arrival of a new hegemon on the Black Sea 
steppe: the Turkic Huns. Their migration is of major importance to the his-
tory of Europe, especially its south-eastern regions. I am thinking here not only 
about the Huns initiating the ‘migration of peoples’, which was to contribute to 
the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, but also to a number of important 
political and ethnic shifts that affected the entire Eurasia steppe, from the Volga 
River basin to the Hungarian plain. At the end of the 4th century, this area fell 
under the political domination of Turkic peoples, who gradually replaced the 
Indo-European groups living there.139 Turkic nomads enjoyed a long, uninter-
rupted period of political supremacy on the Black Sea and Caspian steppe that 
only ended with the arrival of the Mongols in the 13th century.
Despite the great importance of their migration, our knowledge about 
the Huns’ original area of settlement is limited. According to Ammianus 
Marcellinus’ Res gestae, the Huns originally inhabited areas stretching from 
the Maeotic Sea to the Glacial Ocean.140 Similar information can be found 
in Jordanes’ account.141 On the basis of these descriptions, little can be said 
about the Huns’ geographical homelands. It is also difficult to determine how 
far to the east their nomadic settlements reached. In Ammianus Marcellinus’ 
account, there is a tendency to locate the Huns at the borders of the ecumene, 
a suitable place for a people said to ‘exceed every degree of savagery’.142 We 
know even less about the origins of this tribe. Ammianus states that little was 
known by his predecessors about the Huns. Zosimos of Panopolis offers a ste-
reotypical genealogy, ascribing Scythian origins to them, while Jordanes pro-
vides a legendary origo, according to which the Huns were descendants of the 
offspring of evil spirits and witches (the Halirunnae) who had been sent into 
exile by King Filimer.143 This information does not allow us to say anything 
138 Kokowski 2008, 167.
139 Łowmiański 1963a, 228–229; Czeglédy 1983, 29.
140 Amm.Marc. XXXI 2.1 (p. 380).
141 Iord. 123 (pp. 89–90).
142 Amm.Marc. XXXI 2.1 (p. 380).
143 Amm.Marc. XXXI 2.1 (p. 380); Zos. IV 20.3 (p. 174); Iord. 121–122 (p. 89).
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certain about the ethnogenesis of this people, but it clearly shows how great a 
shock their arrival created in the Mediterranean world.144
The findings of modern researchers do not provide much new informa-
tion. In the eighteenth century, the French orientalist Joseph De Guignes 
hypothesized that a link existed between the so-called ‘European Huns’ and 
the Xiongnu (Hsiung-nu) people,145 who created a strong steppe empire near 
China and for many centuries posed a serious problem for their neighbours.146 
However, during a period of crisis in the Xiongnu state early in the Common 
Era, part of this ethnic group migrated to the west.147 The European Huns are 
said to have later emerged from these peoples. This traditional concept has 
long been and continues to be accepted by many scholars,148 but numerous 
researchers have doubts about this explanation. It cannot be ruled out that 
some groups of Xiongnu survived the collapse of their state, and joined the 
ranks of the European Huns after moving westwards. However, it is extremely 
difficult to prove this was indeed the case because there are no clear references 
to either of these two peoples during the period between the collapse of the 
Xiongnu state and the arrival of the Huns in Europe.149
The first victims of the Huns were the Alani, who lived on the Don. They 
were most likely conquered early in the 370s.150 Following this victory, the Huns 
turned to the Kingdom of Ermanaric. Despite his initial efforts to challenge 
their invasion, the aging ruler was unable to halt the aggressors and committed 
suicide.151 It is very likely that the arrival of the Huns unleashed tensions within 
Ermanaric’s multi-ethnic state. It is strongly suggested by Jordanes’ account 
of events during this period152 that such tensions contributed significantly to 
the collapse of the monarch and his political system. Ermanaric’s successor, 
144 On the origo of the Huns: Maenchen-Helfen 1944a, 244–251; Tyszkiewicz 2001, 81–90.
145 Guignes 1756, 215–218.
146 Dąbrowski 1975, 29–35; Jagchid, Symons 1990, 24–36, 52–67, 114–120, 141–144, 165–170; Di 
Cosmo 2002; Barfield 1992, 32–84.
147 Dąbrowski 1975, 35.
148 Hirth 1899, 245–278; Gumilev 1966; Cf. Łowmiański 1963a, 229 (n. 704); Czeglédy 1983, 33; 
Tyszkiewicz 2004, 11–32; Kliashtornyi, Savinov 2005, 33, 35; Botalov 2009, 32; Hyun Jin Kim 
2013, 26–31.
149 Maenchen-Helfen 1944, 222–243 (for a systematic analysis of the arguments in favour of 
such an identification of both peoples); 1973, 444–455; Sinor 1990, 178–179; Yu Taishan 
2014, 233–264 (he analyzes the arguments justifying the identification of both peoples 
in order to conclude that the identity of the Huns and Xiongnu cannot be proven on the 
basis of these arguments). Cf. Łowmiański 1963a, 229–230.
150 Amm.Marc. XXXI 3.1 (pp. 394, 396). Cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 19–23; Dąbrowski 1975, 43; 
Sinor 1990, 180.
151 Amm.Marc. XXXI 3.2 (p. 396).
152 Iord. 129–130 (pp. 91–92). Cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 21–22; Strzelczyk 1984, 77–78.
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Witimir, identified by Jordanes as Winitar (Vinitharius), fought to maintain his 
people’s independence, but was eventually killed in battle by Balamber, ruler 
of the Huns.153 The Ostrogoths, like the Alani before them, were forced to 
submit to the rule of the invaders. They were now placed under the rule of 
Hunimund, a member of the Amali line and a vassal of the Huns. A group of 
Ostrogoths who refused to submit to the rule of the nomads left their peo-
ple, and ultimately were given refuge in the Roman Empire.154 These events 
occurred in ca. 375. The Huns soon took control of the lands up to the Dniester 
River, where Athanaricus, iudex (i.e., ‘judge’, as opposed to rex) and leader of 
the Visigoths, tried to halt their further expansion. But after twice suffering 
defeats on the battlefield, his rule was challenged by his people. Most Visigoths 
sought refuge within the Roman Empire, while Athanaricus and his followers 
took control of Caucaland,155 an area usually located in the sources in either 
Transylvania156 or Banat.157 The influence of the Huns had now reached the 
Lower Danube, and soon contacts were established with Rome, which at the 
time was preoccupied with defending themselves from the Goths.
The organization of the Huns’ society during this period is worthy of special 
attention. Available sources say very little on this subject, and much of what is 
written is fragmentary and based on stereotypes. Outside of Balamber, whose 
historicity is questioned by some researchers,158 we know none of the names 
of the Huns’ rulers from the mid- to late-4th century. The names of the first 
chiefs are known only from an account describing events dating back to 395. 
Such the case, it can be concluded that until the beginning of the 5th century 
we cannot speak of the existence of a single ruler to whose authority all Hun 
groups submitted. Individual tribal units are believed to have enjoyed con-
siderable independence, as evidenced by the ease with which they were able 
to shift their allegiance to Rome and acquire the status of foederati.159 Some 
scholars even suggest that there was no strong sense of solidarity or ethnic 
awareness among the Huns. It would seem, however, that a great deal of cau-
tion needs to be exercised in regard to such findings, due to the unreliability 
153 Amm.Marc. XXXI 3.3 (p. 396); Iord. 246–249 (pp. 121–122). Cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 
22–23; Sinor 1990, 180.
154 Amm.Marc. XXXI 3.3 (p. 396); 12,12 (p. 468); Iord. 250 (p. 122). Cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1970, 
26–27; Sinor 1990, 180.
155 Amm.Marc. XXXI 3.4–8 (pp. 396, 398, 400); 4/12 (pp. 406, 408); Iord. 131–133 (p. 92).
156 More precisely, in the Strâmba river valley (Hungarian: Tekerőpatak), which is a tributary 
of the Mureş river (Hungarian: Maros).
157 The area between the Mureş (Hungarian Maros), Tisza and Danube Rivers. Maenchen- 
Helfen 1973, 25–26.
158 Thomson 1948, 57.
159 Sinor 1990, 181–182.
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of the sources at our disposal. Compared to the period analyzed here (very 
late 4th century), these sources are few in number and burdened with strong 
negative stereotypes. Their authors, even ones as outstanding as Ammianus 
Marcellinus, present the Huns as wild, lawless creatures, deprived of moral 
principles and growing out of a horse’s body like a centaur.160 ‘Though they live 
in the form of men, they have the cruelty of wild beasts’, writes Jordanes.161 The 
Huns’ alleged lack of leaders fits perfectly with the image of them as a horde 
of wild animals, devoid of leadership. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine 
that nomads capable of defeating theoretically better organized enemies (e.g., 
the Ostrogoths and Visigoths) would have fought without commanders.
The Huns’ main settlements at the end of the 4th century were most likely 
located on the Black Sea steppe. This is indicated by their incursions deep into 
West Asia. In 395–396, the Huns launched a major invasion led by Basich and 
Kursich through the Caucasus into Armenia, Syria, Palestine, and northern 
Mesopotamia. The aim of this attack was apparently plunder, as evidenced by 
the fact that the invaders took large herds of cattle.162 The type of booty taken 
suggests that the Huns’ invasion may have been prompted by hunger they 
were suffering on the Pontic steppe.163 In the west, nomadic groups controlled 
Pannonia, Wallachia, and Dobrudja. The lands of the latter became the starting 
point for attacks on Rome, which became widespread in the 5th century. These 
were carried out by Uldis – the second Hun ruler (after Balamber) known 
to us by name – who is known to have invaded Thrace two times (404–405, 
408).164 The purpose of these invasions was primarily plunder and there was 
no attempt by the Huns to instate their rule on lands belonging to the Empire.
In 412–413, Olympiodorus of Thebes was sent to the Huns on a diplomatic 
mission. Accounts of his work as an envoy have been preserved only in frag-
mentary forms. We do not know exactly who he represented. Some research-
ers believe he was an agent of Emperor Honorius and met with the Hun king 
Charaton in Pannonia. Others believe that he was sent by Theodosius II and 
that the meeting place was the Black Sea steppe. We also do not know the pur-
pose of this mission.165
160 Amm.Marc. XXXI 2. 2–11 (pp. 380, 382, 384, 386).
161 Iord. 128 (p. 91): Hi vero sub hominum figura vivunt beluina saevitia. English translation: 
Mierow 2007, 75.
162 Prisc. 11.2 (pp. 276, 278) Cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 51–59; Sinor 1990, 182. The expedition 
of Basich and Kursich to West Asia described by Priscos sometimes is dated back to 420–
430: Demougeot 1979, 517–518; Kazanski, Mastykova 2009, 123–124; Kazanski 2009, 85.
163 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 52; Sinor 1990, 183.
164 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 59–72; Sinor 1990, 184–185.
165 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 73–74; Sinor 1990, 185–186.
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We hear about the Huns again in accounts of a major invasion in 422 dur-
ing which they ravaged Thrace and reached the gates of Constantinople. Two 
kings, Roas (Rugila, Ruga) and his brother Octar, ruled jointly over the Huns. 
The people’s political affairs were handled by Roas, who also led its military 
expeditions. He forced Theodosius II to sign a peace agreement which pro-
vided for payment by the Eastern Roman Empire of a tribute in the amount of 
350 pounds of gold a year.166 However, from the time of Roas to the 440s, the 
Huns’ rulers continued to actively engage Byzantium along its Balkan border. 
As in the time of Uldis (Ulti), the nomads’ military actions in the region were 
not aimed at territorial expansion. The objectives of both Roas and Octar and, 
later, Attila and Bleda, were limited to extracting ample tributes, demanding 
the extradition of fugitives who had taken refuge within the Empire, and sell-
ing back the Romans they held in captivity for a handsome sum.167
After a peace with the Western Roman Empire had been consolidated in 
432/3, the Huns made preparations for another invasion of the Byzantine 
Empire. The reason for this was said to be their desire to pacify certain tribes 
that the Hun ruler considered to be his subjects and which had taken refuge 
within the territory of the empire. The sudden death of Roas did not save 
Constantinople from danger, because his successors, Attila and Bleda, contin-
ued the political course set by their uncle. To maintain the peace, Byzantium 
was forced agree in 433 to double its annual tribute, pay amends for fugitives in 
its territory, and conclude a trade agreement with the Huns.168
For the next several years, there was peace in the Balkans. The nomads 
did not cross the empire’s border, which ran along the Danube, even in the 
face of growing arrears in Constantinople’s tribute payments. However, a new 
conflict, the exact course of which is unclear, erupted in 441 and ended in a 
severe defeat for the empire.169 The provisions of the peace agreement, dated 
447, were extremely harsh. Constantinople would now have to pay an annual 
tribute of 2,100 pounds of gold (six times as much as in 422), was obliged to 
immediately pay 6,000 pounds in payments in arrears, once again pay amends 
for fugitives who had taken refuge in the empire, and finally, agree to withdraw 
from a strip of land south of the Danube five-day’s travel in width. This ‘demili-
tarized zone’ was intended to allow for easy observation of the movements 
166 Prisc. 2 (p. 224). Cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 76, 81–94; Sinor 1990, 186–188.
167 The ransom increased in successive arrangements: in 433 it was 8 gold pieces, in 447–12 
pieces per head. Prisc. 2 (p. 226), 9.3 (p. 236).
168 Prisc. 2 (pp. 224, 226). The agreement of 433 covers the equal treatment of Huns and 
Romans in marketplaces. Cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 90; Sinor 1990, 188.
169 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 102–123.
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of military units and people in the area.170 It is difficult to say whether this 
last point of the agreement was ever carried out. The imminent death of 
Theodosius II (27 July 450) and a radical change in policy towards the Huns 
by his successor Marcian suggest that such a withdrawal never took place.171
At this time, we can also observe greater involvement by Attila in the West. 
His intentions now were much more ambitious and far-reaching, including 
winning the hand of Augusta Honoria, sister of Emperor Valentinian III, and 
with this marriage, attaining great influence in the Western Roman Empire.172 
Attila invaded Gaul in 451, but his troops were defeated in the Battle of the 
Catalaunian Fields by a coalition of Roman and Visigoth armies. As a result 
of this defeat, Attila failed to achieve the main goal of the campaign, i.e., the 
destruction of the Roman legions in Gaul.173 However, this was not the begin-
ning of the end for the Huns or for Attila. This was demonstrated the following 
year, when the Huns invaded northern Italy and plundered the cities of the Po 
Valley. This time, too, the invasion was not a complete success. According to 
tradition, Attila abandoned plans for a march on Rome after being persuaded 
to do so by Pope Leo I. Otto Maenchen-Helfen believes the primary reason for 
this decision was actually an epidemic that had begun to decimate the ranks 
of the barbarians. It also cannot be ruled out that Attila met with a determined 
defence that halted his advance at the foot of the Apennines.174
The sources we have at our disposal provide a much more palpable account 
of the history of the Huns’ involvement in fighting in the Balkans and Western 
Europe. Yet for our purposes, much more important is their activity in the east 
of the Continent, with a particular emphasis on the Black Sea and Caspian 
steppe. Indeed, in Attila’s time and even earlier, it cannot be ruled out that the 
centre of the Huns’ lands was in the west. In the mid-5th century, this was the 
area between the Danube and Tisza (Tisa) Rivers. However, there is no rea-
son to believe that the Huns gave up control of the Black Sea steppe during 
this period,175 as it remained a region of great strategic importance, and was 
170 Prisc. 9.3 (p. 236), 11.1 (p. 242). Cf. Wirth 1960, 41–69; Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 124–125; Sinor 
1990, 189–190.
171 Sinor 1990, 192.
172 Prisc. 20.1 (pp. 304, 306), 20.3 (pp. 306, 308). Cf. Gračanin 2003, 62, 64–67; Tyszkiewicz 
2004, 141–160.
173 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 129–131.
174 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 132–141; Sinor 1990, 192–196.
175 According to Priscos of Panion, Attila ‘ruled the islands of the Ocean and, in addition to 
the whole of Scythia, forced the Romans to pay tribute.’ Whatever is meant by the second 
of the geographical concepts mentioned by the Byzantine diplomat, it seems that it prob-
ably covers significant stretches of the Eastern European steppe. Prisc. 11.2 (p. 276). On 
the possible meanings of the use of this phrase by Priscos: Paroń 2006, 448, 450; 2013, 226. 
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close to the heart of the lands they controlled. The Huns’ interest in this area 
is demonstrated by incidents related to a failed diplomatic mission carried out 
by an unknown agent of Theodosius II to the Akatziri. Information about this 
mission, the aim of which was the forming of an alliance with the Akatziri, is 
found in the writings of Priscos of Panion.176 If Byzantium had been success-
ful, it would have gained a very valuable ally, as the Akatziri inhabited areas 
to the rear of the Huns. Constantinople’s plans, however, were never realized 
because one of the tribal chiefs, Kouridachus, reported the Byzantine plot. 
In 445, a punitive expedition was launched against the tribes which had con-
spired with Constantinople.177 All of the Akatziri leaders, with the exception of 
Kouridachus, were placed under the rule of Ellac, Attila’s eldest son.178
The death of Attila (453) and the Huns’ defeat in the Battle of Nedao (454 
or 455) resulted in a sudden disintegration of their empire. The nomads suf-
fered huge losses, with nearly 30,000 warriors killed, including Ellac.179 
Those who survived the slaughter withdrew under the command of Irnich to 
‘Lesser Scythia’ (probably today’s Dobrudja), while Ellac’s place was taken by 
Dengizich. In 466, the brothers approached Emperor Leo I with a proposal for 
peace and a request to designate sites through which the Huns could trade 
with Byzantium. The Emperor’s refusal infuriated Dengizich, who began prep-
arations for renewed military action; Irnich, however, preferred a different 
path of action, and for a time conflict was avoided.180 But this calm did not 
last long. Three years later, Dengizich died in battle fighting the Romans in an 
effort to win the status of foederati for his people. The surviving nomads took 
refuge within the empire.181 At this point, we hear nothing more about Irnich 
and the Huns under his rule. The fact that his name is found second on a list of 
Archaeological data also support similar conclusions. Remnants of material culture dis-
covered in the area, ranging from the central Danube to the Ural Mountains and western 
Kazakhstan, show a number of similarities. Researchers, however, distinguish two sepa-
rate regions, the border of which ran along the Dnieper River. The western region is said 
to have been inhabited by the Huns, while the eastern regions were inhabited by peoples 
subordinate to them. Kazanski, Mastykova 2009, 114–126; Kazanski 2009, 65–404.
176 Prisc. 11.2 (p. 258).
177 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 103–105.
178 Sinor 1990, 190–191; Kazanski, Mastykova 2009, 124 (researchers locate Akatziri’s dwell-
ings on the Don and in the Crimea).
179 Iord. 262 (p. 125). Cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 147–151; Sinor 1990, 197–198.
180 Prisc. 46 (p. 352). Cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 165–166 (believes that the settlements of 
Dengizich and his people were located in the area of today’s Wallachia).
181 Prisc. 48 (p. 354). Cf. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 166–168.
73Black Sea-Caspian Steppe: Ethnic and Political Relations
Bulgar princes seems to indicate that his people may have survived and later 
become part of the Bulgar tribal union.182
But was he able to maintain his hegemony on the Black Sea steppe? 
Probably not. Political changes were taking place in the region triggered by 
new migrations dating back to ca. 463. According to Priscos of Panion, the 
Black Sea steppe was invaded at that time by peoples of the Saragur, Ugor and 
Onogur tribes. These tribes were forced to leave by the Sabir people, who in 
turn were forced to migrate by the Avars, who were said to be fleeing from 
a horde of man-eating griffins (sic!).183 This last piece of information is most 
likely a topos borrowed from Herodotus by which the author tries to explain 
the reason for the Avars’ migration, which he apparently does not know.184 The 
above-mentioned tribes are usually labelled together in scientific literature as 
Oghuric tribes; before their arrival on the Black Sea steppe, they probably lived 
in western Siberia and the steppe of Kazakhstan. Some researchers assume 
that they comprised the western part of a tribal union referred to by Chinese 
sources as T’ie-lê.185 Western Siberia, the Ili River valley and western Tien-Shan 
were the seat of the Sabirs.186 The expansion of the Avars, who forced the 
Sabirs to migrate, was probably the root cause of the defeat inflicted on them 
by China in 460.187 After arriving on the Black Sea steppe, the Oghurs quickly 
became the dominant force in the region. Initially, the dominant position was 
held by the Saragurs, who in 467 conquered the Akatziri and other unknown 
peoples.188 They soon attracted the attention of Byzantine diplomats. Having 
formed an alliance with Constantinople, the Saragurs directed their military 
forces against the Persian empire.189 Afterwards, however, there is no further 
mention of their name in the sources.190
The first mention of the Bulgars, who at that time were allied with Emperor 
Zenon against Theodoric, ruler of the Ostrogoths, dates back to 480. The eth-
nonym ‘Bulgar’, which is usually translated as ‘mixed’, was applied to vari-
ous peoples, but predominately to Huns and Oghurs. Their area of activity 
in the coming centuries would range from the North Caucasus to the Lower 
182 Sinor 1990, 198–199; Golden 1980, 43; 1990, 256–257.
183 Prisc. 40.1, 40.2 (p. 344).
184 Moravcsik 1930, 55–59.
185 Czeglédy 1983, 35–37, 100, 109–110; Golden 1990, 257.
186 Czeglédy 1983, 37, 100; Golden 1990, 257.
187 Golden 1990, 258.
188 Prisc. 40.1, 40.2 (p. 344).
189 Prisc. 47 (pp. 352, 354). Cf. Czeglédy 1983, 97–98; Romashov 1992–94, 218–19.
190 Moravcsik 1930, 59–62. The last mention of the Saragurs is made by Zacharias Rhetor 
(6th c.). Cf. Golden 1990, 258; Romashov 1992–94, 219 (the scholar assumes that their exis-
tence as an independent ethnos came to an end as the result of their defeat by the Turks).
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Danube.191 At the turn of the fifth/sixth century, strong ethne may have already 
existed here. The area east of the Dnieper and west of the Don, and perhaps as 
far as the lower Danube, was occupied by the Kutrigurs. Their neighbours to 
the east were the Utigurs, who lived between the Don and Kuban Rivers. The 
nomadic settlements of the Onogurs were located on the Kuban River itself.192 
The relations between these tribal groups and Byzantium, especially those of 
the Kutrigurs, took various shapes. Periods of peace and cooperation were inter-
woven with invasions and armed confrontations. In 499 the Bulgars broke their 
alliance with Constantinople and began a series of invasions, which at inter-
vals of several years plagued the Balkan provinces of Byzantium. In 517 they 
reached Thermopylae, and in 530 they ravaged Illyricum.193 In the same year, 
Kutrigur troops fought as an ally of the Empire in Italy.194 In the years 539–540 
they once again became an enemy of Byzantium. During their invasions, which 
date back to the mid-sixth century (551, 559), they reached Constantinople 
and entered Greece and Asia Minor. Due to Justinian the Great’s diplomatic 
efforts, a fratricidal war broke out between the Utigurs and Kutrigurs, which 
resulted in a short break in the Bulgars’ attacks on Byzantium.195 The appear-
ance of the Avars on the Black Sea steppe temporarily lessened the threat from 
the Bulgars.196
In the early years of the next century, another participant in the migration 
of 463, the Sabirs, settled in the Volga region and the northern Caucasus, where 
they quickly became the dominant political force. In 508, they devastated 
Armenia, and in later years, fought as an ally of Byzantium against Persia.197
At the turn of the fifth and sixth centuries, a rather short-lived balance of 
power emerged on the Black Sea and Caspian steppe. The western part of the 
region was controlled by Oghuric tribes, and the eastern part by the Sabirs. 
However, this political order broke down in the mid-6th century following the 
arrival of the Avars.
The relationship between these Avars and those mentioned in the accounts 
of Priscos of Panion is unclear. Until recently, both were generally identified 
as the same group, and it was assumed that the forerunner of this ethnos was 
191 Beševliev 1981, 75; Romashov 1992–94, 205–208, Pohl 2008, 281–282; Ziemann 2007, 38–39, 
44–45.
192 Romashov 1992–94, 209–217, 251; Wasilewski 1988, 32–33; Golden 1990, 258; Ziemann 
2007, 95–103.
193 Beševliev 1981, 77–81; Wasilewski 1988, 33.
194 Golden 1980, 34–36; 1990, 258–259.
195 Syrbe 2012, 295–298.
196 Beševliev 1981, 95–101; Wasilewski 1980, 33.
197 Golden 1990, 259–260.
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what is known in Chinese sources as the Rouran Confederation.198 In 551, an 
uprising against the Rouran broke out among the Göktürk people, who lived 
under their rule. They quickly brought down the state established by their for-
mer rulers and forced them to flee westward. As in the case of the Huns, how-
ever, the issue of their ethnogenesis is complicated.199 The main role in the 
formation of this nomadic group was probably not played by the defeated and 
discredited Rouran, although some aspects of their political organization were 
quite likely incorporated into that of the Avars.
In 557 or 558, the Avars established contacts with Constantinople.200 They 
quickly brought the Sabirs, Alani, and all three Oghuric tribal unions under 
their rule.201 Their reign, however, proved to be rather short-lived, as in 567 the 
Avars were forced to moved on to Pannonia under pressure from newly-arrived 
Göktürks.202
Ultimately, in spite of resistance from the Onogurs and the Alani, the 
Göktürks had few problems bringing the steppe region under their control.203 
The fact that Persia was a common enemy for both Byzantium and this new 
dominant power on the Black Sea steppe opened up opportunities for politi-
cal cooperation between the two. However, the Byzantines’ delay during a 
previously arranged joint campaign angered the Göktürks, who in retalia-
tion attacked and occupied the Crimean Boporus. The expansion of nomadic 
groups also affected the northern Caucasus, where Abkhaz tribes, among 
others, were conquered. Hostility between Constantinople and the rulers of 
the Ashina clan continued up until the collapse of the Turkic Khaganate.204 
The main reason for its downfall was a civil war fueled by China’s Sui dynasty 
(584). In 604, the political unity of the khaganate was ultimately broken, and 
it splintered into two rival orders: eastern and western. The latter included ter-
ritories to the west of the Dzungarian Basin. Continual internal conflicts led 
to the weakening of the Western Turkic Khaganate. However, the death blow 
was struck by the powerful Chinese Tang Dynasty, which until the end of the 
seventh century would maintain a weak, vassal khaganate in its place.205
198 Czeglédy 1983, 105, 106–107, 118.
199 Szymański 1979, 25–31; Pohl 1988, 278–281; Yu Taishan 2014a, 297–325.
200 Pohl 1988, 37–38; Golden 1990, 260.
201 Pohl 1988, 39–40; Golden 1990, 260.
202 Pohl 1988, 49–51; Golden 1990, 260.
203 Romashov 1992–94, 228–230; Golden 1990, 260.
204 Golden 1980, 38–39; 1990, 260–261; Sinor 1990a, 304–305.
205 Gumilev 1993, 135–147, 154–160; Golden 1980, 39; Sinor 1990a, 305–308; Romashov 1992–
94, 231–2.
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The loosening of Turkic control over the Pontic-Caspian steppe, caused 
by the issues described above, led to changes in political relations within 
the region. On the one hand, there was a return of Avar influences, espe-
cially in the western part of the Black Sea steppe. At the turn of the 6th and 
7th centuries, the Avar Khaganate was at the height of it power and posed a 
serious threat to Byzantium.206 Yet there was also a progressive strengthening 
of Oghuric tribes, the strongest of which turned out to be the Onogurs, whose 
settlements were on the Kuban River. The Onogurs took part in the T’ie-lê 
confederation’s uprising against the Göktürks.207 They also sought to eman-
cipate themselves from Avar influence. This last fact made them a natural ally 
of Byzantium. Friendly relations with Emperor Heraclius were maintained by 
Orkhan, the Onogur Khan. In 619 he arrived with his family and an extensive 
entourage to Constantinople, where he was baptized and received the rank 
of patrician from the Emperor.208 His nephew Kubrat, a member of the Dulo 
clan, was taken as a hostage to Byzantium, where he accepted Christianity. 
In 635, he defeated the Avars and renounced his allegiance to the Turks. During 
his reign, so-called Great Bulgaria was created, stretching from the Kuban to 
the Dnieper and including the tribal union of the Kutrigurs, who had previ-
ously been under Avar rule. Kubrat, like his predecessor, maintained friendly 
relations with Constantinople, whose support allowed him to create a vast 
political body.209 However, the hegemony of the Onogur Bulgars on the Black 
Sea steppe did not last long. By the mid-7th century disruptive forces began 
to show themselves. According to Byzantine sources, at the time of his death, 
Kubrat had five sons who, despite his father’s admonitions, failed to maintain a 
united front, and divided their people instead. This state of affairs made them 
vulnerable to outside enemies like the Khazars, and around 660, Great Bulgaria 
disintegrated under pressure from them.210 The various sons of Kubrat all 
reacted differently to the threat posed by the Khazars. The oldest son Batbaian 
(Βατβαιᾶν/Βαιανός) remained in his homeland and came to terms with Khazar 
206 Szymański 1979, 32–41; Pohl 1988, 58–59, 128–162, 237–255; Kliashtornyi, Savinov 2005, 
92–101.
207 Czeglédy 1983, 109–112; Golden 1990, 261.
208 Golden 1980, 44; Wasilewski 1988, 33.
209 Moravcsik 1930, 71; Wasilewski 1988, 33; Beševliev 1981, 145–148; Golden 1980, 44; 1990, 
261–262; Romashov, 232–244; Kliashtornyi, Savinov 2005, 98.
210 Dunlop 1954, 41–43; Tryjarski 1975, 174–176; Beševliev 1981, 149–155; Wasilewski 1988, 33–34; 
Golden 1980, 44–45; 1990, 262; Romashov 1992–92, 249–250. The relationship between the 
fratricidal struggle between Kubrat’s sons and the Khazar attack is unclear and has been a 
frequent topic of discussion. Recently, Veselina Vachkova (2008, 351 (n. 25) has described 
this issue as a typical academic problem.
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rule. Kotrag (Κᾠτραγος) withdrew north to the Don.211 His people later made 
their way (no earlier than the mid-8th century) to the Volga in the environs 
of the Kama River Estuary, where a state known as the Volga-Kama Bulgaria 
was established. A group led by Asparukh (Ἀσπαρούχ), another son of Kubrat, 
crossed the Dnieper River and settled on the lower Danube around 680, giving 
rise to the First Bulgarian Empire. Finally, the last two unnamed sons, whose 
existence is often questioned by scholars, were to move to the westernmost 
lands with their peoples. One reached Pannonia, where he recognized the sov-
ereignty of the Avars; the other travelled to Italy and settled near Ravenna. In 
this way, the legend attempts to explain the presence of Bulgar groups in Italy 
and Pannonia.212
In the latter half of the 7th century, the rulers of the Khazar Khaganate 
became the new masters of the Black Sea and Caspian steppe. This political 
organism deserves a closer look for a number of reasons, the most impor-
tant of which – its longevity and stability – are of exceptional importance in 
steppe conditions. Not much is known about its origins. It was most likely an 
amalgam of nomadic tribes (including Sabirs, Oghurs and Göktürks) headed 
by a charismatic Turkic family, which were the main elements contributing 
to the creation of the Khazar Khaganate.213 The early history of the Khazars 
is therefore very closely connected with the history of the Turkic Khaganate, 
and more specifically with the period of its domination in the western part of 
the Great Steppe. The Khazars emerged suddenly from the chaos that arose 
during the weakness and fall of the Western Ashinids and created a new khga-
nate. Information about the Khazar language is scant and often contradictory. 
Arabic writers suggest it was similar to other Turkic languages, although they 
also emphasize its specificity. The few extant pieces of linguistic evidence seem 
to indicate a close affinity with what has been dubbed the ‘common Turkic 
language’, but, as Peter Golden states, there is no definitive proof of this.214 
Between the 7th to the mid-9th centuries, the Khazars’ expansion spread 
across vast areas of the Black Sea and Caspian steppe, sporadically extend-
ing even beyond these borders. The Khaganate’s influence stretched from the 
Kama River in the north to the Caucasus in the south, and from the Don and 
211 This interpretation has been rejected by István Zimonyi, who rightly points out that in 
the Byzantine tradition descriptions of events associated with the break-up of ‘Great 
Bulgaria’ contain no mention of any group of refugees that supposedly reached the con-
fluence of the Kama and the Volga. Zimonyi 1990, 62–63.
212 Moravcsik 1930, 71–73; Tryjaski 1975, 175–176, Golden 1990, 262–263.
213 Pletneva 1976, 14–23. Golden 1980, 58–59; 1990, 263; 2005, 57–59.
214 Golden 1980, 51–57; 1990, 263–264; Erdal 2005, 125–139 (He is highly sceptical of the 
assumptions made to date).
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Donets Rivers in the west to the Ural River in the east. Like the kingdom of the 
Goths in the 4th century, this political organism had a territorial core located 
in the region of the Volga estuary and the steppe of the North Caucasus. The 
remaining areas were Khazar protectorates. It cannot be ruled out that from 
at least the first half of the 9th century the sovereignty of the Khaganate was 
recognized by the lands of East Slavdom, including Kiev.215
Such a vast and ethnically diverse organism was characterized by its strong 
vitality. Up until the mid-10th century, the Khazar Khaganate was the stron-
gest state in Eastern Europe, and the main force determining the political 
relations in the region. It was able both to effectively limit the migration of 
warlike nomads from the Transvolga Region and Inner Asia and to hold back 
Arab expansion. The Khazars created a political order with a high level of sta-
bility and security in the light of steppe conditions. Ananiasz Zajączkowski 
described it as the Pax Chazarica.216 The Polish scholar noted that it allowed 
for the creation of optimal conditions for the development of trade in the 
region, which was centred along the Volga River,217 with the Khaganate’s last 
capital (Itil) lying on its delta near the Caspian Sea.218
Other forms of economic activity also expanded greatly in the Khazar state. 
This is indicated by archaeological remains of the Saltovo-Maiaki culture, 
which was centred in the basin formed by the Don, Donets and their tribu-
taries. Remains of it have also been found in Dagestan, Eastern Crimea and 
on the Black Sea steppe. A slightly different variant of Saltovo-Maiaki culture 
has been also observed along the central Volga. It existed from the mid-8th to 
the 10th century, and therefore corresponds to the period of splendour and 
gradual disintegration of the Khazar Khaganate. The creators of this archaeo-
logical culture are said to have been peoples from within the Khaganate, but its 
territorial range does not fully coincide with the that of the Khazar state. Based 
on a comparison of funeral rites, the closest archaeological match is between 
two groups under Khazar rule, the Bulgars and the Alani. The first of these 
peoples, who were based in the steppe north of the Sea of Azov, buried skeletal 
215 Golden 1980, 86–88; 1990, 264; Pletneva 1976, 43–60. According to an account by Ahmed 
ibn Fadlan from the first half of the 10th century, the ruler of Khazaria collected tribute 
from 25 peoples whose leaders were likewise obliged to give him their daughters in mar-
riage. ibn Fadlan-Yaqut: ibn Fadlan, 256/7. Cf. Dunlop 1954, 140–2.
216 Zajączkowski 1947, 77; Cf. Boba 1967, 226.
217 Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 1975, 422–431.
218 On Khazar cities: Artamonov 1962, 178, 211, 219–220, 222–3, 234–5, 387–8, 398–9; Pletneva 
1967; Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 1978, 125–134; Romashov 2004, 189–264; Flerov 2011 (the 
researcher consistently proves that there were no Khazar cities. He even refuses to con-
sider Itil a city); Zhivkov 2015, 196–212.
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remains in grave pits, while the latter, who lived somewhat further north in 
the forest-steppe zone, buried their dead in catacomb tombs. A significant 
part of the population of the Saltovo-Maiaki culture made a living from ani-
mal husbandry. Traces of yurts discovered by archaeologists testify to their 
connection to a nomadic lifestyle. However, remains of this culture have also 
been found in settlements and strongholds. We can thus observe a progressive 
process of sedentarization, with a large part of the population living a settled 
or semi-settled lifestyle, and engaging in activities typical of such a lifestyle. 
Land cultivation was also on an advanced level, as indicated by the agricultural 
tools discovered (ploughs with iron fittings, sickles). Gardens and vineyards 
were also cultivated, and hunting and fishing played an important role in the 
economy, as well, providing a source of additional income for both shepherds 
and farmers. Crafts were also well-developed, including smithing, goldsmith-
ing, and pottery-making, which is unusual for nomads. Production of this kind 
flourished mainly in towns and strongholds. Yet among the settled population 
there were also signs of continued nomadic traditions. It is believed that some 
farmers left town each spring, and returned in autumn with their harvests.219
The diversity of the Khaganate’s population in terms of material culture 
is accompanied by a diversity in terms of spiritual culture. This can best be 
seen in religious practices. With time, Judaism became the dominant religion, 
i.e., the religion practiced by the Khazar elites. It is difficult to determine the 
date of this conversion and the circumstances surrounding it. It most likely 
occurred over a period of time between 750 and 850.220 The conversion of the 
elites, however, was not linked to persecution of believers of other religions. 
Evidence of tolerance towards dissenters is found in information preserved in 
al-Masudi’s writings. Writing in the 10th century, the Arab author mentions the 
appointment by the Khazar rulers of seven judges who were to pass sentences 
219 Pletneva 1967, 144f.; 1999, 7–23; Hilczer-Kurnatowska 1975, 30–34; Noonan 1995–97 
253–318; 2007 207–244. The last scholar believes that the highly diversified nature of the 
Khaganate’s economy, i.e., the existence of such a wide range of economic activities, a 
diversity exceptional on the steppe, made the Khazar state particularly resilient. At the 
same time, he states that the main source of crisis within the state, and to a considerable 
extent, the reason for its downfall, was a decline in the importance of the Volga trade 
route in the late 9th century. Thomas Noonan thus recognizes the crucial role of trade in 
the Khaganate’s economy. A slightly more nuanced picture has been recently presented 
by Boris Zhivkov: 2015, 171–220.
220 Dunlop 1954, 85f.; Artamonov 1962, 264–290; Pletneva 1976, 62; Golden 1983, 134–139; 
Petrukhin 2001, 111–113; Zuckerman 1995, 241–250 (he dates the conversion to Judaism to 
861 or soon afterwards); Kovalev 2005, 220–253; L’vova 2005, 143–152 (the Russian scholar 
assumes that the first khagan to follow Judaism was Aibat (after 690–730/1).
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in accordance with the laws in force for a given religious group. Christians, 
Jews, and Muslims had two judges each, while pagans had one.221
The foreign policy of the Khazar rulers often involved entering into alliances 
with Byzantium, although relations between successive khagans and basileis 
were not always friendly.222 This cooperation between the two states dated 
back to 626, when the Khazars fought as allies of Emperor Heraclius in his 
campaigns against the Avars and Persians.223 The subsequent destruction of 
Great Bulgaria, also an ally of Byzantium, as well as competition for influence 
in the Crimea and South Caucasus certainly distanced the two states from each 
other. The main factor contributing to the improvement of Khazar-Byzantine 
relations seems to have been the threat from the Arabs. The Khazars had been 
fighting wars with them since 642. Initially, this fighting did not bring much 
success to either side. In 737, a military breakthrough occurred that posed 
great dangers for the Khazars. The Arab leader and future caliph Marwan ben 
Muhammad successfully invaded the Lower Volga and occupied the heart 
of the Khaganate. The Khazar ruler was forced to fee and seek refuge in the 
territory of his vassals, the Burtas. The Khazars, wanting to preserve at least 
some of their people’s cultural distinctiveness, recognized the sovereignty of 
the Caliph and adopted the Muslim religion. This forced conversion was soon 
renounced, and war once again broke out between the two sides. A conflict 
began that continued without resolution until the end of the 8th century. With 
time a lasting political balance was re-established in the Caucasus region. The 
city of Derbent (Bab al-Awab) marked the border of the two sides’ spheres of 
influence. Yet, contrary to popular belief, the Khazars did not so much stop 
Arab expansion into the region as merely provoke conflicts with the Caliphate 
through their bellicose actions and attacks.224 However, this does not change 
the fact that their hostile attitude towards the Islamic world naturally brought 
them closer to Byzantium.
The role played by the Khazar Khaganate on the Black Sea steppe was a 
second argument for convincing Constantinople that friendly relations should 
be maintained. Thanks to the Khazars, from the middle of the seventh century 
to the end of the ninth century, we do not hear of any serious ethnic shifts in 
221 Al-Masudi, 11; Pellat 1962, 162. Cf. Por. Dunlop 1954, 93, 206–207; Golden 1990, 266. For 
more on the subject of the Khaganate’s ideological and religious syncretism: Zhivkov 
2015, 17–126.
222 The existence of such a close relationship between the Khazars and Byzantium has been 
justifiably questioned by Noonan (1992, 109–132).
223 Golden 1980, 50–51; Gumilev 1993, 196–201.
224 Dunlop 1954, 45–87; Pletneva 1976, 35–42; Golden 1980, 59–65; 1990, 264–265; Wasserstein 
2007, 373–386.
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the region of Black Sea-Caspian steppe. The only exception, dating back to the 
beginning of the second third of the 9th century, was the migration of Magyars, 
which did not lead to any major political perturbations. Byzantine sources 
note the empire’s role in helping to build the Sarkel fortress, situated on the 
Don. This suggests that the Khazars acted as a policeman, maintaining stabil-
ity and the political balance on the Black Sea and Caspian steppe, and did so 
with the approval and support of Constantinople.225 Earlier marriages of the 
Byzantine rulers Justinian II (685–695; 705–711) and Constantine V (741–775) to 
Khazar princesses provide an additional example illustrating the proximity of 
contacts between the two states.226
At the end of the 9th century, the first signs of crisis in this efficient and sta-
ble political structure began to appear. The creation of a Rus’ state and the shift 
of its centre to Kiev on the middle Dnieper triggered the process of freeing East 
Slavic tribes from their submission to the Khaganate.227 Thus, just beyond the 
borders of the Khazar state a dangerous and highly expansive rival appeared – 
Kievian Rus’ – that would ultimately contribute to its downfall. At the same 
time, ethnic shifts were taking place that initially must have been problematic 
for the Khazar monarchy. The Pechenegs were one of the main participants in 
these shifts.
They appeared on the Black Sea steppe during a period of profound change, 
which would eventually turn the steppe into a niche region, surrounded by 
powerful and stable monarchies of sedentary peoples. From the nomads’ point 
of view these changes were not beneficial. The Black Sea steppe had previously 
been part of the Great Steppe politically, and events there determined mainly 
by ethnic shifts among its inhabitants themselves. The nomadic ‘early states’ 
created by the Scythians and Khazars proved to be more resistant to such dis-
ruptive changes. The secret of their relative success seems to have been their 
development of a more diversified economy and the ability to create links 
between the worlds of nomads and of settled farmers. This first skill gave them 
the ability to rationally exploit the agricultural population, which was subjected 
to the authority of the steppe rulers; the second allowed the nomads to fulfil 
the role of a commercial intermediary, establishing trade ties between the ‘bar-
baric’ North and the rich and civilized South. This role, however, required the 
existence of a strict binary system consisting of a nomadic political organism 
225 Th.Cont., 122f.; DAI XLII (pp. 182, 184). Cf. Pletneva 1967, 3–50, 44–46; Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 
1978, 131–134; Romashov 2004, 214–217; Ostrogorski 1967, 136, 162; Golden 1974, 62–63; 1980, 
67f.; 1990, 265, 267.
226 Ostrogorski 1967, 136, 162; Vachkova 2008, 351–358.
227 Artamonov 1962, 400–424; Pletneva 1976, 61–71; Golden 1990, 268–269.
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and its southern agricultural counterpart(s). If a strong political organism 
arose just outside the steppe zone, the presence of a nomadic intermediary 
could become a redundant feature, or even a hindrance, in North-South com-
munication. In the light of these general observations, the case of the Eastern 
Goths, and especially the so-called Ermanaric state, is a very interesting one. A 
political structure of this kind presaged both the Pax Chazarica and, consider-
ing the origin of the Gothic elites, the ‘Kievan Rus’. However, the Amali dynasty 
differed from the Rurikids in that the latter did not locate the centre of their 
state on the steppe. Perhaps it was this circumstance that made Ermanaric’s 
kingdom less resistant to the attacks of the relatively uncivilized, but highly 
militarily effective Huns. The strength of the Huns’ short-lived empire con-
sisted in the creation of a perfect, albeit short-lived binary system linking the 
barbaric Hun North with the Roman South. Yet this relationship was overly 
exploitative, representing, in effect, a rationalized form of plunder. There was 
no room in it for the mutual benefits that result from the establishment of long-
distance lines of communication. It would seem that the parasitic nature of 
Attila’s plunder-based empire pre-determined its short-lived nature. The suc-
cesses of the Scythians, Khazars, Huns and, to a lesser extent, Avars, in creating 
vast, early political organisms were far more spectacular. The other nomadic 
ethne that inhabited the Black Sea steppe functioned within much simpler 
political structures. The Pechenegs, due to both historical circumstances and 
their specific form of socio-political organization, will be closer to this latter 
group of nomadic peoples.
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chapter 3
The Earliest History of the Pechenegs
3.1 The Problem of Ethnogenesis
Very little is known about the origins of the Pechenegs. Those seeking to ascer-
tain the time, place, and manner of their ethnogenesis have to rely on indirect 
data. Like most nomadic peoples, the Pechenegs first appear in the sources 
only after they attain a significant degree of political importance. No legend-
ary version of their origo has survived, so researchers can offer only hypotheses 
about their origins. These hypotheses are often based on similarities between 
their ethnonym and that of another group found in the sources.
This was the case with Paul Pelliot’s equating the Pechenegs with the Pei-ju 
(Beiru) people, who appear in the Book of Sui (Suí Shū), the official history of 
the Sui dynasty in China (581–618), written under the direction of Wei Zheng 
in 629–636.1 In it the Pei-ju are listed as part of the T’ie-lê (Tiele) confederation, 
which was based in the lands east of Fu-lin (Byzantium) and probably as far 
west as the Caspian Sea.2 While this identification has been recognized by some 
researchers,3 it is not universally accepted.4 In addition to philological doubts, 
historical premises also seem to speak against Pelliot’s hypothesis. According 
to the information in the Book of Sui, the Pei-ju ought to be based in the Black 
Sea or Black Sea-Caspian steppe, and thus within Constantinople’s sphere of 
interest. Therefore, if the Pechenegs were actually a tribe of the T’ie-lê confed-
eration, they would most probably have been recorded in Byzantine historiog-
raphy. However, we find no mention of them in the 7th century.
The first written information generally regarded as reliable on the Pechenegs 
dates to the latter half of the 8th century: a diplomatic report prepared by 
five agents of the ‘King of the Uyghurs’ contains the following information: 
‘Northwest of them [i.e., the i-byil-kor tribe] is the Pecheneg [Be-ča-nag] tribe, 
1 Pelliot 1949, 226.
2 The full text of the mention cited here, translated into German by Liu Mau-Tsai, reads as 
follows: ‘Östlich von Fu-lin leben die En-k’ü, A-lan, Pei-ju, Kiu-li, Fu-wu, Hun und andere mit 
annähernd 20 000 Mann.’ Liu Mau-Tsai 1958, 128.
3 Kliashtornyi 1964, 117; 2003, 226–7; Pritsak 1975, 211.
4 P.B. Golden expresses doubts about this: 1990, 271; 1992, 264; 1995, 289 Friedrich Hirth iden-
tifies them with the Buljars or Bulgars, which seems more likely. Liu Mau-Tsai 1958, 569 
(n. 663).
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they have five thousand warriors. They led the war against the Hor [Uyghurs].’5 
The identification of the Pechenegs with the Be-ča-nag tribe does not arouse 
much controversy among experts on the subject, nor do scholars question 
the authenticity of this report, written sometime between 787 and 848.6 
However, further efforts to interpret the document have been controversial. 
Some researchers say that the Hor tribe mentioned in the document are none 
other than the Uyghurs. Such an identification leads to various hypotheses 
about the location of the Pecheneg nomads. According to some researchers, 
they were located north of Lake Balkhash or in the Upper Irtysh region. Based 
on battles mentioned in the report, the Pechenegs were said to have migrated 
westwards.7 It should be noted, however, that some scholars identify the Hors 
with the Oghuz (the Uzes in Byzantine sources), who are believed to have 
defeated the Pechenegs and driven them from their settlements on the lower 
Syr Darya River and the Aral Sea.8
This last hypothesis shares affinities with others derived from an etymo-
logical analysis of the name ‘Kangar’, used to refer to some Pecheneg tribes. 
Information about this group’s existence is provided by Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitus in his De administrando imperio, where he mentions them 
three times. The first occurrence coming near the end of Chapter 37:
The Pechenegs are also called ‘Kangar’, though not all of them, but 
only the folk of the three provinces of Iabdierti and Kouartzitzour and 
Chabouxingyla, for they are more valiant and noble than the rest: and 
that is what the title ‘Kangar’ signifies.9
In the next chapter, the learned emperor adds:
[…] the Pechenegs […] were previously called ‘Kangar’ (for this ‘Kangar’ 
was a name signifying nobility and valour among them) […]. And when 
battle was joined between the Turks and the Pechenegs who were at that 
5 Bacot 1956, 143 (original), 147 (French translation). English translation: Zimonyi 2016, 68.
6 Tryjarski 1975a, 492.
7 Clauson 1957, 16; Tryjarski 1975a, 504; Senga 1992, 503–516. The supposed time of their migra-
tion westward was before the year 821. Senga 1992, 508–509.
8 Kliashtornyi 1964, 177–178; 2003, 227; Pritsak 1975, 215; Golden 1990, 271; 1995, 289.
9 DAI, XXXVIII 68–71 (p. 170/171). ‘[…] Κάγγαρ ὀνομάζονται οἱ Πατζακῖαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ πάντες, πλὴν ὁ 
τῶν τριῶν θεμάτων λαός, τοῦ ̓ Ιαβδιηρτὶ καὶ τοῦ Κουαρτζιτζοὺρ καὶ τοῦ Χαβουξιγγυλά, ὡς ἀνδρειότε-
ροι καί εὐγενέστεροι τῶν λοιπῶν τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ ἡ τοῦ Κάγγαρ προσηγορία.’
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time called ‘Kangar’, the army of the Turks was defeated and split into 
two parts.10
The Byzantine monarch’s mid-10th-century text contains two very important 
pieces of information for interpreting the name ‘Kangar’. The first is the par-
ticular qualities he assigns to the three Pecheneg tribes. These three tribes 
probably dominated over the whole ethnos. The second is the clear emphasis 
in the De administrando imperio on the long history of the name (Chapter 38). 
‘Kangar’ is said to have been the name of an entire confederation of tribes 
before they began to be called the Be-ča-nag. Both the continuity in the ethnic 
tradition and the changes it underwent are important here, as the new ethn-
onym may be an indicator of major changes taking place in the group’s politi-
cal structure.
The information provided by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, and espe-
cially the information about the Pechenegs’ former ethnonym, have fueled a 
great deal of speculation among scholars. It was believed, for example, that 
it would be possible to find the forebears of the Pechenegs among ethne 
with similar names. Such research sometimes focused less on the ethnos and 
more on the ethnonym. The given name ‘Kangar’ was known to the late 5th-
century Armenian author Lazar Parpetsi. In addition, it is found in two Syrian 
martyrologies from the latter half of the sixth century.11 On the basis of this 
information, Karoly Czeglédy concluded that the lands of the Kangar were 
located in the Caucusus between the Kura River and Lake Sevan, on the border 
between Albania and Iberia (Georgia).12 The Kangar ethnonym is associated 
with the word *kānk (‘stone’) from Tocharian A (‘East Tocharian’). Based on 
this, Omeljan Pritsak concluded that the Kangar were originally inhabitants 
of Tashkent (‘stone city’) and the surrounding area. The Ukrainian researcher 
also links them to the people of K’ang-chü (Kangju), who were classified as 
Tocharians by Chinese sources from the Han Dynasty era (2nd century BCE). 
This tribal union was said to be comprised of two different, but complementary 
tribal groups. One consisted of nomads, the creators of great steppe empires 
(e.g., the great Yuezhi [Yüeh-chih], founders of the Kushan state), while the 
other were inhabitants of oasis towns where the primary means of support was 
10  DAI, XXXVIII 19–21, 24–26 (p. 170/171). ‘Οἱ δὲ Πατζινακῖται, οἱ πρòτερον Κάγγαρ ἐπονομαζòμε-
νοι (τοῦτο γὰρ τò Κάγγαρ ὄνομα ἐπ᾿ εὐγενείᾳ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ ἐλέγετο παρ᾿ αὐτοῖς), […]. Ἀναμεταξὺ 
δὲ τῶν Τούρκων συναφθέντος πολέμου καὶ τῶν Πατζινακιτν, τῶν τηνικαàτῶα Κάγγαρ ἐπονομα-
ζομένων, τὸ τῶν Τούρκων φοσσᾶτον ἡττὴθη καὶ εἰς δύο διῃρέθη μέρη’.
11  Czeglédy 1954, 14–45; 1954a, 65–66; 1956, 243–276.
12  Cf. Kliashtornyi 1964, 175–176; 2003, 225; Pritsak 1975, 211–212.
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trade. The two groups were connected not only by a shared language, but also 
by trade relations and shared common interests. Pritsak concludes that the 
Kangar were initially merchants and residents of towns along the Syr Darya 
River (mainly Tashkent). With time they formed an alliance with Turkic tribes 
and took their ‘political name’ from them.13
The name ‘Kangar’ has also been associated with the Kängäräs, who are 
mentioned in an inscription honouring Kül Tegin from the early 8th century.14 
Based on its content, it has been established that around 713 the Kängäräs were 
attacked by the Türgäsh, who incited an uprising against the Orkhon Turks. 
Some researchers consider the Kängäräs to have been allies of this latter group 
and place their settlements on the Syr Darya and the Aral Sea.15 Additional evi-
dence for this location was provided by Josef Marquart, a German researcher 
who noticed that the Syr Darya in its lower and middle sections was referred 
to as the Kängär or Känkär by medieval Muslim authors. The ethnonym 
‘Kengeres’ should therefore be interpreted as Kängär-as, ‘people of the Kangar 
River’.16 Marquardt also tried to connect the Pechenegs with the Kengeres 
based on another premise, one provided by al-Masudi, an Arab historian writ-
ing in the 10th century. In one of his works, al-Masudi relates the reasons for 
the migration of four Turkic tribes, including the Pechenegs, and the Magyars 
to the west, as well as ‘the wars and invasions that occurred between them 
and the Oghuz, Karluks and Kimäks on the Jurjān Sea [Aral Sea].’17 The events 
referred to here are usually dated to the 9th century; however, there is a lack 
of agreement about a more detailed chronology.18 For our purposes, of great-
est importance is the fact that Marquart considered al-Masudi’s relation to be 
confirmation of the Pechenegs’ presence in the environs of the Aral Sea and 
Syr Darya.19 However, al-Masudi’s account cannot be treated as evidence in 
support of this thesis. The fact that warfare was waged in the Aral Sea region 
does not automatically mean that any of the peoples involved had settlements 
nearby. Likewise, aspirations to extend control over an area of the steppe can-
not automatically be equated with the expansion of an area of settlement. 
The history of the political organisms created by nomads provides many 
examples demonstrating the potential for a decoupling of these two phenom-
ena. Moreover, it seems that al-Masudi could have referred to the Jurjān Sea 
13  Pritsak 1975, 212–213.
14  Thomsen 1924, 152–153; Malov 1951, 32 (transcription of Old Turkish text), 41 (translation).
15  Marquart 1898, 10; 1914, 35, 99; Kliashtoryi 1964, 162–3; 2003, 211, 213.
16  Marquart 1914, 26; 1898, 10–11; Golden 1972, 58; 1990, 271–272; 1995, 289.
17  al-Mas‘ūdī, Kitāb, s. 180–181. Cf. Golden 1972, 58–59 (n. 52).
18  Cf. below.
19  Cf. also Kliashtornyi 1964, 164–5, 177–179; 2003, 227–8.
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merely as a point of reference. The battles described could have taken place 
in its immediate vicinity or more distant from it, somewhere on the steppe of 
today’s central Kazakhstan.
The ethnonym Kängäräs figured into Pritsak’s hypothesis as well, but he 
proposed a different interpretation in which the term contains two sepa-
rate elements. The first is the previously-mentioned Tocharian word *kānk-, 
while the latter has its source in the name of the Aorsi (‘Aorsoi=*ãvrs->ārs-
>ās’), an East-Iranian tribe. Since the first component was rendered in Turkic 
as a pre-syllabic word, the vocalism of the second component was governed 
by the principle of apophony (Umlaut). According to Pritsak, the ethnonym 
Kängäräs should therefore be interpreted as *Kängär As, meaning ‘stone Ās 
[people]’, which he said indicated that around the eighth century they were 
associated with the Alani-Asi confederation.20
Pritsak also states that following the collapse of the Orkhon Turk (Tujue) 
empire (744), ethnic shifts in Central Asia forced the Pechenegs to migrate 
to the Transvolga region. By the mid-8th century, the Uyghurs had achieved 
hegemony on the Inner Asian steppe. In a punitive expedition following an 
earlier insurrection, their allies the Karluks attacked the Oghuz Turks, who 
lived in north-east Mongolia. The latter were forced to leave their settlements 
and migrate to environs of the upper Syr Darya and the Aral Sea, where their 
settlements neighboured those of the Pechenegs. It was here that the clashes 
mentioned in the ‘Report of the Five Hors’ are said to have taken place, forc-
ing the migration of the Pechenegs. The Oghuz sought to wrest from the 
Pechenegs control of this area, which was a valuable region in terms of trade. 
The Pechenegs, whose nucleus was comprised of Kangar, who had inhabited 
oasis towns and engaged in the trade of goods for centuries, were defeated and 
forced to leave their settlements and relocate them on the steppe of today’s 
western Kazakhstan, which led to a radical change in their lifestyle. From this 
time on, the Pechenegs would live as typical nomads. Pritsak dates these events 
to the early 9th century. The next clash between these ethne is believed to have 
taken place around the year 830. This time the Pechenegs, having crossed the 
Volga, moved onto the Black Sea steppe.21
Peter B. Golden assumed a version of accidents very similar to those proposed 
by Pritsak. In his opinion, the Pechenegs were descendants of an earlier wave 
of Turkic peoples who led a pastoral way of life and settled around the Iranian 
cities of Transoxania (Mā warāʾ an-Nahr). The area was known to Chinese 
sources under the name K’ang-chü. An influx of additional Turkic groups 
20  Pritsak 1975, 213.
21  Pritsak 1975, 214–216.
90 chapter 3
began in the 6th century, leading to a gradual process of Turkification of the 
area’s Iranian inhabitants. Also moving into the area were the Pechenegs, who 
Golden identifies with the Kängäräs people and places in the area of the town 
of Kängü Tarban on the Syr Darya.22 Conflicts with the Karluk, Kimek (Kimäk), 
and, above all, Oghuz peoples led to the forced exodus of the Pechenegs from 
this area. The works of the 11th-century Iranian writer al-Biruni contain valu-
able information relating to this period.23 Basing his claims on earlier sources, 
he writes that the Pechenegs inhabited the Aral Sea region, while in another 
work he states that their settlements neighboured those of the Karluks. Golden 
additionally refers to Oghuz folklore, in which the memory of wars with the 
It-Bäčänä (Pecheneg-Dogs) has been preserved.24 In a work by Abu-l-Gazi, a 
khan of the Khanate of Khiva who reigned in the 17th century, we find informa-
tion about battles between one of the Oghuz tribes (Sal’or) and the Pechenegs. 
If these colourful and semi-legendary stories are based on real events, then 
they should be dated (according to most researchers) to the 9th century. It is 
not possible to determine the time and place of these conflicts more precisely, 
though from Abu al-Gazi’s account, it is clear that the Pechenegs were on the 
victorious side.
Based on this evidence, Golden concluded that the Pechenegs were driven 
from their lands on the Syr Darya due to ethnic displacements in the first 
third of the 9th century caused by wars fought between the Karluks and 
the Uyghurs – and later, the Kyrgyz (Kirghiz). This led to the collapse of the 
Uyghurs (840), hitherto the dominant force in the eastern part of the Great 
Steppe. According to Golden, the effects of these migrations were not limited 
only to Inner Asia. Waves of ethnic migration not only led to the appearance of 
the Oghuz, Kimaks and Karluks on the Syr Darya and forced the Pechenegs to 
flee to the west, but also led the Magyars to leave Bashkiria and move onto the 
Black Sea steppe (840–41). These events, he says, forced the Khazars to build 
an extensive system of fortifications of which Sarkel was only a part. They also 
contributed to the Byzantine Empire’s reengagement along the northern shores 
of Pontos, as evidenced by the construction of not only the above-mentioned 
fortress, but also the city of Kherson.25
Golden’s hypotheses deserves a closer, more critical look, as the Pechenegs’ 
presence in the environs of the Aral Sea and the lower and middle Syr Darya 
22  Golden thus follows the consensus among Russian scholars: Kliashtornyi 1964, 164–165; 
2003, 228; Romashov 1999, 21.
23  Biruni, 95–6.
24  Abu-l-Gazi, 56, 71, 73–74. Cf. Zhirmunskii 1962, 181–187; Golden 1972, 58–59.
25  Golden 1972, 59–68. Cf. Zuckerman 1997, 214.
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has not been definitively confirmed. In spite of his laudable efforts to explain 
the causes of nomadic migrations and show their connection to events in the 
9th century that involved directly or indirectly almost every significant politi-
cal organism on the Great Steppe, the arguments Golden puts forward seem 
less than convincing. First, the chronological premises underlying his concept 
are not based on hard facts. It is difficult to link the construction of the Sarkel 
fortress (in the 830s) with the migrations that are said to have led to the col-
lapse of the Uyghur state. Moreover, the reasons for the Khazar Khaganate’s 
building the fortress are not entirely clear. They need not have been, or at least 
not only have been, motivated by a desire to hold back the Magyars or other 
peoples. Golden’s identification of the Pecheneg Kangar, and of the Pechenegs 
themselves with the Orkhon Kängäräs, is even more questionable. In princi-
ple, the only argument for such an identification, apart from similarities in the 
two ethnonyms, is the proximity of the homelands of these peoples in the 8th 
century, a question that remains largely speculative. Likewise, the alleged link 
between the Kängäräs and the Alan-As confederation proposed by Pritsak has 
not gained wide acceptance. It is also difficult, as György Györffy has argued, to 
positively identify the Pecheneg as the Caucasian Kangar found in Armenian 
and Syrian sources.26 However, the most serious reservations concern the 
theory that the Pechenegs have their origins in an East Iranian ethnos. The 
problem here is not the idea that within one tribal union there would be two 
groups with different origins, because such phenomena certainly occurred.27 
Rather, what is hard to imagine here is that, in accordance with the hypoth-
esis presented above, the semi-nomadic or fully settled inhabitants of an oasis 
town would have so suddenly adopted a nomadic way of life and so quickly 
come to lead a steppe-based tribal organization. Sergei Kliashtornyi has noted 
a number of difficulties that would have resulted from such a rapid cultural 
change – one that would have required adapting to radically different natu-
ral conditions.28 This is how he explains the presence of the so-called yatak 
[‘indolent’] social class among the Oghuz Turks, as testified by Mahmud al-
Kashgari. This was the name applied to members of an ethnos who did not go 
to war or live a nomadic lifestyle.29 According to Kliashtornyi, the yatak were 
semi-nomadic Pechenegs, the inhabitants of oasis towns who were unable to 
adapt to life on the steppe.
26  Györffy 1978, 123–126; Kristó 1996, 140–141.
27  Cf. Wenskus 1961.
28  Kliashtornyi 1951, 61.
29  al-Kāšgarī III 11. Cited from: Zeki Validi Togan 1939, 146.
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However, this explanation is less than satisfactory. If we take into account 
the Kangar origins proposed by some scholars for the Pechenegs, in particular 
Pritsak, then we have to conclude that they were largely predestined to become 
yatak. Given this situation, it is hard to imagine that they could have led an 
entire people and, moreover, make claims to their noble origins and military 
valour. Claims to the complete Turkification of the Kangar also raises serious 
doubts. Among the relics of the Pecheneg language (though it is true that not 
much of it has survived), words of Turkic origin clearly dominate. Statements 
made about the Pechenegs by authors of their time confirm this fact. Anna 
Komnena states that the Pechenegs spoke the same language as the Cumans.30 
Mahmud al-Kashgari, on the other hand, considers their language to be a cor-
rupted form of Turkic. Most contemporary researchers also conclude that they 
spoke a Common Turkic language.31 A question then arises as to whether such 
a sudden and complete process of Turkification could have taken place in an 
ethnos whose elites would have been of foreign descent. This possibility can-
not be ruled out, as the history of the Danube Bulgars and Varangians in Rus’ 
seems to indicate.32 However, such an assimilation process is always a lengthy 
one and traces of former ethnic differences remain.
Finally, the above hypotheses only have relevance if the word ‘kangar’ is 
treated as a foreign word or ethnonym. Meanwhile, research has proven that its 
etymology can potentially be derived from Turco-Mongol languages. The word 
‘kangar’ therefore could in fact correspond to the Turkic word qïngïr, mean-
ing ‘stubborn, firm, courageous, brave’.33 Such an interpretation would confirm 
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus’ information about the name’s ennobling 
aspect. An interesting etymological analysis was presented by Karl H. Menges, 
who argued that ‘kangar’ could be derived from the word qan, which is consid-
ered an abbreviated version of khan or khagan. This would give it the follow-
ing lexical structure: qan + noun suffix -gar, and, corresponding to the Turkic 
qangar, the meaning ‘royal’, ‘ruling’, or ‘those close to the ruler’. Menges evokes 
an analogy with the Royal Scythians of Herodotus.34 It is known that this type 
of titular was used in reference to dominant elements in other Iranian tribal 
unions. Was the same true of the Turkic Pechenegs? This cannot be ruled out. 
30  An.Kom., VIII 5.6 (pp. 247–248).
31  Golden 1995, 290.
32  Halperin 2007, 84–98: Halperin provides interesting comments on the assimilation of 
the elites into an ethnic environment foreign to them. The process may have been quite 
lengthy due to deliberate resistance on the part of the ruling social group, since maintain-
ing their political dominance depended on them preserving their distinct identity.
33  Moravcsik 1983a, 145.
34  Menges 1944–45, 270–271.
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Menges’ interpretation is appealing, but, as the author himself has pointed 
out, it is only one of a number of possibilities.
In the light of current research, the Pechenegs’ origins thus remain uncer-
tain. They began to be noticed as an independent people by outside observers 
no earlier than the mid-8th century. At that time they were based somewhere 
on the steppe of today’s eastern or central Kazakhstan (Aral Sea region). More 
detailed interpretations of extant sources would be merely hypothetical in 
nature, and any effort to reconcile them would by necessity entail arbitrary 
speculation. After their defeat by the Hors, the Pechenegs may have migrated 
from Lake Balkhash or the upper areas of the Irtysh River to the steppe north 
of the lower and middle Syr Darya. The choice of such a route can be justi-
fied based on both geographical and economic considerations, as the nomadic 
Pechenegs would have been naturally drawn to the rich oasis towns of Central 
Asia. Yet such an interpretation, though plausible, is little more than informed 
speculation. It is just as easy to assume that at the dawn of their history the 
Pechenegs were already residing on the Syr Darya, or, more likely, on the steppe 
stretching north of the river and the Aral Sea.
Their ethnogenesis is likely to have come after the break-up of the Western 
Turkic Khanate. At that time, no single Turkic tribe exercised hegemonic 
control over the Great Steppe. Up until the end of the 7th century, this area 
belonged to China, which ruled it with the help of Turkic vassals. However, 
in 679 a large horde (orda) of Göktürks (Blue Turks) left the steppe of Ordos, 
travelled north and began to form what became the Göktürk Khanate. They 
were decidedly hostile to the Chinese empire, and their arrival was considered 
a moment of liberation by the inhabitants of the western zones of the Great 
Steppe. Constant threats to the northern boundary of the Middle Kingdom 
would limit its ability to interfere politically in the region. This state of affairs 
was further exacerbated the growing importance of Tibet, which beginning in 
the early 7th century would become a dangerous enemy of China.35 It can thus 
be said that in the early 8th century the steppe between Dzungaria and the 
Volga region became a place of freedom for smaller ethne, unable to impose 
their rule on their neighbours, like the Khazars on the lower and middle Volga 
and the Black Sea steppe, or the Blue Turks in the eastern areas of the Great 
35  The rivalry between China and Tibet started during the reign of King Namri (570–620). 
It reached its apex, however, in the second half of the 7th century. Although China ulti-
mately triumphed, the more than century-long conflict considerably weakened the posi-
tion of the Middle Kingdom on the Great Steppe. Gumilev 1993, 250–258; Hoffman 1990, 
376–382.
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Steppe.36 It was during this period that the Pechenegs may have emerged as an 
independent political entity.
Analysis of their ethnonym yields some interesting facts. The word ‘pech-
eneg’ is generally assumed to mean ‘wife’s sister’s husband, brother-in-law’.37 
The term is thus said to prove that the Pechenegs, and in particular, their elites, 
belonged to the ‘brother-in-law’ clans, which occupied a high position within 
the imperial political structures of the Great Steppe (Tur. el/il) and had close 
ties to the ruling clan.38 Pritsak sees a clear link between the Pechenegs and 
the Ashina dynasty, which ruled the Turkic Khaganates (552–744).39 Such an 
interpretation is not unfounded, but it poses questions about the branch of 
the Ashina clan with which the Pechenegs elite is said to have had such close 
relations. One is also tempted to associate them with the Göktürk dynasty, 
which in the last decades of the 7th century began rebuilding the Eastern 
Khanate. If the Hor mentioned in the above-mentioned diplomatic report 
were in fact Uyghurs, this would also help explain their hostile relations with 
the Pechenegs. As the Göktürks’ conquerors and successors, they would have 
aroused the ire of that group’s close allies. However, we know that the Hors 
can also be identified with the Oghuz Turks. In this case, the Be-ča-nag would 
have enjoyed close contacts with the dynasties of the declining Western Turkic 
Khanate. One conclusion can be positively drawn from these suppositions: in 
the 8th century the Pechenegs may have already enjoyed significant political 
importance in the lands between the Transvolga region and Dzhungaria.
3.2 Pechenegs on the Transvolgan Steppe
More detailed information about the Pechenegs exists concerning the period 
when they lived on the Transvolgan Steppe. It is difficult to say exactly when 
they arrived in this area, likewise with the cause of their migration. However, 
it can be cautiously assumed that it took place in the second third of the 
36  A state of relative freedom and rivalry among smaller ethne on the western stretches of 
the Great Steppe would continue for another few centuries. In 8th and 9th centuries, 
the Karluks, who originally inhabited the area between the western part of the Altai 
Mountains and the Irtysh River, had their greatest period of significance. Their domi-
nance was brought to an end by the Samanids in late 9th century, which led to a series of 
ethnic shifts. Kałużyński 1986, 61–62; Golden 1990a, 348–354; Tryjarski 1975a, 504.
37  Pritsak 1975, 211; Schamiloglu 1984, 215–222; Bazin 1986, 73. A different opinion was held by 
Doerfer 1965, 233.
38  Pritsak 1952, 52, 79; 1988, 749–780.
39  Pritsak 1975, 211.
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9th century,40 perhaps under pressure from other Turkic tribes mentioned in 
al-Masudi’s account.41 However, it cannot be ruled out that the nomads were 
attracted by the area’s proximity to the affluent Khazar Khaganate and the 
desire to profit from the dynamic expansion of trade along the Volga River.
More detailed information on the location of the Pechenegs’ nomadic set-
tlements can be found in the writings of al-Gardīzī, al-Bakrī, and al-Marwazī, 
i.e., Muslim authors whose works provide information from a lost 9th-century 
source, known as The Anonymous Account.42 The first two of these authors state 
that after leaving Jurjāniyyah (i.e., Urgench), a city located in the Khwārazm 
region43 and covering a distance of 12 parasangs, you reached what was called 
Khwārazm Mountain.44 This was probably one of the peaks of the Ustyurt 
Plateau.45 Gardīzī adds that once you reached Khwārazm Lake, you continued 
along its shore, keeping it to your right side. The author here is probably talk-
ing about the Aral Sea, and thus confirming the identification of the above-
mentioned elevation. Gardīzī also states that during the journey, you passed 
through a waterless steppe (Ustyurt Plateau), and on the ninth day of your 
travel you would reach a spring where there were numerous animals. On the 
seventeenth day of the journey, you finally reach the areas controlled by the 
Pechenegs.46 We can therefore assume, on the basis of Gardīzī’s report, supple-
mented by information from al-Bakrī, that the Pechenegs’ encampments were 
located beyond the Ustyurt Plateau, and seven days’ travel north-west of them. 
The last conclusion is based on the following premise. If the Pechenegs inhab-
ited areas located due north of Ustyurt, then their nomadic settlements would 
be located on the southern slopes of the Urals. However, in al-Bakrī we read: 
40  Łowmiański 1973, 61–62; Lewicki 1977, 12; Gumilev 1993, 375. Łowmiański claimed that the 
Pechenegs’ camps had already reached the lower Volga in the mid-8th century. A similar 
opinion is held by A. Róna-Tas (1999, 235). He believes that the Pechenegs were already 
present on the Yaik and Volga rivers at the time when the ‘Report of the 5 Hors’ was being 
prepared, and that this is where their original homeland should be located.
41  Cf. footnote 17 above.
42  Cf. the introductory chapter of the present book.
43  It is usually identified as present-day Kunja Urgenč, a town located on the lower Amu 
Darya, about 30 km from present-day Nukus. Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 163 (n. 384).
44  Gardīzī: Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 162–164; Martinez 1982, 151. Bakrī: Кunik, Rozen 1878, 
58–9; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 221. Zachoder 1967, 71.
45  For more on the identification of Khwarezmian Mountain: Minorsky 1937, 314 (n. 1); 
Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 163 (n. 385). On the identification of other geographical terms: 
Tryjarski 1975a, 507.
46  A different opinion was held by V. Bartol’d (1897, 119–120), who, based on data from 
Gardīzī’s account, initially estimated that Urgench was a 27-day journey from the 
Pecheneg lands. In a later work, he revised his estimates and shortened the distance to a 
journey of 17 days. Bartol’d 1963, 820. Cf. Zakhoder 1967, 71.
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‘The country of the Pechenegs is completely flat. There is neither mountain 
there nor stronghold to take refuge in it.’47
We can thus tentatively posit that in all probability they inhabited the steppe 
between the Volga and the Emba River.48 More precise information on the 
homelands of the Pechenegs in the 9th century can be found in Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitus’ De administrando imperio. In the chapter discussing events 
connected with the Pechenegs’ leaving the Volga region, it states:
Originally, the Pechenegs had their dwelling on the river Atil, and like-
wise on the river Geïch, having common frontiers with the Chazars and 
the so-called Uzes.49
On the basis of this reference, some researchers assumed that the territory of 
the Pechenegs lay between the Volga and the Ural rivers.50 Such an interpreta-
tion is not entirely convincing. While the fact that the Pechenegs’ nomadic 
settlements (due to their proximity to the Khazar’s trading empire) could not 
have been located on the right bank of the Volga is undisputable, we cannot 
talk about their border with the Ohguz (Uzes) with a similar level of certainty. 
This is definitely not offered by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus’ claim that 
the Pechenegs lived ‘likewise on the river Geïch’ (ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν 
Γεήχ). The thesis that they lived on the right side of the river is only one pos-
sible interpretation; the Pechenegs just as easily could have ruled over both 
banks of the river. It is worth considering this possibility, especially if we take 
into account the evidence we have indicating such was the case. Ahmed ibn 
Fadlan, a member of the embassy of Abbasid Caliph al-Muqtadir to the ruler 
of the Volga-Kama Bulgars, noted during a journey in the spring of 922 the 
existence of impoverished Pechenegs in the Transvolga.51 The decidedly anti-
Khazar nature of his mission forced ibn Fadlan to take a route far from the 
Khazars’ lands. Therefore, not only did he not cross the Volga, but in the lower 
47  Bakrī: Кunik, Rozen 1878, 59; Zakhoder 1967, 75; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 222. English 
translation Zimonyi 2013, 102 (note 10).
48  A similar location, but without supporting evidence, was given by Tadeusz Lewicki (1970, 
85–86).
49  ‘Ἰστέον, ὅτι οἱ Πατζινακῖται τὸ ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν Ἀτὴλ τὴν αὐτῶν εἶχον κατοίκησιν, 
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν Γεήχ, ἔχοντες τούς τε Χαζάρους συνοροῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπονομαζο-
μένους Οὔζους’. DAI, XXXVII 2–4 (p. 166/167).
50  Such an interpretation was adopted by Macartney 1929, 343. Likewise: S.A. Pletneva 1958, 
154, fig. 1; Varady 1982, 26.
51  ibn Fadlan: ibn Fadlan, 212; Zeki Validi Togan 1939, 33; Kovalevskii 1956, 130; Frye 2005, 42.
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and middle course of the river, he steered clear of the valley of the Volga in gen-
eral. A similar thesis, combined with information that these Pechenegs inhab-
ited an area by some ‘non-flowing’ lake, gave reason to locate them in the area 
of Shalkar Lake near Oral (Rus. Ural’sk).52 It is especially important to remem-
ber that this place was located on the left bank of the Ural river, not far from 
the area where it turns sharply to the south and directs its course towards the 
Caspian Sea. Of course, it can be suggested that between the moment when 
the main part of the Pechenegs left the Volga region and Ahmed ibn Fadlan 
wrote his notes, ethnic shifts occurred which ultimately forced weaker tribal 
groups to cross the Yaik (Ural) River. It seems unlikely, however, that such cir-
cumstances existed.
The Pechenegs’ nomadic settlements could therefore also have extended 
east of the Ural River. Such an assumption is further reinforced by the men-
tion in Arab sources from the al-Jayhānī tradition that the Pechenegs’ territory 
stretched over the equivalent of 30 days’ travel.53 This is a huge area. Even if 
we believe that the ratio proposed by Tadeusz Lewicki for converting travel 
days into distances measured in kilometres is exaggerated,54 it still seems 
unlikely that such a large territory would be located between the Volga and the 
Yaik-Ural. This is all the more difficult to believe when we take into account 
the fact that after losing in their rivalry with the Khazars and Oghuz (Uzes), 
and after experiencing demographic losses that are difficult to estimate, but 
no less important, the Pechenegs still managed to control large nomadic set-
tlements on the Black Sea steppe, stretching, according to Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitus, from the Khazar’s fortress in Sarkel on the Don to the Lower 
Danube.
Thus, if the Pechenegs’ encampments were also located on the left bank of 
the Ural, how far east could they have stretched? This question is extremely dif-
ficult to answer. However, it seems that given the nomads’ attachment to their 
natural environment, such as the steppe and forest steppe, it can be assumed 
that the pastures of the Pechenegs were limited by the south-eastern slopes of 
the Urals and their extensions, the Mugodzhar Hills.55
52  ibn Fadlan: Zeki Validi Togan 1939, 33 (n. 5); Kovalevskii 1956, 192 (n. 308). Tryjarski 
1975a, 513.
53  Gardīzī: Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 164; Martinez 1982, 151. Bakrī: Кunik, Rozen 1878, 221. 
Marwazī: Minorsky 1942, 32–33; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 250. Zakhoder 1967, 71.
54  T. Lewicki estimates that at an average speed, caravans travelled about 30 kilometers per 
day in this area. This means that the Pechenegs’ encampments stretched over an area of 
900 kilometers in both width and length. Lewicki 1977, 67.
55  Cf. Zimonyi 2013, 287–301.
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This series of uncertainties also includes the problem of the peoples neigh-
bouring the Pechenegs. According to Muslim accounts, their neighbours 
included the Khazars, Oghuz, Kipchaks, and Slavs (as-Sakaliba, Saqlab). The 
first two ethne have already been mentioned in the discussion of the accounts 
of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, who considered them to be one of the 
Pechenegs’ neighbours at the end of the 9th century.56 Islamic writers dif-
fer about the direction in which these two ethne bordered the Pechenegs. 
According to al-Bakrī, the Khazars inhabited areas south of the Pechenegs, 
while al-Marwazī and al-Gardīzī place them to the southwest. The latter ver-
sion is probably closer to the truth. In the case of the Oghuz (Uzes), there is 
agreement between al-Bakrī and al-Marwazī, who both say they lived on the 
steppe to the east of the Pechenegs. Al-Gardīzī makes no mention of them. The 
Kipchaks, also referred to as the Cumans or in Slavic as the Polovtsy, were said 
to occupy areas either to the east (al-Gardīzī) or north (al-Marwazī, al-Bakrī) 
of the Pechenegs.57 Al-Gardīzī’s version should be completely rejected, as he 
seems to have mistaken the Kipchaks for the Oghuz, and hence, the lack of 
information about the group in his writings. However, the information pro-
vided by the other two writers also needs to be corrected. Since we know that 
in the latter half of the 9th century, the Kipchaks had nomadic settlements in 
the forest-steppe areas between the Irtysh and Tobol Rivers,58 their western-
most borders could have reached at most to the southern slopes of the Urals, 
and this is most probably the area where their lands bordered those of the 
Pechenegs. Therefore, the border between these two peoples ran northeast.
However, the greatest controversy seems to concern the Slavs in their envi-
rons. Although there is a consensus among Arab authors that Slavs occupied 
the territories west of the Pechenegs’ encampments, the situation is less clear 
in relation to the Transvolga. As a result, some researchers are inclined to 
assume that these references are to the Volga-Kama Bulgars. The basis for a 
similar revision is that Ahmed ibn Fadlan, who lived among the Bulgars, called 
them as-Saqaliba, a name previously reserved for Slavs.59 However, this is 
56  DAI, XXXVII 2–4 (p. 167/168).
57  Gardīzī: Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 164; Martinez 1982, 151. Bakrī: Кunik, Rozen 1878, 59; 
Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 221. Marwazī: Minorsky 1942, 32–33; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 
250. Zakhoder 1967, 72–73.
58  Gumilow 1973, 82; Kumekov 1972, 56–7.
59  Tryjarski 1975a, 507 (n. 98). The ethnonym Ṣaqlab or Ṣaqāliba is found relatively often in 
Arabic texts and may be understood more generally as a nomen collectivum for the peo-
ples inhabiting the forests and forest steppe zones of the lower and middle Volga River. 
Cf. Marquart 1903, 466f.; Zimonyi 1990, 149–150; Nazmi 1998, 73–113; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 
2001, 165 (n. 390).
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not the only possible revision. The British scholar Carlile Aylmer Macartney 
assumes these references are to the Burtas.60 A number of important pieces of 
information about them can be found in the writings of ibn Rusta. He writes, 
for example, that:
The lands of the Burdās (Burtās) are located between the lands of the 
Khazars and those of the Bulkār (Bulghār). They are fifteen days’ march 
from the land of the Khazars. They obey the King of the Khazars and 
supply him with 10,000 horsemen. […] Their lands are vast and they live 
in forests. They periodically raid the territories of the Bulkār and the 
Pečeneg. They are valiant and brave. […] Their territory is seventeen days’ 
march in length and breadth.
And further:
The Bulkār (Bulghār) border the lands of the Burdās (Burtās). They are 
camped on the bank of a river that flows into the Khazar Sea (Caspian), 
which is called the Itil (Volga). They live between the Khazars and the 
Saqāliba.61
The Bulkār who appear in ibn Rusta’s account are Kama-Volga Bulgars. It is 
possible to situate the Burtas more precisely thanks to the work of T. Lewicki, 
who used information from ibn Rusta’s writings and al-Iṣṭahrī’s itinerarium 
to determine the location of the southern border of their territory, which lay 
in the area of today’s city of Saratov. His determinations are supported by a 
description of the Burtas’ land as being in close range of forests and forest-
steppe. We know that today the transition zone between the steppe and the 
forest-steppe stretches runs along the line of latitude where Saratov is found. 
The northern boundary of their territory, according to T. Lewicki’s findings, 
was located in the area of today’s Kuibyshev; in the east it was supposed to 
reach as far as the Volga.62 Taking into account the arguments given to support 
the location presented above, it must be admitted that C.A. Macartney’s pro-
posal rests on a stronger body of sources.
60  Macartney 1968, 26. The author assumes that mentions of the Slavs, rather than the Burtās, 
among the Pechenegs’ neighbours was the result of a revision made by later editors.
61  Rusta: ibn Rusta, 29, 31; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 56, 57. English translation: Lunde, Stone 
2012, 118, 120.
62  Lewicki 1977, 66–68; Zakhoder 1962, 230–238.
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The information provided by ibn Rusta allows us to speculate about the 
existence of some type of neighbourly relations between the Pechenegs and 
the Magyars when both tribes were still in the Volga region. We read in his 
work that:
Between the country of the Pečenegs and Iskil (Askel), which belongs to 
the Bulkār (Bulghār), lies the first of the Magyar frontiers.63
It is not easy to find a convincing interpretation of this information. It seems 
worth considering that before their arrival on the Black Sea steppe, the Magyar 
tribes could have inhabited an area of the Volga region in close proximity 
to the Pechenegs. Archaeological discoveries from the vicinity of the town 
of Ufa and the valley of the Belaia River, as well as to the south, in the lower 
reaches of the Kama, seem to confirm the assumption that these regions could 
have been inhabited by Magyars from the eighth century to the first half of 
the ninth century.64 Therefore, ibn Rusta’s account would not seem to be an 
incomprehensible phantasmagoria, an issue that will be of particular impor-
tance when considering the later relations between these two peoples. At this 
point, it can only be stated that they could have lived adjacent to each other in 
the vicinity of the upper reaches of the Belaia River.
To sum up, it can be stated that the neighbours of the Pechenegs were: to 
the north and north-east, the Kipchaks and perhaps until their migration to 
the Black Sea steppe the Magyars, to the south-west and west the Khazars 
and the Burtas, and to the east, in the region of the Mugodzhar Hills, the 
Oghuz (Uzes).
A separate problem is the issue of the relations between the Pechenegs and 
their neighbours. If we believe Muslim authors, they were as bad as possible. 
63  Rusta: ibn Rusta, 33; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 64–66. English translation: Lunde, Stone 
2012, 122.
64  Dąbrowska 1979, 156–157; Fodor 1982, 210–217. Such an interpretation raises objections 
among many scholars. Marquart (1903, 515) deemed Ibn Rusta’s account be a form of 
scholarly mystification. The Arabic writer supposedly associated Magyars with the 
Bashkirs, who in his day inhabited the northern Transvolga (present-day Ufa), based on 
similarities in their ethnonyms. This opinion was shared by Zimonyi 1990, 150–152. Kristó 
(1996, 105, 170) considered Ibn Rusta’s data trustworthy, but he applied it to the second 
half of the 9th century, when Hungarians had already arrived on the Black Sea steppe. 
This prompted him to search for some kind of land passage that would connect the 
Transvolga region with the Magyars’ encampments on the Black Sea, which at the same 
time, would have allowed them to establish contacts with the Pechenegs. This hypoth-
esis seems rather artificial and unconvincing. Cf. Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 66–7 (n. 80); 
Zimonyi 2014, 123–163; 2016, 82; Spinei 2003, 39–40.
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Al-Marwazī writes: ‘These peoples [the Khazars, Kipchaks, Uzes, and most 
likely the Burtas – A.P.] all raid the Pechenegs, who [likewise] raid them.’65 The 
same is stated by al-Bakrī. Al-Gardizī adds: ‘All these peoples […] they abduct 
them [Pechenegs – A.P.] into slavery and sell as slaves […]’.66 However, such 
a state of permanent armed conflict and military oppression contrasts with 
the Pechenegs’ wealth, to which all of the writers above testify. They are said 
to have possessed vast herds, large quantities of gold and silver, and expensive 
dishes and household appliances.67 How can we explain this contradiction? 
First of all, the Pechenegs were probably one of the strongest tribal unions 
in the Volga region. An apparent measure of their demographic, and there-
fore political potential was the huge size of the territory they occupied.68 No 
wonder, then, that they were probably able to effectively fend off their hos-
tile neighbours.69 We must also take into account the possibility that although 
conflicts on the Eurasian steppe were quite common, they probably differed 
in intensity. We should remember that the Pechenegs, who were bordered to 
the west by the Khazars and their vassals, also lived alongside the major trade 
route the ran along the Volga. They also had direct contact with the rich Khazar 
Empire, which may have led to a desire to participate in their trading activities, 
or, in the absence of such opportunities, to carry out regular looting raids. We 
should therefore look to the west for the front lines of their battles with their 
neighbours; this is all the more so given that the Khazars might have seen them 
as a serious threat to their interests. The main objective of the Khaganate rul-
ers was to create the best possible conditions for the flourishing of trade, from 
which they earned significant profits. Instability in the area of trade routes 
caused by the emergence of a difficult neighbour would have greatly limited 
their proper functioning. Limiting the Pechenegs’ aggression or eliminating 
competition from them posed a very important task for the Khazar elites. This 
65  Marwazī: Minorsky 1942, 33; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 250.
66  Bakrī: Кunik, Rozen 1878, 59 (scholars interpret this text somewhat differently and have 
concluded that the Pechenegs traded with all their neighbours); Zachoder 1967, 72–3 (this 
includes other possible interpretations of the Arabic text); Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 221–
2. Gardīzī: Zakhoder 1967, 73; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 164–5; Martinez 1982, 151 (con-
siderably different interpretation of Gardīzī’s passage: ‘[The Pechenegs] incite all these 
people[s] to raid [one another], and so they go marauding for the Pecheneg and taking 
captives and sell /these/’).
67  Bakrī: Кunik, Rozen 1878, 59; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 222. Gardīzī: Göckenjan, Zimonyi 
2001, 164–5; Martinez 1982, 152. Marwazī: Minorsky 1942, 33; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 
250. Zakhoder 1967, 73–74.
68  Cf. Zimonyi 2013, 297.
69  István Zimonyi (2013, 298) interprets information about the Pechenegs fighting with 
neighbouring peoples as the evidence of their political independence.
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was probably the purpose of the systematic penal expeditions they carried out, 
which we read about in ibn Rusta’s book:
Their king [the Khazars – A.P.], the īshā imposes a levy of cavalry on the 
people of power and wealth, in accordance with their wealth and means. 
They raid Pečenegs every year. The īshā leads the expedition himself, 
going with his men on raids.70
As mentioned,71 the Khazars had achieved hegemony on both the Black Sea 
steppe and the Volga region, and were thus capable of forming a coalition to 
keep in check the aggressive intentions of the Pechenegs. Its allies probably 
included the Burtas, an ethnos dependent on the Khazars; the Volga-Kama 
Bulgars were in a similar position of dependence until the early 10th century, 
so it is possible that they also took part in battles on the side of their overlords. 
However, it is not entirely impossible that among the primary motives for 
these expeditions were the abductions mentioned by Gardizī. After all, as an 
object of trade slaves were a potential source of income, as the Khazars knew 
very well. The Pechenegs’ chances of gaining an upper hand on their rival grew 
due to an internal crisis the khaganate suffered in the mid-9th century that 
resulted in a civil war. We do not know much about this conflict, apart from 
the fact that it may have been caused by dissatisfaction among some circles 
of the tribal aristocracy following the introduction of political and religious 
reforms.72 Ultimately, a group of three tribes known as the Kabars (Kabaroi) 
broke away from the Khazars and joined the Magyar tribal confederacy.73 For 
our purposes, most important was the fact that this conflict led to a temporary 
weakening of the Khazar state, giving the Pechenegs greater freedom of action. 
The forced migration of the Magyars to the Black Sea steppe was probably an 
earlier consequence of the Pechenegs’ military actions, an issue we will return 
to in the last part of this chapter. The Pechenegs almost certainly became more 
active on the Volga trade route, as the Khazars’ temporary weakness provided 
them with better conditions for successful plunder, which became one of the 
sources of the wealth mentioned by Arab writers. Of course, this may also 
have been derived from trade with the caravans passing through their territo-
ries, but the peripheral location of the Pechenegs, as well as their universally 
70  Rusta: ibn Rusta, 29; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 54. English translation: Lunde, Stone 
2012, 117.
71  Cf. Chapter 2 of the present book.
72  Artamonov 1962, 324–334; Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 1975, 400.
73  DAI, XXXIX; XL 3–7 (p. 174/175).
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noted warlike character, probably limited the possibilities for such types 
of exchange.
The arguments presented above, however, do not exclude the possibility 
of minor conflicts also playing out on the eastern border of the Pechenegs’ 
nomadic settlements. It seems, however, that the rich Khazar Empire and 
the trade routes running through it constituted a particularly attractive area 
for expansion, while victories over the Pechenegs’ eastern and north-eastern 
neighbours, who had attained a similar level of development, could not supply 
the Pechenegs with equally valuable loot.
map 2 The Transvolga Region in the 9th century
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3.3 The Pechenegs’ Wars with Magyars. Migration to the  
Black Sea Steppe
A similar state of affairs lasted until the end of the 9th century. The Khazar 
Khaganate was supposed to effect the removal of these troublesome neigh-
bours from the Volga region with the help of a strong ally. Quite unexpect-
edly, this turned out to be the Oghuz (Uzes). Very little is known about the 
specific circumstances leading to the creation of this alliance directed 
against the Pechenegs. We owe what basic information we have about it to 
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus. We read in Chapter 37 of De administrando 
imperio:
But fifty years ago the so-called Uzes made common cause with Chazars 
and joined battle with the Pechenegs and prevailed over them and 
expelled them from their country, which the so-called Uzes have occu-
pied till this day.74
In the next chapter, the learned emperor adds:
Now, the Pechenegs who were previously called ‘Kangar’ […], these, then, 
stirred up war against the Chazars and, being defeated, were forced to 
quit their own land and to settle in that of the Turks [i.e., Magyars – A.P.]75
The first fragment seems to indicate that the political and military initiative 
was on the Oghuz side. It is therefore important to determine what led to an 
increase in the activity of this ethnos. This phenomenon is all the more puz-
zling because, despite their constant conflicts with the Pechenegs, as recounted 
in Arab sources, it was not until the end of the 9th century that the Oghuz mus-
tered up the resources to deliver such a powerful blow to their western neigh-
bours. The motivation for such a fierce fight should most probably be sought 
in the political situation that emerged on the western stretches of the Great 
Steppe after the creation of a Sunni empire by the Samanids. This empire, 
which originally inhabited Transoxania, managed to conquer much larger 
territories during a rapid expansion in the late 9th century. In 893, the Samanid 
74  DAI, XXXVII 5–8 (p. 166/167). ‘Πρὸ ἐτῶν δὲ πεντήκοντα οἱ λεγòμενοι Οὖζοι μετὰ τῶν Χαζάρων 
ὁμονοήσαντες καὶ πο λεμον συμβαλοντες πρὸς τοὺς Πατζινακίτας, ὑπερίσχυσαν, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς 
ἰδίας χώρας αὐτοὺς ἐξεδίωξαν, καὶ κατέσχον αὐτὴν μέχρι τῆς σήμερον οἱ λεγομενοι Οὖζοι.’
75  DAI, XXXVIII 19–23 (p. 170/171). ‘Οἱ δὲ Πατζινακῖται, οἱ προτερον Κάγγαρ ἐπονομαζομενοι […] 
πρὸς Χαζάρους οὖν οὗτοι κινήσαντες πολεμον καὶ ἡττηθέντες, τὴν οἰκείαν γῆν καταλεῖψαι καὶ 
τὴν τῶν Τούρκων κατοικῆσαι κατηναγκάσθησαν.’
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ruler Ismail ibn Ahmed defeated a Turkic tribe, most probably the Karluks, 
who lived in Semirechie (Zhetysu), forcing them to migrate west, thus trigger-
ing other major ethnic shifts. The Karluks, in turn, attacked the Oghuz (Uzes) 
en masse, occupying their nomadic settlements, which provoked an immedi-
ate reaction on their part, because the loss of these pastures posed a serious 
threat to the continued existence of their people.76 Faced with a similar threat, 
they decided to invade the territory of the Pechenegs. The Kimäk tribe and 
especially their western Kipchak group could also have been involved in these 
events. However, this last scenario is only possible if the clashes described by 
al-Masudi pitting the Magyars and Pechenegs against the Karluks, Kimäks and 
Uzes in the Aral Sea region can be dated to the end of the 9th century and 
linked to the expansion of the Samanids.77
At this point we are faced with a key question: was it just the Uzes or a whole 
coalition of peoples hostile to the Pechenegs who entered into an agreement 
with the Khazars? It should be noted that the question of a possible alliance 
remains an open question, despite Constantine VII’s rather unambiguous 
account. There seems to have been a commonwealth of interests between 
the two potential partners that favoured the formation of such an alliance. 
The Khazars may have sought to rid themselves of an inconvenient neigh-
bour, while the Oghuz, who had strong motivations to fight, were well suited 
to achieving this goal. A joint attack, in which other vassal ethne under the 
Khazars may have also participated, offered the opportunity to completely 
annihilate the Pechenegs, or weaken them to such an extent that they would 
be reduced to a weak ethnic union that could be easily controlled.
The Khazars, however, were risking a great deal. First, there was nothing 
to guarantee they would have better relations with their new neighbours 
than with the Pechenegs, who were at a comparable level of development. 
Al-Masʿūdī’s The Meadows of Gold, contains information that seems to indicate 
very clearly that the subsequent relations between the Khazars and the Oghuz 
were terrible. In a report on an expedition by the Rus’ that took place after 
912/13, al-Masʿūdī writes that the Oghuz had a practice of taking advantage of 
the Volga freezing over in winter to organize invasions of the Khazar lands.78 
76  Györffy 1972, 168–174 (Györffy proposes a slightly different interpretation. The Oghuz’ 
aggression would have been caused not by the loss of their encampments by the Aral Sea, 
but simply by their desire to enlarge their territory at the Pechenegs’ expense. The break-
down of the state of the Karluks, the Oghuz’ eastern neighbours, was supposed make this 
goal easier to achieve); Kristó 1996, 182. Cf. also footnote 37.
77  Cf. footnote 18. Numerous scholars accept the above interpretation: Macarteney 1929, 343; 
1968, 72; Kumekov 1972, 58–9; Zimonyi 1990, 168–9.
78  al-Masʿūdī, Les Prairies 1863, 19; Pellat 1962, 165.
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Secondly, in the event of failure, even partial failure, the Pechenegs would be 
able to maintain their political integrity and, as happened in reality, move into 
the Black Sea steppe, thereby undermining the political and economic inter-
ests of the Khazars in the region.79 In view of such high risks, it would have 
been much more rational to take steps to maintain the status quo in the Volga 
region. The aggression of the Pechenegs who occupied this area did not pose 
such a serious threat to the Khazars’ interests, all the more so given that the 
penal expeditions undertaken by successive Khazar beys probably limited its 
scale. A similar interpretation, one which rules out the existence of any coop-
eration between the two peoples, seems to be justified by the passage from 
Chapter 38 of De administrando imperio cited above. There is no mention in 
it of any supposed military cooperation between the Oghuz and the Khazars. 
The war mentioned by the author was probably an attempt by the Pechenegs 
to occupy part of the Khazars’ territory, following an attack by their eastern 
neighbours. This attempt was clearly unsuccessful, but because it was impos-
sible for the Pechenegs to retreat to their old encampments, they had no alter-
native other than to cross over to the right bank of the Volga.80
How can the information written by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus in 
Chapter 37 be explained? We need to remember that these were very violent 
ethnic shifts, and this is probably reflected in their speed. We can assume that 
clashes between the Oghuz and the Pechenegs, and then between them and 
the Khazars, were separated by a very small space of time. As a result, the oral 
tradition from which Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus drew his information 
about these events could easily have been distorted, and instead of informa-
tion about two failures, the memory could have been preserved of just one 
failure resulting from cooperation between the Oghuz and the Khazars. If it is 
also correct to assume that Chapter 37 of De administrando imperio was based 
on accounts from Pecheneg informants, then we can find another motive that 
would lead to combine two shameful defeats into one and likewise explain 
79  The loss of the Black Sea steppe would have increased the importance of the 
Itil-Bulgar-Kiev-Kraków trade route, which in combination with the conquests of the Rus’ 
princes, would have had a highly negative impact on the Khazars’ interests in the region. 
Lewicki 1956, 34; Novosel’tsev 1990, 211; Romashov 2004, 222; Kovalev 2005, 80, 104–105, 
Zimonyi 2016, 278, 324, 352. For a more cautious interpretation: Zhivkov 2015, 123–146, 160. 
Cf. also Chapter 4.2 of the present book.
80  For a similar interpretation: Zimonyi 1990, 174–5; Kristó 1996, 182 (he assumes here, how-
ever, that the conflict between the Pechenegs and both the Oghuz and the Khazars took 
place at roughly the same time).
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the alleged collusion between their eastern and western neighbours. This is a 
deeply wounded sense of pride.81
Unfortunately, we do not know what direction the Pechenegs’ road to the 
Black Sea took. A lack of source data allows us only to assume that it would 
have been easier for them to move through areas belonging to the weaker of 
their two western neighbours, i.e., the Burtas. Having found themselves on 
the right bank of the Volga, the Pechenegs – as previously mentioned – came 
into contact with the Magyars. The history of the conflict between these two 
peoples is presented to us by Constantine VII in three chapters of his work. We 
read in Chapter 37:
The Pechenegs fled and wandered round, casting about for a place for 
their settlement; and when they reached the land which they now pos-
sess and found the Turks living in it, they defeated them in battle and 
expelled and cast them out, and settled in it, and have been masters of 
this country, as has been said, for fifty-five years to this day.82
In the next chapter, he adds:
The nation of the Turks had of old their dwelling next to Chazaria, in the 
place called Lebedia after the name of their first voivode, which voivode 
was called by the personal name of Lebedias […]. Now in this place, the 
aforesaid Lebedia, there runs a river Chidmas, also called Chingilous.83
Next, after the information about the Pechenegs’ defeat in their war with the 
Khazars and their exodus to the lands of the Magyars, the author writes:
81  Bury 1906, 567–568; DAI-Com., 143; Macartney 1968, 82–86.
82  DAI, XXXVII 8–14 (p. 166/167). ‘Οἱ δὲ Πατζινακῖται φυγοντες περιήρχοντο, ἀναψηλαφῶντες 
τοπον εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν κατασκήνωσιν, καταλαβοντες δὲ τὴν σήμερον παρ’ αὐτῶν διακρατουμένην 
γῆν καὶ εὑροντες τοὺς Τούρκους οἰκοῦντας ἐν αὐτῇ, πολέμου τροπῳ τούτους νικήσαντες καὶ 
ἐκβαλοντες αὐτοὺς ἐξεδίωξαν, καὶ κατεσκήνωσαν ἐν αὐτῇ, καὶ δεσποζουσιν τὴν τοιαύτην χώραν, 
ὡς εἴρηται, μέχρι τὴν σήμερον ἔτη πεντήκοντα πέντε.’
83  DAI, XXXVIII 3–6, 7–9 (p. 170/171). ‘῞Οτι τὸ τῶν Τούρκων ἔθνος πλησίον τῆς Χαζαρίας τὸ παλαι-
ὸν τὴν κατοίκησιν ἔσχεν εἰς τὸν τοπον τὸν ἐπονομαζομενον Λεβεδία ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ πρώτου βοεβο-
δου αὐτῶν ἐπωνυμίας, ὅστις βοέβοδος τὸ μὲν τῆς κλήσεως ὄνομα Λεβεδίας προσηγορεύετο, […]. 
Ἐν τούτῳ οὖν τῷ τοπῳ, τῷ προρρηθέντι Λεβεδίᾳ, ποταμος ἐστιν ῥέων Χιδμάς, ὁ καὶ Χιγγιλοὺς 
ἐπονομαζομενος.’
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And when battle was joined between the Turks and the Pechenegs who 
were at that time called ‘Kangar’, the army of the Turks was defeated and 
split into two parts. One part went eastwards and settled in the region 
of Persia, and they to this day are called by the ancient denomination 
of the Turks ‘Sabartoi asphaloi’; but the other part, together with their 
voivode and chief Lebedias, settled in the western region, in places called 
Atelkouzou, in which places the nation of the Pechenegs now lives.84
In the same chapter, Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus presents the circum-
stances of the abdication of Lebedias and the assumption of power over all 
the Magyar tribes by Arpad and his race. It is significant that the new leader 
(ἄρχων) was appointed with the consent of the Khazar khagan and in accor-
dance with a ritual typical of them.85 After this information, the narrative of 
the De administrando imperio returns to issues of particular interest to us:
Some years later, the Pechenegs fell upon the Turks and drove them out 
with their prince Arpad. The Turks, in flight and seeking a land to dwell 
in, came and in their turn expelled the inhabitants of great Moravia and 
settled in their land, in which the Turks now live to this day.86
Finally, in Chapter 40 of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus’ work we read:
[…] at the invitation of Leo […] they crossed over [Magyars – A.P.] and 
fought Symeon and totally defeated him, and drove on and penetrated 
as far as Preslav, having shut him up in the city called Moundraga; and 
they went back to their own country.  […] But after Symeon was once 
84  DAI, XXXVIII 24–31, (p. 170–173). ‘῾Αναμεταξὺ δὲ τῶν Τούρκων συναφθέντος πολέμου καὶ τῶν 
Πατζινακιτῶν, τῶν τηνικαῦτα Κάγγαρ ἐπονομαζομένων, τὸ τῶν Τούρκων φοσσᾶτον ἡττή θη καὶ 
εἰς δύο διῃρέθη μέρη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἕν μέρος πρὸς ἀνατολὴν εἰς τὸ τῆς Περσίδος μέρος κατῴκησεν, 
οἳ καὶ μέ χρι τοῦ νῦν κατὰ τὴν τῶν Τούρκων ἀρχαίαν ἐπωνυμίαν καλοῦνται Σάβαρτοι ἄσφαλοι, τὸ 
δὲ ἕτερον μέρος εἰς τὸ δυτικὸν κατῴκησε μέρος ἅμα καὶ τῷ βοεβοδῳ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀρχηγῷ, Λεβεδίᾳ, 
εἰς τοπους τοὺς ἐπονομαζομένους Ἀτελκούζου, ἐν οἷς τοποις τὰ νῦν τὸ τῶν Πατζινακιτῶν ἔθνος 
κατοικεῖ.’
85  DAI, XXXVIII 31–55 (p. 172). Cf. DAI-Com., 148–149; Várady 1982, 49–53; Kristó 1996, 159–
168 (Kristó corrects the account of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus and suggests that it 
was Arpad’s father, Álmos, who became Hungary’s first military leader and prince).
86  DAI, XXXVIII 55–60 (p. 172/173). ‘Μετὰ δέ τινας χρονους τοῖς Τούρκοις ἐπιπεσοντες οἱ 
Πατζινακῖται, κατεδίωξαν αὐτοὺς μετὰ τοῦ ἄρχοντος αὐτῶν Ἀρπαδῆ. Οἱ οὖν Τοῦρκοι τραπέντες 
καὶ πρὸς κατοίκησιν γῆν ἐπιζητοῦντες, ἐλθοντες ἀπεδίωξαν οὗτοι τοὺς τὴν μεγάλην Μοραβίαν 
οἰκοῦντας, καὶ εἰς τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν κατεσκήνωσαν, εἰς ἣν νῦν οἱ Τοῦρκοι μέχρι τῆς σήμερον 
κατοικοῦσιν.’
109The Earliest History of the Pechenegs
more at peace with the emperor of the Romans and was free to act, he 
sent to the Pechenegs and made an agreement with them to attack and 
destroy the Turks. And when the Turks had gone off on a military expedi-
tion, the Pechenegs with Symeon came against the Turks and completely 
destroyed their families and miserably expelled thence the Turks who 
were guarding their country. When the Turks came back and found their 
country thus desolate and utterly ruined, they settled in the land where 
they live to-day […].87
The accounts cited above have been and continue to be the subject of end-
less commentary, the main purpose of which has been to clarify three con-
tentious issues. The first is the chronology of events. While it was relatively 
easy to set a date for the final expulsion of the Magyars from the Black Sea 
steppe, the moment of their first clash with the Pechenegs has not been pre-
cisely determined. The second issue is closely related to the first, i.e., whether 
in fact the Magyars were defeated twice by the Pechenegs and forced to leave 
their homeland. The third issue is the question of the location and mutual rela-
tionship of the two geographical lands inhabited by the Magyars before they 
migrated to their Carpathian territories. The value of the above-mentioned 
passages as source material has been assessed in different ways. The relatively 
clear and easy to interpret passages from Chapters 37 and 40 have been con-
trasted with the very confusing narrative of Chapter 38. Hungarian academ-
ics, who for understandable reasons have shown particular interest in the 
aforementioned parts of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus’ work, have applied 
nearly every available method of interpretation to them.88 The information in 
Chapter 38 has often been described as having no value for reconstructing the 
actual course of events. A functional analysis has sometimes taken the place 
of a strictly historical interpretation. There are story lines in the accounts of 
Constantine VII’s Magyar informants that are clearly intended to explain or 
even legitimise the political changes that took place within the Magyar tribal 
87  DAI, XL 8–12, 13–21 (p. 176/177). ‘[…] παρὰ Λέοντος, […] προσκληθέντες διεπέρασαν, καὶ τὸν 
Συμεὼν πολεμήσαντες κατὰ κράτος αὐτὸν ἥττησαν, καὶ ἐξελάσαντες μέχρι τῆς Πρεσθλάβου 
διῆλθον, ἀποκλείσαντες αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ κάστρον τὸ λεγομενον Μουνδράγα, καὶ εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν χώραν 
ἰπέστρεψαν. […] Μετὰ δὲ τὸ πάλιν τὸν Συμεὼν μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως τῶν Ῥωμαίων εἰρηνεῦσαι καὶ 
λαβεῖν ἄδειαν διεπέμψατο πρὸς τοὺς Πατζινακίτας, καὶ μετὰ αὐτῶν ὡμοφώνησεν τοῦ καταπο-
λεμῆσαι καὶ ἀφανίσαι τοὺς Τούρκους. Καὶ ὅτε οἱ Τοῦρκοι πρὸς ταξίδιον ἀπῆλθον, οἱ Πατζινακῖται 
μετὰ Συμεὼν ἦλθον κατὰ τῶν Τούρκων, καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν φαμιλίας παντελῶς ἐξηφάνισαν, καὶ τοὺς 
εἰς φύλαξιν τῆς χώρας αὐτῶν Τούρκους ἀπ’ ἐκεῖσε κακιγκάκως ἀπεδίωξαν. Οἱ δ Τοῦρκοι ἰποστρέ-
ψαντες καὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν οὕτως εἰροντες ἔρημον καὶ κατηφανισμένην, κατεσκήνωσαν εἰς τὴν 
γῆν, εἰς ἣν καὶ σήμερον κατοικοῦσιν […].’
88  Cf. Kristó 1996, 97–108.
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federation in the 9th century. An example of this is the story of Lebedias’ ‘abdi-
cation’ and ceding of power to the Arpads. It is hard to deny the accuracy of 
these kinds of charges. On the other hand, a complete rejection of the infor-
mation contained in Chapter 38 of De administrando imperio would hardly be 
justified. Convincing answers to some of the questions raised in his very com-
plicated narrative have yet to be found. However, such a state of affairs does 
not justify a sometimes overly arbitrary questioning of the reliability of the 
information it contains.
Efforts have been made to establish the chronology of the fighting between 
the Pechenegs and the Magyars using information from the Chronicon of the 
abbot Regino of Prüm. He noted that in 889 the Hungarians (gens Hungarium) 
were expelled from their lands by the Pechenegs (Pecinaci), who surpassed 
them in numbers and bravery.89 According to Regino, at the time of the 
Pechenegs’ attack the Magyars also occupied the areas surrounding the mouth 
of the Don, which has inclined some researchers to consider the date given by 
him as the moment of the first clash between the two ethne, and as a result of 
which the Magyars left Lebedia.90 Such a chronology was adopted by, among 
others, C.A. Macartney. In his opinion, the Pechenegs first appeared in areas 
west of the Volga as early as ca. 880. Their migration was said to be the result 
of ethnic shifts in Eurasia. An additional argument was that of a brief mention 
of the defeat of a large number of Pechenegs by Askold and Dir.91 However, 
this information comes from a late compilation (16th century) of the Nikonian 
Chronicle and was moreover placed under a date inconsistent with that pro-
posed by Macartney (867).92
J. Marquart presented a diametrically different concept, completely ignoring 
the account of Regino of Prüm. He claims the first Magyar-Pecheneg clash took 
place around 862. The basis for such an assumption is information provided 
by Hincmar of Reims about the ravaging of Louis the German’s East Francia 
by the Magyars.93 According to Marquart, their military activity in Western 
Europe testifies to their abandonment of the Sea of Azov and their relocation 
89  ‘Gens Hungarium […] a Scythicis regnis et a paludibus, quas Thanais sua refusione in 
inmensum porrigit, egrssa est. […] Ex supradictis locis gens memorata a finitibus sibi 
populis, qui Pecinaci vocantur, a propriis sedibus expulsa est, eo quod numero et virtute 
prestarent […]’. Regino, 131, 132.
90  DAI-Com., 144, 148.
91  Macartney 1929, 343; 1968, 69–79.
92  PNL, AM 6375 (AD 867), p. 9. Cf. Sielicki 1968, 225 (n. 1).
93  Ann.Bert., sub anno 862, p. 458. Constantine-Cyril, Methodius’ brother, encountered 
Magyars in Crimea at roughly the same time. VCM, 33 (original), 57 (trans.).
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to areas west of the Dnieper River.94 The observations of the German scholar 
are important for dating the presence of the Magyars on the Black Sea steppe. 
Since they were able in the early 860s to organize an expedition to the other 
side of the Carpathian Mountains, it is reasonable to assume that they had to 
control at least the western parts of the Black Sea steppe at that time. However, 
this is not a clear indication of their loss of control over the eastern part of that 
region. It is also worth noting that according to a Byzantine chronicler, as early 
as in 836, a group of Turks helped the Bulgar Khan Presian suppress an upris-
ing by former citizens of Adrianople (Hadrianopolis), who had been resettled 
during the time of Krum on the Lower Danube.95 If the allies of the Bulgarian 
ruler are identified with the Magyars, their presence on the Black Sea steppe in 
the 830s should seriously considered. However, their involvement in fighting 
on the Lower Danube proves nothing more than the fact that they were already 
regarded by their neighbours as a worthwhile ally.
György Györffy is highly sceptical about the possibility of establishing the 
date for the first attack of the Pechenegs on the basis of the chronology in 
Regino of Prüm’s Chronicon. Györffy proves that the aforementioned men-
tion was not made in 889, but somewhat later, probably in 906–908. His main 
argument is the repetition of specific names with names appearing with infor-
mation incorrectly dated to 901.96 In addition, other observations by Györffy 
seem to exclude the possibility of using this source to determine the date of 
the Pechenegs’ first attack. He correctly points out that Regino writes about 
only one and not two clashes between these two peoples as the reason for the 
Magyars leaving Scythia. No other interpretation is possible, since it is hard to 
imagine that a monk writing in Lorraine would have noted information con-
cerning ethnic shifts within the Black Sea steppe. Such events were part of the 
internal affairs of the steppe, and not of much interest to Western European 
citizens.97 The situation would have been completely different if the Magyars 
had left Scythia and arrived in Pannonia, since by that time, migration had 
become a phenomenon of enormous significance. It was followed by inva-
sions that until the mid-10th century impacted almost the whole of Western 
Europe. The earliest of them was recorded by Regino himself, who died in 915. 
Therefore, the mentions in the Chronicon cannot provide a basis for setting 
the date of the first attack of the Pechenegs.98 Its chronology is all the more 
94  Marquart 1903, 33.
95  Georg.Mon., 817–818. Cf. Varady 1982, 24.
96  Györffy 1975, 285–286.
97  Györffy 1975, 284–285.
98  Despite the reservations listed above, this was recently accepted by S.A. Romashov (1999, 
24; 2004, 221).
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doubtful given that the ethnic shifts that led the Pechenegs to leave the Volga 
region had already begun, as we established above, around 893. The Pechenegs 
could have arrived on the Black Sea steppe only after that date. The final 
exodus of the Magyars from this area occurred no later than in 896.99 Such 
a date seems to confirm the accounts of Byzantine sources, which mainly 
recorded events related to the Byzantine-Bulgarian war of 894–896, and of 
Latin sources, which recorded the process of the Magyars’ assuming control 
of the Carpathian Basin.100 One extremely important conclusion can be drawn 
here – namely, that if there were two wars between the Pechenegs and the 
Magyars, and both took place on the Black Sea steppe, then they would have 
to have been divided by a small space of time. If that were indeed the case, it is 
unlikely that they would have been seen in the sources as two separate clashes.
The case is similar with the second disputed issue, i.e., did the two wars 
actually take place between Pechenegs and the Magyars – and if so, where did 
they take place? The only account from which we learn details about the two 
attacks by the Pechenegs is Chapter 38 of De administrando imperio. The author 
makes it clear that the first attack occurred when the Magyars lived in Lebedia, 
and its immediate consequence was the splintering of the ethnos into two 
groups, one of which migrated west to Atelkouzou, while the other went east to 
Persia. Most researchers assume that the target of the latter group’s migration 
was not Persia itself, but Armenia, which had repeatedly found itself under 
Persian rule.101 Another target destination was proposed by László Várady, who 
assumed that the Sabartoi asphaloi emigrated to Persian Khorasan.102
However, much more interesting than this Magyar sub-group’s new home is 
the name they used for themselves. In its original form it was written: Σάβαρτοι 
ἄσφαλοι. According to Marquart, it is associated with the Armenian name 
Sevordik or ‘Black Sons’. Marquart claims it is derived from the ethnonym of the 
Sevortioi people, who are found in Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus’ De ceri-
moniis aulae Byzantinae. They were said to live somewhere in Transcaucasia 
(Georgia or Armenia) and their leaders received imperial orders (keleuseis) 
from the Byzantine rulers. This last fact indicates the Sevortioi’s dependence on 
99  These circumstances seem to have been ignored by Constantin Zuckerman (1998, 666 
(n. 11)).
100 Georg.Mon., 853–855; LeoGramm., 257–268; Th.Cont., 357–360; Sym.Magist., 275–278; 
Io.Scyl., 176–177; Ann.Fuld., 129–130. For more on the Byzantine – Bulgarian wars in the 
years 894–896: Leszka 2013, 76–95.
101 Marquart 1903, 36–37; Macartney 1968, 88–89; Łowmiański 1975, 61. Cf. Kristó 1996, 
138–141.
102 Varady 1982, 27.
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Constantinople.103 Marquart suggested that this was a distortion of an ethnic 
name that was actually Sev-Ogrik, or ‘Black Magyars’,104 which would be evi-
dence that Constantine VII was not mistaken about their possible association 
with the sub-group of that people that later crossed the Carpathian Mountains.
However, a closer analysis of the accounts found in sources concerning the 
people referred to as the Sabartoi asphaloi raises further interpretative chal-
lenges. They were known to Arab writers as as-Savardiya, and are mentioned 
under this name for the first time by al-Baladuri. From his accounts we learn 
that they attacked the city of Shamkur in Armenia. According to Marquart, this 
attack took place between 750 and 760.105 Macartney, in turn, believes that this 
did not mark the period when the Magyars resettled in the South Caucasus, 
but represented a solitary expedition carried out, most likely, with the con-
sent of the Khazar rulers, whom they served.106 The Sevordik, however, are not 
mentioned by Armenian sources as permanent residents of Armenia until the 
mid-9th century.107 Therefore, it is sometimes assumed that their resettlement 
could have taken place sometime between 830 and 840; it is also likely that 
there was a disintegration of the Magyar community at that time.108 The same 
conclusion is reached by Pritsak. In his research, however, he relied on ibn 
Rusta’s information about the ‘first border of the Magyars’, mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, which is said to come from a work by another Arab author, 
al-Khwārizmī, written no later than in 833. The rest of the information about 
the Magyars, which concerns their time on the Black Sea steppe, was taken by 
ibn Rusta from al-Jarmī, who, in turn, could not have written his work earlier 
than around 840.109
The chronological data obtained during earlier studies seem to suggest that 
the first Kangar/Pecheneg war with Magyars/Sabartoi asphaloi took place 
at least a half a century before the clash that resulted in the latter people’s 
exodus from the Black Sea steppe. This observation also seems to lead to the 
logical conclusion that the Volga region must have been the site of the earlier 
conflicts. According to the accounts of Constantine VII, this is also the area 
where we should locate Lebedia. Such an interpretation is difficult to accept 
103 DCB 1, II 48, 13–14, (p. 687); Moffat, Tall 2012, 687. Cf. Róna-Tas (1999, 418–420) questions 
the existence of the Sabartoi asphaloi, considering them a product of Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitus’ erudion. It is hard to accept his opinion.
104 Marquart 1903, 36.
105 Marquart 1903, 37; Macartney 1968, 88. Cf. Dunlop 1954, 202.
106 Macartney 1968, 90.
107 Macartney 1968, 90. In the year 853, to be exact.
108 Łowmiański 1973, 61–62; Kristó 1996, 147–148.
109 Pritsak 1976, 19.
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by researchers, however, who are inclined to place Lebedia on the Black Sea 
steppe. Macartney attempted to resolve this contradiction by demonstrating 
that the disintegration of the Magyars occurred as a result of an attack not 
by the Pechenegs, but by a Caucasian tribe, the Cherkess (Circassians), men-
tioned by al-Masʿūdī as the Nandarin. Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus identi-
fied them as the same group, partly in error, and partly in order to point out the 
important role played by the Pechenegs in shaping the political relations in the 
Black Sea region. The Cherkess invaded the Magyars at a time when the latter 
lived in areas north of the Kuban River.110 This or a similar location would seem 
to be beyond dispute, first because this would mean the Magyars neighboured 
the Cherkess, which is a necessary condition for the possibility of a conflict 
between the two ethne; secondly, such a location is tentatively supported by 
the consequences of an event mentioned here earlier numerous times: if the 
Magyars’ defeat led directly to the disintegration of their original ethnic com-
munity and to the migration of the Sabartoi asphaloi to the South Caucasus, 
the conflict would very likely have taken place in the environs of the Kuban. 
According to further findings by Macartney, the western faction of the Magyars 
went to Lebedia, where it was again attacked, this time by the Pechenegs.111 
Since Macartney is willing to accept, as does John Bagnell Bury, that De admin-
istrando imperio is only a loose, collection of notes from various sources and 
drawn up at different times,112 lacking deeper analysis, he therefore consid-
ers that Chapter 38 provides information only on the first clash between the 
Pechenegs and the Magyars. The circumstances of the second conflict between 
the two peoples would therefore be presented only in Chapter 40.113
A different way of resolving this troublesome contradiction is a concept 
proposed by Henryk Łowmiański, who, unlike Macartney, considered the pas-
sage in Constantine VII’s work concerning the disintegration of the Magyar 
community to be credible. However, the author of The Origins of Poland 
(Początki Polski) located the Pechenegs’ first attack in the Volga region, when 
the Magyars lived within the territory of what would later become Bashkiria. 
Archaeological data from the vicinity of the Belaia and Kama Rivers, as well as 
a passages from ibn Rusta, seem to confirm the possibility of a conflict between 
the two ethne during their nomadic period east of the Volga. After the defeat 
of the Sabartoi asphaloi, they are said to have travelled to the South Caucasus 
along the Volga, while a second group of Magyars reached Levedia following a 
110 Macartney 1968, 103, 106–108.
111 Macartney 1968, 108.
112 Bury 1906.
113 Macartney 1968, 80–83, 96–103.
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path the led down the Don. Łowmiański’s final conclusion was based on topo-
mastic data collected in the Kazan, Tambov and Simbirsk Governorates.114
It seems that the two hypotheses presented above, both aimed at clarify-
ing the troublesome discrepancies contained in Chapter 38 of De administ-
rando imperio, unfortunately raise a number of additional doubts. In terms of 
Macartney’s reasoning, the method of criticism he applied to Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitus’ account needs to be approached with considerable scepti-
cism. Based on J.B. Bury’s well researched findings, Macartney goes one step 
further – namely, he tries to prove that the accounts that gave Chapter 38 of 
De administrando imperio its final shape concerned a single clash between 
the Pechenegs and the Magyars, but the fact that they came from various 
informants could have led to an accidental ‘doubling’ of the battles between 
the two peoples. However, in the absence of any alternative source describ-
ing in equal detail the events connected with the Pechenegs’ journey to 
the Black Sea steppe, such a conclusion exposes its author to accusations of 
having made arbitrary choices in the treatment of data.115 The identifica-
tion of the Cherkess/Nandarins with the Kangar is also highly questionable. 
Constantine VII states twice that the Pechenegs used to be called Kangar. 
This claim arouses Macartney’s scepticism, who quite rightly notes that 
the Pechenegs had never appeared earlier under such a name (at least in the 
sources known to us), which indicates that they were not the same as the 
Kangar.116 This last argument would fully justify Macartney’s assumptions 
if not for a reference made at the end of Chapter 37 of De administrando 
imperio, which clearly states that the nickname (προσηγορία) Kangar was used 
in reference only to the bravest members of the Pecheneg tribe (ἀνδρειότεροι) 
and to those who were among the ‘better born’ (εὐγενέστεροι).117 In view of the 
such a finding, Macartney’s argument is proved inconclusive, a fact of which 
he is aware and he thus questions the value of the above mention, demon-
strating that the word ‘kangar’ does not have the meaning attributed to it by 
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus in the Old Turkic language. However, if we 
acknowledge that the Byzantine emperor did not make such a statement expre-
sis verbis, but offered it only as one possible interpretation, then Macartney’s 
linguistic analysis, regardless of its results, seems totally misguided and inca-
pable of achieving the desired outcome.118 It is also difficult to accept the 
114 Łowmiański 1973, 62–67.
115 Łowmiański 1973, 58.
116 Macartney 1968, 106.
117 DAI, XXXVII 68–71 (p. 170).
118 Macartney 1968, 104–106.
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argument that Constantine VII would have attributed to the Pechenegs a vic-
tory over the Magyars in which they actually played no role when his inten-
tion was to demonstrate to his son the political significance of this people. The 
learned basileus had enough real examples to illustrate this thesis that he did 
not have to resort to a more or less deliberate fabrication.119 Finally, the place-
ment of the Magyars on the Kuban River is also questionable. This hypoth-
esis rests on a weak source base. It would seem more justified to place the 
Black Bulgars in this region.120 Their existence is confirmed by Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitus in the middle of the 10th century. The emperor writes about 
them twice. In Chapter 12 of the De administrando imperio he assumes they 
are capable of attacking Khazaria, while in Chapter 42 he suggests that their 
territory is located near the Azov Sea.121 Both pieces of information seem to 
confirm the location we have adopted as likewise being valid in the mid-10th 
century. Macartney’s hypothesis that the territory north of the Kuban River 
could have been inhabited by Magyars in the first half of the 9th century is thus 
rather unlikely.122
The second hypothesis cannot be accepted without reservation. If the 
Magyars, as Łowmiański claims, left Bashkiria as a result of Pecheneg invasions, 
then we need to ascertain their character. In other words: was their aim to con-
quer the territory of their neighbours, or did they only carry out systematic loot-
ing attacks, without any attempt to seize the Magyars’ nomadic settlements? 
The first possibility clearly seems to be indicated by the account provided by 
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus. From the troublesome mentions found in 
Chapter 38 of De administrando imperio, it can be deduced that the Kangar, 
having expelled the Sabartoi asphaloi, then occupied their lands. However, it is 
unclear why they should have done so in the period between 830 and 840. The 
easiest thing to assume would be that at this time some kind of migration was 
taking place which encompassed large areas of the steppe. This is what Golden 
suggests. His interpretation was rejected, however, because the chronology of 
the source data on which he based his reasoning was questionable. Another 
reason this problem is worth considering because Łowmiański seems to sug-
gest that the Pechenegs occupied at least part of Bashkiria, pointing to a tribal 
name still found in this land – Youmalan, which the researcher associates with 
the Pecheneg and not the Magyars.123 This is the first reservation.
119 Macartney 1968, 108.
120 Cf. Chapter 2 of the present book.
121 DAI, XII (p. 64/65); XLII (p. 186/187).
122 For more on the question of what lands were inhabited by the Black Bulgars: Łowmiański 
1973, 65, fig. 2; Wozniak 1979, 120–121; Zhivkov 2015, 136–140.
123 Łowmiański 1973, 62.
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The second is as follows: if a direct result of the first invasion of the 
Pechenegs was the disintegration of the Magyar community, which seems 
to be the case in the account of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, then any 
attempt to date these events to a later time is unjustified. Nevertheless, this 
is what Łowmiański did, claiming that before the Sabartoi asphaloi separated 
from the rest of their brethren, they travelled with them over a long stretch of 
road until they reached the mouth of the Kama, and only then headed south, 
while the rest of the tribe went westwards. What is more, Łowmiański allows 
that both groups may have reached Lebedia, where the break-up occurred.124 
This land is also located on the Black Sea steppe.
A satisfactory solution to all the problems associated with the first clash 
between Pechenegs and Magyars – or rather, if we adopt the timeline of 
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus’ narrative, between the Kangar and the 
Sabartoi asphaloi – would seem to be impossible, especially one based on the 
information contained in extant sources. The picture of political relations in 
the Volga region in the 830s and 840s looms as very complicated. At this time, 
the Khazar Khaganate seems to have been experiencing a crisis, which was 
accompanied by major power shifts within it. If so, the state would have been 
vulnerable to exploitation by hostile political entities such as the Pechenegs. 
The Lebedias’ tribes, allies of the Khazars, were most likely also victims of 
Pecheneg aggression.
An extremely interesting issue is the relation between these events and the 
rebellion of the Kabars. From Chapter 39 of De administrando imperio we learn 
that they were originally among the tribes of the Khazars, but found them-
selves in conflict with its rulers, rebelled, were defeated and seceded from 
the tribe. They eventually merged with the Magyars and settled with them in 
Atelkouzou.125 The centrifugal nature of the Kabars’ political aspirations could 
have, but not necessarily made them natural allies of the Pechenegs.126 In any 
case, it contributed to temporary instability in the Pax Chazarica, which the 
warrior neighbours of the Khaganate tried to use to their advantage. However, 
this crisis was eventually overcome; the Khazars managed not only to hold 
back the Pechenegs, but also to maintain at least nominal control over the 
Black Sea steppe. The merger of the defeated Sabartoi asphaloi faction with 
the Kabars gave rise to a new political organism, which most likely harboured 
124 Łowmiański 1973, 67.
125 DAI, XXXIX, (p. 174/175).
126 Cf. Bartha 1975, 63–64. Bartha assumes that the Pechenegs took the side of the Khazars 
in the Kabars’ revolt. But this interpretation seems to contradict both data gathered by 
Constantine VII and information found in Arabic sources.
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no hostilities towards the Khazars. On the basis of the complicated narrative 
in Chapter 38 of De administrando imperio, I believe that after the secession 
of the Kabars and their domination of the Magyar tribal union, a compromise 
was reached between the former rebels and the Khaganate.127 In exchange for 
formal recognition of the sovereignty of their rulers, they were granted consid-
erable independence. They made eager used of this, especially in the latter half 
of the 9th century, when they began to penetrate areas west of the Carpathians 
militarily. In spite of internal crisis and external pressures from its enemies, the 
Khaganate managed to maintain its influence on the Black Sea steppe. Their 
hegemony would come to an end only in the last decade of the 9th century as 
a result of Pecheneg migration.
Despite all the doubts expressed above, we can assume there were two wars 
between the Pechenegs and the Magyars. It should be noted, however, that the 
first clash was part of a series of events that contributed to the ethnogenesis 
of the Magyars, whom Byzantine authors called ‘Turks’. If we follow the ethnic 
terminology used by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, then we should say that 
Lebedias’ tribes known as the Sabartoi asphaloi had to face the Kangar, or – if 
the last ethnonym is treated as a pars pro toto of the whole ethnos – with the 
Pechenegs. As a result of their defeat, a sub-set of the defeated group, perhaps 
with the consent or even inspiration of the Khazars, migrated to the Black Sea 
steppe.128 In the course of their migration, or after they had arrived in their new 
home, they merged with Kabars.129 This was one of a series of events that led 
to the creation of a new political organism, i.e., the ethnogenesis of Magyars. 
The merger of these two groups was probably peaceful, as evidenced by the 
fact that in the 880s both remained ethnically distinct.130 Nevertheless, the 
new political system, as Constantine VII clearly indicates, had a much more 
centralized structure than the loose confederation led by the Lebedias.131 The 
compromise reached with the Khazars, a sign of which was the elevation of 
Arpad to power,132 defined the place of the Magyars within the Pax Chazarica, 
i.e., within the political relations of Eastern Europe at the time.
127 DAI, XXXVIII 31–55 (p. 172/173).
128 Cf. Várady 1982, 27.
129 Cf. Bartha 1975, 63; Várady 1982, 30; Kristó 1996, 150–151 (contains a breakdown of different 
viewpoints on Hungarian histography).
130 Ann.Iuv., sub anno 881 (p. 742). According to these accounts, the entire tribal union for-
ayed west, reaching Vienna. The Kabars remained allied with the other tribes, but oper-
ated independently. Cf. Kristó 1996, 150.
131 DAI, XXXVIII 53–55 (p. 172/173). Constantine VII stresses that the Turks (Magyars) did not 
have a monarch before Arpad.
132 DAI, XXXVIII 51–53 (p. 172/173).
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We can therefore see that the first defeat in the struggle against the Pechenegs 
was a fundamental event for the Magyars, since it initiated a series of events 
that ultimately led to the formation of their community, both in terms of its 
ethnic composition and its political structure. These circumstances most likely 
determined how these events were preserved within the Magyar oral tradition, 
which was the basis for the accounts of Constantine VII. We should acknowl-
edge the claims of those researchers who place this clash in the Volga region, 
although such an interpretation will pose further problems for us.
At this point, we should proceed to analyze the third and last of the issues 
mentioned above, i.e., the location of the two geographical lands mentioned 
by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus: Lebedia (Λεβεδία) and Atelkouzou 
(’Ατελκούζου). There is still no consensus among scholars as to whether both 
lands were located in the Black Sea steppe region.133
Lebedia’s location raises more difficulties, as linguistic analysis has not pro-
duced clear results. Since, according to Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, the 
name of the land was to come from the name of the Magyar voivode Lebedias, 
some researchers assume that its source is the Old Hungarian term for steppe 
areas – lebedi.134 Another proposal for deciphering its etymology was pre-
sented by Macartney, for which it is a Slavicized term meaning ‘a place con-
taining many trees and water, where the soil is wet and swampy’.135 Still other 
researchers believe that the word’s etymology is derived from the Hungarian 
root lel-, which appears in such words such as lelek – spirit, soul’.136 We can thus 
see that not only is there no fundamental agreement on the origin of the word 
Λεβεδία, but also that the results of linguistic analyses are of doubtful value in 
determining the location of this land.
Much more worthy of mention are the attempts to identify the river 
Chidmas/Chingilous, which according to the accounts of Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitus, flowed through Lebedia. Some researchers are inclined 
to see its equivalent in the Molochnaia, a small river flowing into the Azov 
Sea, formed by Tokmak (a metathesis of its first syllable allegedly appears in 
the name Chidmas) and the Chingul (Chingilous). Such a resolution can be 
explained by the fact that the learned basileus recorded two names for the 
same river.137 Łowmiański believed that this was supported by an additional 
133 Kristó 1996, 107–110.
134 DAI-Com., 147; Swoboda 1967, 30.
135 Macartney 1968, 92–93.
136 Artamonov 1962, 341; Tryjarski 1975a, 512.
137 Marquart 1903, 32; Macartney 1968, 91; Łowmiański 1973, 59; Huxley 1984, 81. Marquart 
adds that the environs of the Molochnaia River were supposedly still known as Lepedika 
in the late 19th and early 20th century. The source of his information, however, is 
unknown.
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argument – namely the location of the Molochnaia River almost exactly along 
the border of Saltovo-Maiaki culture, which would explain the fact that a rela-
tively small river attained a representative status.138
However, even if we assume that Molochnaia was the river Constantine VII 
had in mind, the matter of defining the borders of Lebedia remains an open ques-
tion. We do not need, as Łowmiański would like, to recognize the Molochnaia 
as its eastern border. The account of Constantine VII creates equally valid 
premises for stating that the Chidmas/Chingilous flowed through the interior 
of Lebedia, and thus was not a border river. It should also be remembered that 
there is a historiographical tradition which accepted the fact that the Magyars 
remained for a significant time in the vicinity of the Don, i.e., in areas located 
much farther east than the Molochnaia. Similar information can be found in 
the writings of Regino of Prüm, whose chronicle is of little value for the chro-
nology of events, but according to Hungarian scholars the data they contain 
can be treated with a high degree of confidence. The Lorraine abbot explicitly 
mentions that at the time of their attack by the Pechenegs, the Magyars lived 
in the vicinity of the Tanais (Don).139 Traces of a similar textual tradition can 
be found in the Hungarian chronicles.140 It seems, therefore, that the eastern 
border of Lebedia could have been the Don, rather than the Molochnaia.
Another proposal was made by the Hungarian scholar Géza Feher, who 
argued that the Chidmas/Chingilous should be identified with the Donets 
River.141 Finally, it was also thought that the river was the same as the Inhul 
tributary of the Boh.142 According to Edward Tryjarski, from a purely linguistic 
point of view, this is the most probable interpretation.143
138 Łowmiański 1973, 59.
139 Regino, 131.
140 In particular, in: G.Ung., 34, 39. Cf. Spinei 2003, 52–53.
141 Fehér 1959, 308.
142 Vernadsky 1957, 17 (According to Vernadsky, Lebedia stretched from Podolia and the Inhul 
area in the west, to the upper Donets and Don in the east, and to the Ugra in the north); 
Ilinskii 1930, 101 (an identification with the Inhulets, a right tributary of the Dnieper River, 
is also permissible); Zukerman 1998, 668 (both of these rivers are the Inhul); Kristó 1996, 
111; 1998, 152–154 (Kristó assumes that the rivers in question are the Kodyma and Inhul, 
which means that Lebedia would have been located south of the lower Boh); Múcska 
2004, 283; Spinei 2003, 41 (Spinei does not attempt to identify the Chidmas [Chingilous] 
river, but assumes that Lebedia could have been located between the Volga and Don rivers 
or between the Don and Dnieper). Cf. also DAI-Com., 147; Litavrin, Novosel’tsev 1989, 392 
(n. 3).
143 Tryjarski 1975a, 512.
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Far fewer researchers locate the Lebedia in the Volga region. Among them 
was Gábor Vékony.144 He believed we should look for this land between the 
Urals and the Aral Sea. The Chidmas/Chingilous was, in his opinion, the same 
as the Emba.145 László Várady identified this mysterious river with the Bolshoi 
Uzen and Maly Uzen, which means that Lebedia would have been on the steppe 
between the Volga and the Yaik-Ural.146 Our earlier observations concerning 
the site of the battle between the Sabartoi asphaloi and the Kangar seem to 
justify locating Lebedia somewhere to the east of the Volga. However, the find-
ings of the archaeologists referred to above do not allow us to accept either of 
the two hypotheses mentioned above. The homeland of the people with the 
material culture closest to finds from the Hungarians from the Pannonian area 
have been located on the Belaia and Kama Rivers, and therefore far north of 
the Emba river basin or the Bolshoi Uzen and Maly Uzen.
It is worth noting one more circumstance that has become a subject of con-
sideration by numerous researchers. According to Constantine VII, the name 
of the home of the Sabartoi asphaloi was supposed to be derived from the 
name of the voivode Lebedias. The credibility of this information has often 
been questioned. Researchers have emphasized that the construction of the 
toponym ‘Lebedia’ cannot be of Hungarian origin, because it is in stark con-
tradiction with the native tradition for creating personal names, which in 
Hungarian is certainly not the final suffix -ia.147 It also seems unlikely that a 
person’s name would become a toponym for a great land or province inhabited 
by a whole people. The Hungarian language allows for this possibility only in 
the case of small settlements.148 In the light of such arrangements, Lebedia 
could only be the seat of the voivode himself and not of a whole union of 
tribes. It should be noted, however, that in the realities of the tribal societ-
ies that lived on the steppe, a primary factor guaranteeing their survival was 
their bonds of personal subjection. Territorial ties played a lesser role. Given 
this situation, Lebedias, as someone who bound individual tribes, naturally 
united and embodied the whole community. His seat was obviously also the 
centre of community relations. The centre was thus located where the voivode 
lived.149 Such an ascertainment would render efforts to locate Lebedia com-
pletely pointless. It could be located both in the Volga region and on the Black 
144 Vékony 1986, 42–43, 50–51.
145 For a critical look at Vékony’s views: Kristó 1996, 109–110.
146 Várady 1982, 26. Várady does not present any evidence rooted in linguistic research to sup-
port his proposed identification.
147 Kristó 1996, 107; Róna-Tas 1999, 418.
148 Kristó 1996, 108; Róna-Tas 1999, 418–419.
149 Cf. Moór 1936, 217; Kristó 1996, 108.
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Sea steppe. After all, according to Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus’ account, 
Lebedias would remain at the head of the tribal union even after the defeat 
he suffered to the Pechenegs. Yet, convincingly identifying references to 
the Chidmas/Chingilous River remains a key issue in resolving the question 
at hand.
The location of Atelkouzou raises markedly fewer doubts. In this case, 
researchers agree more on the etymology of this toponym. In all probability 
it consists of two nouns: Turkic ‘atel/itil/etel’ (water, river) and Turkic ‘köz’ 
or Finno-Ugric ‘küzü’ (area, terrain). Thus, the word could mean an area 
through which several rivers flow, as well as an area situated on one river or 
between rivers.150
In De administrando imperio, apart from the previously quoted passage from 
Chapter 38, some very important information about Atelkouzou can also be 
found in Chapter 40:
The place in which the Turks used formerly to be is called after the name 
of the river that runs through it, Etel and Kouzu, and in it the Pechenegs 
live now.151
The above passage seems to indicate that this is a riverside territory, but we 
do not have any other information to identify it. Therefore, the majority of 
researchers wishing to determine the location of Atelkouzou refer to the data 
contained at the end of Chapter 38:
The place of the Pechenegs, in which at that time the Turks lived [i.e., 
the time of the Pechenegs’ attack – A.P.], is called after the name of the 
local rivers. The rivers are these: the first river is that called Barouch, 
the second river that called Koubou, the third river that called Troullos, 
the fourth river that called Broutos, the fifth river that called Seretos.152
150 Marquart 1903, 33; Macartney 1968, 96; Łowmiański 1973, 59; Huxley 1984, 82; Kristó 1996, 
155–156; Múcska 2004, 283; Spinei 2003, 43; DAI-Com., 148, 151; Litavrin, Novosel’tsev 1989, 
393 (n. 13).
151 DAI, XL 23–25 (p. 176/177). ‘Ὁ δὲ τοπος, ἐν ᾧ προτερον οἱ Τοῦρκοι ἰπῆρχον, ὀνομάζεται κατὰ 
τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τοῦ ἐκεῖσε διερχομένου ποταμοῦ Ἐτὲλ καὶ Κουζοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἀρτίως οἱ Πατζινακῖται 
κατοικοῦσιν.’
152 DAI, XXXVIII 66–71 (p. 174/175). ‘Ὅτι ὁ τῶν Πατζινακιτῶν τοπος, ἐν ᾧ τῷ τοτε καιρῷ κατῴκη-
σαν οἱ Τοῦρκοι, καλεῖται κατὰ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τῶν ἐκεῖσε ὄντων ποταμῶν. Οἱ δὲ ποταμοίεἰσιν 
οὗτοι· ποταμὸς πρῶτος ὁ καλούμενος Βαρούχ, ποταμὸς δεύτερος ὁ καλούμενος Κουβοῦ, ποταμὸς 
τρίτος ὁ καλούμενος Τροῦλλος, ποταμὸς τέταρτος ὁ καλούμενος Βροῦτος, ποταμὸς πέμπτος ὁ 
καλούμενος Σέρετος.’
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This passage is of paramount importance for further consideration of this 
topic, mainly because the names of the rivers mentioned in it have been indis-
putably deciphered. These are respectively: the Dnieper, Boh, Dniester, Prut, 
and Siret.153 Since the above description refers to an area with an abundance of 
rivers, to which it owes its name, many scholars have been inclined to believe 
that this is Atelkouzou, although the quoted excerpt does not explicitly men-
tion this name. Supporters of such an interpretation include Marquart and 
Łowmiański.154 In their view, Atelkouzou is a separate land from Lebedia, 
bounded to the east by the Dnieper River and to the west by the Danube or the 
Seret. Other researchers (Macartney, Grégoire, Artamonov) are inclined either 
to stipulate the identity of Lebedia and Atelkouzou155 or otherwise define the 
area occupied by the latter land.156 The latter possibility seems to be worthy 
of consideration, given that the interpretation presented above is not the only 
plausible one. We could just as well adopt another, according to which, if the 
aforementioned rivers flowed through the territory of the Pechenegs, its rulers 
(present and former) would rule on both their right and left banks, so that the 
Dnieper and Siret would cease to function as the borders of nomadic settle-
ments. Moreover, if we assume that by the term ‘the place of the Pechenegs’ 
(ὁ τῶν Πατζινακιτῶν τόπος) Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus understood the 
whole territory occupied by them in the middle of the 10th century, and not 
only its western part, then it is all the more difficult to accept the hypothesis 
presented earlier. From his writings it is clear that the lands occupied by the 
Pechenegs at that time stretched between the Danube and the Don. We must 
also note that in the passage under discussion, almost all the larger rivers flow-
ing into the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov are mentioned. The only ones omit-
ted are the Don and Danube. The explanation for their absence is relatively 
simple. The Danube and Don were the borders of the Pechenegs’ nomadic 
settlements, so they did not flow through the territory of these steppe-people. 
The only circumstance that undermines our interpretation is the lack of an 
equivalent for the Donets, which does not flow into any sea, but is an impor-
tant river in the region. It seems, however, that the Chapter 42 of De administ-
rando imperio contains an interesting piece of information that both explains 
this doubt and supports our reasoning:
153 DAI-Com., 149; Litavrin, Novosel’tsev 1989, 394 (n. 26, 27).
154 Marquart 1903, 33; Łowmiański 1973, 59; Huxley 1984, 83; Litavrin, Novosel’tsev 1989, 394 
(n. 27).
155 Macartney 1968, 94–96; Grégoire 1937, 635; 1938, 268; Artamonov 1962, 340.Cf. Tryjarski 
1975a, 512; Kristó 1996, 154.
156 Györffy 1975, 287.Cf. Spinei 2003, 44.
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From the Danube river to the aforesaid city of Sarkel is a journey of 
60 days. In this land between [i.e., between the Danube and the Don, 
on which lay Sarkel – A.P.] are many rivers: the two biggest of them are 
the Dniester and the Dnieper. But there are other rivers, that which is 
called the Syngoul and the Hybyl and the Almatai and the Kouphis and 
the Bogou and many others.157
It is clearly stated here that the area between the Danube and the Don is a 
land of many rivers, and this provides a means for interpreting the name of 
the territory of the Magyars and Pechenegs – Atelkouzou. It should more-
over be noted that according to Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, the rivers 
particularly representative for this area are the Dnieper and Dniester, which 
are also mentioned in the final part of Chapter 38. The learned emperor men-
tions several other rivers, including the Syngoul, which can be identified as the 
Donets,158 though he gives them a clearly secondary character. We can there-
fore assume that:
– The description we find in the final passage of Chapter 38 of De administ-
rando imperio concerns Atelkouzou. This seems to be indicated by the men-
tion that this is the former territory of the Magyars, now inhabited by the 
Pechenegs. Similar information can also be found in Chapter 40, where the 
name Atelkouzou is mentioned.
– It is also a description of the entire territory of the Pechenegs, which, accord-
ing to Constantine VII, stretched in the middle of the 10th century from the 
Don to the Danube.
– Atelkouzou covered exactly this same area. The origin of this name becomes 
understandable for us, especially in the light of the last of the passages of 
De administrando imperio quoted above.159
The issue of Lebedia’s mutual relationship with Atelkouzou, in particular in 
the light of the findings discussed above, cannot be resolved satisfactorily. 
In order to remain faithful to my own observations as well as to the account 
offered by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, I am inclined to look for the first 
of the lands in the Volga region. From the information contained in De admin-
istrando imperio, it seems that the Sabartoi asphaloi lived in Lebedia and were 
expelled from it by the Kangar-Pechenegs. If this clash took place somewhere 
in Bashkiria, it is there that the sought-after land should be located. On the 
157 DAI, XLII 55–59 (p. 184/185). ‘Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Δανούβεως ποταμοῦ μέχρι τοῦ προρρηθέντος 
κάστρου, τοῦ Σάρκελ ὁδος ἐστιν ἡμερῶν ξ´. Μέσον δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης γῆς ποταμοὶ μέν εἰσιν πολλοί 
δύο δὲ μέγιστοι ἐξ αὐτῶν ὅ τε Δάναστρις καὶ ὁ Δάναπρις. Εἰσὶ δὲ ἕτεροι ποταμοί, ὅ τε λεγομενος 
Συγγοὺλ καὶ ὁ Ὑβὺλ καὶ ὁ Ἀλματαὶ καὶ ὁ Κοῦφις καὶ ὁ Βογοῦ καὶ ἕτεροι πολλοί.’
158 Feher 1959, 308.
159 Similar borders for Atelkouzou (Hungarian: Etelköz) were outlined by Györffy 1975, 287.
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road to such an interpretation, however, stands the impossibility of convinc-
ingly deciphering the name of the Chidmas/Chingilous River.
The possibility of locating Lebedia on the Black Sea steppe therefore 
remains open. If Lebedia was indeed located there, the question arises as to 
why it was placed next to Atelkouzou in the Hungarian oral tradition. There 
seems to be one rather important premise that can explain this fact. The 
memory of Lebedia may reflect the process of the Magyars’ migration onto the 
Black Sea steppe. It cannot be ruled out that at first they occupied a small area 
east of the Don, but soon extended their rule to the right bank of the Dnieper 
River. This seems to be evidenced by the reference in the Annals of Saint Bertin 
(Annales Bertiniani) to the Magyars’ invasion of East Francia, mentioned ear-
lier in reference to Marquart’s dating of the first Magyar-Pecheneg clash.160 
Marquart rightly assumed that if the Magyars were able then to carry out a 
looting expedition targeted at a Western European power, the borders of their 
homeland had to extend to the Danube delta. It is difficult to imagine such an 
attack being possible if the aggressor occupied an area east of the Dnieper. 
Unfortunately, Marquart mistakenly links this event to the Pechenegs’ inva-
sion, but his observation is in general quite valuable. We can therefore conclude 
that the Magyars conquered the entire area comprising Atelkouzou as early as 
the 860s. This assumption is confirmed by a number of later sources, indicat-
ing indirectly that the Magyars occupied the territories in the environs of the 
Danube.161 Meanwhile, they maintained their sovereignty over the eastern part 
of the Black Sea steppe. Lebedia, if it was indeed in the area they controlled, 
was only part of a much larger territory, yet the Hungarians sought to preserve 
the memory of their original homelands. To some extent, it is therefore appro-
priate to agree with Łowmiański that Lebedia could have been a kind of start-
ing point for their excursions. The Pechenegs attacked the Magyars for the 
second time when the latter already controlled the steppe between the Don 
and the Danube.
Since we have already taken a stance on a number of controversial issues 
resulting from the aforementioned passages in De administrando imperio, we 
can therefore attempt now to establish the course of events that led to the 
establishment of the Pechenegs on the Black Sea steppe. The start of this jour-
ney was probably a result of ethnic displacements, in this case caused by the 
expansion of the Samanid Empire. Around 893 they forced the Oghuz to leave 
their nomadic settlements and attack their western neighbours, the Pechenegs. 
The latter, succumbing to the mechanism of the ‘migration of peoples’, made 
160 Marquart 1903, 33. For additional arguments supporting the hypothesis of Magyar expan-
sion onto the Black Sea steppe and beyond: Spinei 2003, 41–42.
161 Cf. Györffy 1975, 287–288.
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an attempt to settle on the territory of the Khazars, which ended in a total 
failure. Despite this defeat and contrary to Khazar’s interests, the Pechenegs 
managed to cross to the right bank of the Volga at a crossing place that was 
probably in an area controlled by the Burtas, who were allies of the Khazars 
but were clearly weaker than them. Information about possible Khazar-Oghuz 
cooperation against the Pechenegs should be considered unreliable, mainly 
due to the lack of a motive justifying such a move.
The arrival of the Pechenegs on the Black Sea steppe took place at a rather 
pivotal moment in history. A war was being fought between Simeon I, the 
ruler of Bulgaria, and the Byzantine emperor Leo VI (the Wise), father of 
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus. Its participants included the inhabitants of 
Atelkouzou, i.e., the Magyars, who were fighting on the side of Leo VI. When 
Simeon I found himself in a desperate situation, which we learn about in 
Chapter 40 of De administrando imperio, he decided to call on the Pechenegs 
for help. Other Byzantine sources do not note this fact,162 which sometimes 
leads researchers to accept the premise that the nomadic invasion were car-
ried out on their own initiative.163 Indeed, the extremely violent nature of 
events seems to exclude the possibility of the Bulgarians organizing a dip-
lomatic mission aimed at persuading the Pechenegs to fight the Magyars or, 
more likely, to agree on a joint attack by them and Simeon’s troops. The true, 
or rather unwitting ally, who had just lost his home and was now ‘wandering in 
flight’ in search of a new one, had a great motivation to fight that did not have 
to be reinforced in any way. The Pechenegs were also able to take make good 
use of the tactical advantage given to them by circumstances. They attacked 
the Magyars not when they were prepared to repel an attack, but during the 
absence of their main forces due to a military expedition. The impact of the 
Pechenegs must have been extremely severe, especially given that Emperor 
Leo VI abandoned his former allies after entering into a peace agreement with 
Simeon. As a result, the Magyars were forced to leave their homelands once 
again, this time the vast lands of Atelkouzou, which the aggressors seized.
Judging by the information contained in Constantine VII’s account, this 
event took place ca. 895. Its significance for the further history of the Pechenegs 
cannot be overestimated. This steppe people occupied an area that was a place 
of lively contacts – both commercial and cultural, but above all political – 
between several countries, of which the most powerful were Byzantium and 
the Khazar Khaganate.
162 Cf. footnote 101 above.
163 Kristó 1996, 188.
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chapter 4
Structures and Forms of Existence
4.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with a sphere that is both wide-ranging and extremely hard 
to define, a sphere usually referred to as culture. It is not possible to ascertain 
in full the characteristics of the Pechenegs’ culture. The fragmentary nature of 
written and archaeological sources allows us only to outline the most charac-
teristic elements of the culture that grew out of the Pechenegs’ nomadic life-
style and shaped the quality of this steppe people’s relations with their settled 
neighbours.
The Pechenegs remained nomads throughout their existence as an inde-
pendent people. Their contacts with sometimes highly developed agricultural 
communities undoubtedly influenced them, but did not radically change their 
way of life. Neither the starkly different natural conditions of their new home 
nor close relations with other culturally dissimilar communities – two factors 
that often put nomadic groups on a path to sweeping cultural change – had 
a significant impact on Pechenegs until the mid-11th century. We can point 
to two other nomadic communities, the Volga-Kama and Danube Bulgars, as 
examples of groups that underwent a process of acculturation and sedenta-
rization due to such factors.
As a result of events which took place in the mid-7th century, the Danube 
Bulgars were forced to leave the Black Sea steppe and relocate to the Lower 
Danube. They ultimately settled in today’s north-eastern Bulgaria. Recent 
research shows that the Volga-Kama Bulgars did not reach the mouth of the 
Kama River, where it flows into the Volga, until the mid-8th century.1 In their 
new homelands, both nomadic groups met a settled population whose cul-
ture differed from theirs. In the case of the Volga-Kama Bulgars, these were 
Finno-Ugric peoples living in forests where they hunted and Alano-Sarmatian 
agricultural communities.2 The members of the Danube Bulgars led by 
Asparukh, in turn, came into contact with Slavic agricultural peoples who 
were dominant in terms of numbers.3 In both cases, the necessary conditions 
1 Cf. Chapter 2 of the present book.
2 Tryjarski 1975 183; Fakhrutdinov 1984, 14–26; Zimonyi 1990, 64–83.
3 Tryjarski 1975, 271–273; Kurnatowska 1977, 89–90; Beshevliev 1981, 179–181; 1984, 60–61; 
Wasilewski 1988, 35.
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existed for dynamic cultural exchange between the politically dominant but 
less numerous nomadic groups and the rest of the local population. For both 
Bulgar groups, a change in their geographical environment played a vitally 
important role in intensifying the process of sedentarization.4 This was partic-
ularly true for the Volga-Kama Bulgars. When they settled in their new home-
land, which was full of forests, swamps, and rivers, they were forced to reduce 
the role that pastoralism played in their economy. Its place was taken in part 
by activities that were completely alien to such nomadic communities (e.g., 
fishing, harvesting honey, etc.).5 However, this process of acculturation was 
arduous and progressed slowly. An important role in delaying acculturation, 
especially in the beginning, was played by the nomads’ conscious attempts to 
maintain their cultural distinction, as well as their hostility towards the indige-
nous local peoples. The example of the Danube Bulgars shows that the process 
of overcoming this hostility could take centuries; we can observe a phenom-
ena that allows us to assess the progress of this process only in the early- 
9th century.6 Distrust towards outsiders and their cultural milieu sometimes 
took the form of a cultural conservatism that manifested itself in an attach-
ment to the ‘old ways of life’, despite the fact that these practices sometimes 
had no practical value in the new living environment. Yet this conservatism 
was not absolute and did not rule out the possibility of adopting foreign cul-
tural models.7 In the case of the Danube Bulgars, a sentiment for their old life-
style, which seems to have been reflected in hybrid dwellings that combined 
the features of a yurt and a basin house,8 was accompanied by a willingness 
among their elites to incorporate cultural novelties. The second generation 
of Bulgar monarchs, for example, were already beginning to borrow methods 
for demonstrating power from the Byzantine empire.9 Borrowings of this kind 
were incorporated into their existing pagan system of values. Therefore, the 
disintegration of their former cultural universe, which could function only in 
4 For general information on the sedentarization process in nomadic communities: Khazanov 
1978, 119–126; 1984, 198–202; 1990, 1–15. Khazanov describes cultural change in nomads as a 
case of ecological change par excellence.
5 Tryjarski 1975, 192–194; Fakhrutdinov 1984, 27–36.
6 This mainly concerns the internal policies allegedly pursued by Khan Krum (802/803–814), 
who is believed to have sought to strengthen the role of Slavs in the governance of the 
Bulgarian State and to place them on an equal footing with the Bulgars. Tryjarski 1975, 276–
277; Beshevliev 1981, 264; 1984, 131; Halperin 2007, 88–89.
7 On this phenomenon in general: Paroń 2009, 43–54.
8 These are dated to the 8th and 9th centuries: Waklinow 1984, 93.
9 Atanasov 1999, 32–46; Havliková 1999, 407–420; Stepanov 1998, 247–254; 2001, 6–7, 13; 
Ziemann 2007, 307–308; Fiedler 2008, 169–188, 191–193, 193–196.
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a steppe milieu, was accompanied by a process of identity formation in which 
older traditions continued to play a considerable role.
Similar phenomena can be observed in the case of the Volga-Kama Bulgars. 
Although in the early 10th century their lifestyle became largely sedentary,10 
in the account of Ahmad ibn Fadlan, who visited their capital, we can find a 
wide range of information that indicates the ruler of Volga-Kama Bulgaria still 
had strong attachments to his people’s former nomadic lifestyle.11 Therefore, 
although powerful factors promoting change were at work, the nomads’ pro-
cess of acculturation may have been a slow one and may not have resulted in a 
complete and immediate rejection of their previous identity.
For the Pechenegs, the chances of experiencing such radical cultural 
change were more limited. Unlike the Bulgar groups, the geographical condi-
tions in their new surroundings did not differ significantly from their previ-
ous home in the Transvolga Region. The Black Sea steppe offered excellent 
conditions for extensive pastoralism, which comprised the foundation of a 
nomadic economy.12 Moreover, their contacts with other cultural communi-
ties were much less intensive. Nonetheless, during their time on the Black Sea 
steppe, the Pechenegs may have subjugated settled communities associated 
by archaeologists with the Balkan-Danube culture (so-called Dridu culture).13 
The Pechenegs most likely extended their rule over this people, who inhab-
ited western Wallachia and Moldavia. Particularly close contacts might have 
been established with them in the Lower Dniester region, north of the Danube 
Delta, from the Lower Prut in the west to the Cogîlnic in the east, and also in 
the lands between the Prut and Siret Rivers.14 It cannot be ruled out that the 
local population provided the nomads with farming products and handicrafts. 
Some items could have been given as tribute,15 and others exchanged through 
barter. It is assumed, however, that factors such as differences in their economy, 
lifestyle, social organization, and spiritual culture fostered separation between 
them.16 The nomads and settled population therefore apparently lived side by 
side rather than together. While it cannot be ruled out that the two communi-
ties developed some sort of modus vivendi, the early 11th century marked its 
10  Tryjarski 1975, 191.
11  A most remarkable fact is that the ruler of the Volga-Kama Bulgars lived and received for-
eign emissaries in a yurt. ibn Fadlan: ibn Fadlan, 218/219, 228/229; Zeki Validi Togan 1939, 
41–42, 64.
12  Cf. Chapter 1 of the present book.
13  Diaconu 1975, 235; Spinei 1986, 103.
14  Spinei 1975, 274; 1986, 224, 226 (maps 1–2); Dobroliubskii 1986, 24 (fig. 1).
15  Diaconu 1975, 235; Spinei 1975, 273; 1986, 103.
16  Spinei 1975, 276; 1986, 104.
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end, as the agricultural population began to withdraw to upland and wooded 
areas that were more difficult for the nomads to reach.17
External cultural contacts were facilitated by the fact that the Pechenegs 
controlled an area that contained important trade routes and shared a bor-
der with Byzantium. However, the relations created by these circumstances 
remained sporadic in nature. In addition, the quality of the contacts between 
the Pechenegs and neighbouring countries often were not conducive to fruit-
ful cultural exchange. Periods of peaceful cooperation recorded in written 
sources were interwoven with raids and bloody conflicts. Yet, there is reason to 
believe that there were instances of close contacts with neighbouring commu-
nities. One of the most interesting remarks on this issue comes from a work by 
Ibrahim ibn Yaqub. He lists a number of peoples, among them the Pechenegs, 
and claims that they spoke the language of the Slavs due to their close relations 
with them.18 This statement is very hard to believe. Perhaps Tadeusz Kowalski 
was correct when he claimed that this should be interpreted from the perspec-
tive of Ibrahim ibn Yaqub, i.e., from the perspective of a merchant. Finding a 
channel for communication that would make it possible to trade with foreign 
peoples was therefore of particular importance to him. Ibn Yaqub’s remark 
thus need not be taken to mean that the Pechenegs’ mother tongue was a 
Slavic dialect, but rather that in trade matters it was possible to communicate 
with them by means of a Slavic language.19
It thus seems that as a culturally independent group, the Pechenegs 
remained nomads. Conditions conducive to cultural change, which ultimately 
led to their adopting a sedentary lifestyle, did not exist until the mid-11th cen-
tury, when most of the ethnos had settled in the Byzantine Empire. However, 
the desire to maintain their old ways of life remained strong even then.20
A separate problem is the question of what elements of the nomads’ cul-
ture determined the quality of their existence and relations with their settled 
neighbours. It is natural to begin addressing such a question with the issue of 
the Pechenegs’ social and political organization. The survival of any human 
community exposed to turbulent historical events would most likely be impos-
sible if its members did not establish at least basic socio-political structures. 
The nomads’ strong means of organization, introduced mainly for the sake 
of carrying out military actions, sometimes gave them an advantage over less 
17  Diaconu 1970, 37–48; 1975, 237; Spinei 1975, 274; 1986, 103. Cf. also Chapter 6 of the present 
book.
18  ibn Yaqub, 52; Mishin 1996, 190.
19  ibn Yaqub, 105 (n. 125).
20  Paroń 2009a, 443–474 and Chapter 7 of the present book.
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organized settled communities.21 It enabled them to impose political domina-
tion over farmers or at least force them to maintain the best possible relations 
with the belligerent nomads. Meanwhile, the nature of their organization, its 
efficiency and internal cohesion also determined the shape of their political 
relations with local powers. The last remark is particularly important in view 
of the fact that the Pechenegs bordered the Byzantine Empire.
The existence of any community, including a nomadic one, is conditioned 
by the nature of its economy. Therefore, the type of economy the Pechenegs 
had needs to be examined. As is the case with most nomads, their economy was 
dominated by pastoralism, which was accompanied by other, secondary forms 
of economic activity. Most nomadic communities, including the Pechenegs, 
were not economically self-sufficient. They were forced to satisfy their demand 
for products they could not produce themselves either through the exchange 
of goods or organized plundering.22 Nomads are often demonized for the level 
of intensity of these plundering raids. It needs to be remembered that these 
aggressive actions were often the only means available for overcoming the iso-
lationist tendencies of a neighbouring state or simply an attempt to replenish 
food supplies, which were at times dramatically scarce.23 At the same time, it 
would be difficult to deny, in light of available source data, that the Pechenegs 
organized plundering raids with relatively regularity.
Another factor that made such a state of affairs possible was the Pechenegs’ 
system of military organization. Bellicosity is a feature attributed to nomads in 
general. Kazimierz Moszyński claimed that apart from its economic impact, 
this bellicosity also nourished a specific way of life.24 Frequent attacks on set-
tled communities, as well as particularly ruthless fighting on the steppe, the 
aim of which was the complete destruction of the opponent, contributed to 
the emergence of a specific sociopolitical organization and to the development 
of an extremely effective method of warfare. In this respect, the nomads some-
times surpassed much larger agricultural communities, whose members both 
watched the nomads’ exploits with horror, and copied their methods of fight-
ing in an effort to resist them more effectively.25 These general observations 
21  Moszyński 1996, 30–31; Golden 2011a, 89–92.
22  Moszyński 1996, 27; Swoboda 1978, 413–14.
23  Cf. Paroń 2013b, 271–283.
24  Moszyński 1996, 26–27.
25  Moszyński 1996, 31. Many very spectacular examples come from China’s interactions 
with the world of the steppe. In the early days of the Han Dynasty (until the 120s BCE), 
the nomadic Xiongnu (Hsiung-nu) Empire enjoyed military dominance, which led the 
Chinese court to avoid armed confrontation with the nomads and to pursue a policy of 
peace, known as heqin (ho-ch’in), towards them. It was only after adopting elements of 
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apply to the Pechenegs as well. Mounted military formations and the types 
of weapons typical of nomads became popular in Rus’ as a result of encoun-
ters, or rather clashes, with the Pechenegs.26 Due to their military skills, small 
groups of the Pechenegs were enlisted into service by Byzantine emperors, as 
well as by Rus’ and Hungarian rulers.27 Ultimately, and most importantly for 
our considerations, the bellicosity of the Pechenegs laid the foundations for 
their political significance.
The last, fourth part of this chapter is devoted to phenomena that shaped 
the feeling of community among the Pechenegs, contributed to the creation 
of a system of values universally recognized by this group, and constructed 
the image of these nomads in the eyes of their settled neighbours. Such fac-
tors strengthened the ethnic bond shared by members of this community 
and shaped a kind of nomadic ethos, thereby determining to a large extent 
the political actions undertaken by the Pechenegs. These factors also influ-
enced their attitude towards neighbouring peoples, defined the value of the 
Pechenegs as a political partner for potential allies, and strengthened their 
sense of solidarity, which was of extreme importance when the ethnos as a 
whole or in part came under threat.
4.2 Political and Social Organization
The shape of the social and political organization of a particular community 
is of fundamental importance to understanding its history. Discussing this 
subject, however, is akin to walking through a minefield. There are numerous 
pitfalls awaiting any researcher who deals with historical societies. The first 
of these is terminology. Every scientific language needs one, but it is hard to 
resist the impression that today’s language of description of past social struc-
tures has undergone far-ranging deconstruction. As a result of criticism of the 
evolutionary paradigm, the category of the state in particular has lost much 
of its significance. First of all, it has ceased to be an acid test for the level of 
development of a specific community. The state is also no longer perceived as a 
Xiongnu’s military policies (especially the use of large-scale cavalry) that the Han were 
able to introduce a bellicose foreign policy (Di Cosmo 2002, 229–247). Likewise, in the 
times of the late Sui Dynasty and early Tang Dynasty (7th century), resistance to Turkish 
invasions became effective following the creation of elite cavalry units, which were fully 
“Turkified”, meaning they fought using the methods as the steppe-dwellers. (Li Jinxiu 
2014, 66–74).
26  Szymański 1973, 126–131.
27  Tryjarski 1975a, 519–520. Cf. also Chapter 7 of the present book.
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necessary institution, nor as a guarantee of a community’s successful continu-
ation. Human communities have sometimes achieved a high level of develop-
ment (e.g., the Greek polis) despite the lack of distinct state structures.28 We 
find ourselves at this point entering into a hopeless discussion on the defini-
tion of a state, i.e., a discussion that has no chance of being resolved. We can 
accept the pragmatic observation that an excessive widening of the definition 
of a state leads to the conclusion that any political organization of a human 
community is essentially a state, which results in a complete loss of the term’s 
value as an analytical category.29 However, it is also impossible not to notice 
that a precise definition of the term is extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
A universal definition covering all civilizations and epochs most likely simply 
does not exist. Such the case, phrases like ‘pre-state community’ and ‘pre-state 
organism’ lose their meaning entirely.
A separate issue is the problem of statehood in nomads. This discussion has 
been ongoing for many decades, and seems to have yielded two basic posi-
tions. The representatives of the first of these positions are inclined to claim 
that nomadic communities are not capable of creating states. At best, they 
form empires, which are externally dangerous and perfectly suited for expan-
sion and exerting pressure on neighbouring political entities, but internally 
possess a loose federal or tribal structure.30 Representatives of the opposing 
view believe that nomads are not inferior to other communities when it comes 
to their capacity for state-building.31 This view can be maintained only with a 
very broad definition of the category of the state, which, especially in view of 
the fragmentary nature of sources, may result in almost every political organ-
ism of nomads being considered a state. It seems that taking into account the 
specificity of the steppe world, the least controversial solution would be to 
use the category of ‘early state’, i.e., a political structure with a clearly defined 
centre, in which all the institutions typical of a mature state apparatus have 
not yet been created, or are merely embryonic in character.32 Such transitional 
28  Bravo, Wipszycka 1988, 133–138; Bondarenko, Korotayev, Kradin 2003, 6. The authors of 
the latter study remind us that organisms of the polis-civitas type were neither merely 
an ancient phenomenon, nor a European one. Moreover, they seem to have been quite 
numerous, meaning they cannot be viewed as a systemic anomaly.
29  Tymowski 2009, 12–13.
30  Markov 1976, 312–313; Barfield 1992, 7–8; 1993, 149–151; Kradin 1992, 152; 2002, 244–246; 
Kradin, Skrynnikova 2006, 50.
31  Sneath 2007, 21–37.
32  Claessen, Skalník 1978, 3–27; Khazanov 1978a, 77–92; Skalník 1978, 597–618; Claessen, 
Skalník 1978a, 619–635; Khazanov 1981, 155–175; Claessen, Skalník 1981, 469–510; Khazanov 
1984, 228–233, 295–302. The concept of an early state in nomad societies is sometimes 
opposed with the concept of a supercomplex chiefdom, used to describe the structure of 
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formations were created relatively often by Eurasian steppe nomads. A feature 
specific to them, however, was their lack of stability. The status of a mature 
state seems to have been achieved only by nomadic cultures that had already 
moved off the steppe.33
In modern academic discourse, use of the categories of ‘clan’ and ‘tribe’, 
once very important for describing social and political structures, have been 
largely repudiated. Together with these terms, the notion of ‘clan-tribal system’ 
and ‘patriarchal and clan system’ have also lost their value. This terminological 
crisis seems to have resulted, at least to some extent, from the abandonment 
of the evolutionary paradigm. So-called pre-state societies, whose political 
existence was framed within one of the above-mentioned ‘systems’, were fre-
quently compared to societies ‘already’ functioning within state structures. 
Nevertheless, notions like ‘clan’ and ‘tribe’, condemned by some researchers, 
continue to be commonly used. In fact, we seem to be dealing not so much 
with their abandonment, as with their redefinition.34
Written sources provide much information on the sociopolitical organiza-
tion of historical communities, but these pronouncements are tainted by sub-
jectivism and bias – which in the case of nomadic communities is extremely 
common – having been prepared by foreign authors, i.e., individuals not 
belonging to the community described. However, this merely burdens the 
researcher with the obligation of having to try to decipher the conceptual appa-
ratus used in a specific text and, afterward, reconstructing a fragment of the 
social reality it describes. The existence of certain notions does not, of course, 
determine their actual meaning. In other words, the fact the a specific author 
notices the presence of certain sociopolitical organizational units, the name of 
which allows us to associate them with categories commonly used in anthro-
pology (e.g., ‘clan’ and ‘tribe’), does not in itself determine the basis of these 
the so-called steppe empires. The latter were not states, because they had not yet man-
aged to create a fully developed administrative apparatus, only its foundations (cf. Kradin 
2002a, 372–373; Kradin, Skrynnikova 2006, 50–51). It should be noted, first of all, that such 
a definition of a supercomplex chiefdom makes it a concept very close to that of an early 
state. Nikolai Kradin and Tatiana Skrynnikova called it a ‘state prototype (proobraz)’. This 
means in practice that it is very difficult to distinguish between the two political organ-
isms. A supercomplex chiefdom seems to have been an entity that could only exist in 
scholarly discussions, as another ‘degree of abstraction’ between the well-rooted catego-
ries of chiefdom and an early state.
33  Khazanov 1984, 228–232; Di Cosmo 1994, 1115–1118; 1999, 20–28.
34  Lindner 1982, 689–711. The researcher assumes that a nomadic tribe is simply a political 
organism in which blood kinship is no longer meaningful. The tribe is understood as the 
basic political structure of nomads. Its size is unimportant; the empires of the European 
Huns and the Ottoman Turks are tribes as well.
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organizational units.35 In addition to political and historical factors par excel-
lence, such as common interest as a factor leading to the formation of alliances 
between previously separate groups, or simply the conquest of the weaker by 
the stronger, we should at least in theory allow for the principle of kinship. 
This concept most likely did not provide the foundation for large political 
organisms. The ‘idiom of kinship’ in these was in fact a tool for communicat-
ing the order created within the political process. The terminology associated 
with this notion was therefore not an organizing principle, but a secondary 
phenomenon, reflecting the existing system of interests and hierarchies. It 
seems, however, that at the lowest, most basic levels of social organization, real 
blood relationships, rather than fictitious one, played a very important role 
among nomads. Finally, it is worth remembering that in the political organ-
isms of steppe people, real (blood) kinship or affinity sometimes acquired 
political significance as a tool for consolidating alliances between individual 
aristocratic families.36
The Pechenegs will therefore be described, above all, as a political organism 
shaped and modified by historical events. Groups of people of different origins 
could belong to this organism; however, the principle that united them was 
political in character. In order to understand this principle, it is necessary to 
refer to primary sources, supplemented by comparative materials concerning 
other Eurasian steppe groups.
A fortunate circumstance is the fact that the sociopolitical organiza-
tion of the Pechenegs was described in some detail in Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitus’ De administrando imperio. An additional propitious factor is 
the emperor’s keen interest in the sociopolitical structures of nomads, result-
ing from his plans in relation to them. This data is probably quite reliable, 
although it does not contain the native names of the individual units of the 
Pechenegs’ system of social organization, but instead uses (sometimes quite 
surprising) Greek terms. This means that it is necessary to take a closer look at 
them and then compare them with what is generally known about the socio-
political systems of steppe peoples.
35  In one of his works, Peter B. Golden seems to reject David Sneath’s criticism of tradi-
tional concepts. Golden is right that some of them simply come from written sources, but 
this does not mean they do not require detailed analysis and, if necessary, redefinition. 
Sneath, on the other hand, sometimes seems to assume that the mere use of traditional 
names of socio-political entities by a particular researcher is tantamount to accepting 
their former meaning, related to now outdated concepts, uncritically. Golden 2011, 17 
(n. 1); Sneath 2007, 2.
36  Markov 1976, 310–311; Lindner 1982, 696–700; Khazanov 1984, 138–144; Barfield 1992, 
26–27.
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To describe all Pechenegs and individual units of their political organism 
Constantine VII uses the following terms: ethnos (τὸ ἔθνος), laos (ὁ λαός) and 
genea (ἡ γενεά), while for units of their territorial organization he uses: thema 
(τὸ θέμα) and meros (τὸ μέρος).
Clarifying the scope of the meaning of the first of these terms does not pose 
too great a problem. Constantine VII uses ethnos [ἔθνος] when he means the 
whole people. In the first chapter of De administrando imperio we read:
Ὅτι γειτνιάζει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔθνος τῶν Πατζινακιτῶν τῷ μέρει τῆς 
Χερσῶνος, […].37
This nation [ἔθνος] of the Pechenegs is neighbour to the district of 
Cherson, […].
Similarly, in the Title of Chapter 37:
Περὶ τοῦ ἔθνους τῶν Πατζινακιτῶν38
Of the nation [ἔθνος] of the Pechenegs
The second term, ὁ λαός, is somewhat more difficult. It is used four times in 
relation to the Pechenegs, for the first time in Chapter 4:
Ὅτι καὶ ἕτερος λαὸς τῶν τοιούτων Πατζινακιτῶν τῷ μέρει τῆς Χερσῶνος 
παράκεινται, […].39
Yet another folk [λαὸς] of these Pechenegs lies over against the district of 
Cherson […].
Then again in Chapter 8:
Ὅτι καὶ ες τὸ μέρος τῆς Βουλγαρίας καθέζεται λαὸς τῶν Πατζινακιτῶν, ἐπὶ 
τὸ μέρος τοῦ Δάναπρι καὶ τοῦ Δάναστρι καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων τῶν ἐκεῖσε ὄντων 
ποταμῶν.40
37  DAI, I 25–26 (p. 48/49).
38  DAI, XXXVII 1 (p. 166/167).
39  DAI, VI 2–3 (p. 52/53).
40  DAI, VIII 5–7 (p. 54/55).
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In the region of Bulgaria also is settled a folk [λαὸς] of the Pechenegs, 
toward the region of the Dnieper and Dniester and the other rivers of 
those parts.
In Chapter 37:
Ἰστέον, ὅτι καὶ Κάγγαρ ὀνομάζονται οἱ Πατζινακῖται, ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ πάντες, πλὴν 
ὁ τῶν τριῶν θεμάτων λαός, τοῦ Ἰαβδιηρτὶ καὶ τοῦ Κουαρτζιτζοὺρ καὶ τοῦ 
Χαβουξιγγυλά, ὡς ἀνδρειότεροι καὶ εὐγενέστεροι τῶν λοιπῶν· […].41
The Pechenegs are also called ‘Kangar’, though not all of them, but only 
the folk [λαὸς] of the three provinces of Iabdierti and Kouartzitzour and 
Chabouxingyla, for they are more valiant and noble than the rest […].
The term also appears a second time in Chapter 8. This time Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus quotes a statement about the Pechenegs by the Magyars, who 
say ‘they cannot fight them, because their country is great and their people 
numerous’ [λαὸς πολὺς].42 The juxtaposition of contexts in which the term 
λαὸς is used seems to indicate that the scholarly emperor applies it in a rather 
inconsistent manner. It may mean a part of the Pecheneg people, but it may 
also mean its entirety. To some extent it seems to be synonymous with the 
word ethnos [ἔθνος], although the latter is used much more consistently, always 
towards the whole people.
An analysis of the third term, ἡ γενεά, brings interesting results. In Chapter 37, 
we find the following passage:
Ἰστέον, ὅτι αἱ τέσσαρες τῶν Πατζινακιτῶν γενεαί, ἤγουν τὸ θέμα Κουαρτζιτζοὺρ 
καὶ τὸ θέμα Συρουκαλπέη καὶ τὸ θέμα Βοροταλμὰτ καὶ τὸ θέμα Βουλατζοπόν, 
κεῖνται πέραν τοῦ Δανάπρεως ποταμοῦ πρὸς τὰ ἀνατολικώτερα καὶ βορειότερα 
μέρη, ἐναποβλέποντα πρός τε Οὐζίαν καὶ Χαζαρίαν καὶ Ἀλανίαν καὶ τὴν 
Χερσῶνα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κλίματα.43
41  DAI, XXXVII 68–71 (p. 170/171).
42  DAI, VIII 29–33 (p. 56/57). Ἡμεῖς μετὰ τοὺς Πατζινακίτας ἑαυτοὺς οὐ βάλλομεν· οὐ γὰρ δυνά-
μεθα πολεμεῖν πρὸς αὐτούς, ὅτι καὶ χώρα μεγάλη καὶ λαὸς πολὺς καὶ κακὰ παιδία εἰσίκαὶ τοῦ 
λοιποῦ τὸν λόγον τοῦτον πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὴ εἰπῇς οὐ γὰρ ἀγαπῶμεν αὐτόν.
43  DAI, XXXVII 34–39 (p. 168/169).
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Four clans [γενεαί] of the Pechenegs, that is to say, the province of 
Kouartzitzour and the province of Syroukalpei and the province of 
Borotalmat and the province of Boulatzopon, lie beyond the Dnieper 
river towards the eastern and northern parts that face Uzia and Chazaria 
and Alania and Cherson and the rest of the Regions.
The author further states that four other geneai live in an area west of the 
Dnieper River. In the light of the above example of geneai (sg. genea), it should 
be recognized as a higher unit in the Pechenegs’ social organization. Each is 
clearly determined by territory and has its own name. The term also appears 
in a text that described events from the mid-11th century, i.e., 100 years after 
Constantine Porphyrogenitus’ account. In the Chronicle of John Skylitzes, 
we read:
Διῄρηται δὲ εἰς τρισκαίδεκα γενεάς, αἵτινες καλοῦνται μὲν πᾶσαι τῷ κοινῷ 
ὀνόματι, ἔχουσι δ’ ἑκάστη καὶ ἴδιον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτῆς προγόνου καὶ ἀρχηγοῦ τὴν 
προσηγορίαν κληρωσαμένη.44
They [Pechenegs] are divided into thirteen tribes [γενεάς] all of which 
have the same name in common but each has its own proper name inher-
ited from its own ancestor and chieftain.
This extremely interesting information poses a number of difficulties for the 
researcher. We cannot assume in advance that Constantine Porphyrogenitus 
and John Skylitzes are using analogous terminology. This need not be excluded, 
but there are reasons to remain sceptical. The older author mentions eight 
large units in the Pecheneg organization, while the younger one lists 13. The 
scholarly basileus does not know about the alleged origin of the names of these 
units from the names of some ancestor-protagonist.
The term genea in the context of the sociopolitical organization of the 
Pechenegs also appears in the Scylitzes Continuatus. Here it refers to a later 
period, when the steppe people already inhabited the Balkan provinces 
of Byzantium. The author claims that the entire population was divided 
into geneai and fratriai (sg. φρατρία), but does not give their number.45 This 
extremely laconic information allows us to assume that the last term, not men-
tioned anywhere else in relation to the Pechenegs, may correspond to some 
social organizational unit below the level of genea.
44  Io.Scyl., 455 (v. 34–37). Cf. Wortley 2010, 426.
45  Scyl.Cont., 107.
139Structures and Forms of Existence
The discrepancy between the information in the writings of Constantine VII 
and John Skylitzes can be explained by the time interval between the two 
accounts. Over the course of this roughly 100-year period, the Pechenegs 
experienced a series of severe disasters, which likely affected, if not devas-
tated, their sociopolitical organism.46 Geneai – its highest level in the times of 
Constantine VII – may simply have ceased to exist or underwent far-reaching 
transformations in the first decades of the 11th century, after the series of 
defeats the Pechenegs suffered in battles with the Uzes. They would, therefore, 
not be the same as the 13th geneai from the period preceding the Pechenegs’ 
departure from the Black Sea steppe, which is the subject of Skylitzes’ account. 
The author does give the names of only two of these geneai: Pagumanis 
(Παγουμανίς) and Belemarnis (Βελεμαρνίς).47 None of these were known to 
Constantine Porphyrogenitus.
References to comparative materials only provides a half-way solution. In 
general, it is assumed that there were two or three levels of socio-political 
organization among nomad peoples, composed of relevant taxonomic 
units.48 Among the Altai steppe people there was a unit called a bone (Tur. 
süŋük~söŋük~süök, Mong. yasun), synonymous with the Slavic ród or English 
clan. Its members claimed shared family ties between them and their descent 
from a common ancestor. The last circumstance was to supposed ensure that 
its boundaries were precisely defined, so it was thus originally an agnatic unit, 
quite closed and very close-knit, and therefore stable.49 In addition to the bones 
of nomadic societies, there was also a larger unit of social organization called 
an omuq in Old Turkic, and in Mongolian oboγ. Its equivalents is the notion 
of tribe (Ger. Stamm). The omuq/oboγ, unlike bones, however, was a much less 
stable entity. Blood relations did not play an important role in it as a binding 
force, and its continuation was determined by common economic and politi-
cal interests. It could therefore disintegrate or merge into larger organizational 
units much more easily than a bone.50 Unfortunately, the relationship between 
the two entities is unclear. This is because members of the same bone could 
simultaneously belong to various Omuq/oboγ.51 In addition, according to some 
46  Cf. in particular Chapter 6 of the present book.
47  Io.Scyl., 456 (v. 59–60).
48  Moszyński 1996, 53; Khazanov 1984, 132–138. The latter scholar calls them communities 
of primary/second/third order. However, not all nomadic communities featured all three 
levels of organization. It is usually assumed that the existence of three levels of social 
organization is reflective of state organisms. Cf. Carneiro 1981, 45–46.
49  Kotwicz 1949, 160–161; Kałużyński 1970, 39–40; Tryjarski 1975a, 567. Cf. Pritsak 1952, 60.
50  Kotwicz 1949, 161; Kałużyński 1970, 40; Tryjarski 1975a, 567.
51  Kotwicz 1949, 161; Krader 1963, 324.
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researchers, only part of a community, that with an aristocratic background, 
could be identified as belonging to a particular bone.52 Tatiana Skrynnikova, 
in her description of the sociopolitical structure of the Mongols in the times 
of Genghis Khan and in the period immediately preceding him, posited the 
existence of two types units organizing an ethnos: urug and obog. The first one 
is described by the researcher as lineage, the second is a clan. A combination of 
urug formed units of a higher order, such as an obog, but they could also easily 
detach themselves and give rise to a new clan.53 Thus, the observations of the 
Russian researcher correspond to the common conviction among research-
ers of nomadic societies of the fundamental importance of family structures 
in the sociopolitical organization of nomads. This is because the daily life of 
nomads takes place within these units. They also form the basis for their eco-
nomic existence as a common nomadic group and for grazing cattle. However, 
they acquire political importance only within larger units.54
References made in these general observations to source data leads to the 
cautious conclusion that the genea as a taxonomic unit in De administrando 
imperio may be identical to that of John Skylitzes. The failures experienced 
by the Pechenegs at the turn of the 10th and 11th centuries most likely led to 
the devastation of the largest units of their political organization. In the new 
conditions, however, the place of geneai was not taken by smaller units, which 
we will call ‘clans’, but rather by a transformation of the structure of the whole 
ethnos and the emergence of 13 new geneai, instead of the previous eight.
The information in De administrando imperio indicates a strong link 
between the sociopolitical organization and territorial divisions of the 
Pechenegs, which was already noted above. Their entire territory consisted of 
eight units, each with a name identical to that of a genea. These units were 
described by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus as thema (τὸ θέμα), as we read 
again in Chapter 37 of his work:
Ἰστέον, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ Πατζινακία εἰς θέματα ὀκτὼ διαιρεῖται, ἔχουσα καὶ 
μεγάλους ἄρχοντας τοσούτους. Τὰ δὲ θέματά εἰσιν ταῦτα· ὄνομα τοῦ πρώτου 
θέματος Ἠρτήμ, τοῦ δευτέρου Τζούρ, τοῦ τρίτου Γύλα, τοῦ τετάρτου Κουλπέη, 
τοῦ πέμπτου Χαραβόη, τοῦ ἕκτου Ταλμάτ, τοῦ ἑβδόμου Χοπόν, τοῦ ὀγδόου 
Τζοπόν.55
52  Sneath 2007, 171–172.
53  Skrynnikova 2011, 458–459. Cf. also Igor de Rachewiltz’s comments in: 2004, I, 249–250.
54  Moszyński 1996, 52–53; Khazanov 1984, 126–128 (the scholar does not use the term ‘family’, 
but instead ‘primary kin group’); Szyjewski 2001, 414.
55  DAI, XXXVII 15–19 (p. 166/167).
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The whole Patzinacia is divided into eight provinces [θέματα] with the 
same number of great princes. The provinces [θέματά] are these: the 
name of the first province [θέματος] is Irtim; of the second, Tzour; of 
the third, Gyla; of the fourth, Koulpeï; of the fifth, Charaboï; of the sixth, 
Talmat; of the seventh, Chopon; of the eighth, Tzopon.
A researcher’s interest is sure to be awakened by the use of the Byzantine term 
thema by Constantine VII to name a territorial unit of the Pechenegs’ lands. By 
the mid-10th century, thema already had a long history. The beginning of the 
reform that made it the basis of Byzantium’s administrative and military struc-
ture is traditionally attributed to Emperor Heraclius. By the turn of the 9th and 
10th centuries, the thema system had reached its mature form.56 During the 
reign of Constantine VII it was still the foundation for the functioning of the 
state, so use of the term to describe divisions in the territory of the Pechenegs 
could not have been merely accidental. This seems all the more improbable 
given the fact that the author uses different terms in relation to the territo-
rial organization of other peoples described in De administrando imperio. 
Describing the relationship between the Alans and the Khazars, he states:
Ὅτι τὰ ἐννέα κλίματα τῆς Χαζαρίας τῇ Ἇλανίᾳ παράκεινται, […].57
Nine regions [κλίματα] of Chazaria are adjacent to Alania […].
If the term thema is applied to the territorial organization of the Pechenegs, it 
should be given clear, distinctive features. The question then arises: what did 
Constantine VII intend to focus on? The state of our knowledge does not allow 
us to go beyond the sphere of conjecture. However, it seems that two possible 
explanations need to be pointed out. First, the basileus wanted to highlight 
the very strong relationship between the military and territorial organization 
of the Pechenegs. Such an assumption is validated by other information given 
about them as well as by comparative data about the culture of steppe peoples. 
Second, the learned emperor may have been particularly interested in demon-
strating the efficiency and coherence of the Pechenegs’ means of organization, 
which could serve as an analogy for the administrative system of the Byzantine 
Empire. If we take into account the fact that Constantine VII linked specific 
political plans with the Pechenegs, which he expressed in the first chapter of 
56  Ensslin 1964, 356–357. Ostrogorski 1967, 215; Lilie 1984, 27–39, 190–201; Kazhdan 1991a, 
2034–2035. On the meaning of the term ‘thema’: Koder 1990, 155–165.
57  DAI, X 5 (p. 64/65).
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his work, then it is not too difficult to find a motive for such a course of action. 
This does not mean, however, that the Emperor distorted reality for the sake of 
his diplomatic doctrine.
Constantine VII also mentions the existence of lower-level territorial orga-
nization units among the Pechenegs. This is indicated by the following passage:
Τὰ δὲ ὀκτὼ θέματα διαιροῦνται εἰς τεσσαράκοντα μέρη, καὶ ἔχουσι καὶ ἐλάττο-
ντας ἄρχοντας.58
The eight provinces [θέματα] are divided into forty districts [μέρη], and 
these have minor princelings over them.
If we take into account the fact that the tribe (genea) corresponded to the 
thema on the level of the Pechenegs’ social organization, then, based on anal-
ogy, we can assume that a smaller territorial organizational unit (τὸ μέρος) 
should correspond to some social unit. Unfortunately, we do not know its 
name, which makes it very difficult to find analogies among the data concern-
ing other nomadic peoples. It cannot be ruled out that it corresponded to 
the clan.
In the mid-10th century, the Pecheneg ethnos therefore consisted of eight 
large socio-political units, which in turn were broken down into forty smaller 
ones. Within each genea there were probably five smaller units.59 This type 
of organization was overlapped by the territorial division of the whole of 
Patzinacia, according to which four geneai lived in the area west of the Dnieper 
River (Giazichopon, Kato Gyla, Charaboï, and Iabdiertim) and the remaining 
four to the east (Kouartzitzour, Syrukoulpeï, Borotalmat, and Boulatzopon).60 
This division, whose axis was the Dnieper, very much resembles the two-wing 
toliš-tarduš system, attested for many steppe-based political organisms. It is 
also a typical element of the military organization of nomadic groups.61
It is difficult to say how long the Pecheneg sociopolitical organization existed 
in the shape outlined here. It is highly probable, however, that the events of 
the turn of the 10th and 11th century, i.e., the Pechenegs’ failures in their fight 
against Rus’ and, above all, pressure from the Uzes, seriously strained it. The 
loss of settlement areas to the east of the Dnieper most certainly compromised 
58  DAI, XXXVII 32–33 (p. 166/167).
59  A similar interpretation was adopted by Pletneva 1958, 192.
60  DAI, XXXVII 34–45 (p. 168).
61  Tryjarski 1975a, 571; Pritsak 1975, 218.
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its territorial basis, which was then accompanied by demographic losses. These 
phenomena caused the aforementioned transformation of the geneai.
Fragmentary source data makes it difficult to describe relations within par-
ticular units of the Pechenegs’ social organization. However, we can assume 
that the same factors that led to social stratification within other nomadic 
ethne were also influential here. Despite the formal egalitarianism strongly 
emphasized and cultivated among nomads,62 the political primacy of certain 
individuals and sub-groups is clearly visible among them. The sources of such a 
state of affairs can be found in two phenomena: differences in terms of wealth 
and a hierarchy of prestige in terms of both individuals and entire groups.63 
In the case of nomadic communities, the source of differences in wealth was 
mainly the size of herds. The phenomenon of land ownership was practically 
non-existent on the steppe.64 Wealth, although important as a determinant of 
prestige, is not the only source of it. A telling example is that of Temujin, who 
was born the heir of several yurts, and later stripped of all his property and 
degraded to the status of an outcast, but died as the creator of an enormous 
empire. His life is therefore the best illustration of the relative value of wealth 
and the immense role of charisma in the life of a steppe leader.65
The mechanism of significant fluctuations in wealth in nomadic communi-
ties resulted, according to experts on the subject, from the specificity of the 
steppe economy, which was based on pastoralism. Natural disasters, among 
which very harsh winters were most important, could significantly reduce the 
size of herds. For rich nomads, this usually resulted in a significant reduction 
in their wealth, while for those of average and lesser means it meant the loss of 
their means of subsistence and a fall to the lower reaches of the social scale.66 
Robbery was also a phenomenon that brought about significant changes in 
ownership. As a result of regular looting raids, steppe people could get rich or, 
62  Moszyński 1996, 34–35; Khazanov 1984, 153–157.
63  Cf. Pritsak 1952, 52–53. The hierarchy of tribes proposed by the Pritsak concerns mainly 
large steppe empires. Therefore caution is required when applying it to smaller political 
organisms. Cf. Khazanov 1984, 152. He points to private ownership of livestock and one’s 
place in the social structure as sources of social diversity.
64  Markov 1976, 298–300; Khazanov 1984, 123–126; Nowicka 2001, 327, 329.
65  The Secret History of the Mongols describes Temüjin as one with ‘[…] fire in his eyes, […] 
light in his face’. This type of formulation is said to be a typical topos in Mongolian oral 
literature used to indicate a person with extraordinary intellectual and spiritual qualities. 
Rachewiltz 2004, I, 14, 24, 327–328. It is also characteristic of a charismatic personality. 
Charisma (Turkic: qut, Persian: hvarena) was often imagined and presented as a ray of 
light. Cf. Golden 2006, 44.
66  Moszyński 1996, 36; Khazanov 1984, 73–76; Gumilow 1997, 12–13.
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in the case of an attack by another ethnos, lose almost everything.67 Military 
activity triggered another noteworthy phenomenon. As a group undertaking, 
military activity required the existence of an efficient command that would 
ensure its success. A similar state of affairs promoted talented nomads, whose 
military and plundering successes had becoming a source of considerable 
prestige and, consequently, an opportunity to attain political power. We are 
dealing here with a phenomenon that Omeljan Pritsak described as ‘charisma’. 
As he achieved successive victories, a leader endowed with such charisma 
gathered faithful and devoted warriors around him. In this way, a relationship 
was formed that resembled the Germanic Männerbund. The success of the 
leader was interpreted in religious terms as a special gift and mandate from 
Heaven (Tängri). The mechanism described by Pritsak is extremely important 
for understanding the origins of many steppe empires. Their creators were 
often small groups of nomads headed by a charismatic leader.68
As a result of the impact of the combination of factors described above, 
a group of nomads was formed who enjoyed greater importance and respect 
than other members of their ethnos. Social and economic relations of this type 
may have resulted in a form of clientelism.69 An additional factor conducive to 
the enlargement of a dependent population were invasions, during which pris-
oners of war were abducted.70 A large part of these prisoners was usually sold 
off, but those who remained among the nomads could soon become members 
of the new community, although they remained dependent on their patrons.71
From Pritsak’s research we know that the hierarchy of tribes (the second 
phenomenon of interest to us) consisted of four traditional categories: ruling 
tribes, voluntarily affiliated (brother-in-law) tribes, tribute-paying tribes, and 
finally, conquered tribes, which were deprived of all rights.72 As has already 
67  Moszyński 1996, 36.
68  Pritsak 1952, 51; 1988, 750, 751–753; Golden 2006, 42–44; Geary 2012a, 47.
69  Moszyński 1996, 29–30; Szymański 1979, 93; Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 1985, 82–83; Khazanov 
1984, 157–159.
70  Moszyński 1996, 30; Dąbrowski 1975, 103; Szymański 1979, 93.
71  Cf. the very interesting example of a merchant from Viminatium described by Priscos 
of Panion. Abducted by the Huns, he was to become the property of Onegesios, Attila’s 
trusted minister, as part of the booty. Later, however, he stood out in battles with the 
Romans and the Akatziri, regained his freedom and married a barbarian woman. 
According to Byzantine diplomat’s accounts, he valued his status among the barbarians 
much more than his former position in the empire. He also remained, what is significant, 
a member of the household of Onegesios. Priskos states that he ate at his table (Ὀνηγησίῳ 
τραπέζης κοινωνοῦντα). Prisc., 11.2 (p. 266–268). For more on slavery among nomads in gen-
eral: Khazanov 1984, 160.
72  Pritsak 1952, 52–53; Swoboda 1978, 412; Tryjarski 1975, 302.
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been discussed, the shape of this hierarchy was a consequence of the history 
of a given steppe-based political organism. The founding groups, those which 
had been part of it the longest, enjoyed the greatest prestige. The combination 
of phenomena described above determined the shape of relations within a 
given political organism.
Despite the relative scarcity of sources, it seems that some of these general 
observations can also be applied to the specific case of the Pechenegs. The fact 
that there were property differences within their communities can be deduced 
from accounts associated with the Jayhānī tradition. These authors (al-Bakrī, 
al-Gardīzī and al-Marwazī) agree that the Pechenegs were wealthy, possessing 
large flocks, gold and silver dishes, and silver belts and weapons.73 This afflu-
ence was most likely not spread evenly among all the members of the ethnos. 
The lion’s share was probably in the hands of the elite. This assumption seems 
to confirmed by information from Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, who in 
the second chapter of De administrando imperio reports that the Pechenegs 
sold horned cattle, sheep and horses to Rus’.74 In another place he mentions the 
existence of a commodity exchange operated by the inhabitants of Byzantine 
Kherson for purposes of trading with the Pechenegs.75 Both examples indicate 
quite clearly that surpluses occurred in the Pechenegs’ economy and that these 
later became objects of trade. In all probability such surpluses belonged to the 
richer members of the group, as it is hard to imagine that an average member 
of the community would sell part of his herd, which provided the means of 
existence for him and his family. A surplus sufficient to allow for trade was thus 
most easily obtained by the owner of a larger herd of livestock.
Archaeological materials provide weak documentation of the differences in 
wealth among the Pechenegs. Their material culture is known mainly from the 
inventories of burial sites, which raises the question of to what extent funeral 
practices reflected differences in social status and wealth. Funeral ceremonies 
usually provide an opportunity to manifest the social prestige of the deceased. 
In this respect, nomads were no exception, although their attempts to conceal 
the burial site of significant personalities for fear of profanation and robbery 
have also been confirmed.76 Material traces of these burial sites, in spite of hav-
73  Gardīzī: Martinez 1982, 152; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 165. Bakrī: Кunik, Rozen 1878, 59; 
Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 222. Marwazī: Minorsky 1942, 33; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 
250. Zakhoder 1967, 74.
74  DAI, II 6–8 (p. 50).
75  DAI, VI (pp. 52–53); LIII 530–532 (p. 286). Cf. the part of this chapter dedicated to the 
economy.
76  Roux 1984, 263–280; 1988, 528. The researcher does not question the fact that some steppe 
peoples (e.g., Mongols) concealed graves out of fear of robbery and desecration, but he 
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ing been protected against their contemporaries, nevertheless remain. In the 
case of the Pechenegs, thus far only so-called ‘secondary’ burial mounds have 
been discovered, i.e., those dug into the banks of old burial mounds, usually 
from prehistoric eras. The inventory of steppe grave sites is generally relatively 
poor. Nevertheless, some researchers have tried to prove the existence of dis-
tinctions in property among the Pechenegs on their basis. Svetlana A. Pletneva 
has pointed out that more valuable weapons (e.g., sabres) have been found in 
only a few Pecheneg grave sites.77 Economic differentiation is also said to be 
evidenced by differences in the amount of horse remains discovered in graves. 
A full skeleton, a very rare finding, would be testimony to great wealth, while 
an incomplete skeleton would indicate the lower status of the person buried.78 
Interpretations of this kind, however, are not convincing. This data seems 
to indicate in fact a rather low level of economic diversification among the 
Pechenegs. In the light of the material remains of funeral rituals, they appear 
to have been a rather egalitarian society with small, relatively poorly mani-
fested social differences among its members.
Interesting data concerning the nature of relations within the Pecheneg 
community can be found in the writings of al-Bakrī. He states that the 
Pechenegs made a proposal to prisoners from Byzantium, but also from other 
lands, to stay with them as equal members of their community who had the 
right to take one of its women as a wife. If he rejected such an offer, they would 
take him safely to the border of their lands.79 The quoted fragment does not 
necessarily come from the lost work of al-Jayhānī, as is indicated by the lack of 
an analogous passage in the works of al-Gardīzī, al-Marwazī and ibn Rusta. It 
most likely concerns the Black Sea period of the Pechenegs’ history. Pletneva 
considers this report to be proof of the existence of nomadic feudalism among 
them,80 but it would be safer to talk about some form of clientelism. A pris-
oner who did not have any means of subsistence was only formally made a 
full member of the community. His continued existence depended on his 
patron, who could provide him with decent living conditions for the services 
he received from him. It is also worth considering whether the Pechenegs 
points out that their location was often widely known because they were places of wor-
ship. According to Roux, workers who worked on the construction of graves and funeral 
rites were killed because they were sullied.
77  Pletneva 1958, 197; 1981, 215.
78  Pletneva 2003, 158. Cf. Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 69, 82–93 (the data refer to areas east 
of Volga); Atavin 2008, 78 (interprets this similar diversity of funeral rites as a deliberate 
manifestation of a separate ethnic identity).
79  Bakrī: Кunik, Rozen 1878, 60; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 223–224.
80  Pletneva 1958, 193.
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made such an offer to every refugee who came to them. It seems reasonable, 
although not supported by the source data, to assume that such an offer was 
mainly addressed to those with special skills who for some reason were valu-
able to the Pechenegs.81 Unfortunately, we are not able to go beyond conjec-
ture about what kind of qualifications would make them so valuable for the 
nomads. Perhaps they were highly specialized craftsmen or possessed some 
kind of military skills that were not commonly found among the Pechenegs.82 
Another hypothesis should also be taken into account, according to which the 
prisoners were individuals thanks to whom the Pechenegs would be able to 
establish contact with neighbouring states. Their origins guarantees a knowl-
edge of a potential political partner, and they could serve as translators or 
intermediaries in the formation of alliances.83
Most importantly, however, al-Bakri’s account provides evidence that seems 
to confirm the existence of a group of wealthy people capable of providing 
for the subsistence of a valuable prisoner-of-war. The resulting dependence, 
in turn, opened the path for the creation of a kind of patron elite that could 
increase its political significance thanks to the support of its clients.
At the other end of this social system were the people dependent on their 
patrons. The appearance of such people among the Pechenegs resulted from 
multiple causes. Some clients, as we have seen, were former prisoners-of-war, 
while others were impoverished steppe-dwellers.
There is no doubt that both large and small units in the Pechenegs’ system 
of social organization had their own leaders. Constantine VII claims they were 
headed by ‘chieftains’ (ἄρχοντες). At the same time, he emphasizes the dif-
ference in quality between them, adding the nicknames of ‘great chieftains’ 
(μεγάλοι) of geneai and ‘lesser chieftains’ (ἐλάττονες) who led ‘clans’.84 The 
Emperor also describes the mechanism of succession within larger units. We 
learn that upon the death of the chief, power passed into the hands of his cousin 
(ὁ ἑξάδελφος) or son of his cousin (ὁ παῖς ἑξαδέλφου). Thanks to a similar proce-
dure, the learned emperor claimed, the position of leader was not held by just 
one branch of the clan, but also by collateral branches; however, power could 
never be fall into the hands of a stranger tribe.85 This system of inheritance was 
not only characteristic of the Pechenegs. Some similarities can be observed 
81  Tryjarski 1975a, 575.
82  Tryjarski 1975a, 575.
83  Tryjarski 1975a, 575. It is known that in their dealings with the imperial court, the Huns 
were helped by Romans from the provinces they had conquered. Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 
106–107.
84  DAI, XXXVII 15–16, 32–33 (p. 166/167).
85  DAI, XXXVII 24–32 (p. 166/167).
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with the ‘lateral sucession’ system (udel’no-lestvichnaia sistema), which existed 
among the Blue Turks. It stipulated that supreme power over the whole empire 
would be inherited not by the leader’s son, but by his younger brother, and by 
the oldest fraternal nephew from his younger paternal uncle. While waiting for 
the throne, ‘princes of the blood’, i.e., members of the royal Ashina clan, were 
to manage districts assigned to them. According to Lev Gumilev, this system 
was introduced in the 6th century when the great Turkic Khaganate was cre-
ated. Its prototype was a system of inheritance known from the second century 
in southern Xiongnu.86 It was introduced namely to prevent fratricidal fights 
between individual princes of the blood. This system both provided members 
of the Ashina clan with an appropriate standard of living, and gave them hope 
for the assumption of supreme power. While there are obvious differences 
between the Turks and Pechenegs, the system observed in the latter most likely 
played a similar role. In spite of its clear process for closing off tribal power, 
this type of succession guaranteed that the political primacy of one branch of 
the clan would be limited, while at the same time creating opportunities for 
another branch of the clan to assume leadership.
Another problem is the question of the nature of the power of tribal lead-
ers. During their life-long authority over a genea did they have to take into 
account the opinions of other members of the community, perhaps gathered 
in elementary political institutions? It seems that the answer to this question 
is affirmative. Despite the issues outlined above, which allow us to see signs of 
social differentiation, the Pechenegs appear to have been quite an egalitarian 
community, in which the largest part of the population possessed an average 
material status and a similar level of prestige. This would have meant that any 
decision concerning the whole community would require the consent of all 
its free members. A similar state of affairs was the raison d’être for institutions 
like the public gathering. However, within such an institution or alongside it, 
86  Gumilev 1966, 213–214; 1993, 56–59; Kychanov 2010, 127–129. In fact, in the Xiongnu 
empire after the First Civil War (60 BCE), direct-line (father to son) and lateral (elder to 
younger brother) systems of inheritance were used interchangeably. Barfield 1992, 71–77 
(on succession in Xiongnu), 133–138 (on succession in Turks). The latter seems to have 
treated the mechanism of succession as the outcome of purely political factors and the 
principles of inheritance known to steppe people. Khazanov 1975, 195–199 (in the case 
of the Scythians the author assumes the dominance of the principle of succession ‘from 
father to son’, in the case of Xiongnu he takes a position similar to T.J. Barfield). Finally, 
there is no shortage of researchers who question the existence of any principle of succes-
sion in the Ashina Turks, except for their limiting the group of potential successors to the 
charismatic Ashina clan. The final recipient of the throne was determined by the political 
and military power of a particular candidate. Cf. Fletcher 1979, 238–239; He Xingliang, 
Guo Hongzhen 2008, 78–79; Skaff 2012, 78.
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there may have been a place for prominent members of a given genea, i.e., 
those with greater social capital, to have a voice. The information provided 
by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus leaves no doubt that in the mid-10th cen-
tury there was a group of families that had reserved for themselves power over 
individual units of Pecheneg ethnos. The existence of such a quasi aristoc-
racy is also confirmed by later accounts. They must have had more of a voice 
within individual geneai than average members. However, it is difficult to say 
whether this advantage assumed an institutionalized form, such as a council 
comprised of ‘more worthy’ Pechenegs. If such a council did in fact exist, it 
probably also included candidates for future chiefs of a given genea, as well 
as chiefs of smaller units. Such an institution, or perhaps simply an influential 
pressure group, could realistically co-rule, limiting the role of the current head 
of a given genea to the role of primus inter pares.87
It seems that the existence of both types of collegial institutions is con-
firmed by written sources. Bruno of Querfurt, who entered the lands of the 
Pechenegs in the spring of 1008 with the intention of preaching the Gospel, 
came across some of their ‘larger people’ (maior populus) and had to wait a 
week before they could gather to pass judgement on the missionary.88 The fact 
that members of the community, notified by messengers, arrived at the gath-
ering (concilum) in a relatively short period of time, gives rise to the assump-
tion that this was not the whole ethnos of the Pechenegs, but rather one of its 
larger units. The functioning of a congregation comprised of warriors is con-
firmed by the account of John Skylitzes. A Pecheneg force (15,000 riders and 
four chiefs) sent against the Seljuks by Emperor Constantine IX Monomachos 
in the spring of 1049 were to hold a meeting near Bithynia, during which a 
decision was made about whether to begin a rebellion against Byzantium. The 
word (τὸ κομέντον) used by the Byzantine chronicler to describe the Pechenegs’ 
gathering probably did not come from their language, but was a Greek form of 
the Latin word conventus.89 Anna Komnena describes the following incident. 
During fighting with Byzantium there was a dispute among the Pechenegs over 
what to do with prisoners-of-war. The chiefs wanted to kill them, but this was 
opposed by a number of warriors, who hoped to obtain a ransom for them. 
87  Moszyński 1996, 53; Pletneva 1958, 192–193; Tryjarski 1975a, 573. The last two researchers 
believe that before the mechanism of succession among the Pechenegs came to assume 
an automatic formula, new chiefs may have been elected by the members of a given 
genea.
88  Bruno, 99. Cf. Pletneva 1958, 192; Tryjarski 1975a, 573. For a dating of Bruno’s mission: 
Paroń 2013, 116 (n. 68).
89  Io.Scyl., 460; Wortley 2010, 430–431. Cf. Moravcsik 1951, 225–233; Pritsak 1975, 220.
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In the face of the opposition of their subordinates, the commanders aban-
doned their plans.90
The ‘public gathering’ could have provided an important counter-balance 
to the opinions of more influential individuals. In St. Bruno’s letter we learn 
that his fate would have been a foregone conclusion if the decision of the more 
important members of the community (maiores terrae) had not changed the 
unequivocally hostile position of the people.91 It is significant that the mission-
ary does not mention any Pecheneg chiefs, heads or princes. In the light of his 
account, the steppe people seem to have been guided by a collegial structure in 
which none of them stood above the others. The lack of clear leadership may 
have been due to its limited authority, which would confirm the thesis that the 
heads of the geneai, about whom Constantine VII wrote, as members of the 
elite were in fact ‘first among equals’.
An issue not yet addressed in this study is the question of the existence of 
central institutions among the Pechenegs, i.e., those that incorporated the 
ethnos as a whole. This problem is especially important for understanding 
the ability of steppe people to act together before external political powers. 
The information contained in De administrando imperio seems to indicate 
that among the Pechenegs there was a ‘hierarchy of tribes’, also observed in 
other nomadic ethne. Its residual form is confirmed by the final passage of 
Chapter 37:
Ἰστέον, ὅτι καὶ Κάγγαρ ὀνομάζονται οἱ Πατζινακῖται, ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ πάντες, πλὴν 
ὁ τῶν τριῶν θεμάτων λαός, τοῦ Ἰαβδιηρτὶ καὶ τοῦ Κουαρτζιτζοὺρ καὶ τοῦ 
Χαβουξιγγυλά, ὡς ἀνδρειότεροι καὶ εὐγενέστεροι τῶν λοιπῶν· τοῦτο γὰρ δηλοῖ 
ἡ τοῦ Κάγγαρ προσηγορία.92
The Pechenegs are also called ‘Kangar’, though not all of them, but only 
the folk [λαὸς] of the three provinces of Iabdierti and Kouartzitzour and 
Chabouxingyla, for they are more valiant and noble than the rest: and 
that is what the title ‘Kangar’ signifies.
The above description seems to indicate that three geneai of Pechenegs enjoyed 
greater prestige than the others. On the basis of other information from De 
administrando imperio it can be concluded that the Kangar was the oldest part 
of the Pecheneg political organism, around which the remaining tribes were 
90  An.Kom., VII 4.4 (p. 216).
91  Bruno, 100.
92  DAI, XXXVII 68–71 (p. 170/171).
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united.93 Constantine VII clearly states that earlier, i.e., in the times of their 
first clashes with Magyars, all Pechenegs called themselves Kangar. This kind 
of story – assuming that it is not just a legend – seems to suggest that the three 
tribes mentioned could have enjoyed some real, and not just honorary political 
primacy. However, it is very difficult to determine how this manifested itself. 
In De administrando imperio we find no additional information, but we do find 
some in another work attributed to Emperor Constantine VII. In De cerimoniis 
aulae Byzantinae, a number of political subjects (states and peoples) are men-
tioned with whom Byzantium maintained diplomatic contacts. The author of 
the work also described the nature of these relations. Letters (τὰ γράμματα) 
with a golden seal of the appropriate value were sent to independent rulers, 
while orders (αἱ κελεύσεις) were sent to political subordinates of the empire. 
The heads of the Pechenegs (the author uses the plural form) were to receive 
letters bearing a two-solidi gold seal.94 The steppe dwellers were therefore 
recognized by Constantinople as an independent people, headed by several, 
probably eight, tribal chiefs. Worthy of note is the Emperor’s lack of knowledge 
about any central institutions of power. The importance of the Pechenegs to 
Constantine VII’s political plans would seem to exclude the possibility of his 
being ignorant about such a matter. This would mean that there was no unified 
power leader among the Pechenegs in the mid-10th century.
There are, however, relations that seem to contradict this last statement. In 
Chapter 17 of al-Masʿūdī’s Golden Meadows we read that each of the four peo-
ples (including the Pechenegs) who attacked the Byzantine fortress Walandar 
(W.l.nd.r.) had a king. What is more, before the battle the ruler of the Pechenegs 
requested he be given supreme command and was granted it.95 Moreover, the 
anonymous Persian geography The Regions of the World (Hudūd al-ʾĀlam) 
reads:
The [Pechenegs] have no towns; their chief (mihtar) is one of themselves.96
Finally, we learn from John Skylitzes, in his account of the conflict between 
Kegenes and Tyrach, that the latter came from a noble family and was the 
leader (ἀρχηγός) of the entire Pecheneg people. His adversary, on the other 
93  DAI, XXXVII 68–71; XXXVIII 19–21, 24–26 (p. 170/171).
94  DCP, II 48 (p. 691, v. 5–7): εἰς τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν Πατζινακίτων. βούλλα χρυσῆ δισολδία. γράμ-
ματα Κωνσταντίνου καὶ Ῥωμανοῦ τῶν φιλοχρίστων βασιλέων Ῥωμαίων πρὸς τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν 
Πατζινακίτων. Cf. Moffatt, Tall 2012, 691; Stephenson 2000, 35–36.
95  al-Mas‘ūdī, Les Prairies, II, 58, 62; Pellat 1962, 177, 178.
96  Hudūd al-‘Ālam: Minorsky 1937, 101; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 208.
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hand, was said to come from the lower classes.97 The chronicler clearly states 
that in the mid-11th century there was at least an ad-hoc form of unified leader-
ship over the whole ethnos.
Is it possible to reconcile these quite unambiguous sounding accounts with 
the silence of Constantine VII? Perhaps a partial explanation is provided by 
the space in time that separates the individual accounts, or more precisely 
De administrando imperio and Skylitzes’ chronicle. We have already stated 
that the more than 100 years that elapsed between the writing of both works 
was sufficient time to bring about changes in the Pechenegs’ political system. 
However, there are two more accounts, both of which are much closer, almost 
contemporary, to De administrando imperio. The first is Masʿūdī’s work, which 
dates back to the 940s.98 In his description of events that took place around 
the year 934, Masʿūdī mentions the ‘king of the Pechenegs’.99 The second work, 
The Regions of the World, was written in the early 980s. However, it is more 
difficult to determine to which period in the Pechenegs’ history to date the 
facts presented in the Persian geography. If we consider it part of the Jayhānī 
tradition, we would date this reference work to the 9th century, which is what 
Vladimir Minorsky has done.100 The relevant passage, however, does not find 
a counterpart in other sources, drawing on a lost work written by a Samanid 
dignitary, which suggests that the account refers to a later period in the his-
tory of the Pechenegs. Such an interpretation is more probable due to the fact 
that a unified leadership is attributed to the so-called Turkish Pechenegs. The 
anonymous geographer could have understood by this name some part of the 
ethnos which at the end of the 9th century had not left the Caspian steppe and 
was thus cut off from the main mass of the people and most probably subor-
dinated to the Uzes.101 The mihtar mentioned by the author of Hudūd al-’Ālam 
would therefore have been the leader of a small group that remained outside 
the Pechenegs’ sociopolitical organization.
It is more difficult to reconcile the data from Golden Meadows with the infor-
mation provided by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus. It is possible to resolve 
this discrepancy between sources in part by taking into account the circum-
stances in which the ‘king’ mentioned by Masudi appears. He stood at the head 
of a war expedition, which leads us to accept the hypothesis that in the event 
of the need for a joint armed action, power over the entire Pecheneg ethnos 
97  Io.Scyl., 455 (v. 39–43); Wortley 2010, 427.
98  Swoboda 1990a, 228; Lewicka-Rajewska 2004, 45.
99  Marquart 1903, 64. Cf. also Chapter 5 of the present book.
100 Minorsky 1937, 314. Similarly Zimonyi, Göckenjan 2010, 208 (n. 144).
101 DAI, XXXVII 50–57 (pp. 168–169). Ahmad ibn Fadlan mentions the existence of such a 
group, which possibly lived near Shalkar Lake. Cf. footnote 53 in the previous chapter.
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could be granted to one of its prominent members for a strictly defined period 
of time, with the consent of all the tribes. This unified command gave them a 
better chance of conducting their military operation efficiently, but once the 
fighting was over, the power of the chief commander expired. Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitus does not mention this because the description of sociopo-
litical relations contained in the Chapter 37 of his work concerned a period 
of peace.
In the mid-10th century there were thus three tribes (geneai) among the 
Pechenegs which enjoyed considerable prestige, and which could have led to 
their effective possession of political primacy. If Pletneva’s hypothesis is true, 
and the Kangar brought the other five clans together by means of conquest,102 
then the credibility of the previous hypothesis increases significantly. 
Unfortunately, written sources do not provide us with such certainty. There 
are a number of doubts about the emergence of a unified political authority 
among the Pechenegs. However, we can assume that one did not exist when 
they arrived to the Black Sea steppe. When there was a need for joint mili-
tary action, the chief command was probably entrusted to one of the chiefs. 
Given the fact that the Kangar tribes maintained their political domination, 
we can assume that the chief commander might have come from among 
them. His power was limited in that it concerned only military matters and 
expired at the end of combat. During times of peace, the leadership of the 
various tribes was in the hands of the chiefs (μεγάλοι ἄρχοντες), which seems 
to be confirmed by information found in De cerimoniis aulae Byzantinae. The 
upsetting of the sociopolitical organization of the Pechenegs at the turn of 
the 10th and 11th centuries and the constant threat posed by the Uzes, which 
required the engagement of the entire ethnos, could have opened up a path 
to the establishment of a monarchy. This seems to be indicated by the case 
of Tyrach, who gained power over all of ethnos before the mid-11th century. 
The metamorphosis of this political system probably took place shortly before 
Skylitzes’ account was written. This seems to be evidenced by the clear lim-
itations placed on Tyrach’s power in favour of the lesser chiefs around him. 
It is possible that he held the position among them of primus inter pares.103 
We do not know into what spheres his authority extended. One can assume 
that they were probably military in nature, considering that his power most 
102 Pletneva 1958, 162–163.
103 Skylitzes writes that after the formal recognition of the sovereignty of Constantine IX 
Monomachos, Tyrach and his 140 chiefs were brought to Constantinople. The fact that the 
whole group was baptized and received with the greatest honours additionally proves its 
members’ aristocratic origin. This seems to prove the persistence of social structures and 
institutions limiting Tyrach’s powers. Io.Scyl., 459 (v. 83–85); Wortley 2010, 430.
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likely grew out of his temporarily being entrusted with the function of chief 
commander. He probably also had to represent his entire people in talks with 
external political partners. This is evidenced by the fact that Tyrach sent a mes-
sage to Constantinople with a demand to limit Kegenes’ attacks on his former 
compatriots.104 However, it should be stressed once again that his position was 
not so strong that he was able to take decisions independently in regard to his 
policies, be they external or internal.
There remains the question of how to name the formula for political life 
adopted by the Pechenegs. This requires the use of terminology that poses a 
number of problems, including those outlined above. Nevertheless, it is impos-
sible to avoid defining the shape of the Pechenegs’ system of political organiza-
tion because it largely determined the shape of their relations with the outside 
world. The aim of the following discussion will therefore be to determine 
whether they developed a model of political organization that allowed them 
to effectively defend their interests in their contacts with neighbouring politi-
cal powers. This question is closely related to that of the origins of the state 
among steppe peoples. In the case of nomadic societies, a number of factors 
favouring its creation have already been pointed out. Academics basing their 
investigations on a Marxist paradigm have focused mainly on internal changes 
affecting the social and economic sphere. Inequalities in terms of wealth, as 
in the case of other societies, led to the emergence of a class society, which 
the state had to choose as the framework for its existence.105 A scheme of this 
kind cannot be maintained in pure form. This seems to have been proven by 
findings which show that permanent social divisions are often secondary to 
the creation of the state.106 Moreover, the schematism of orthodox Marxist 
approaches, which fail to take into account the specificity of steppe communi-
ties, is striking. Today a direction in academic reflection seems to dominate 
whose most eminent representatives are inclined to seek the main impulse 
for state formation outside the nomadic communities themselves. Contacts 
with the outside world created the conditions and the need for the creation 
of a state.107 It was not just external threats or the expansion of neighbour-
104 Io.Scyl., 457 (v. 20–27); Wortley 2010, 428.
105 Vladimirtsov 1934; Grekov, Iakubovskii 1950; Pletneva 1967; 1982; Fedorov-Davydov 1973; 
Kyčanov 2010. A different position is taken by G.E. Markov (1976, 312–313), who both effec-
tively criticizes the scheme of orthodox Marxist approaches, and considers that steppe 
people were unable to create a state, because they were unable to create a permanently 
hierarchical society. Cf. also N.N. Kradin’s remarks: 2003, 169–170, 172.
106 Tymowski 1992, 270; Khazanov 1984, 177–178.
107 There is an entire group of researchers inspired mainly by the studies of the American 
orientalist Owen Lattimore. (1988 [first published in 1940]). Khazanov 1984, 228–233; 
Barfield 1992; 1993; Di Cosmo 1999; 6–9; Kradin 2003, 171–172.
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ing steppe people that created the necessity to place power into the hands of 
a single person or small group of individuals. Problems of this kind did not 
have to lead to the emergence of a permanent centre of power. There have 
been many cases when after an external threat was neutralized or an armed 
conflict ended, the system of social relations returned to its initial state.108 
Some researchers attach much greater importance to the regular contacts 
nomads had with settled communities. These relations led steppe people to 
assimilate their models of political organization; moreover, whether through 
conquest or payment of tribute, they could obtain the means to maintain state 
structures.109 The majority of organisms of this type were, as mentioned above, 
highly unstable in character. However, this does not change the fact that they 
were the best tools for nomads to define their relations with the outside world 
under the most favourable conditions possible for them.
The political organization of the Pechenegs has been described in a number 
of very different ways. Eugeniusz Kucharski and Marian Lewicki believe that 
the Pechenegs ‘created [….] a perfectly organized and threatening steppe state’. 
According to these authors, this state was union (Pol. rzesza) in character, i.e., a 
militarily organized state consisting of various ethnic elements of both Turkic 
and non-Turkic origin.110 This last claim is confirmed by archaeological data.111 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw upon the findings of these Polish research-
ers for support, as they were presented without any arguments to support 
them. The existence of a more developed form of political existence, perhaps 
a state, seems to be acceptable to Josef Németh in the case of the Pechenegs. A 
Hungarian scholar, made a linguistic analysis of the eight names of tribes men-
tioned by Constantine Porphyrogenitus. His results, accepted by the majority 
of researchers, boil down to his finding that each of the tribe names contains 
two elements: an equine coat colour term and a honorific title. According to 
the Németh, these titles and offices were inherited by the leaders of particular 
tribes, while their names originally designated administrative units.112 Despite 
its unquestionable scientific value, it is very difficult to interpret the results of 
the linguistic analysis presented above. It is not exactly clear to what period in 
108 However, a long-term external threat may force political centralization, which, if main-
tained over a long period of time, will lead to lasting changes of a state-forming nature. Cf. 
Di Cosmo 1999, 9–18; 2002, 178–190; Steuer 2006, 227–236 (based on other source material, 
he points to the mechanism of militarization, which can lead to the creation of new tribal 
or state structures).
109 Khazanov 1984, 230–233.
110 Kucharski, Lewicki, 1934, 44.
111 Pletneva 1958, 162.
112 Németh 1922, 219–225; 1930, 27–32. Cf. Marquart 1929, 84–85; Menges 1944–45, 260–269; 
Vörös 2002, 623–627.
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the history of the Pechenegs it should be applied, the mid-10th century, which 
seems doubtful, or an earlier period. It is also puzzling that none of the above 
tribe names is found in the later history of the Pechenegs. According to Pritsak, 
the political structure of Pechenegs can be described as a double kingdom.113 
As in many other nomadic groups in the Middle Ages, power was allegedly 
held by two khagans.114 The existence of such an institution is confirmed by a 
very late mention contained in the works of two Arab geographers: Ibn Saʾid  
al-Maghribi (13th century) and Abu al-Fida (14th century).115 However, the 
statements of both authors arouse suspicion,116 especially if we compare them 
with the information of a writer from the 10th century, i.e., a contemporary of 
the Pechenegs: Constantine Porphyrogenitus.
Edward Tryjarski has expressed scepticism about claims the Pechenegs cre-
ated their own state. Tryjarski draws attention to a lack of ‘tribal solidarity’ 
among the Pechenegs, expressed through frequent fratricidal conflicts and 
a tendency to enter into the service of foreign rulers. He also seems correct 
in his observation that the Pechenegs lacked a strong leader who could have 
consolidated power over the entire ethnos and directed its future path. Both 
of these factors led to political weakness in the Pechenegs and to their ulti-
mate defeat.117 Pletneva also assessed the coherence of the Pechenegs’ politi-
cal organism very negatively. She stated that the four western and four eastern 
geneai mentioned by Constantine VII were not one, but two completely inde-
pendent tribal unions. Unfortunately, she does not provide any justification 
for her hypothesis.118 Victor Spinei has recently expressed a very similar view. 
He particularly emphasized the lack of intercommunity cohesion among 
Pechenegs.119
113 Pritsak 1975, 221.
114 The existence of a double khaganate has allegedly been confirmed for the Blue Turks, 
Avars, Khazars and Hungarians: Pritsak 1988, 754; Györffy 1994, 87–104. The problem is 
that in most of these cases (especially the Avars and Khazars) we are dealing not so much 
with a double khaganate, as with an evolution of the political system which led to reduc-
ing the real power of monarchs and limiting their role to the sacral and symbolic spheres. 
Political affairs began to be conducted on behalf of the ruler by a high-ranking dignitary. 
Similar mechanisms seem to have existed in all civilizations (cf. Merovingian kingdoms, 
Abbasid Caliphate) and can hardly be seen as evidence of a double monarchical system. 
Cf. also Pohl 1988, 293–300; Avenarius 1988, 147–150.
115 Ibn Sa’id al-Magribi: Konovalova 2009, 34; Abu-l-Fida, II, 293; Konovalova 2009, 118.
116 P.B. Golden considers the above information to represent a topos: 1990, 273; 1992, 267. Cf. 
Konovalova 2009, 73 (n. 3).
117 Tryjarski 1975a, 568–569.
118 Pletneva 1958, 192.
119 Spinei 2003, 106–107.
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While acknowledging the arguments of these three researchers on many 
issues, it should be noted that they underestimated the ‘tribal solidarity’ of the 
Pechenegs. This problem will be discussed in more detail in the fourth part of 
this chapter.120 The transition to acting in the service of foreign countries inten-
sified markedly in the late period of the Pechenegs’ history, after their political 
significance had significantly decreased.121 Moreover, this usually concerned 
small groups or even individuals, so it is difficult to consider it a measure of the 
degree of coherence in the Pechenegs’ internal ethnos throughout their his-
tory. In terms of internal contradictions, it is difficult to deny that they existed 
among the Pechenegs. The conflict between Kegenes and Tyrach is the best 
testimony to their existence.122 However, they were ambivalent in character. 
On the one hand, they splintered the unity of ethnos; on the other, in the case 
of Kegenes and his victory, they could have led to the emergence of a strong 
centralized authority among the Pechenegs.123 Moreover, it is worth noting 
that internal struggles were an extremely frequent phenomenon and affected 
communities that had already managed to create their own states. The history 
of the Ashina Turks or Chingisids best illustrates this statement. It is therefore 
not so much a problem of determining whether armed conflicts took place 
within a given nomadic community, but rather of examining whether this led 
to the creation of mechanisms or institutions that would limit factors condu-
cive to the outbreak of fighting. The Pechenegs seem to have had two institu-
tions that fulfilled such tasks. The first was a territorial division corresponding 
to the division of the ethnos into tribes (geneai) and ‘clans’. The second was 
the system of succession within tribes, which was most likely conceived of as 
a limiting factor in power struggles the ruling family. We have already men-
tioned that the tribe was a less coherent unit within nomadic social organi-
zations, and therefore probably did not stand up well to internal shocks, and 
thus, preventing them through the creation of a system of inheritance was a 
necessity that benefited the Pechenegs. However, we should share the doubts 
of Tryjarski and Pletneva on the question of the existence of a unified political 
authority who had power over the whole ethnos. As we have noted, even if one 
came into being, it was in an embryonic form and came in the last years of the 
independent existence of this ethnos.
120 Cf. excellent information from Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus: DAI, XXXVII 50–57 
(p. 168/169).
121 All the examples cited by V. Spinei come from this period.
122 Io.Scyl., 455–457; Wortley 2010, 426–428.
123 Cf. Chapters 4.4 and 7 of the present book.
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Anatoly M. Khazanov also spoke briefly about the political organization 
of the Pechenegs. In his inquiries, Khazanov relied solely only on the data of 
Constantine VII. On this basis, he decided that they formed a segmentary struc-
ture consisting of eight chiefdoms.124 This interpretation, as can be deduced 
from the terms used by Khazanov, assumes the equal status of individual units 
(chiefdoms), who could act together against a common enemy; at the same 
time, they balanced their influence, preventing one of them from gaining dom-
inance. One of the most recent attempts to define the political organization 
of the Pechenegs was made by Aleksei V. Marey.125 He stated that it possessed 
all the features of a so-called nomadic empire, but he ultimately considers it 
to be a complex chiefdom, which could have become a chiefdom proper if 
a charismatic leader appeared. In addition to their insufficient grounding in 
source materials, Marey’s observations raise doubts because the political orga-
nization of the Pechenegs seems not to have met one fundamental condition 
that would allow it to be considered a nomadic empire. This is the lack of a 
strong political centre. Marey also does not define the terms used in his analy-
sis. We can only assume that a complex chiefdom can be distinguished from an 
ordinary chiefdom by the lack of a unified power structure. If so, then Marey’s 
reconstructed model of the Pechenegs’ political structure would be identical 
to the segmentary model.
Therefore, how can we characterize the form of political life that existed 
among the Pechenegs? Lev Gumilev believed that steppe people adopted two 
models for the organization of their societies: that of a state (el) and of a confed-
eration of tribes. The latter is characterized by a lack of central power; its place 
is occupied by a single tribe, which enjoys a certain honorary primacy, but does 
not rule. Each tribe is headed by a chief with a considerable level of autonomy. 
Members of similar federations were united by a mutual desire to defend their 
independence and therefore banded together only when it was threatened.126 
The description of the system offered by Gumilev is extremely general, merely 
a rough sketch; nevertheless, in spite of such reservations, it possesses a certain 
analytical value. As mentioned above, the Eurasian steppe peoples were able 
to create political organisms such as early states, which rarely took the form of 
mature states. The term ‘confederation of tribes’ raises legitimate objections, 
as it suggests a voluntary association of the constituent units. Meanwhile, the 
124 Khazanov 1984, 178–179.
125 Marey 2011, 450–456.
126 Gumilev 1993, 13; 1997, 78. The scholar attributes the confederation model to the T’ie-lê 
(4th–5th century AD) and the Uyghurs (7th–8th century AD). Both examples, especially 
the latter, are very controversial.
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use of force in the process of creating such political structures was at least as 
frequent as peaceful means.127 Nevertheless, the similarity between the politi-
cal organism of the Pechenegs and the confederation model seems quite obvi-
ous. This is due in particular to the lack of a clearly defined centre of power, or 
rather, the existence of one that was merely ad-hoc and temporary in nature. 
The main units of this political organism were chiefdoms, despite the domina-
tion of the Kangar, who together formed a segmentary structure.128 In spite 
of the Pechenegs’ turbulent history, it was apparently never violated. We can 
only observe quantitative changes, e.g., the number of main units compris-
ing the ethnos. Its segmental power structure was also in line with the rela-
tive egalitarianism of the Pechenegs. There were undoubtedly more influential 
and richer groups with a quasi-aristocratic status among them, but they never 
became completely independent of the will of the majority, the role of which, 
even during military campaigns, cannot be underestimated.129 The egalitarian-
ism of the Pechenegs also seems to be emphasized by material traces of funeral 
rituals, which do not confirm a strong tendency to manifest prestige among 
the richer or more influential members of the ethnos.
The persistence of such a segmental structure also shaped the relations 
of the Pechenegs with the outside world. The lack of a strong ruler able to define 
the interests of the entire ethnos and implement them in their external rela-
tions led the Pechenegs to conduct such affairs in a rather instinctive manner, 
limiting themselves for the most part to reacting to direct threats. Given this 
situation, one cannot even really speak about their having a defined political 
strategy, as their actions were based more on political reflexes. In theory, these 
circumstances should have been favourable to their better organized neigh-
bouring political entities, in particular Byzantium and Rus’, whose diplomats 
could more easily induce the steppe people to pursue interests that benefited 
these states. However, such a conclusion seems premature. The fact that rela-
tions with a divided political organism lacking a distinct political centre were 
not at all easy requires we exercise caution. On the other hand, the segmented 
127 Khazanov 1984, 152.
128 The organization of the Pechenegs is quite reminiscent of the segmental union of chief-
tains, for which Aidan Southal proposed the term ‘segmentary state’. A structure of this 
type had already developed the three levels of governance typical of a state, though the 
highest of the three exists only on occasion. Such a state of affairs, however, does not 
allow for full centralization of power and its independence from lower levels of manage-
ment, which seems to make it difficult to call this type of political organization a state. 
Southal 1988, 52–82. Cf. Tymowski 2012, 774–775.
129 Pletneva (1958, 193) calls the social and political system of the Pechenegs a military 
democracy. A similar term is also used by Pritsak (1975, 220), who notes that he does not 
use it in the Marxist sense.
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nature of the Pechenegs’ system resulted in an almost complete lack of desire 
for political expansion aimed at subjugating any of the neighbouring peoples 
or states. Having conquered huge stretches of the steppe from the Danube to 
the Don at the end of the 9th century, the Pechenegs never tried to enlarge their 
territory further. Perhaps their further expansion was limited by geographical 
factors (the Carpathian arch in the west, the Black Sea in the south), but they 
never tried to expand their borders at the expense of the Khazar Khaganate 
or Rus’. Such projects in the early 10th century, after all, might have brought 
positive results. Similarly, after crossing the borders of Byzantium in the mid-
11th century, the Pechenegs guarded their separateness, but did not attempt, 
like the Bulgars, to create a strong state organism. Even clearer conclusions 
can be drawn from a comparison with the Huns, the Ashina Turks and the 
Mongols, whose history at certain times is one of constant and unrestrained 
conquest. Such a comparison best demonstrates the differences resulting from 
the fact that these other ethne created strong states based on a highly efficient 
military organization. Meanwhile, the aggression of the Pechenegs very often 
arose from non-political motives, which we will attempt to show in subsequent 
chapters of this work.
4.3 Economy
The economy of nomadic peoples is based on extensive pastoralism, usually in 
the form of open-range or free grazing, in which herds remain in open spaces 
year round, rather than being driven into enclosures, with the animals mov-
ing from place to place within a specific territory. They are accompanied by a 
large majority of the population, for which pastoral activity is their source of 
livelihood. Animal production is generally geared towards meeting the basic 
needs of the community rather than profit, which is fundamentally different 
from modern animal husbandry in a market economy. This does not mean, of 
course, that a population engaged in extensive pastoralism did not obtain sur-
pluses that could become an item of trade. Experts in the subject distinguish 
several types of pastoralism, two of which can be attributed to nomadic peo-
ples: nomadism proper and semi-nomadic pastoralism. These differ in terms 
of whether or not agriculture functions as a complementary form of economic 
activity. In the first, less common case, agriculture is not practiced at all.130
The Pechenegs most likely practiced semi-nomadic pastoralism. The areas 
in which they lived, as we could see in Chapter 1, were definitely conducive to 
130 Khazanov 1984, 15–22.
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this form of economic activity. This particularly concerns the Black Sea steppe, 
whose vast stretches of land were covered with tall grasses, perfectly suited 
for animal feed.131 The only significant impediment posed by the steppe was 
its harsh winters, which covered the steppe floor with a thick layer of snow, 
from which sparse clumps of grass protruded. However, the conditions during 
winter did not always pose a significant threat to livestock, which were able to 
extract food from under the snow. A real threat, however, was posed by glazed 
frost, which often appeared at the turn of late winter and early spring, when 
ice covering the snow prevented the animals from getting food, which in turn 
led to significant losses in the herd. This danger could only be avoided by mov-
ing to a less snowy area or one free of ice cover.132 In summer, droughts on the 
steppe were a major problem, but during this time animals were driven to the 
forest-steppe zone, where conditions were more tolerable.
Most scholars say that in a developed nomadic economy, herds generally 
consist of horses, sheep, goats, large horned cattle, and camels.133 Specialization 
in the breeding of one species is an extremely rare phenomenon. A specific 
feature of the Eurasian steppe is the existence of herds comprised of different 
animals,134 with sheep and horses dominating.135 The raising of horses was a 
characteristic feature of the Eurasian steppe, where these animals served not 
only as a means of transport, but also as a source of milk and meat. The impor-
tance of sheep to the nomadic economy is most clearly demonstrated by an 
Uzbek saying that these animals came to earth straight from heaven.136 Both 
sheep and horses were perfectly adapted to live in the difficult conditions of 
the steppe. They were able to feed themselves even in the most difficult cir-
cumstances. According to modern-day scholars, a steppe horse is able to dig 
up grass from underneath snow cover up to a depth of 40 cm, and in extreme 
cases, even 50 cm, while a sheep can find grass in up to 15 cm, or even 17 cm, 
of snow.137 Herodotus, Pseudo-Hippocrates, and Strabo all wrote about this. 
Recent data seems to confirm the information provided by Ahmad ibn Fadlan, 
who wrote: ‘The sheep graze mostly on what lies underneath the snow, digging 
131 Pletneva 1958, 186.
132 Pletneva 1958, 187. Cf. Gumilow 1997, 12–13; Kałużyński 1970, 30.
133 Moszyński 1996, 18; Pletneva 1958, 187; Jagchid, Hayer 1983, 22; Kałużyński 1983, 59.
134 Khazanov 1984, 46.
135 Khazanov 1984, 46–47.
136 Khazanov 1984, 46.
137 Khazanov 1984, 46, 50. Sechin Jagchid and Peter Hayer (1983, 21–22) are of a slightly dif-
ferent opinion as far as the sheep’s abilities is concerned. According to both researchers, 
these animals, like cows, require feeding by humans during winter; otherwise they are 
likely to starve to death.
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for the grass with their hooves.’ He then adds: ‘If they do not find grass, they eat 
snow instead and grow inordinately fat.’138
Less frequently among the herds of animals bred by nomads were large 
horned cattle. Although steppe peoples appreciated their qualities, the high 
feed requirements and the fact that they did not tolerate a nomadic lifestyle 
well meant that they constituted a small percentage of the nomads’ livestock. 
Experts on the subject claim that an increase in the number of large cattle 
indicated that the nomadic community raising them was undergoing a pro-
cess of sedentarization. Yet we have confirmation of the presence of these live-
stock animals on the Black Sea steppe already in antiquity from the writings of 
Herodotus, Pseudo-Hippocrates, Strabo, and elsewhere.139
In Eurasian areas, goats usually grazed in desert or semi-desert areas. They 
were not very highly valued, and were most commonly reared by poorer peo-
ple.140 The question of the presence of camels on the steppe is somewhat more 
complicated. The natural conditions there, especially during the harsh winters, 
made it very difficult for camels to survive. Among the early Eurasian nomads, 
camels were rather rare. It is usually assumed that an increasing prevalence 
of this animal most likely occurred during the Mongolian period.141 However, 
data from chronicles seems to contradict this. In accounts about Russian expe-
ditions against the Cumans, we find information that camels belonging to the 
steppe-dwellers were taken as booty by the princes.142
In the case of the Pechenegs, the accounts of Constantine Porphyrogenitus 
and Muslim writers testify to the breeding of horses, horned cattle, and 
sheep.143 We can suppose that the population of these animals was quite 
numerous because they were objects of trade.144 The lack of source data leads 
us to assume that the Pechenegs bred goats but on a small scale or not at all. The 
possible presence of camels in their herds is also questionable. Pletneva states, 
however, that their presence on the Black Sea steppe is confirmed by a fresco 
uncovered in Saint Sophia’s Cathedral in Kiev. It depicts a bactrian camel, a 
species which was bred in Inner Asia. According to Pletneva, the inspiration 
138 ibn Fadlan: ibn Fadlan, 212–215; Zeki Validi Togan 1939, 33; Kovalevskii 1956, 130; Frye 2005, 
42.
139 Cf. Chapter 1 of the present book.
140 Jagchid, Hayer 1983, 22; Khazanov 1984, 47.
141 Spuler 1967, 253, 361, 373, 410, 423; Khazanov 1984, 48.
142 PVL 1, AM 6603 (1095), col. 228; AM 6611 (1103), col. 279; PNL, AM 6660 (1152), p. 196. Cf. 
Noonan 1992, 311.
143 DAI II 6–8, (p. 50/51). Gardīzī: Martinez 1982, 152; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2010, 165; Bakrī: 
Кunik, Rozen 1878, 59; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2010, 222; Marwazī: Minorsky 1942, 32–33; 
Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2010, 250. Zakhoder 1967, 74.
144 DAI, II 6–8, (p. 50/51).
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for the artist’s image came from the southern neighbours of the Rus’. Was this 
the Pechenegs?145 The only mention in written sources about their possible 
use of camels comes from The Life of Lietbertus, Bishop of Cambrai.146 On his 
way to the Holy Land in ca. 1054 he travelled through the Balkans, where he 
and his companions were attacked by ‘Scythian robbers (latrunculi Sciticae 
gentis)’, who are said to have ridden horses and camels (sessores equorum 
camelorumque).147 The characteristics of the attackers supplied by the author 
leaves no doubt that they were nomads, which has prompted researchers to 
identify these ‘Scythian robbers’ as Pechenegs.148 This hagiographical source 
would therefore contain testimony of camel breeding by these nomads. The 
credibility of this account, however, is limited. It is worth noting that The Life of 
Lietbertus was written ca. 1099–1100, i.e., almost half a century after the saint’s 
pilgrimage. Its author, Raoul (Rodulphus), a monk of the Abbey of the Holy 
Sepulchre of Cambrai, may have accompanied Lietbertus on his journey, but 
his message is quite jumbled and plagued with numerous errors.149 The char-
acteristics of the attackers, in particular, arouses the researcher’s doubts. Raoul 
initially describes them as coming from a Scythian tribe, then assigns to them 
the practice of circumcision, found among the Saracens, and finally, several 
lines below, simply refers to them as Saracens. Similar reasoning gives rise to 
suspicions that in his description of the nomadic bandits, the monk simply 
combined the characteristics of several nomadic peoples with whom he came 
into contact during his pilgrimage to the Middle East. This suspicion is further 
substantiated by the fact that the nomads of the Great Steppe rarely used cam-
els as mounts, while in the biographer’s account, they are mentioned alongside 
horses. We therefore cannot use The Life of Lietbertus as a basis for concluding 
that the Pechenegs bred camels.
The same applies to archaeological sources. The remains of camel bones 
have been discovered at sites located within or nearby territories that could 
have been controlled by the Pechenegs. A number of such finds come from 
cemeteries and settlements located on the Don, the upper Severskii Donets, 
the middle Oskol and in Dinogetia (near today’s village of Garvăn) on the 
lower Danube.150 These discoveries have been interpreted as evidence of 
145 Pletneva 1958, 187–188.
146 V.Liet., 838–866.
147 V.Liet., XXXIII–XXXIV (pp. 854–855).
148 Uzelac 2010, 65–67.
149 The author has very little knowledge of the geography of south-eastern Europe and the 
Middle East: he confuses Corinth with Thessaloniki and places Isauria in the Balkans, 
somewhere between Dalmatia and Corinth. V.Liet., XXXV (p. 855).
150 Kovalev 2005, 81, 86 (map no. 2), 88–89, 99; Haimovici 1984, 311–319.
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the functioning of trade routes; meanwhile, the Pechenegs were involved in 
trade, especially in the first two-thirds of the 10th century. Long-distance trade 
required the replacement of animals during the journey. This mechanism is 
described by Ahmad ibn Fadlan.151 The Pechenegs, who were involved in this 
trade, could therefore have provided merchants travelling across their lands 
with necessary means of transport, including camels. Yet, the data from writ-
ten sources is insufficient to dispel any doubts. Al-Gardīzī states that while 
travelling through the lands of the Pechenegs it was necessary to purchase rid-
ing animals, but he only mentions horses.152
We can say a bit more about the types of horses used thanks to archaeologi-
cal evidence. Data from the vicinity of the Sarkel confirms the presence of two 
breeds of horses among the steppe peoples. The first of these, with a large head 
and strong, massive limbs, was typical of steppe horses. The second one was 
characterized by a much smaller head, narrow nostrils and long, thin legs. This 
breed occurred much less frequently on the steppe and was probably used as a 
mount by the nomadic aristocracy.153
The nomads’ horned cattle were said to be extremely hardy and able to 
survive even in the harshest conditions, although they were not a particularly 
productive species.154 However, in light of the above considerations, it must be 
concluded that they were probably not very numerous and therefore could not 
have been traded on the same scale as the horses and sheep, two other animal 
species mentioned by Constantine VII. There is no doubt, however, that the 
Pechenegs were engaged in the breeding of large horned cattle.
As a basic branch of the nomad economy, pastoralism provided access to a 
number of essential products. Above all, it provided food. These animals were 
bred for meat, among other things, so the nomadic menu included sheep and 
beef, as well as goat and horse meat.155 The latter, as a high-calorie food,156 had 
a particularly high nutritional value, and also contained minerals, vitamins A 
and B, and amino acids.157 Animals were usually slaughtered in autumn, when 
151 See the discussion on trade below.
152 Gardīzī: Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2010, 166; Zakhoder 1967, 75. A.P. Martinez explains the rel-
evant passage in a slightly different way (1982, 152).
153 Pletneva 1958, 188.
154 Pletneva 1958, 187.
155 Pletneva 1958, 187; Kałużyński 1983, 61, 65; Khazanov 1984, 52–53.
156 Horsemeat contains the most calories (4090 calories per kg) of all types of meat con-
sumed by the steppe people. Meanwhile, mutton and beef have 4043 and 2365 calories, 
respectively. Smith 2000, 2 (the data cited by the researcher was converted from pounds 
into kilograms).
157 The fact that the Pechenegs consumed this type of meat is well documented. Cf. Mich.
Psell., VII 68 (p. 241); Sewter 1953, 242. Ott.Fr., VI 10 (pp. 271–272).
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livestock, thanks to the abundance of food in summer, had gained weight.158 
The nomads’ livestock above also supplied milk, which was consumed in 
various forms;159 however, milk production was not constant all year round. 
Having been exhausted by the severe conditions during winter, the animals in 
late winter and early spring produced almost no milk.160 Therefore, while in 
winter the nomads’ diet was based on meat, in summer, dairy products were 
most commonly consumed. In the case of the Pechenegs, we have been able to 
confirm the use of blood from livestock as food.161 However, its use for this pur-
pose was probably relatively rare. This seems to be proven by analogous data 
from other steppe peoples. It cannot be excluded that blood was consumed 
in extreme situations, e.g., during an exhausting march, as is clearly indicated 
in Marco Polo’s account.162 Blood was also obtained during the slaughter 
of animals, when, as the example of the Mongols shows, it was stored and 
added to broths and sausages.163 Although consumed in a smaller quanti-
ties than milk, some basic plant products, i.e., vegetables and certain types of 
cereals, were also a part of the diet of each nomad.164 Animal skins provided 
material for clothing, while sheep wool was used to make felt that was used to 
cover yurts.165
Extensive pastoralism involved the need for frequent migration and changes 
in encampment sites. The migrations of Eurasian steppe peoples, who mainly 
inhabited areas within the temperate zone, occurred quite regularly, based on 
seasonal changes. Their routes were generally linear and longitudinal, i.e., they 
usually ran along the north-south axis. They usually travelled north in sum-
mer. Here they found better pastures on which, despite the warm season, veg-
etation continued to grow. In winter, the animals grazed in the south, where 
158 Kałużyński 1983, 66; Allsen 2001, 128.
159 Kałużyński 1983, 69; Moszyński 1996, 43–45; Tryjarski 1975, 201; Allsen 2001, 128.
160 Moszyński 1996, 46; Kałużyński 1983, 68.
161 Mich.Psell., VII 68 (p. 241); Sewter 1953, 242. Cf. Paroń 2011, 129–130.
162 Mar.Polo, I 54.
163 Allsen 2001, 128.
164 Contrary to the common stereotype, plants sometimes comprised a larger proportion of 
the nomadic diet than meat. According to research by Sergei Vainshtein, the Tuva inhabit-
ants, like the Khalkha Mongols in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, obtained 55.31% 
of their calorie intake from the consumption of milk and milk products, 24.38% from 
the consumption of plant products (sic!) and 20.31% from eating meat. Vainshtein 1991, 
122; Maiskii, 1921, 156. However, it is worth noting here studies according to which steppe 
people consumed only small amounts of cereal products. There merely provided a sup-
plement (albiet an essential one) to their diet. Shakhanova 1989, 114. Of more in general 
on nomadic diet: Khazanov 1984, 52.
165 Pletneva 1958, 189–190; Kałużyński 1983, 61.
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it was warmer, thanks to which they were able to extract food from under a 
thinner layer of snow. In general, we can say that the main factor that deter-
mined the route of migration in summer was access to water, and in winter, 
access to fodder. A similar form of migration was practiced by the Black Sea 
steppe-dwellers.166 Giovanni da Pian del Carpine noted that nomads stayed 
in the Black Sea region throughout the winter. Similar observations can also 
be found in Herodotus, Strabo and other authors.167 Regular invasions of Rus’ 
in the summer by the Cumans also proves that at that time of the year these 
steppe-dwellers were in the forest-steppe, not far from the borders Kievan 
Rus’.168 In winter, however, the Byzantine Empire’s possessions were probably 
at greater risk. It would seem that the characteristics of the migrations pre-
sented here could also be applied to the Pechenegs.
The portage of one’s belongings during migratory journeys required ade-
quate means of transport; this was supplied by the nomads’ herds. It is pos-
sible that steers were harnessed to the carts, although in illustrations in the 
Radziwiłł Chronicle we can also clearly see horses serving as draught animals.169 
The Mongols also used camels for such purposes,170 though such practices in 
the case of the Pechenegs have not been confirmed. During wars and plunder-
ing expeditions, mounted units naturally rode horses.
The dominance of extensive pastoralism in the economy of the steppe did 
not exclude the existence of other ways of making a livelihood. Shortages in 
foodstuffs were compensated for by hunting, the development of which, as we 
have already seen, was favoured by the rich fauna of the Black Sea steppe.171 
Hunting activities could either be limited in scale, involving a small number 
of people, or take the form of relatively large, well-organized expeditions in 
which the whole tribe or clan participated. The Mongols are known to have 
organized hunting expeditions with such great fanfare that they resembled in 
some ways military excursions.172 Some researchers are even inclined to sup-
pose that these events played the role of military exercises, the aim of which 
was to educate participants in skills useful on the battlefield.173 It is difficult 
166 Khazanov 1984, 50–52.
167 Cf. Chapter 1 of the present book.
168 Golden 1991, 78.
169 Pletneva 1958, 187, 202 (fig. 25, 26); Kałużyński 1983, 61.
170 Kałużyński 1983, 84; Khazanov 1984, 49.
171 Pletneva 1958, 186; Tryjarski 1975a, 498. For more in general on hunting among the Altai 
and Amur peoples: Sinor 1968, 119–127.
172 Olbricht, Pinks 1980, 117–118. Cf. Kałużyński 1983, 62–65; 1970, 28. The practice of group 
hunting was widespread among Eurasian steppe people. Moszyński 1996, 36; Dąbrowski 
1975, 107; Szymański 1979, 71; Mukhamejanov 2000, 288–289.
173 Kałużyński 1983, 63–64.
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to say to what extent these observations can be applied to the Pechenegs. It 
would seem, however, that we could assume they also most likely organized 
larger hunting expeditions. The Pechenegs probably also engaged in wildcraft-
ing, but we are unable to say anything definite about this.
Agriculture is usually perceived as a complementary and less typical form 
of economic activity for nomads. However, they had to develop a means of 
obtaining agricultural products because some of these were essential to their 
lives.174 One way was simply to engage in farming, adapting it to a nomadic 
way of life. Examples of such practices are provided by data from cultural 
anthropologists and, in the case of historical societies, from written sources. 
In the mid-20th century, the Selenga Mongols sowed rye, barley, and wheat 
on plots of land alongside a river that had been previously loosened with the 
help of a wooden lister plough. The thickest clods of earth were broken up by 
hand. Sowing was usually carried out in spring. The plots were left to grow over 
the summer and harvested in autumn upon the nomads’ return. Mature cere-
als were picked like grass without the use of sickles.175 The Khalkha Mongols 
had a specific division of labour in their farming. Wealthy families entrusted 
the job of looking after their sown fields to fellow nomads who were poor 
and possessed no livestock.176 Very interesting information can be found in 
the account of the 15th-century Italian traveller Giosafat Barbaro. He claimed 
that in February the subjects of the Golden Horde who were engaged in farm-
ing were called upon to make preparations for the upcoming sowing period. 
In March, they sowed grain on designated plots of land, which were located 
two days away from their encampment sites at the time the call to prepare 
the plots was made. After completing their field work, they returned to their 
horde. When the sowed plants were ripe, they separated from the horde once 
again to harvest the crop. According to Barbaro, the Khan himself was said to 
personally oversee work in the fields.177 The information of the Italian traveller 
leaves no doubt that we are dealing with a method of tillage typical of nomads, 
while the involvement of the state apparatus and the ruler himself seems to 
prove that this form of economic activity, although supplementary, was very 
important for the Golden Horde Tatars.
In addition to cultivating their own plant products, steppe-dwellers also 
obtained them from settled populations, for whom agriculture was the main 
174 Cf. especially Khazanov’s general comments (1984, 52–53). For more about the special 
case of the Tuvans, see Vainshtein 1991, 143–147.
175 Róna-Tas 1959, 443–465; Di Cosmo 1994, 1100.
176 Vreeland 1957, 46.
177 Io.Bar., 125 (text), 150 (translation). Cf. Zajączkowski 1968, 231.
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source of income. Contrary to stereotypical beliefs reinforced by some writ-
ten sources, within the borders of the Great Steppe, which stretched from 
Manchuria to the Hungarian Plain, there were many enclaves inhabited by 
agricultural populations, some of which dated back to the Bronze Age.178 Their 
presence provided conditions for interaction between nomadic and settled 
communities. The nomads were thus able to purchase the crops they needed 
through trade or receive them in tribute. The latter method required the 
nomads to impose their political domination over the settled farmers. Among 
the many nomadic peoples who did so were the Xiongnu (Hsiung-nu),179 
Scythians,180 European Huns,181 Ashina Turks,182 Avars,183 and Khazars.184 
Agricultural products were also obtained from neighbouring sovereign states 
that were threatened by the nomadic invasions and purchased their security 
with annual ‘gifts’. A similar course of action is well documented in the case of 
China, for which it was often more economical to pay the tribute demanded by 
steppe peoples than to respond in kind to their armed aggression.185 It is worth 
noting, however, that this method of obtaining crops did not play as large a role 
on the steppe as was once thought.186 Necessary agricultural products could 
also be acquired through trade.187
In considering the role of agriculture among the Pechenegs, we need to 
address an additional issue: the gradual reduction in the role of pastoralism 
and increasing importance of agriculture and other forms of economic activity 
in the steppe economy. Soviet researchers, including Aleksander Iakubovskii, 
have usually associated this process with feudalization and the emergence of a 
group of nomads incapable of supporting themselves from pastoralism alone, 
forcing them to cultivate the land, which entailed changes in their lifestyle.188 
This kind of forced sedentarization occurred mainly among impoverished 
nomads, and those who fell victim to it generally regarded it as a temporary 
solution to their economic difficulties. As soon as their material situation 
178 Di Cosmo 1994, 1096–1115.
179 Di Cosmo 1994, 1094; 2002, 169–170; Kradin 2007, 126–127.
180 Khazanov 1975b, 427, 429–430; Di Cosmo 1994, 1110–1111.
181 Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 174–178.
182 Skaff 2002, 364–72; 2012, 65–71.
183 Szymański 1979, 66; Beranová 1986, 85–91; Pohl 1988, 189–195.
184 Noonan 2007, 207–244.
185 Dąbrowski 1975, 34; Barfield 1992, 46–47. The latter researcher emphasizes that the quan-
tities of grain and wine delivered to Xiongnu, confirmed in Chinese sources, were suf-
ficient only to maintain the court of their ruler.
186 Di Cosmo 1994, 1115–1118.
187 Liu Mau-Tsai 1958, I, 452–455; Jagchid, Symons 1989, 24–51.
188 Grekov, Iakubovskii 1950, 19; Pletneva 1958, 188; Fedorov-Davydov 1966, 199.
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somewhat improved, however, they tried to return to their previous way of life 
and the activities associated with it. Apart from an attachment to the native 
ethnos, a mechanism that fueled such a desire to return was the fear of being 
scorned by fellow tribesmen and the threat of exclusion from their commu-
nity. We know that among the Oghuz those who ended their nomadic way of 
life lost some of their rights.189 An obvious and much stronger incentive to take 
up agricultural work was created by environmental factors. Both the Bashkirs 
and the Volga-Kama Bulgars found themselves in areas with insufficient pas-
tureland and were forced to look for other ways to obtain food, including 
agriculture. An important factor favouring such a metamorphosis was close 
contact with settled communities, for whom land cultivation was the main 
source of income.190
In the case of the Pechenegs, farming was most likely practiced as a second-
ary form of economic activity. This conclusion is based not only on compara-
tive data, but also on accounts found in written sources. It is more difficult to 
answer the question whether there were communities dependent mainly on 
farming among the Pechenegs or those people under their rule. During the 
early stages of the Pechenegs’ history, there is no data indicating this. It is 
doubtful that the core of the ethnos was ever comprised of inhabitants of the 
oases of Transoxania.191 Not until the Pechenegs’ migration to the Black Sea 
steppe were the conditions created for close contact with agricultural popu-
lations, in this case, people of the Dridu culture living on the Siret, Prut and 
Dniester Rivers. The nature of their relationship with the Pechenegs is unclear. 
It seems, however, that until the 11th century, when the agricultural population 
began to withdraw from the lower reaches of the rivers, the relations between 
the two communities may have been good.192 It cannot be ruled out that the 
steppe-dwellers imposed some form of subjugation on the Dridu population, 
though the political structure of the Pechenegs seems to exclude a particularly 
strong and burdensome form of subjection. Political domination may have 
been accompanied by the acquisition of agricultural produce through tribute 
or forced unequal trade, the latter of which is confirmed by archaeological 
sources.193 Plant products could also be obtained by the Pechenegs through 
189 Agadzhanov 1969, 109; Khazanov 1984, 82–84. For a similar observation about the 
Scythians: Khazanov 1975, 148–149.
190 Pletneva 1958, 188. Por. Cf. Rudenko 1955, 61–65.
191 Cf. discussion in Chapter 3 of the present book.
192 Diaconu 1970, 37–48; 1975, 235–237; Spinei 1975, 271–276; 1986, 103; Dobroliubskii 1986, 24; 
Paroń 2009, 458–460.
193 Spinei 1975, 271–273; 1986, 103.
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external trade, which has been confirmed in the case of Byzantium and Rus’. 
We will return to this issue later in this chapter.
Close contact with people with distinctly different cultures apparently did 
not result in broad cultural change among the nomads. The natural conditions 
of the Black Sea steppe were conducive to animal breeding and did not force 
them limit this form of economic activity in favour of others. Moreover, the 
intensity of contacts between Dridu and Pecheneg farmers was probably not as 
high as in the case of the Danube Bulgars and the Slavic population subordinate 
to them. In addition, a sedentary way of life and the agricultural activities that 
accompanied it were generally disliked by nomads, which meant that the pro-
cess of their sedentarization and agrarianization, even in conditions that were 
exceptionally favourable to this, progressed slowly. This situation was probably 
the same with the Pechenegs. It is striking that the first mentions of their prac-
ticing tillage date back to the mid-11th century, i.e., the period just after they 
left the Black Sea steppe. John Skylitzes’ chronicle tells us that after the entire 
ethnos had entered the territory of the Byzantine Empire and formally surren-
dered to Emperor Constantine IX Monomachos, the Pechenegs were settled 
around three places in the territory of today’s Bulgaria, Northern Macedonia, 
and Serbia (Sofia, Ovče Pole, and Niš). They were required to pay tribute and 
cultivate the land there. They did so for a period of time, but soon rose up in 
rebellion and apparently abandoned the occupation.194 In Anna Komnena’s 
Alexiad, we find a report about a large group of ‘Scythians’ (γένος τί σκυθικὸν) 
crossing the Danube in 1085. In the breaks between military campaigns, they 
were said to plough and sow millet and wheat.195 These ‘Scythians’ are usu-
ally identified as Pechenegs;196 however, the date of their migration (almost 
40 years after the main wave of Pechenegs) and the formulation used by the 
scholarly Byzantine princess suggest that this group may have been a mixture 
of nomadic ethne withdrawing from the Black Sea steppe under pressure from 
the Cumans. Pechenegs may have been present during these events depicted, 
but we do not know what role they played in them. We must therefore treat the 
above-mentioned report with great caution, because we are unable to state to 
what extent it concerns the Pechenegs themselves. It is interesting to note that 
these ‘Scythians’ practiced ploughing, because it proves that they used more 
sophisticated methods of tillage. However, it is not advisable to attribute too 
much importance to agriculture in their economy, if only because of the fact 
194 Io.Scyl., 459, 461; Wortley 2010, 430, 431.
195 An.Kom., VI 14.1 (p. 199); Sewter 2009, 182. Cf. also Chapter 7 of the present book.
196 Macartney 1929, 349; Tryjarski 1975a, 527.
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that Anna Komnena’s account shows that they engaged in it on a casual basis 
during breaks between plundering expeditions.197
The information from both sources refers to the final chapter in the 
Pechenegs’ history, after they were expelled from the Black Sea steppe and 
forced to seek shelter in the territory of neighbouring countries, mainly 
Byzantium. In addition to undergoing political change, they also experienced 
changes in their natural environment: they found themselves in areas with 
limited possibilities for continuing to practice extensive pastoralism. Given 
this situation, the importance of agriculture – thus far regarded as a secondary 
branch of their economy – certainly increased. It cannot be ruled out that this 
shift had already begun somewhat earlier, during their stay on the Black Sea 
steppe. The defeats suffered in the early-11th century in battles with Rus’ and 
the Uzes had caused the Pechenegs to lose some of their pastures and herds, 
which, even if accompanied by a significant loss in their population, must 
have made it difficult to provide for themselves. This most likely forced them 
to make up for these shortages through plunder, which is best evidenced by 
their invasions of the Balkan provinces of Byzantium in the 1020s and 1030s.198 
The defeats mentioned above also led to a significant impoverishment of the 
Pechenegs. In comparison to earlier periods of prosperity, there appeared a 
greater number of déclassé nomads, for whom agriculture probably provided 
an essential means of support. However, the cultural changes outlined here, 
especially as depicted in the information provided by Skylitzes, were adopted 
with great reluctance.
Crafts were also a part of the Pechenegs’ economy. A more detailed descrip-
tion of its characteristics, however, requires a few introductory remarks. It is 
easy to augment the stereotypical image of a nomad as a destroyer and plun-
derer with an equally distorted vision of him being a versatile producer. It is 
hard to deny that the level of production on the steppe often did not equal 
that of the craftsmanship in settled communities, especially when the latter 
were represented by highly developed civilizations (China, Byzantium, Persia). 
197 Spinei 2009, 227. The researcher assumes that the ‘Scythians’ described by Anna Komnena 
could not have been the Pechenegs, but were rather members of a community that lived 
in the area of the Paristrion province and joined immigrants in attacks on the Byzantine 
Empire. However, this reasoning contradicts the account of Anna Komnena, who clearly 
states that it was newcomers from across the Danube who worked the land before they 
invaded the provinces of the Empire. Their modus operandi seems to fully match that 
of the nomads who entered the Balkans. They probably came in winter or autumn, tak-
ing advantage of the freezing of the Danube, in spring they were able to cultivate their 
fields, and then, in summer or early autumn, organize a military expedition. Komnena’s 
‘Scythians’ were therefore a nomadic group, but it is difficult to identify them precisely.
198 Cf. Chapter 6 of the present book.
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The desire to obtain various luxury goods, rare among nomads, is a very fre-
quent motif in the literature of neighbouring civilizations. It cannot be denied 
that the development of more sophisticated forms of artistic crafts was often 
possible in nomadic communities thanks to the acquisition of technologi-
cal from more developed areas. These ‘borrowings’ were sometimes achieved 
by means of brute force through the abduction of experts in certain types of 
craftsmanship.199 Yet, it is hard not to notice that the inhabitants of the steppe 
were also able to produce very artistically sophisticated items. The conditions 
for the development of highly developed crafts, however, were created only 
within nomadic early-state organisms. In such societies, there existed an elite 
with a strong interest in manifesting its prestige that was able, thanks to its 
social and economic position, to create the conditions necessary for the opera-
tion of permanent specialized craft workshops. These were often established 
in centres which functions as a kind of capital, or central hub, for a nomadic 
empire.200 In the case of the egalitarian and segmented political organisms 
created by the Pechenegs, the existence of such a production centre for luxury 
craftsmanship is much less likely. This does not mean, however, that special-
ized production was completely alien to them. It must have existed, though 
on a smaller scale. The Pechenegs were able to process certain types of non-
ferrous metals, especially silver, and to a lesser extent, gold.201 According to the 
Muslim authors mentioned earlier in this study, whose data refers to the 9th 
century, affluence among the Pechenegs manifested itself in the possession of 
numerous gold and silver vessels and silver belts.202 Appliqué work on these 
199 Małowist 1976, 541, 543, 553, 554. After they had seized a city, the Mongols usually spared 
the craftsmen, who were distributed among the dignitaries of the empire and usually 
taken to the east. Cf. also data from William of Rubruck on the settlement of the Teutons 
who lived in the town of Talas (20 days from Samarkand), who were then transferred to 
the town of Bolaq, located a month’s journey west, where they mined gold and forged 
weapons for Möngke Khan. The Franciscan also mentions several times a Parisian 
goldsmith, master Wilhelm Buchier, who worked for Möngke in Karakorum. Rubruck, 
XXIII 2–3 (pp. 224–225), XXIX 3 (p. 253), XXX 2–3 (pp. 276–277). Marcin Broniewski, Stefan 
Batory’s envoy to the Khan of Crimea, claims that the Tatars were not involved in crafts or 
trade. In the Khanate, these economic activities were left to Christian slaves and to Turks, 
Armenians, Jews, Circassians, Petyhorcy, Philistines and Roma. Broniewski, XXIII (Latin 
text), 70 (Polish translation).
200 Małowist 1976; Khazanov 2005, 168–172; Pohl 2008b, 97–120.
201 Tryjarski 1975a, 533.
202 Gardīzī: Martinez 1982, 152; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2010, 165; Bakrī: Кunik, Rozen 1878, 59; 
Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2010, 222 (Bakrī writes about richly decorated, not silver belts); 
Marwazī: Minorsky 1942, 33; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2010, 250 (Marwazī mentions the 
Pechenegs possessed silver and gold, with no indication of the form in which these met-
als were found in the steppe). Cf. Zachoder 1967, 74.
173Structures and Forms of Existence
latter items could have indeed been made by craftsmen living on the steppe.203 
Archaeological evidence attributed to the Pechenegs also indicates their abil-
ity to produce other silver, and much less often gold, jewellery (pendants, 
bracelets, earrings, rings, appliqué work on horse tack).204 However, they were 
less likely to make gold or silver vessels on their own.205
Contrary to the information found in written sources, the archaeologi-
cal materials attributed to the Pechenegs are most often ornaments made of 
bronze. This applies to practically all of the above-mentioned categories of 
item, from appliqué work on belts to the decoration on horse tack.206
Iron was even more widely used in the Pecheneg economy. These steppe-
dwellers mastered the technique of metal-working, which is evidenced by the 
frequent occurrence in their burial sites of iron elements of equestrian equip-
ment (bit, stirrup), as well as some elements of weapons (e.g., arrowheads).207 
According to Arab sources, the Pechenegs possessed many different types of 
weapons,208 though these brief references don’t allow us to determine exactly 
what types are meant here. Among the archaeological materials discovered, 
apart from arrowheads, there have also been sabres, spearheads, axes and 
mace heads.209
In all past societies, the ability to smelt metals and produce and process 
metal alloys was connected with the specialization of production, and the 
203 Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 88; Ivanov, Krylasova 2006, 17, 25–26.
204 Chardaev 1991, 257; Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 90, 93–94; Ivanov, Krylasova 2006, 17, 21–22, 
28–30.
205 The question of the origins of the Treasure of Nagyszentmiklós, containing 23 vessels 
made of 18–22 carat gold, has yet to be resolved. However, Joseph Németh’s hypothesis 
that it came from the Pechenegs has generally not been accepted. Németh 1932; 1971, 1–51. 
Cf. Csebe 1922, 213; Gyula 1974; Tryjarski 1975a, 596–597; 1975, 238–239; Waklinow 1984, 
173–181; Erdal 1988, 221–234; Göbl, Róna-Tas 1995, 9–20; Bálint 1989, 187–192; 2010 (The 
treasure belonged to an Avar princely family from the 7th–8th century, which lived in the 
southern or eastern part of the Carpathian Basin. 2010, 624).
206 Bronze was also used to make famous openwork pendants, in oval or heart-shaped 
form filled with ornamentation which is seen by some researchers as solar symbolism, 
while others interpret it as a motif of the tree of life, and yet others see it as a bird with 
open wings. Some pieces had an elongated ending with a hole at the end. Some archae-
ologists also consider the artifact to be a kind of grooming utensil (Russian: kopoushka). 
Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 88–89; Ivanov, Krylasova 2006, 34. This pendant is often treated 
as a very important ethnic indicator pointing to the presence of the Pechenegs. For a 
skeptical stance on this subject: Curta 2013, 168–170; Fiedler 2013, 274–276.
207 Pletneva 1958, 156–159; Dobroliubskii 1986, 50; Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 82–86, 87.
208 See footnote 841.
209 Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 87–88. More on the above in the next section of this chapter.
174 chapter 4
craftsmen who worked with metals enjoyed a special social status.210 The situ-
ation was no different among the nomads, where people engaged in smithery 
and jewellery production were excluded from the traditional division of labour 
into men’s and women’s activities.211 It cannot be ruled out that in addition to 
native craftsmen, foreign specialists also engaged in such work, either working 
among the Pechenegs or in close contact with them.212
In addition to the above-described artisanal production, a common form of 
production among nomads was based on processing raw materials supplied 
by their extensive herds. As shown in written sources and in the field research 
of contemporary ethnologists, this served mainly to satisfy the nomads’ own 
needs, and thus functioned within a division of labour into activities typical 
of men and women. It was characterized by a lack of specialization and was of 
relatively poor quality, i.e., lacking in artistic ambition.213 Due the abundance 
of leather among the Pechenegs, and their having mastered the skill of tan-
ning, processing of this material was widespread. Women made leather san-
dals, boots, and probably some types of clothing, sewing them together with 
thread made of animal tendons. Leather was also used to make elements of 
horse tack, as well as bags, which replaced clay vessels, as these were not very 
useful in the conditions of nomadic life.214 The Pechenegs mastered the ability 
to make wool felt, which was used, among other things, to cover yurts.215 The 
Pechenegs were certainly also able to work in bone and horn, as is evidenced 
by the bone overlays of the composite bow216 found in grave inventories and, 
much less frequently, appliqué on quivers.217
210 Eliade 1993, 73–104. Blacksmiths and metallurgists, as ‘masters of fire’, enjoyed a status 
similar to shamans and sorcerers.
211 In the context of the division of labour: Szynkiewicz 1981, 56 (the researcher considers 
blacksmithing and goldsmithing to be specialized occupations, although practiced by 
men). On the subject of the special status of craftsmen dealing with metalworking in 
nomadic communities: Pohl 1988, 194. Cf. Tănase 2010, 213–225. The researcher argues 
that goldsmiths and blacksmiths enjoyed a high social status, but were not part of the 
ruling class.
212 Daniela Tănase points to the mostly wandering nature of craftsmen specialising in met-
alworking (2010, 224–225). V. Spinei (1986, 103) records the presence of individual objects 
of nomadic origin or their imitations in ‘Dridu’ culture sites as evidence of trade contacts. 
However, it is not impossible that this was in fact craftwork produced to meet the needs 
of the nomads.
213 Pletneva 1958, 190; Moszyński 1996, 33.
214 Pletneva 1958, 190; Kałużyński 1983, 76, 78, 81.
215 Tryjarski 1975a, 529; Kałużyński 1983, 61.
216 Pletneva 1958, 159; Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 86–87, 92.
217 Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 92.
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Judging by the writings of Byzantine authors, the Pechenegs were also 
skilled in carpentry. This is indicated by information about their use of carts, 
both as a means of transport and as defensive weaponry.218 Construction of 
such carts required mastering carpentry skills at a high level.
In contrast, their ability to make ceramic vessels was poorly developed. 
It is traditionally assumed that this was due to the fact that such items were 
not well suited to living conditions on the steppe. The frequent changing of 
encampments meant that fragile ceramics were constantly at risk of being 
broken during transport. Leather bags and iron boilers substituted for clay 
vessels. It is worth remembering, however, that in some political empires cre-
ated by nomads, technologically advanced ceramic production was sometimes 
present, although foreign craftsmen and technology were usually responsible 
for their production.219 Steppe-dwellers themselves did not master the use of 
the potter’s wheel, so even when we find dishes, these are either imported or 
examples of primitive ceramics made without the use of such a wheel.220 This 
also applies to the Pechenegs. Admittedly, clay vessels are sometimes found 
in the inventories of their graves, but only very rarely. Besides, these are usu-
ally primitive moulded pots.221 Large, richly ornamented clay kettles, widely 
found on the lower and middle Danube, and whose appearance in these areas 
had been associated by Petre Diaconu with the Pechenegs,222 can no longer 
be attributed to the nomads of the Black Sea steppe. These items appeared in 
the Balkans (Bulgaria) long before the Pechenegs. Moreover, to the east of the 
Dniester, that is, in the area they occupied for more than a century, not a single 
kettle of this type has been discovered.223
In general, the level of the Pechenegs’ craftwork was not particularly high. 
Although it is hard to deny that they were familiar with its more specialized 
forms, they do not seem to have achieved a particularly impressive level of 
artistry. Their desire to own rare on the steppe luxury goods, which is often 
mentioned in written sources, is also clear.224 Even if we try to account for the 
bias of some authors who were overly inclined to attribute an insatiable greed 
218 An.Kom., VII 3.7 (pp. 211–212); 7.2 (pp. 220–221); 10.4 (p. 231); Sewter 2009, 193, 201, 211.
219 The ceramic production of the Golden Horde is considered an example of this. Cf. Koval’ 
2005, 75–86; Lavysh 2013, 121–125.
220 Pletneva 1958, 190; Kałużyński 1983, 80–81; Spinei 2009, 238.
221 Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 89, 94; Spinei 2003, 100.
222 Diaconu 1964, 249–263.
223 Spinei 2009, 238; Curta 2013, 159–161.
224 See especially DAI, VI 8–9 (p. 52/3); VII 8–17 (p. 54/5). Cf. Paroń 2007a, 107–108.
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to all barbarians, and peculiarly to steppe people,225 it seems that behind a 
layer of literary topoi and stereotypes lay real-world experiences. The desire 
to obtain deficit goods grew as a result of contacts with settled communities 
with a significantly higher level of development in terms of material culture. 
This problem will be dealt with later in this chapter, so here we should limit 
ourselves to the observation that the desire to own luxury goods was one of 
the nomads’ motives for carrying out looting raids against the peoples who 
produced these goods, this desire may have also been equally conducive to the 
establishment of trade contacts.
The economy of the Pechenegs, like that of most nomadic peoples, was not 
self-sufficient. This was not a feature typical only of steppe-people, because 
it is difficult to find a community that was able to satisfy all its needs relying 
solely on its own production, without the need to trade in goods or other means 
for supplementing its economic deficits. Nevertheless, extensive pastoralism 
made the nomadic economy particularly susceptible to crisis shocks, while 
hunting, gathering and primitive agriculture could not sufficiently compensate 
for its weaknesses to protect the steppe peoples from hunger, which, despite 
their indiscriminate diet, often plagued them.226 Threatened by a lack of food, 
nomads, according to Giovanni da Pian del Carpine, ate ‘everything that could 
be eaten’.227 They did not refrain from eating the meat of dogs, wolves and 
foxes, the blood a mare releases when giving birth or even human lice.228 They 
were even credited with practicing cannibalism in cases of extreme hunger.229 
While the eating practices of the Pechenegs may have seemed disgusting to an 
outside observer,230 they were probably dictated by extreme necessity. They 
225 Cf. Sinor 1978, 171–182.
226 Kałużyński 1983, 71–72.
227 di Carpine, IV 7 (p. 248). ‘Cibi eorum [Mongols – A.P.] sunt omnia que mandi possunt’.
228 di Carpine, IV 7 (p. 248).
229 di Carpine, IV 7 (p. 248). ‘[…] et in necessitate carnes humanas manducant’. Similar prac-
tices are attributed to the Cumans by William of Rubruck. Rubruc, I 12 (p. 171). ‘[…] et 
quando venerunt Tartari tanta multitudo Comanorum intravit provinciam illam [i.e., the 
steppe area of Crimea – A.P.], qui omnes fugerunt usque ad ripam maris, quod comede-
bant se mutuo vivi morientes, secundum quod narravit michi quidam mercator, qui hoc 
vidit quod vivi devorabant et lacerabant dentibus carnes crudas mortuorum, sicut canes 
cadavera’.
230 Cf. remarks of Michael Attaleiates, who states that the food of the Pechenegs is simply 
repulsive. Mich.Att., 52/53.
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were also said to eat lice,231 cats232 and human meat.233 The last of these ‘items’ 
probably appeared in their menu only in the most extreme situations.234
Survival on the steppe was difficult, especially on the turn of winter and 
spring, when the provisions accumulated for the winter were exhausted, the 
animals could not be slaughtered, and their milk yields fell to a minimum. At 
that time, glazed frost was also experienced, which was extremely dangerous 
for livestock.235 However, if there were no major losses among the herds, those 
fortunate enough to survive until spring could now safely await the coming 
seasons. However, if their situation was worse, i.e., there were significant losses 
among the animals in their herds, the nomads would be threatened with fam-
ine throughout the coming year.
Faced with such a state of affairs, they were forced to look for additional 
methods of earning a livelihood. These included trade and organized plunder. 
The first practice should theoretically have limited the second, as the estab-
lishment of effective trade contacts was not conducive to a state of temporary 
or permanent armed conflict. Among some steppe peoples it seems that a spe-
cific evolution can be observed, consisting in a gradual reduction in looting 
attacks and their replacement with trade. The material gains acquired from 
plunder must have diminished over time, as it tended to either lead attacked 
communities to organize more effective defences or simply leave threatened 
areas. Looting attacks thus either no longer made sense or became a difficult 
and risky undertaking without any guarantee of success.236 Establishing trade 
contacts also had its positive sides for the settled communities neighbouring 
the nomads, because the latter, in having satisfied their needs through trade 
or forced tribute, lost one at their primary motives for organizing plundering 
expeditions.
231 LeoDiac., IX 12 (p. 157).
232 Ott.Fr., VI 10 (p. 272).
233 Ad.Brem., Schol. 17 (18), p. 80. ‘Mahari sunt populi Sclavorum, qui sunt ab oriente 
Behemorum, habentque in circuitu hinc Pomeranos et Polanos, inde Ungros et crudelis-
simam gentem Pescinagos, qui humanis carnibus vescuntur’. The consumption of corpses 
is attributed to the Pechenegs by Matthew of Edessa. Mat.Ed., 89.
234 It is worth mentioning that pointing to cannibalism has a classifying value and indicates 
the extreme wildness of the Pechenegs and their distant geographic location, at the 
ends of the world. Cannibalism was also associated with extreme cruelty. Cf. Paroń 2011, 
131–132.
235 Khazanov 1984, 73.
236 Liu Mau-Tsai 1958, I, 452–455; Sinor 1972, 174–177; Gumilev 1997, 33.
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However, the economic weakness of the nomads posed a barrier to normal-
izing contacts. In conditions of equal exchange, they had less to offer to their 
settled trade partners. The assortment of goods they had to offer was limited to 
animal products, usually in the form of livestock. Of these, the steppe-dwellers 
could easily find buyers for their horses. Their endurance and ability to obtain 
food on their own were both widely appreciated.237 The nomad’s mounts were 
also the only ones able to withstand the hardships of a journey through the 
steppe. However, these animals were practically all the nomads had to offer 
outside of surpluses of other animals from their herds. But the sale of an exces-
sive number of animals led to disturbances in the herd balance, which usually 
had dire economic consequences.238 In addition, the position of the nomads 
was weakened by the fact that they were often more interested in trade than 
their settled neighbours.239
The weakness of the nomads’ economy seems to have made them inclined 
to violence. The threat of invasion therefore did not disappear, but became a 
tool for establishing economic relations that were more advantageous for the 
steppe-dwellers. Through the skillful use of brute force, nomadic communi-
ties were able to transcend the limits of their economies by imposing forms of 
unequal trade on their neighbours, which was in fact a hidden form of tribute. 
The Pechenegs’ military superiority not only provided a means of achieving 
political domination, but also opened the way for more effective use of trade 
relations. If a particular nomadic political organism ruled over an area through 
which important trade routes ran, it could use its political dominance to orga-
nize an extensive trade network. Manufacturing weaknesses were overcome 
through tributes provided by subjugated populations. In this way, nomadic 
communities could become not only the organizers of such trade, but also 
participants in it.
The Khazars provide a concrete historical example of such behaviour. 
After a period marked by plunder and conquest, they created an empire 
sometimes referred to as the Pax Chazarica, whose economy was based on 
proceeds received from trade along the Volga route and on tribute provided 
237 Kałużyński 1983, 82. Steppe horses had been sold in China since at least the Han Dynasty 
(late 3rd century BC): Gumilev 1996, 23; 1997, 32; Di Cosmo 2002, 232 (the researcher 
emphasizes, however, that the Han started breeding their own horses very quickly); 
Jagchid, Symons 1989, 167–172.
238 Khazanov 1984, 204. The researcher cites the example of 19th-century Kazakhs, who were 
persuaded by the tsar’s administrators, supported by merchants operating on the steppe, 
to sell such a large part of their herds that they could not naturally restore their original 
numbers. As a result, the breeders were ruined.
239 Khazanov 1984, 202.
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by conquered ethne. However, this system was created and supported by the 
rational use of violence. The security of trading operations depended on curb-
ing the Khazars’ warlike neighbours, including the Pechenegs. According to 
ibn Rusta, the iša, the Khazars’ military chief, organized penal expeditions 
against them each year.240
The wealth and prosperity which, according to Muslim authors, the 
Pechenegs enjoyed in the 9th century, when their lands were in the Transvolga, 
probably originated to a large extent from plunder. This is indicated not only 
by the above-mentioned comments by ibn Rusta, but also by other Muslim 
authors. The Pechenegs were said both to attack all the neighbouring peo-
ples and be targets of aggression from them, as well. One Arab writer even 
states that all the neighbouring ethne attacked them, kidnapped them, and 
sold them.241 However, one can assume that the Pechenegs were not only vic-
tims of violence, but also provoked it and responded to it. It should also be 
assumed that the practice of kidnapping neighbours was not alien to them. 
Unfortunately, we are unable to say anything more about the involvement of 
the Pechenegs in slave trading apart from the fact that in later periods of their 
history they occasionally engaged in it.242
In the 9th century, their role in the trade was probably still quite limited. It 
is significant that according to Muslim authors, the road from the Pechenegs’ 
land to the Khazars led through ‘forest and thickets’. In addition, these authors 
unanimously emphasized the aggressive, bellicose nature of the steppe people. 
This information, we should remember, came from merchants who reached 
the Pecheneg lands in spite of these obstacles. We should therefore assume 
that these lands were far from primary trade routes, though it is not possible to 
say the Pechenegs were not at all involved in such trade.
240 Rusta: ibn Rusta, 29; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 54. Cf. also Chapter 3 of the present book.
241 Gardīzī: Martinez 1982, 151; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 164–165. Cf. Zachoder 1967, 72–74. 
In Martinez’s translation, the Pechenegs are not victims of invasions by their neighbours, 
but they encourage neighbouring peoples to attack each other and supply them with 
slaves for sale.
242 Constantine Porphyrogenitus claimed that when Magyars or the Rus’ are on a war expedi-
tion, the Pechenegs would easily invade their country and enslave their wives and chil-
dren (DAI, IV 10–13 (pp. 50–53). It is reasonable to assume that the abductees were at 
least partly sold into slavery. John Skylitzes, on the other hand, clearly states that Kegenes, 
one of the Pechenegs chiefs either murdered or sold his compatriots whom he managed 
to capture, (Io.Scyl., 459; Wortley 2010, 430). Psellos attributed the same conduct to the 
Pechenegs (Mich.Psell., VII 69 (p. 242); Sewter 1953, 242). However, it is not possible to 
determine the scale of human trafficking or the degree of involvement of the Pechenegs 
in this practice. Akades N. Kurat claimed that the Rus’ would sell slaves to the Pechenegs 
(Kurat 1937, 68). A sceptical stance on this issue: Golden 1991, 71 (n. 52).
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Their migration to the Black Sea steppe seems to have brought about sig-
nificant changes. The Pechenegs probably did not completely abandon their 
looting raids. In fact, they may initially even have intensified them, wishing to 
recoup the material losses they suffered as a result of defeats they suffered at the 
hands of the Uzes and Khazars.243 The victims of their attacks may have been 
those living in territories belonging to eastern Slavs, Magyars or Danube Bulgars, 
or the area around the Byzantine city and thema of Kherson in Crimea.244 
Constantine Porphyrogenitus also extensively described their attacks on Rus’ 
traders travelling along the route ‘from the Varangians to the Greeks’. The sec-
tion running along the Lower Dnieper was an excellent place to prepare an 
ambush due to the need to portage river cargo around the Dnieper rapids. This 
provided the Pechenegs with an opportunity for organizing attacks on the Rus’ 
traders.245 However, this case is somewhat special. It is worth remembering 
that the Rus’ had entered an area controlled by the Pechenegs, and if they did 
so armed and against the will of the steppe-dwellers, the reaction of the latter 
described by Constantine VII seems to be fully understandable.
This period of intensified aggression, which may have been motivated by 
the Pechenegs’ desire not only to compensate for previous economic losses, 
but also to define the boundaries of their new territory and sphere of influence, 
was probably followed by a period of calm in relations with their neighbours. 
Therefore, there seems to be no reason to blame the Pechenegs for causing 
the collapse of the trade route that led from Sarkel to the Lower Danube.246 
On the contrary, there is much evidence of the steppe people’s involvement 
in the trade it fostered. Although Constantine Porphyrogenitus mentions 
several times that the Pechenegs could pose a serious threat to neighbouring 
political powers, at the same time he cites interesting examples of their par-
ticipation in trade. The Rus’ are said to have purchased sheep, horned cattle 
and horses from them. According to the learned emperor, they did so because 
243 Wojciech Szymański pointed to a similar phenomenon in the case of the Avars. 
(Szymański 1979, 67–68).
244 DAI, I–V (pp. 48–53). Cf. also Chapter 6 of the present book.
245 DAI, II 18–23 (p. 50/51); IX 65–71 (p. 60/61). Cf. Paroń 2007a, 103–105.
246 Tadeusz Lewicki does so (Lewicki 1956, 34). Cf. Pletneva 1958, 189, 191–192. E. Tryjarski 
finds ambivalence in the Pechenegs. The nomads were supposed to benefit from trade, 
but allegedly they could not refrain from looting merchants (Tryjarski 1975a, 541–545). 
For a similar judgment, but in a more general form, with the reservation that the trade in 
goods in the steppe did not cease completely: Spinei 2009, 243–244. P.B. Golden recog-
nizes the occurrence of plunder and trade in the Pechenegs as two closely related forms 
of economic activity. The steppe people were supposed to plunder and then sell the booty 
(Golden 1991, 83); Noonan 1992, 320–321 (the trade on the steppe never ceased for a long 
time).
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there was a shortage of such animals in Rus’.247 Witold Hensel has ques-
tioned the accuracy of this information. He pointed out that some East Slavic 
tribes (the Dulebi) had a significant number of horses at their disposal. 
Moreover, from at least the early 12th century, these animals were quite wide-
spread in Rus’, which is proven by their wide use for cultivation on small farms. 
Hensel thus assumes that the Rus’ purchased horses in order to maintain peace-
ful relations with the steppe-dwellers. This would therefore be an example of 
unequal trade, from which the Pechenegs were the main beneficiaries.248 The 
inhabitants of the thema and city of Kherson were also involved in trade with 
them. Constantine VII writes that the Pechenegs performed services for the 
Byzantine emperor and the Khersonites. Judging by the information contained 
in the source, this could not have been purely military in nature. It was decided 
by way of agreements concluded between the parties, represented on one side 
by a single Pecheneg, and on the other by a Khersonite. The partners agreed 
on the type and amount of payment the nomads were to receive for their 
services. The means of payment consisted of purple silk robes (βλαττία), silk 
ribbons (πρανδία), pieces of silk (χαρέρια), golden brocade (σημέντα), pepper, 
scarlet or Parthian leather and other luxury goods, which steppe people partic-
ularly desired.249 The type of agreement, one between two individuals, seems 
to clearly indicate that this was not a political or military agreement, but rather 
a commercial one. The Pechenegs hired by the Khersonites may have acted as 
intermediaries, pursuing their interests in ‘Russia and Chazaria and Zichia250 
and all the parts beyond’,251 which would indicate the significant involvement 
of the nomads in the growing trade in goods in the Black Sea steppe region. 
According to information provided by Constantine VII, trade with nomads was 
very important for the Khersonites. They were said to purchase wax and animal 
skins from the Pechenegs, which they then sold in Byzantium.252 According to 
the learned emperor, if they could not find buyers for these goods in Romania, 
‘the Khersonites cannot live’.253 The Steppe-dwellers supplied goods that 
247 DAI, II 5–8 (pp. 48–51).
248 Hensel 1987, 113, 688. Cf. Noonan 1992, 308–309 (the purchase of these animals by the Rus’ 
resulted from purely economic motivations).
249 DAI, VI (p. 52/3). Identification of goods used as payment to the Pechenegs: DAI-Com., 
14–15; Litavrin, Novosel’tsev 1989, 289 (n. 5).
250 This toponym was used in European literature from the times of antiquity (Strabo XI 2.12) 
to the early 15th century. This probably refers to the area of Cherkessia, especially the part 
located on the eastern coast of the Black Sea. Göckenjan 1997, 126–127.
251 DAI, VI 4–6 (p. 52/3).
252 DAI, LIII 531–532 (p. 286/7). ‘[…] τὰ βυρσάρια καὶ κηρία, ἅπερ ἀπὸ τῶν Πατζινακιτῶν πραγ-
ματεύονται, […]’.
253 DAI, LIII 532 (p. 286/7). ‘[…] οὐ δύνανται ζῆσαι’.
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they probably could not produce themselves. Wax was a product of the forest 
economy which the Pechenegs could obtain from the Slavs254 or people of the 
Dridu culture. Animal skins, especially if there was a culling of fur animals, 
probably came from the Pechenegs’ northern neighbours. We can only guess 
how they obtained both types of goods. Perhaps, at least in part, they were pay-
ment for animals delivered by the nomads to Rus’ or tribute forced upon the 
latter under threat of invasion.
A brief mention that complements information provided by the Byzantine 
emperor in De administrando imperio can be found in the Arab historian 
al-Mas‘ūdī’s Golden Meadows, which also dates back to the mid-10th century. 
In it he claims that merchants came to the Pechenegs from ‘the country of the 
Khazar, Alans, Báb el-Awáb [Derbent] and others’.255
The information provided by both authors not only proves that the presence 
of the Pechenegs on the Black Sea steppe did not contribute to the collapse 
of local trade routes, but also seems to indicate their strong commitment to 
far-reaching trade. Their relations with the east, Khazaria, northern Caucasus 
(Derbent, Alania, Zichia), as well as with Rus’, are particularly demonstrative 
of this. The Pechenegs were most likely included in the network of trade links 
formerly created by the Khazars, then extended to connect with the route 
‘from the Varangians to the Greeks’. Within this system the Pechenegs acted 
as intermediaries, a position facilitated by their location within the steppe 
niche, surrounded by powers interested in trade. It also seems that in certain 
circumstances it was much more convenient to order the delivery of a spe-
cific product from the nomads, as the Khersonites did, than to organize a risky 
expedition on their own. As we have seen, the political body of the Pechenegs 
lacked a clearly defined centre capable of organizing safe passage for merchant 
caravans through Patzinacia, following the example of the Khazars. A mer-
chant travelling through these lands was probably exposed to threats similar 
to those experienced by Ahmad ibn Fadlan during his journey to the ruler of 
Volga-Kama Bulgars. In order to get permission to continue his journey, the 
Abbasid’s diplomat was forced to repeatedly pay ransom to various local lead-
ers of the Uzes or to ordinary petty intruders who stopped his caravan.256 The 
experience of ibn Fadlan shows that these were not insurmountable obstacles. 
He himself writes that in order to cross the lands of the Uzes, a Muslim had 
to first make friends with one of them. This friend would provide the traveller 
254 Cf. Nosek, Szromba 1961, 88; Warnke 1987, 545; Litavrin 1999, 425–426; Schreiner 2013, 214.
255 al-Mas’ūdī, Les Prairies, II, 61; Pellat 1962, 178; Sprenger 1841, 449.
256 ibn Fadlan: ibn Fadlan, 206/207, 210/211, 212/213; Zeki Validi Togan, 1939, 26, 29, 31; 
Kovalevskii 1956, 127–128, 129–130; Frye 2005, 37–38, 39–41.
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with accommodation and food, lend him horses or camels, and grant him a 
loan. The animals and money were returned on the return trip. In exchange 
for this help, the Muslim brought gifts to his friend and his wife.257 Merchants 
coming to the Pechenegs from Islamic countries probably followed the same 
advice. Ahmad ibn Fadlan’s account also shows that the journey through 
the steppe was a difficult logistical undertaking. Only nomads could provide 
proper means of transport. This circumstance additionally justified entrusting 
them with the delivery of necessary goods, as the Khersonites did.
The trade network created by the Khazars was devastated together with 
their state (in the year 965). A short time later, pressure from new Turkic ethne 
reduced the importance of trade routes running across the Black Sea steppe. 
These phenomena were also accompanied by the expansion of Rus’, a conse-
quence of which was the Pechenegs being deprived of their role as intermedi-
aries in the trade in goods. The expansion of Kiev by Vladimir the Great, thanks 
to which the city became an important trade centre, was accompanied by its 
conquest and pillaging of Kherson in 989.258 Although the Crimean city sur-
vived the Rus’ invasion, its role as an important trade centre was, at least for 
some time, severely limited.259 Rus’ also managed to expand their borders to 
the northern shores of the Black Sea. The late 10th century marks the begin-
nings of a settlement on Velikopotemkin Island at the mouth of the Dnieper 
River, which is identified with Oleshe known from Rus’ chronicles.260 The 
Rurik Dynasty also took control of Tmutarakan,261 giving them not only the 
ability to trade through the Kerch Strait, but also direct contact with the north-
ern Caucasus (mainly with Zichia-Circassia).
The Rus’, especially Vladimir, managed to destroy or take control of the 
majority of the Pechenegs’ trade contacts at the turn of the 10th and 11th cen-
turies. In addition, the latter lost their hegemony on the Black Sea steppe as 
257 ibn Fadlan: ibn Fadlan, 204–207; Zeki Validi Togan, 23; Kovalevskii, 126; Frye 2005, 35–36.
258 Andrzej Poppe assumes that this took place between April and the end of July in the year 
989, although the Rus’ arrived at Kherson no later than autumn of the year 988. Poppe 
1976, 238–239; 1978, 18.
259 The conquest of the city by Vladimir’s army resulted in the destruction of significant part 
of it and significant losses among the inhabitants. Kherson also stopped minting its own 
coins. Cf. Talis 1958, 114 (n. 54); Iakobson 1959, 65–66, 283; Poppe 1976, 239; 1978, 18; Bartoli, 
Kazanski 2002, 663. For a critical view on the link between the destruction of the city and 
Vladimir’s invasion: Romanchuk 1989, 182–188 (the cause of the damage could have been 
an earthquake).
260 Sokul’skii 1980, 71. First mentioned in chronicles in 1084 (PVL 1, col. 205).
261 This event is usually dated to be very close to or simultaneous with the conquest of 
Kherson by Vladimir. Cf. Iakobson 1964, 59–60; Gadlo 1994, 79–81 (late 986 to mid-987); 
Chkhaidze 2008, 286 (year 988).
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a result of the pressure from the Uzes, which probably further limited their 
participation in local trade. In the 11th century, especially in its second quarter, 
the Pechenegs again appear as plunderers. In the 1030s, the Byzantine Empire 
was particularly plagued by their aggression. As a result of Pecheneg attacks, 
the Empire’s military assets on the Lower Danube were almost completely 
destroyed.262 These invasions were mainly aimed at plunder, as evidenced by 
the fact that the aggressor penetrated the Byzantium Balkan provinces ever-
more deeply. After 1036 the expeditions were halted for about one decade, 
which, as Paul Stephenson has hypothesized, may indicate the involvement 
of the steppe-dwellers in the trade of goods with the Empire’s cities on the 
Danube.263 These trade ties could have been maintained or renewed after the 
Pechenegs entered the Balkans. However, this trade probably did not match 
the scale and intensity of the trade in which the Pechenegs were involved in 
the mid-10th century.
4.4 Military
The Pechenegs, like most nomads, were known for their warlike character. 
Moreover, even in comparison to other steppe peoples, historical sources 
portray the Pechenegs as an ethnos distinguished by its bravery. Al-Masʿūdī 
expressed this belief very clearly when he wrote:
The first of these nations has the name Bajna. The second is called 
Bajghird the next nation is called Bajnāk, and is the bravest of the 
four. The fourth is called Nūkardah.264
The bravery of the Pechenegs is also noted by Constantine Porphyrogenitus. 
The scholarly emperor considered these nomads to pose a permanent threat 
both to the Byzantine Empire and to other neighbouring states and ethne, i.e., 
the Magyars, Rus’, and Bulgars.265 In his account of the history of the Pechenegs 
in the mid-11th century, when they were already suffering serious defeats in 
battles with the Rus’ and the Uzes, John Skylitzes wrote:
262 Cf. Chapter 6 of the present book.
263 Stephenson 1999, 46–47, 52; 2000, 86.
264 al-Masʿūdī, Les Prairies, II, 59; Pellat 1962, 177–178; Sprenger 1841, 445 (English translation 
has been slightly modified).
265 DAI, I–V (pp. 48–52); VIII (p. 58/9).
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The Pecheneg people are Scythians pertaining to the so-called ‘Royal 
Scyths’. They are numerous and no other people of the Scythians is able 
to withstand them alone.266
Finally, thanks to Anna Komnena’s Alexiad we learn that:
War is their [i.e., the Pechenegs’ – A.P.] blood – they know how to arrange 
a phalanx.267
Military efficiency, as confirmed by these authors, became the main source of 
the political significance the Pechenegs enjoyed, especially in the 10th century. 
Let us take a closer look at their martial prowess.
As was the case with many other nomadic ethne, the social organization of 
the Pechenegs roughly mirrored that of a military organization.268 In times of 
armed conflict, every man capable of bearing arms was expected to fight, and 
in the event of a particularly serious threat, women as well.269 Individual tribes 
formed military units, called ‘arrows’ (oq). Their commanders were probably 
the tribal leaders, about whom we read in the Chapter 37 of De administrando 
imperio.270 We can also assume that the chief of the entire ethnos was elected 
from among this group. In the opinion of some researchers, the fact that 
almost the entire people was called to arms caused the armies of nomads to 
reach considerable size, which meant they were able to outnumber the enemy, 
this being one of the sources of the nomads’ military success.271 This asser-
tion is not completely misguided, though it seems that another effect, resulting 
from the fact that the social and military organization of the steppe peoples 
were synonymous with one another, was more important: namely, the remark-
able ease with which they could mobilize large numbers of fighters in a short 
period of time. The decisive factor would thus be not so much the number of 
266 Io.Scyl., 455 (v. 32–34); Wortley 2010, 426. ‘Τὸ ἔθνος τῶν Πατζινάκων Σκυθικὸν ἰπάρχον, ἀπὸ 
τῶν λεγομένων βασιλείων Σκυθῶν, μέγα τέ ἐστι καὶ πολυάνθρωπον, πρὸς ὃ οὐδὲ ἓν αὐτὸ καθ’ 
αὐτὸ Σκυθικὸν γένος ἀντιστῆναι δύναται’.
267 An.Kom., VII 3.7 (p. 211); Sewter 2009, 193. ‘[…] ἐκ φυσικῆς ἐπιστήμης πολεμεῖν εἰδότες καὶ 
κατὰ φάλαγγα ἵστασθαι […]’.
268 There is no separate native Turkic or Mongolian word for ‘soldier’. The Turkic peoples 
referred to warriors with the word er, which also means ‘man, person’. Sinor 1981, 134; 
Golden 2011a, 90–91.
269 An.Kom., VII 6.6 (pp. 219–220).Cf. Pletneva 1958, 196; Golden 2011a, 91–92.
270 DAI, XXXVII (p. 166/7).
271 Pletneva 1958, 196.
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warriors, but rather the speed with which they were assembled, a product of 
their almost constant readiness to take military action.272
The question of the Pechenegs’ potential mobilization capabilities is partic-
ularly difficult to answer. Although we have data on the number of warriors in 
their military units, these should be considered fanciful.273 Other estimates are 
more reliable if only because they are (sometimes by an order of magnitude) 
lower. It must be admitted, however, that we have no means of verifying these 
figures at our disposal, apart from the researcher’s intuition. Nevertheless, it 
seems that the information contained in The Book of Precious Gems is worth 
closer consideration, as it allows us to indirectly estimate the strength of the 
Pecheneg army. We learn here that the army units expected to go on expedi-
tions headed by the leader of the Magyars consisted of 20,000 horsemen.274 
Ibn Rusta seems to be describing the state of affairs in the latter half of the 
9th century,275 which is the period immediately preceding the Pechenegs’ inva-
sion of the Black Sea steppe. The latter assumption is of particular importance. 
If we take into consideration the fact that they defeated and drove away the 
Magyars, we can assume that they may well have had comparable forces at 
their disposal. This would mean that the size of their armies at the time of their 
arrival on the Black Sea steppe reached or slightly exceeded 20,000. An addi-
tional premise confirming the previous conclusion can be found in Chapter 8 
272 Moszyński 1996, 31. Lev Gumilev (1997, 33) notes that in the 2nd and 1st centuries BCE 
the population of the Xiongnu was about 300,000 people, while the population of the 
Chinese was almost 60 millions (sic!). In this situation, even taking into account the spec-
ificity of the internal organization of the nomads, the mobilization possibilities of the 
Han Empire were much greater. The Xiongnu, on the other hand, were able to prepare 
their forces for an effective attack much more quickly, which determined their success in 
battling this demographic colossus. Based on Martin Loewe’s estimates, Thomas Barfield 
(1992, 49) presents more favourable demographic data for the nomads. The Xiongnu 
population was estimated to be around 1 million, while the Chinese were said to number 
around 54 million.
273 According to Skylitzes, the entire Pecheneg population, which under Tyrach crossed the 
borders of the Byzantine Empire in the middle of the 11th century, was said to number 
800,000 people (ὁ Τυράχ […] μετὰ πάντων τῶν Πατζινάκων […] χιλλιον ὀκτακοσίων […]). 
Io.Scyl., 458 (v. 44–45), Wortley 2010, 429 (an unauthorized revision by a translator to 
80,000). This information was used by Omelian Pritsak (1975, 227) to estimate the size of 
the Pecheneg population; he obtained the rather fantastic number of 2.8 to 3 million peo-
ple. The nomads are said to have had an army of 400,000 warriors at their disposal. The 
figure Pritsak provides is definitely inflated. Cf. Peter B. Golden’s critical remarks (2011a, 
108–109).
274 ibn Rusta: ibn Rusta, 33, 48–49; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 68 (cf. ibid. footnote 82: some 
Hungarian researchers have assumed that the number given by ibn Rusta constitutes 1/5 
of all adult Magyars.). Zakhoder 1967, 48–49.
275 Marquart 1903, 24–26.
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of De administrando imperio. Constantine VII describes the unsuccessful dip-
lomatic mission of the cleric Gabriel who was sent to Magyars as an imperial 
emissary. His mission was to persuade them to attack the Pechenegs in order 
to seize their territory and then settle in the immediate vicinity of the empire. 
Gabriel was unable to complete the task. The Magyars were not interested 
in even considering any attempt at attacking their eastern neighbours. Most 
interesting is the reason they presented to the emperor’s envoy. They stated 
they were not able to fight the Pechenegs, because, among other reasons, ‘their 
people [were] numerous’ (λαὸς πολὺς).276 This last phrase should be under-
stood as proof of the Pechenegs’ numerical superiority; otherwise the concerns 
of the Magyars would seem inexplicable. Interesting data can also be found 
in Masʿūdī’s account of fighting at Walandar (W.l.nd.r.). The army of allied 
nomadic peoples was said to consist of 60,000 warriors. The author adds, how-
ever, that this was not the limit of their mobilization capabilities, as they were 
able to concentrate much greater forces, estimated at 100,000.277 This informa-
tion should be treated with the utmost caution. According to Marquart’s revi-
sions, the units of two, not four steppe ethne took part in the Battle of Walandar. 
This would mean that in determining their combined forces, the two numbers 
given by Masʿūdī should be distributed equally between the Pechenegs and 
the Magyars. Therefore, the mobilization capacity of each ethnos would range 
from 30,000 to 50,000 horsemen. It seems, however, that during invasions the 
maximum number of Pecheneg forces oscillated around the lower line, as 
some warriors had to remain in their homeland to guard their encampments, 
property and defenceless elements of the population.278 Taking into account 
the above premises, we can assume that the Pechenegs were able to deploy a 
20,000–30,000-man army.279 However, these findings are subject to a number 
of reservations. First, they can only be safely applied to the Pechenegs’ situa-
tion in the 10th century, when they were at the height of their political impor-
tance. Moreover, the number obtained should be regarded as an indicator of 
the demographic potential of this steppe people, which, if necessary, might 
276 DAI, VIII (p. 56/7).
277 al-Masʿūdī, Les Prairies, II, 60; Pellat 1962, 178.
278 Hansgerd Göckenjan, using the data on the Székelys community, assumes that about 1/3 
of all warriors remained in such guarding roles. Göckenjan 1972, 105.
279 This number is quite impressive, although it seems that the most powerful nomadic peo-
ples had larger forces at their disposal: the Xiongnu had 50–60,000 warriors (Gumilev 
1997, 33), European Huns, together with foreign auxiliary troops – 60,000 (Dąbrowski 
1975, 100), the Avars – 50,000 (Szymański 1979, 81), Batu Khan – 120,000 (Vernadsky 1953, 
49. The researcher stresses, however, that its core field army, which could be used during 
operations in more distant areas, consisted of just over 50,000 warriors). Cf. Golden 2011a, 
106–108.
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have been (but need not have been) realized for military purposes. Finally, an 
army of this type functioned according to the rules of an egalitarian society. 
Thanks to their ability to effect a general mobilization, they could assemble a 
major military force in a short period of time, but it could disintegrate equally 
quickly when the majority of warriors considered that the goal of the military 
action had been achieved. Engaging all or most of the ethnos for longer peri-
ods seems to have been possible only in extraordinary circumstances, in situ-
ations of extended and permanent crisis that threatened the very existence of 
the ethnos. The use of smaller units seems to be much more common, espe-
cially during foreign expeditions. Maintaining standing military contingents 
was possible and necessary once a nomadic community reached statehood.280
Apart from the ability to efficiently assemble large armies and outnumber 
weaker ethne, the tactics used by the Pechenegs were a crucial factor in their 
military successes. As in the case of most nomads, the speed and violence of 
the attack played a major role, as well as the extremely commonly used ele-
ment of surprise.281 A rapid attack and immediate retreat after accomplish-
ing the objective guaranteed that the attacked state or people would not be 
able to gather sufficient forces to pursue the aggressor and retaliate. Moreover, 
the panic caused by an unexpected attack gave a chance to safely make off 
with booty.282
Speed of movement was ensured by the use of cavalry as the only type of 
unit in the army. If necessary, in order to reach a maximum speed during a 
march, supply trains were abandoned in favour of transporting supplies on 
pack animals.283 The high level of endurance of steppe mounts gave them 
the potential to cover long distances without stops. It was enough for each 
warrior to lead a second saddled horse, so he could switch to it in order to 
let the other rest. Taking spare horses on military expeditions was a common 
practice among nomadic peoples. A Mongolian horseman went to war leading 
280 Di Cosmo 2002, 179–183.
281 In his speech in honour of Emperor Alexios Komnenos (1081–1118), Bishop Theophylact 
of Ohrid compared the attack of the Pechenegs to a lightning strike. The attack was as 
troublesome, because of the losses that resulted, as it was quick, because of the attacker’s 
sudden escape. Theoph.Achr., 221.
282 Kałużyński 1970, 9; Pletneva 1958, 198.
283 The occurrence of such a practice during the nomads’ raiding expeditions seems to have 
been confirmed by Niketas Choniates’ report on the Cuman invasion of the Balkan prov-
inces of the Byzantine Empire. ‘οἱ δὲ Σκύθαι κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῖς εἰωθότα τρόπον λείαν τὰ ἐν ποσὶ 
θέμενοι καὶ ἀναθέμενοι τοῖς ἳπποις τὰ λὰφυρα νόστου ἐμνήσατο [The Scythians, according to 
their custom, collected the available booty, loaded their horses with their spoils, and 
turned homeward]’. Nic.Chon., 93 (v. 77–79). Cf. Magoulias 1984, 54.
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from one to nine additional horses.284 According to Guillaume de Beauplan, 
each Tatar always led three mounts on a looting expedition.285 Thanks to such 
procedures, the cavalry could travel at an astonishing speed.286 During their 
journey, they made frequent but short stops – though after covering longer dis-
tances they usually rested for a few days.287 Long forced marches usually led to 
losses from attrition, meaning only a small part of the army ultimately reached 
the designated destination, so such a grueling pace was imposed very rarely.288
In order to make better use of the element of surprise, an invasion was usu-
ally carried out when the opponent’s main forces were away on a war expedi-
tion. This method was often utilized by the Pechenegs. This is how they inflicted 
a devastating defeat on the Magyars. Thanks to Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 
we know that they did the same during their invasions of the Rus’.289 The 
information provided by the scholarly emperor is confirmed by The Tale of the 
Bygone Years, which describes the Pecheneg attack of 968, undertaken while 
the main forces of the Rus’ were fighting in Bulgaria.290
Each military expedition was probably preceded by scouting, the aim of 
which was to examine the territory to be attacked and the forces of the oppo-
nent had stationed there. We know that some steppe peoples, especially the 
Mongols, mastered this aspect of the art of war.291 All sorts of information was 
collected that would allow for a determination of the level of the enemy’s mili-
tary preparedness. They also examined the political situation. The Mongols 
were able to take advantage militarily and diplomatically of the existence of 
antagonistic groups within an enemy state.292 In the case of the Pechenegs, 
preceding a military expedition with such sophisticated diplomatic manoeu-
vres seems rather unlikely due to the lack of a state apparatus capable of 
284 Göckenjan 2000, 189.
285 Beauplan, 66.
286 Kałużyński 1983, 83. Dąbrowski (1975, 109) refers to information provided by Miklos 
Jankovich (1968, 223), according to which during the invasion of Hungary in 1241, the fore-
ward guard of Batu was said to cover a distance of 480 km in three days, which would 
mean that the Mongolian formations were able to travel at a speed of up to 160 km per 
day. Information of this kind should be treated with great caution, even if it is close to the 
truth. Achieving such a pace is absolutely exceptional, even for nomads.
287 Beauplan claims that the Tatars stopped every hour for 15 minutes. Before entering the 
enemy territory, they rested for 2–3 days. Beauplan, 66.
288 Cf. Maroń 2001, 116–120. Based on modern examples, the author considers a number of 
myths concerning the mobility of nomadic armies.
289 DAI, II (pp. 48, 50), IV (pp. 50, 52).
290 PVL 1, AM 6476 (968), col. 65–67.
291 Olbricht, Pinks 1980, 185. Cf. Kałużyński 1983, 279; Göckenjan 2000, 191–193.
292 Kałużyński 1983, 274; Göckenjan 2000, 189–190.
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planning and directing such activities. However, more modest intelligence 
activities should be considered a possibility, including observation of military 
movements on the steppe and along their territory’s borders, and taking pris-
oners who could serve as sources of information or guides during an invasion. 
In this context, the results of an analysis carried out by Joseph Németh and 
Karl H. Menges of the names of the Pecheneg geneai recorded in De admin-
istrando imperio seems very useful here. One of them, which according to 
Constantine Porphyrogenitus was part of the left wing, was called Talmat (full 
version of the ethnonym: Borotalmat).293 According to a reconstruction car-
ried out by these researchers, the ethnonym in its original version was tolmač/
talmač, which means ‘translator, dragoman’. The word allegedly comes from 
the Turkic til, which has the double meaning of ‘language, speech’ and ‘spy’.294 
These findings lead to the thesis that the Talmat-Tolmač tribe could carry out 
intelligence activities during the Pechenegs’ military expeditions. They prob-
ably also acted as the forward guard during a march. Information obtained 
through scouting was of key importance for the success of both military cam-
paigns and simple looting raids. It also often determined whether a planned 
military undertaking would be successful.
It is generally believed that the season when nomads usually took offensive 
action was early autumn. This was supposedly determined by the condition of 
the combat mounts, which by that time had regained their full strength after 
a very harsh winter thanks to the abundance of spring and summer feed.295 
The time of year also guaranteed easy access to feed for horses. It cannot be 
ruled out that the purpose of the attack also played a role. If the goal was to 
obtain supplies, such as agricultural goods the nomads often lacked, then 
seizing it became possible only after the harvest, i.e., in early autumn. In the 
case of the Pechenegs, the direction and moment of an attack was probably 
also determined by the proximity and availability of the enemy’s territory. 
Svetlana A. Pletneva claims that their invasions on the Rus’ usually took place in 
the summer, when they were camping near the borders of the Kievan state.296 
However, military expeditions were also organized in winter. Two factors seem 
to have been decisive in initiating them. First, the winter cold made it easier 
for nomadic forces to enter areas that were not accessible at other times of the 
293 DAI, XXXVII (pp. 166, 168).
294 Németh 1921–1925, 223; 1930, 30, 33; 1932, 50; Marquart 1929, 84–85; Menges 1944–45, 261–
263. For a sceptical position: Vörös 2002, 624.
295 Olbricht, Pinks 1980, 53–54. Cf. Kałużyński 1983, 82.
296 Pletneva 1958, 200.
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year.297 Second, shortages of provisions, which were more pronounced during 
the winter months, likewise forced them to undertake looting expeditions. In 
Skylitzes’ chronicle we find two mentions concerning winter invasions by the 
Pechenegs of the Balkan provinces of Byzantium. In both cases, there existed 
a rather special circumstance, namely the freezing of the Danube in its lower 
course. As a result, the nomads had easy access to areas on the other side of 
the river.298 A similar expedition in early autumn required a difficult cross-
ing, the inconvenience of which became particularly acute during the retreat, 
when the nomads were burdened with the booty they had seized.299
The element of surprise, which gave the Pechenegs a tactical advantage over 
the enemy, was often achieved thanks to their use of ambushes. Their attacks 
on Rus’ travellers making their way to Constantinople along the route ‘from the 
Varangians to the Greeks’ have already been mentioned. The final section of 
the route, due to the rapids on the Dnieper River, created excellent conditions 
to ambush the enemy. As we learn from Constantine Porphyrogenitus’ account, 
the dugout canoes (called ‘monoxylas’) used to carry cargo on the river had to 
be ported in the area of the rapids. The Rus’ would pull them ashore and carry 
them along with their cargo around the rapids and then continue their journey 
by water. It was at this moment when the Pechenegs would make a surprise 
attack.300 Prince Sviatoslav lost his life in such an attack while returning to Rus’ 
in 972 after an unsuccessful expedition to the Balkans.301
Apart from offensive tactics, which assumed the Pechenegs taking the ini-
tiative, they were also often forced to adopt a defensive approach. A num-
ber of campaigns undertaken against them by the Byzantine Empire in the 
latter half of the 11th century provide evidence that, when forced to defend 
themselves, they were also able to demonstrate significant military skills. 
The steppe-dwellers avoided open battles when the enemy had a tactical 
advantage. In times of danger, they were able to disperse quickly, making it 
difficult to combat them effectively. Delaying a decisive confrontation, they 
used hit-and-run tactics, defeating weaker enemy units that strayed from the 
main forces. Examples of such behaviour can be found in Anna Komnena’s 
Alexiad. During the 1087 campaign, Alexios Komnenos crossed the Balkans 
and reached the area of the Dristra fortress, having travelled dangerously far 
297 Cf. a report by Guillaume Beauplan on Tatar invasions in winter, the organization and 
course of which differ from those in summer. Beauplan, 65.
298 Io.Scyl., 399 (v. 3–5), 458 (v. 39–46); Wortley 2010, 376, 429; Io.Maur., 144–145.
299 This does not mean, of course, that steppe people were unable to cross a major river. Cf. 
Sinor 1961, 156–179; Golden 2011a, 113.
300 DAI, II (p. 50/1), IX (pp. 60–63).
301 PVL 1, AM 6480 (972), col. 74. Cf. chapter 5 of the present book.
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from his supply base in Thrace. The Pechenegs managed several times to inter-
cept the Byzantine units sent to bring horse feed. The course of events that 
followed showed that once the nomads had achieved a tactical advantage over 
the enemy, they initiated combat. The battle took place near Dristra, and by 
the time it had ended, the Byzantines had suffered a crushing defeat, which 
Alexios Komnenos was fortunate to survive.302 This battle was significant not 
only as a proof of the Pechenegs’ ability to achieve and make use of tactical 
superiority, but also as an example of the combat methods they used in open 
battle. This is what we read in Book VII of the Alexiad:
The Scythians also prepared for the battle […]. So, after placing ambushes, 
binding together their ranks in close formation, making a sort of rampart 
from their covered wagons, they advanced en masse against the emperor 
and began skirmishing from the distance.303
The quote above quite unambiguously confirms that the Pechenegs used 
wagon forts during the battle. The effectiveness of these kinds of tactics is 
best evidenced by the outcome of the aforementioned battle. More informa-
tion about the tactics used by the Pechenegs in open battles can be found in 
al-Mas‘ūdī’s account of a clash at the Greek stronghold Walandar. The Muslim 
writer does not mention the use of wagon forts by the allied forces; instead 
he points to the dominant role of the cavalry. It was said to be organized into 
squadrons of 1,000 horsemen each.304 The battle began with an attack by the 
Pechenegs’ light cavalry, which, without engaging in close combat, approached 
the enemy’s line and carried out an archery attack.305 This strike was carried 
out with the use of a small part of the nomadic force. The attack of the cavalry 
caused some confusion among the Greeks, who ultimately decided to engage 
the enemy. Light cavalry squadrons fired with their bows on the Byzantines as 
they attacked the main body of the nomad forces, which was not yet engaged 
in the fighting. These forces responded to the Byzantine army’s attack first by 
302 An.Kom., VII 2–3 (pp. 204–214); Sewter 2009, 187–196.
303 An.Kom., VII 3.7 (pp. 211–212); Sewter 2009, 193. ‘Αλλὰ καὶ οἱ Σκύθαι σχῆμα πολέμου διατυ-
πώσαντες […] καὶ λόχους καθίσαντες καὶ τὰς τάξεις τοῖς τακτικοῖς δεσμήσαντες σφίγμασι καὶ 
καταπυργώσαντες οἱονεὶ ταῖς ἁρμαμάξαις τὸ στράτευμα ἰλαδὸν κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος ᾔεσαν 
καὶ ἠκροβολίζοντο πόρρωθεν’.
304 This would probably be the only example of a Pecheneg application of the decimal sys-
tem in their army’s organization, a system that was widespread among the Altaic peoples 
and beyond. Cf. Göckenjan 1980, 51–86.
305 We are most likely looking here at ‘caracole tactics’, commonly known on the steppe. Cf. 
May 2007, 72–74.
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shooting arrows, and then engaging in a direct confrontation, which halted the 
enemy’s attack and routed their forces. The nomad warriors began a pursuit, 
during which the Greeks suffered considerable losses.306
The combat methods used by the Pechenegs in both battles were simi-
lar to those commonly utilized by other Turkic peoples. Teresa Nagrodzka- 
Majchrzyk states that in battle the Khazars also used light carriages tied 
together with ropes.307 Attacking the enemy with just a part of one’s forces, 
and thus the use of a tactical reserve, has been confirmed for both the Avars 
and the Mongols.308 The nomads were also familiar with grouping cavalry into 
units thousands strong, and the existence of two types of cavalry, i.e., light and 
heavy.309 Finally, their military tradition also included arranging armies into a 
two-wing formation.310
Both examples presented above do not confirm that the Pechenegs used a 
‘feigned escape’ manoeuvre, a very popular tactical trick among steppe peo-
ples, the aim of which was to lure the enemy into an ambush and attack with 
one’s main forces after the enemy had loosened their formations during the 
course of pursuit.311 This does not mean, of course, that the Pechenegs did not 
know about this kind of tactical manoeuvre. Paradoxically, however, the oppo-
site situation was documented, when their forces were lured into a trap and 
annihilated by the Byzantines, who in the initial phase of the battle feigned 
their retreat. This happened during the Battle of Arcadiopolis (970), during 
Sviatoslav Igorevich’s Balkan campaign.312 Concluding our reflections on the 
tactics used by the Pechenegs in open battles, it should be noted that in the 
event of failure in their attacks, in order to avoid complete defeat, they usually 
opted for an immediate retreat.313
The only type of troops used in the Pecheneg army was that of cavalry. 
This by no means indicates that nomads never fought on foot. It is known 
that Avar horsemen would assume an infantry mode whenever they wanted 
to storm Byzantine fortresses.314 Anna Komnena writes that Emperor Alexios 
was attacked by ‘three Scythian infantrymen’ during the battle of Dristra.315 
306 al-Mas’ūdī, Les Prairies, 62–63; Pellat 1962, 178–179. Cf. also Marquart 1903, 65.
307 Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 1975, 440.
308 Szymański 1979, 88; Pohl 1988, 172.
309 Tryjarski 1975a, 557; Gumilev 1993, 67–68.
310 Tryjarski 1975a, 557; Marquart 1903, 65.
311 Kałużyński 1983, 273; Pohl 1988, 172; Maroń 2001, 54–56, 72; Golden 2011a, 95–96.
312 Io.Scyl., 289–290; Wortley 2010, 277.
313 See especially: Mich.Psell., VII 68 (p. 241); Sewter 1953, 242.
314 Szymański 1979, 88; Pohl 1988, 172 (The Avars did not like fighting this way). Cf. Sinor 1972, 
172–173; Golden 2011a, 96.
315 An.Kom., VII 3.9 (p. 212); Sewter 2009, 194: ‘πεζοὶ Σκύθαι τρεῖς’.
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Nevertheless, these examples indicate that the transformation of cavalry into 
infantry was only temporary and forced by circumstances. Some researchers 
consider the existence of two types of cavalry to have been common among 
nomadic ethne.316 This view can only be supported if we assume that dif-
ferences in social and economic status were reflected in the quality of one’s 
weapons. The type of equipment used by a horseman would be not so much 
a consequence of military regulations, but rather of the natural processes of 
social stratification. According to experts on the subject, there was less a dis-
tinction in terms of equipment between heavy and light cavalry, as there was 
between the weaponry owned by the aristocracy and common members of 
the ethnos.317
Is an analogous division found among the Pechenegs? One can get such an 
impression based on al-Mas‘ūdī’s account of the Battle of Walandar, as well as 
from reports in Arab sources on the ostensible wealth of the Pechenegs, which 
was said to manifest itself also in the possession of a significant number of 
weapons.318 Data from archaeological sources, however, suggests we exercise 
considerable caution here. No blatant manifestation of social position com-
parable to phenomena observed in the Cumans has been found among the 
Pechenegs. Neither the size of graves nor the abundance and richness of their 
inventory can be compared to the mounds of the Cuman khans. Contrary to 
the assertions of Pletneva,319 it should be assumed that the Pechenegs were 
most likely a more egalitarian community. This of course does not exclude the 
existence of wealth and social differences among the Pechenegs. These were 
probably also reflected in differences in military equipment. However, their 
scale, especially in comparison with other steppe ethne, seems to have been 
visibly smaller.
Little is known about the way military formations were commanded during 
warfare. In order to ensure that the operation proceeded smoothly, the func-
tions of chief commander were most likely entrusted to one of the tribal chiefs. 
Apart from the head of command, there was probably a group of minor chiefs 
who acted as commanders. We learn about their existence from the accounts 
of both Anna Komnena and John Skylitzes.320 We do not know what kinds of 
authority the head of command possessed. Could he impose the death penalty 
316 Gumilev 1993, 67–68.
317 Świętosławski 2006, 103–104.
318 Gardīzī: Martinez 1982, 152; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 165. Bakrī: Кunik, Rozen 1878, 59; 
Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 222. Marvazī: Minorsky 1942, 33; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 250. 
Zakhoder 1967, 74.
319 Pletneva 1958, 197.
320 Io.Scyl., 459 (v. 64–66); Wortley 2010, 429–430. An.Kom., VII 4.4 (p. 216); Sewter 2009, 197.
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for failure to engage in combat, insubordination or desertion? In the Mongol 
army, where the principle of absolute obedience to the orders of the com-
mander applied,321 the chief commander of the Danube Bulgars also enjoyed 
a very broad range of powers.322 However, clear differences between the two 
ethne mentioned above and the Pechenegs, especially in terms of their socio-
political organization, prevent us from drawing a simple conclusion by means 
of analogy. On the contrary, much seems to indicate that the chief commander 
was not fully independent and had to take into account the opinions of minor 
chiefs in the decision-making process. What is more, even when command-
ing corps he could not afford to completely disregard the will of rank-and-file 
warriors. The incident recorded by Anna Komnena, mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, provides clear testimony to this fact. In that dispute over the fate of 
captives, the harsh pragmatism of the chiefs was justified. The prisoners-of-
war offered a recruiting reserve that Alexios Komnenos could use to quickly 
rebuild his defeated army, which would give him an advantage in his fight with 
the Pechenegs.323 This example cannot be treated as a demonstration of a gen-
eral rule. In particular, it should not lead us to the conclusion that the function 
of chief commander was of little importance and was not associated with any 
real power. The prestige of this position was of great significance. If the head of 
command proved his military talents, he could gain a reputation that, despite 
the limitations on his powers, would provide him with significant authority to 
enforce his decisions.324
From information provided by Muslim writers, we learn that the Pechenegs 
used banners or pennants which they attached to their spears and would raise 
during battle.325 Various iconographic sources also confirm the use of such 
combat signs by other steppe-dwellers. There is a representation of a horse-
man holding a spear with a piece of cloth attached to it on one of the vessels 
321 di Carpine, IV 2 (p. 245), VI 2–3 (pp. 275–276). Cf. Kałużyński 1983, 262–263; Maroń 
2001, 13.
322 Tryjarski 1975, 315. Cf. Sinor 1981, 135–137; Golden 2011a, 93–94 (both scholars cite many 
examples concerning other peoples of Inner Asia which managed to develop political 
organisms of the imperial type).
323 An.Komn., VII 4.4; 6.1 (pp. 216, 218); Sewter 2009, 197, 198–9.
324 It is significant that Kegenes owed his political significance to military successes in clashes 
with the Uzes. He must have enjoyed considerable influence, since Tyrach, the leader 
of the entire Pecheneg people, saw him as a threat to his power. Io.Scyl., 455; Wortley 
2010, 427.
325 Gardizī: Martinez 1982, 152; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 165. Bakrī: Кunik, Rozen 1878, 59; 
Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 222. Marvazī: Minorsky 1942, 33; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 250. 
Cf. Zakhoder 1967, 74.
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from the famous Treasure of Nagyszentmiklósz.326 A large pennant (banner?) 
can also be seen on a rock face in Pliska. A piece of fabric is attached to the 
upper part of the shaft held by a warrior.327 On one of the stone statues (baby) 
attributed to the Cumans, we find an engraving of a mounted warrior with 
a large pennant.328 Finally, illustrations in the Radziwiłł Manuscript329 show 
armed groups of nomads, probably Cumans, headed by a standard bearer 
holding a pennant. These banners probably served as field signs, indicating the 
commander’s location during battle. Pletneva posits that when the Cumans 
had fully readied themselves to fight, they would raise their pennants.330 It 
cannot be ruled out that the Pechenegs did the same. According to al-Gardizī, 
during battle they would also blow buffalo horns.331 These sounds were prob-
ably used, like banners and pennants, to send signals.
The combat methods characteristic of steppe peoples were related to their 
weapons, the most common element of which was the bow. It is hard to imag-
ine any nomadic military formation without this weapon, and its use by the 
Pechenegs is reported in both narrative accounts and archaeological finds. 
Suffice it to point again to the information we have on the battles at Walandar 
and on the Dristra, where the role of the bow as an offensive weapon was con-
firmed. Bone overlays found in grave inventories332 allow us to assume that the 
Pechenegs used a form of composite bow. This bow was usually made of sev-
eral types of materials,333 and when it was in a resting position, its limbs were 
bent away from the direction in which one pulled the string. This allowed more 
potential energy to be accumulated, thanks to which a much longer range 
was achieved than with longbows, which were more common in Europe.334 
Archaeological findings indicate that Pecheneg arrowheads were mostly flat 
326 Gyula 1974, fig. 147; Świętosławski 1996, 61.
327 Tryjarski 1975, 313 (fig. 10).
328 Świętosławski 1996, tab. IV, fig. 2.
329 Pletneva 1958, 198–199 (fig. 20–22), 202–203 (fig. 25, 27).
330 Pletneva 1958, 197.
331 Gardizī: Martinez 1982, 152; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 165. Al-Bakrī notes that the 
Pechenegs used trumpets instead of drums: Кunik, Rozen 1878, 59; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 
2001, 222. Cf. Zakhoder 1967, 74.
332 Pletneva 1958, 156, 159; 1990, 46–48; Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 18; Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 
87; Bisembaev 2003, 84. More generally: Sinor 1981, 139–140; Świętosławski 1996, 39–44; 
Loades 2016.
333 The precise species of materials varied according to region but all composite bows con-
sisted of wood, horn, sinew and glue with either a bark or leather casing. Cf. Świętosławski 
1996, 40; Loades 2016, 22–23.
334 The average range of the composite bow was about 350 meters. Świętosławski 1996, 41.
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and had a rhomboid shape.335 Hungarian sources provide evidence of the use 
of poison arrows by these steppe-dwellers.336
The Pechenegs used many other weapons as well. Michael Psellos gives us a 
most intriguing piece of information:
The only weapon they carry in their hands is the spear, their sole defen-
sive armour.337
Apart from historical accounts, the fact that the Pechenegs used spears is 
also confirmed by archaeological sources. However, this type of weapon was 
not as widespread as one might think based on Psellos’ account. Spearheads 
with a narrow, often polished leave and a massive bush have been found in 
Pecheneg graves.338 Findings of this kind are, however, quite rare, which allows 
us to assume that only well-armed steppe warriors were equipped with pole 
weapons.339
When it comes to bladed weapons, the use of sabres is well documented.340 
Archaeological research tells us that these sabres were massive and quite wide 
and had slightly curved blades. They were no more than one metre in length. 
The handles were wooden, while the cross-guard was wooden or iron and 
335 Pletneva 1981, 215; 1990, 44; Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 16 (fig. 5), 18; Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 
87 (the most detailed information), 149 (fig. 20, the most common type fig. 11, 20, 22, 29, 
33, 34); Bisembaev 2003, 83, 117 (fig. 15, 10); Świętosławski 2006, 89–93.
336 Chr.Hung., 348–349; Joh.Thur., I, 91.
337 Mich.Psell., VII 68 (p. 241); Sewter 1953, 242. ‘[…] δόρατα δὲ μόνον ἐναγκαλιζόμενοι, τοῦτο 
δὴ μόνον τὸ ὅπλον πρόβλημα ἔχουσιν’. An.Komn. VII 3.12 (p. 214); Sewter 2009, 196. The 
learned empress recalls her father being wounded by a spear wielded by a ‘Scythian’ (ie. 
Pecheneg). Muslim authors also talk about the spear as a weapon, though not the only 
one, of the Pechenegs. Gardizī: Martinez 1982, 152; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 165. Marvazī: 
Minorsky 1942, 33; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 250.
338 Pletneva 1958, 158 (fig. 4); 1981, 215; 1990, 44; Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 88, 150 (fig. 21, il. 
3–5); Bisembaev 2003, 85, 107 (fig. 5.4); 112 (fig. 10). The latter did not find any artefacts in 
the area of western Kazakhstan which could be considered typical spearheads. Only two 
iron cones were discovered, which could have been the lower ends of spears. For more 
in general about pole weapons among the nomads of the Great Steppe: Sinor 1981, 141; 
Świętosławski 1996, 35–37.
339 Pletneva 1958, 197; 1990, 83.
340 PVL 1, AM 6476 (968), col. 67. A Russian source describes the ceremony for establishing 
friendship between the Kiev governor Pretich and some unknown Pecheneg prince. The 
ceremony was accompanied by an exchange of gifts, during which the nomad presented 
a sabre, a horse and arrows to Pretich, while he received chainmail armour, a shield and 
a sword. This story shows that in the late 11th century (the time when the oldest Russian 
chronicles were written) the sabre was perceived as a typical element of a steppe warrior’s 
equipment.
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elliptical in shape. This type of weapons is found relatively rarely in grave inven-
tories. It was therefore a valuable and scarce item, and possibly, as in the case 
of spears, a weapon primarily of the elites.341 In St. Bruno of Querfurt’s Letter to 
King Henry II we also find a reference to swords, which were supposedly part of 
the Pechenegs’ combat equipment.342 This type of weapon was indeed known 
to the steppe people. In his encyclopaedia, the 11th-century writer Maḥmūd 
Kāšgarī often refers to the sword (qilič); judging from the frequent use of this 
word in that work, it must have been one of the most common melee weapons 
used by the Turks in that period.343 However, for the period in question (10th–
11th century) the occurrence of the sword is poorly attested archaeologically 
in the western part of the Great Steppe. And yet nomadic formations were 
armed with swords in antiquity and in the early Middle Ages, and it was still 
the standard weapon of the European Huns and Avars.344 Nonetheless, swords 
dating back to a period later than the 7th century have been discovered in the 
European part of the Great Steppe very rarely. How can Bruno of Querfurt’s 
account be explained? Witold Świętosławski rightly notes that the inhabit-
ants of Europe, who came into contact with nomads from Asia, were rarely 
acquainted with the terms for their weapons.345 Therefore, when describing 
them, they used terms typical of their own cultural milieu, noting only certain 
differences in the ones used by the steppe-dwellers. A good example of this is 
the characteristics of the sabres described by Giovanni da Pian del Carpine:
As for the wealthy, they [Mongols – A.P.] have swords pointed at the end 
but sharp only on one side and somewhat curved […].346
341 Pletneva 1958, 159, 197; 1981, 215; 1990, 43; Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 87–88; Bisembaev 
2003, 84–85.
342 Bruno, 100. ‘[…] mille securibus, mille gladiis super nostram cervicem euaginatis, in frus-
tra nos concidere minantur’.
343 Tryjarski 1993, 239–240; Coman 1998, 579, 598 (Coman provides just one meaning for 
the Cuman word qylyč, qlyč, namely ‘a sword’); Ching-lung Chen 1984, 31 (also assumes 
that the word keilin’ci in Chinese sources refers to a sword, although the description 
seems to indicate that it may have been a sabre). It must be admitted, however, that in 
Turkic (at least in modern Turkish) this word can also mean a sabre or a backsword. See 
Antonowicz-Bauer, Dubiński 1983, 142, 344, 372, 420. We are therefore faced with the ques-
tion to what extent the lexis of a particular Turkic language represented apparent techni-
cal differences between different types of bladed weapons.
344 Szymański 1979, 84; Dąbrowski 1975, 110; Świętosławski 1996, 35.
345 Świętosławski 1996, 32.
346 di Carpine, VI 4 (p. 276); Dawson 1955, 33. ‘Divites autem habent gladios acutos in fine, ex 
una parte tantum incidentes, et aliquantulum curvos […]’. A very similar description of a 
sabre can be found in Chinese diplomatic reports devoted to the 13th-century Mongols. 
According to one of these, the steppe-dwellers used ‘swords’ that were light, narrow and 
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These remarks are similar to those of Bruno of Querfurt’s. It is worth noting 
that the situation in which he came into contact with nomadic weapons was 
not conducive to insightful observation. Therefore, what were placed at the 
necks of Bruno and his companions must have been sabres and backswords. 
The latter are not as well attested in archaeological evidence, but, due to their 
straight blade they bear a closer resemblance to swords.347
The Pechenegs were also familiar with blunt weapons. St. Bruno of 
Querfurt’s Letter to King Henry II contains information on axes,348 which in 
this case is attested in archaeological records.349 The steppe people in question 
used simple battle axes, though only occasionally. Among rank-and-file war-
riors, both the wand (bulava) and club (buzdygan) were common weapons.350 
Other weapons with which warriors were likely to be commonly equipped 
included combat knives,351 as well as lassos, which were used for securing cap-
tives during battle.
An interesting, though somewhat unclear account of the use of another 
type of weapon is provided by Anna Komnena:
It was his [Migidenos’ – A.P.] son who in the war which broke out later 
charged fiercely against the Pechenegs […]. As he swept past, he was 
dragged by an iron grapple inside the circle of wagons by a Scythian 
woman […].352
The original name of the device in question is ἡ σιδηρᾶ ἅρπη. The translation 
by E.R.A. Sewter quoted above is acceptable, but it should be noted that the 
curved. Olbricht, Pinks 1980, 72. In a second report we read that they used, like the Uygurs, 
curved sabres, which were light, nimble and very sharp. Their handles were small and nar-
row, so that they could be easily use for fencing. Olbricht, Pinks 1980, 174. Thomas of Split 
also mentions the curved swords (falcati enses) of the Mongols. Tho.Arch., 282.
347 Świętosławski 1996, 30–35.
348 Bruno, 100.
349 Pletneva 1958, 157 (fig. 3, 10); Bálint 1989, 73; Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 21 (fig. 12); Garustovich, 
Ivanov 2001, 88. For more in general on the subject of the blunt weapons used by the 
steppe peoples: Świętosławski 1996, 37–39.
350 Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 17 (fig. 6), 34 (fig. 19), 35.
351 Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 1985, 109; Bisembaev 2003, 85 (he records three long knives, one of 
which was as long as 18 cm. Their blades had a convex profile. The lack of a hilt-guard led 
the researcher to classify them as khanjalis)
352 An.Komn., VII 6.6 (pp. 219–220); Sewter 2009, 200. ‘[…] οὗ ὁ υἱὸς εἰς τὸν γεγονότα πόλεμον 
ὕστερον κατὰ τὸν … τόπον ὀξέ ως κατὰ τῶν Πατζινάκων ὁρμήσας καὶ παρασυρεὶς παρὰ γυναικὸς 
Σκυθίδος ἑάλω διὰ σιδηρᾶς ἅρπης εἴσω τῶν ἁμαξῶν ἑλκυσθείς’.
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word ἡ ἅρπη can also mean ‘sickle’353 or simply ‘hook’.354 Regardless of which 
of the proposed translations we consider more appropriate, it is quite difficult 
to explain what kind of weapon Anna Komnena is referring to here. Tryjarski 
assumes that the above-mentioned Migidenos’ son could have been caught up 
in a lasso with an iron sickle at the end.355 However, his later fate seems to indi-
cate that this ‘innovation’ was not meant so much for capturing the enemy, as 
for inflicting death.356 It also cannot be ruled out that the above account docu-
mented the use of some kind of improvized pole weapon, topped with a sickle 
or a hook. Giovanni da Pian del Carpine recalls that some heads of Mongolian 
spears were equipped with hooks that were used to pull the opponent off his 
horse.357 However, such a weapon is poorly attested archaeologically. In addi-
tion, it has thus far been discovered only on the eastern stretches of the Great 
Steppe.358 Therefore, the use of this kind of spear by a female ‘Scythian’ warrior 
seems unlikely.
Accounts on the use of armour are definitely the scarcest. On the basis of a 
passage from the chronicle of Michael Psellos, one could even conclude that 
the Pechenegs did not wear any armour at all:
They wear no breastplates, put on no greaves, and no helmets protect 
their heads. They carry no shields of any kind whatsoever, neither the 
long sort like those traditionally borne by Argives, nor the round shield, 
nor do they gird on swords.359
This statement, however, comes from an author who despite his broad edu-
cation was not an expert in the art of war. His account can therefore not be 
regarded as a conclusive basis for determining whether the Pechenegs wore 
armour. Rather, the most probably wore leather armour and gambesons, which 
have not survived to our times due to the low durability of the material from 
353 Cf. Polish and Russian translation of the Alexiad: Liubarskii 1965, 216; Jurewicz 1972, 18.
354 This meaning is assumed by Dieter Reinsch. Reinsch 1996, 251.
355 Tryjarski 1975a, 564.
356 Migidenos’ son was beheaded, and his head was later bought from the Pechenegs by 
Emperor Alexios Komnenos. An.Komn., VII 6.6 (p. 220); Sewter 2009, 200.
357 di Carpine, VI 9 (p. 278). ‘Aliqui eorum lanceas habent, et in colo ferri lancee habent unum 
uncum, cum quo detrahunt hominem de sella si possunt.’
358 Świętosławski 1996, 36–37, tab. XIII (fig. 5–7, p. 95).
359 Mich.Psell., VII 68 (pp. 240–41); Sewter 1953, 242. ‘[…] ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ θώρακας ἀμφιέ ννυνται, οὐδὲ 
κνημῖδας περίκεινται, οὐδ᾽ εὐλόφοις τισὶ τὰς κεφαλὰς κατασφαλίζονται, ἀσπὶς δὲ αὐτοῖς οὐδ᾽ 
ἡτισοῦν ἐν χερσὶν, οὔτ’ ἐπιμήκης ὁποί ας δή φασι τὰς ἀργολικὰς, οὔτε περιφερὴς, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ξίφη 
περιζώννυνται, […]’.
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which they were made.360 Archaeological research confirms that the nomads 
of Black Sea steppe used mail.361 Items of this kind are mostly dated to the 12th 
century and later. Therefore, they could have been used by those Pechenegs 
who became part of the Cherni Klobuci tribal union. The origin of mail is not 
nomadic. Its invention is attributed today to the Celts.362 In the Middle Ages, 
it was commonly used in Rus’ and from there, probably found its way to the 
Black Sea steppe. It cannot be ruled out that the Pechenegs may have worn other 
types of protective garments that were more sophisticated than leather armour. 
At two burial sites in western Kazakhstan (at Bek-Bike and the Shalkar III 
cemetery), dated roughly to between the 8th and the 11th centuries, elements 
of lamellar armour were discovered, while another burial site (Karas I) con-
tained the remains of chain mail.363 The graves at those sites were definitely 
the resting places of members of the highest social strata.364 Unfortunately, it 
is impossible to define their ethnic identity precisely. In the case of the earlier 
dating (8th century), it may have been the Pechenegs, though in the case of the 
later time period (10th–11th century) it was most likely the Uzes.365 The elite 
nature of armour was the cause of its scarcity in the 10th and 11th centuries, 
which in turn resulted in their rarely being attested in archaeological data.366
Elements of the horse tack and riding equipment, however, are very com-
monly found in burial inventories. The most frequently discovered items 
include girth buckles, bits and stirrups.367 The Pechenegs, like most nomads, 
probably used tall saddles with pommels and stirrups on flaps. The latter made 
it easier to get on the horse and made it possible to ride the horse over long 
distances. Moreover, with properly shaped pommels such a saddle allowed a 
horseman to shoot his bow to the rear and to strike his enemies with his sabre. 
Pecheneg stirrups had a characteristic round shape, looped stirrup leather, 
360 Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 18.
361 Dąbrowska 1965, 140–141; Pletneva 1973, 95; Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 1985, 111; Świętosławski 
2006, 114–116. For more in general on the armour used by nomads: Świętosławski 1996, 
16–29; Tryjarski 1984, 173–184.
362 Świętosławski 1996, 21.
363 Bisembaev 2003, 85–86.
364 In addition to plate armour, sabres were also found on both sites; in the burial sites at the 
Shalkar III cemetery, a silver mask was also discovered. Bisembaev 2003, 86.
365 Much like findings from the north-western Black Sea steppe. Dobroliubskii 1986, 50. The 
researcher mentions the presence of the remains of chainmail in nomadic burial sites 
dating back to late-9th to late-11th centuries. However, such a wide range of dates makes 
it difficult to determine the ethnic origin of the find. They could equally well be attributed 
to the Pechenegs, the Uzes or the Cumans.
366 The problem of armour was similar in the Cherni Klobuci: Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 1985, 111.
367 Pletneva 1958, 156; 1981, 214–215.
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and a semicircular footrest. Artefacts of this kind are present on the Black 
Sea steppe in the 10th century, while in the following century they practically 
cease to be found, which seems to indicate their close connection with the 
Pechenegs.368 Equally typical of these nomads was their supposed use of a 
snaffle bit with rigid mouth pieces.369 Girth buckles took a variety of shapes. 
The Pechenegs usually used oval ones slightly curved along the longer side.370 
Rarer finds include saddle decorations and strap separators. One burial inven-
tory discovered in Crimea attributed to the Pechenegs contained strap divid-
ers and fittings, clasps and appliqué work. All of these items were gold-plated 
and decorated.371 The steppe people did not tend to use spurs. To direct their 
horses, they used leather whips, the handles of which are found in nomadic 
graves. These were usually made of bone, bronze, and iron. The Pechenegs’ 
whips are known to have had cylindrical or ovate hilts that were made of bone 
and had a curved ending.372
The above description of the Pecheneg warriors’ equipment seems to 
indicate that, despite some deficiencies, it was quite versatile. A well-armed 
Pecheneg warrior could effectively inflict losses on enemy forces both at a 
distance and in melee. Of course, the manner in which soldiers were armed 
varied greatly. Well-equipped horsemen were probably a minority, recruited 
from among the tribal elites. Judging from Arab sources, the Pechenegs could 
not complain about a lack of military equipment. Although this written infor-
mation concerned the 9th century, there is nothing to indicate that this state 
of affairs changed after the Pechenegs moved onto the Black Sea steppe. The 
wide range of weapons in the steppe-dwellers’ arsenal, as described by Muslim 
authors, stood out in comparison with those of neighbouring nomadic peo-
ples; however, the weaponry of the heavily armed Byzantine horsemen was 
most likely superior in quality to that of a mounted steppe-dweller. A Pecheneg 
warrior’s light, leather armour simply did not provide adequate protection in 
368 Pletneva 1958, 156; 1981, 214; 1990, 50–51; Bálint 1989, 72; Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 21 (fig. 11); 
Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 83–84; Bisembaev 2003, 81–82.
369 Pletneva 1958, 156; 1981, 215; 1990, 48–49; Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 85–86; Bisembaev 
2003, 82. For a critical stance: Spinei 2009, 294–295.
370 Pletneva 1981, 214–215; 1990, 51–52.
371 Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 22, 23 (fig. 13, 14); Chardaev 1991, 257, 338 (tab. 190). The Crimean 
archaeological site (Saraili-Kiyat) shows analogies with the findings from the Lower 
Dnieper (Kamenka, Kotovka, Staro-Shvedskoie, Gorozheno), and from the village of 
Gaievka. This last statement, based on coins featuring Constantine VIII (1025–1028), 
should be dated to the second quarter of the 11th century, which, given its location 
(Voronezh area, over the middle Don) means they should be assigned to the Uzes.
372 Pletneva 1981, 214–215.
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close combat, and for this reason above all they could not effectively fight a 
heavily armoured Byzantine soldier. It must be noted, however, considering 
the course of events at Walandar, that the outcome of such a confrontation 
was not always a foregone conclusion. Thanks to its lighter armour, the nomad 
army possessed a degree of mobility that was superior to that of either the 
Byzantine or Rus’ cavalry. The high value of certain elements of the Pechenegs’ 
military equipment is evidenced by the fact that it was gradually appropriated 
by the armies of neighbouring countries, mainly Kievan Rus’. The items which 
most eagerly adopted and widely disseminated were the nomads’ bows and 
sabres. The latter became a permanently fixture in the Rus’ armoury in the 12th 
century. Later, as an element of the process of adapting to the steppe peoples’ 
military methods, these items began to be produced locally.373 Some elements 
of the nomads’ horse tack, especially their stirrups, which were important for 
proper use of a sabre, also enjoyed wide popularity.374
In order to fully appreciate the merits of the Pechenegs’ military expertise 
and performance, we need to examine those aspects that go beyond the cat-
egories of tactics, weaponry, and organizational military structure, and thus 
those features that stemmed from their specific temperament and way of life. 
Michael Psellos addressed these issues quite eloquently:
In one mass, close-packed and pell-mell, fortified by sheer desperation, 
they emit loud war-cries, and so fall upon their adversaries. If they suc-
ceed in pushing them back, they dash against them in solid blocks, like 
towers, pursuing and slaying without mercy.375
He continues:
When they are thirsty, if they find water, either from spring or in the 
streams, they at once throw themselves down into it and gulp it up; if 
there is no water, each man dismounts from his horse, opens its veins 
with a knife, and drinks the blood. So they quench their thirst by sub-
stituting blood for water. After that they cut up the fattest of the horses, 
set fire to whatever wood they find ready to hand, and having slightly 
373 Szymański 1973, 126–127.
374 Szymański 1973, 128.
375 Mich.Psell., VII 68 (p. 241); Sewter 1953, 242. ‘[…] ἀλλ’ ὁμοῦ φύρδην συμπλακέντες ἀλλήλοις 
καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀπογνώσει ῥωσθέντες, μέγα τε ὀλολύζουσι καὶ οὕτω τοῖς ἀντιτεταγμένοις 
ἐμπίπτουσι κἂν μὲν ἀπώσωσιν, οἷα πύργοι ἐπιρραγέντες αὐτοὺς ἀφειδῶς ἑπόμενοι κατασφάτ-
τουσιν, […]’.
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warmed the chopped limbs of the horse there on the spot, they gorge 
themselves on the meat, blood and all. The refreshment over, they hurry 
back to their primitive huts and lurk, like snakes in the deep gullies and 
precipitous cliffs which serve as their walls.376
Psellos’ account is characterized by a clear tendency to exaggerate. The author 
sees cruelty, ferocity, primitivism, and a disregard for life as the sole source of 
the Pechenegs’ military successes.377 He does not refer to other aspects of their 
military; in fact, he appears to suggest that their military has no tactics or orga-
nizational structure, and that the only weapons it uses are spears. However, 
despite its biased nature, his account confirms that as steppe dwellers, the 
Pechenegs possessed a number of qualities that, together with their approach 
to the art of war, gave them an advantage in a confrontation with an opponent. 
Their courage, endurance and ruthlessness were products of the harsh living 
conditions on the steppe. The loss of herds, pastures or access to sources of 
water was tantamount to depriving them of the right to exist, so a potential 
rival interested in seizing these assets from them was considered be a mortal 
enemy that had to be destroyed at all costs. A similar state of affairs led to the 
creation of a rather specific ‘nomadic’ means of fighting, the strategic goal of 
which was the ruthless elimination of the enemy. Demonstrating benevolence 
after a victory was considered a dangerous move because it could have led to a 
revival of the enemy’s military power and thus to a renewed threat.378
All of the factors described above made the Pechenegs a dangerous oppo-
nent, but their military was not without its flaws, revealed when the Pechenegs 
tried to conquer a well-fortified area. From The Tale of the Bygone Years we 
learn about a number of attempts to occupy Kiev and other fortified Rus’ cities. 
However, all of them, from the first, dated 968, to the last, which took place in 
1036, were unsuccessful.379 An exception in this string of disasters was provided 
by al-Masʿūdī, who described the taking of the Byzantine fortress Walandar. 
It is also known that the invasions of the Pechenegs in the 1030s led to the 
376 Mich.Psell., VII 68 (s. 241); Sewter 1953, 242–43. ‘Δεῆσαν δὲ αὐτοῖς πιεῖν, εἰ μὲν ἐντύχοιεν 
ὕδασιν ἢ πηγαίοις ἢ ποταμίοις, λάπτουσιν αὐτίκα ἐπεισπεσόντες, εἰ δ’ οὖν, τοῦ ἵππου ἕκαστος 
ἀποβὰς ἐξαιματοῦσι τούτους, σιδήρῳ τὰς φλέβας ἀναστομώσαντες, καὶ τὴν δίψαν οὕτως ἰῶνται, 
ὡς ὕδατι τῷ αἵματι χρώμενοι · εἶτα δὴ καὶ τὸν πιότατον τῶν ἵππων ἀνατεμόντες, καὶ τὴν εὑρη-
μένην ἀνακαύσαντες ὕλην, αὐτοῦ που τὰ ἐντετμημένα τοῦ ἵππου μέλη βραχύ τι διαθερμάναντες 
μετὰ τοῦ λύθρου λαφύσσουσι, καὶ οὕτως ἑαυτοὺς ἀναλαβόντες ἐπὶ τὰς πρώτας ἴενται καλιάς · καὶ 
ἐμφωλεύουσιν ὥσπερ ὄφεις φάραγξι βαθείαις καὶ κρημνοῖς ἀποτόμοις, ὁποῖα τείχεσι χρώμενοι’.
377 Cf. footnote 5.
378 For a most striking example of such reasoning: Io.Scyl., 459; Wortley 2010, 430.
379 PVL 1, AM 6476 (968), col. 65–67; AM 6505 (997), col. 127–129; AM 6544 (1036), col. 150–151; 
Thietmar, VIII 32 (p. 530).
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destruction of the system of defences on the Danube border of Byzantium. 
A number of forts guarding this frontier were almost completely destroyed 
during this period. Anna Komnena writes that during the war of 1087–1091, 
the Pechenegs managed to take fortified Byzantine cities several times (e.g. 
Philippopolis).380 We do not know what led to the successes of these assaults. 
Neither the Alexiad nor Meadows of Gold provides any information of value 
for determining how these strongholds were taken. Masʿūdī only states that 
the allied nomadic forces used the bodies of those who had fallen in previous 
fighting to scale the walls of Walandar.381 This rather macabre information, 
however, is not deserving of consideration. It is possible that this success was 
achieved through the help of ethnically foreign experts in the art of siege.382 
We also cannot reject the possibility that these strongholds were taken by 
siege, but with the help of some ploy. According to an account dated 997 in 
The Russian Primary Chronicle, when faced with strong resistance by defend-
ers, the Pechenegs were able to engage in advanced tactics. During their siege 
of Belgorod Kievski, they did not allow the inhabitants to leave the town, hop-
ing that a lack of supplies would force them to surrender. However, this time, 
too, they were unsuccessful.383 It should be stated that in general, large, well-
stocked fortresses were rarely taken by the Pechenegs.
The weaknesses described above were exploited by their opponents, in par-
ticular the Kievan Rus’. We know that in the late 980s, when tensions between 
these two neighbours had reached their peak, Vladimir the Great began con-
struction of a complex system of fortifications to protect the eastern and 
southern borders of his country from invasions by Pechenegs. According to 
information contained in The Primary Russian Chronicle, such strongholds 
were built on the Desna, Oster, Trubezh, Sula, and Stugna.384 It is also possible 
that during the same period a significant part of the fortifications that came to 
be called the ‘Serpent’s Wall’ were constructed or strengthened. They ran along 
380 An.Komn., VII 6.4 (p. 219); Sewter 2009, 200.
381 An equally macabre, but much more reliable example can be found in Roger of Torre 
Maggiore’s Carmen miserabile. The monk describes the conquest of the fortified village of 
Pereg, located between the cities of Arad and Csánad, during the Mongolian invasion in 
1241. During the siege, first Hungarian prisoners-of-war, then Rus’ and ‘Ishmaelites’ (pos-
sibly Muslims from Volga Bulgaria, Alania, Khwārazm and the Black Sea-Caspian steppe) 
stormed the village as human shields, followed by the Cumans, who were forced to fight 
alongside the Mongols. According to the Italian monk, the corpses of the dead were used 
to fill the moat surrounding Pereg. It is possible that an analogous method of siege war-
fare was used by the Pechenegs and the Magyars who supported them at Walandar.
382 Cf. Świętosławski 1996, 45–47.
383 PVL 1, AM 6505 (997), col. 127–129.
384 PVL 1, AM 6496 (988), col. 121.
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rivers (Stugna, Irpin’, Teterev, Dnieper, Sula), which provided a kind of natu-
ral moat for them. The embankments were not particularly high (estimates 
range from 3.5–4 to 6–8 metres), but they were often preceded by a 12-metre-
wide trench. There may have been a palisade along the top of the fortifications. 
Combined with a series of fortified settlements, they formed a rather strong 
defensive barrier against attacks by the Pechenegs, hindering access to Kiev’s 
foreground and making it practically impossible to carry out a sudden attack 
on the capital city.385
Rus’ chronicles and the majority of scholars assume that these fortifica-
tions were built in response to aggression by the Pechenegs. It is difficult to 
question such an interpretation, but it is worth remembering that the steppe 
people’s raids recorded in chronicles, which clearly intensified in the late 980s, 
could have been a response to the incremental southward expansion of Rus’ 
that began under the reign of Sviatoslav and then resumed under Vladimir. 
This clearly harmed the interests of the Pechenegs, disrupting their trade 
relations.386 It is also worth noting that the construction of the Serpent’s Wall 
and the accompanying fortified settlements resulted in a clear shift in the bor-
der of the Rus’ state to the south, in some places by more than 100 km, i.e., 
deep into the area of the forest steppe, which was most likely considered by 
the Pechenegs to be their natural domain. Given this situation, their desire 
to reclaim these lost territories seems understandable. The Pechenegs, were 
unable to do so, but despite this fact, at the turn of the 10th and 11th centu-
ries they managed to threaten Kiev several times. Like most steppe peoples, 
they were able to carry out violent attacks designed to evoke terror. This 
ability made them highly dangerous and difficult to control, but apart from the 
385 Bruno, 99. Cf. Kowalczyk 1969, 141–181; Kuchera 1987, [Rev. Kowalczyk 1989, 180–187: the 
researcher questions a number of Kuchera’s findings, including the chronology of the 
construction of many fortifications, usually dated by the Ukrainian archaeologist to 
the reigns of Vladimir or Yaroslav the Wise]; Hensel 1987, 500–501; Szymanski 1973, 
130–131; Franklin, Shepard 1996, 170–172; Morgunov 2010, 64–65. In the light of the above 
observations, Hansgerd Göckenjan proposed a hypothesis, which involves the existence 
of a system of fortifications on the border between Patzinacia and the Danube Bulgarian 
State, seems quite surprising. The basis for his interpretation is the information contained 
in Chapter 37 of De administrando imperio on six abandoned fortresses (ἐρημόκαστρα) 
located at fords on the Dniester River. The etymological analysis of the forts’ names car-
ried out by Josef Németh is supposed to provide additional justification for this hypoth-
esis. Németh’s findings however have been challenged. Moreover, it is difficult to explain 
why the nomads would have created a system of fortifications along the border with 
Bulgaria. DAI, XXXVII 58–66 (p. 168/9). Marquart 1903, 196; Németh 1930, 33–34; Menges 
1944–45, 271–273; Göckenjan 1972, 92–93.
386 Cf. second part of this chapter.
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destruction and havoc they caused, these attacks did not generally result in 
further-reaching consequences. This was due to the Pechenegs’ specific politi-
cal structure, which allowed them to act jointly against external threats, but 
prevented effective external expansion. Deprived of a clear political centre, 
the Pechenegs were not only incapable of conquering neighbouring territo-
ries, but also of effectively defending their own, as the example of their con-
frontation with Rus’ clearly shows. The efficient fortification and colonization 
of Kiev’s foreground by the Rurikids resulted, as noted earlier, in the nomads 
being deprived of a large portion of their lands, which they were ultimately 
unable to regain.
Owing to their military capabilities, the Pechenegs were able, as depicted 
by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, to threaten neighbouring states and ethne, 
which especially in the mid-10th century, was the source of their political sig-
nificance. However, their military actions were usually instinctive, dictated 
by the need to defend their territory against aggression by other steppe ethne 
(e.g., the Uzes) or the desire for retaliation or the acquisition of wealth. In the 
early 11th century, the Pechenegs began to lose their military advantage. Once 
Byzantine and Rus’ commanders developed an understanding of the merits of 
the steppe people’s tactics, they began to adopt them themselves.387 The role 
of an intermediary in this transfer of knowledge could have been played by 
auxiliary units comprised of nomads who had taken up service under the Rus’ 
prince or the Byzantine basileus.388 In order to adapt to fighting against the 
Pechenegs, cavalry units and some typical elements of the nomads’ military 
equipment become commonplace among the Rus’ forces in the last decades 
of the 10th century.389 Thanks to these borrowings and the construction of 
fortifications, the rulers of Rus’ managed initially to even the odds in battles 
with their troublesome neighbours, and with time, to take the initiative, which 
resulted in their final victory over the Pechenegs in 1036.390
4.5 The Pechenegs’ Ethnic Identity and Value System
Ethnicity is a subjective and situational phenomenon. It involves the choice 
of identity, often made in conditions of a specific experience of contact with 
‘the other’. The creation of ethnic identity consists both in accepting values 
387 Pletneva 1958, 198.
388 Cf. chapters 6 and 7 of the present book.
389 Szymański 1973, 130.
390 PVL 1, AM 6544 (1036), col. 150–151.
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considered by a particular community to be constitutive of it, and in rejecting 
values held by strangers as irrelevant or even threatening. We are therefore 
dealing with a process which determines the existence of a particular com-
munity. Identity is created and reconstructed in each new generation, which 
experts call ‘ethnic practice’.391 The transfer of identity from generation to gen-
eration results in the emergence of a tradition whose components can include 
customs, legal norms, religious beliefs, language, lifestyle, and elements of 
clothing and appearance.392 The choice and meaning of these elements in 
the process of creating the identity of a given ethnos is highly subjective and 
depends on the specific historical situation and needs of the community in 
question. Certain elements of tradition can seem to lose their meaning in one 
generation, only to be revived in the next. Researchers of nomadic peoples talk 
about layers of tradition which ‘remain in reserve’, i.e., elements seemingly for-
gotten or excluded from everyday social practice, but which can suddenly be 
revived and once again become a basis of identity.393
While ethnicity is a subjective phenomenon and one based on individual 
and collective choices, it is not an arbitrary creation. It is founded on a set 
of cultural models and values which have been adopted or created by a par-
ticular community over the course of its history.394 It is, of course, a truism 
to say that not all members of a particular ethnos identify with it to the same 
degree. In fact, quite often – especially when we obtain information from a 
description provided by an outside observer – we find certain collective traits 
being assigned to a given ethnic organism. Herodotus considered all those 
who remained under the authority of the Royal Scythians to be Scythians.395 
Sima Qian used a similar criterion in his characterization of the Xiongnu.396 
However, the example of European historian is much more significant, 
because he did so being aware of the radical cultural differences between vari-
ous Scythian groups. Since the publication of Reinhard Wenskus’ fundamental 
study Stammesbildung und Verfassung, it has been understood that the con-
cept of a uniform origin of all the individual members of a given community 
391 Geary 2012, 32; Pohl 2008, 276–277; 2008a, 19–20.
392 Zientara 1985, 30–32; Geary 2012, 22–25; 2012a, 50.
393 The concept of ideology ‘in reserve’ was introduced by Philip Carl Salzman, who applies 
it to situations where an ideology outwardly accepted and professed by a particular com-
munity is not observed in everyday practice. According to him, this can be explained by 
the desire to maintain a cultural alternative that may be needed when the external condi-
tions of the life of the community change. Salzman 1978, 618–637; 1980, 1–19.
394 Geary 2012, 31
395 Paroń 2007, 55–57.
396 Paroń 2012, 94.
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is entirely fictional, since in the course of history its composition has been 
complemented by ethnically and anthropologically diverse collectivities.397 
Given this situation, it is natural for degrees of identification to differ within 
groups. Most researchers emphasize the importance of an ethnic core, which 
is primarily responsible for storing and promoting the traditions that integrate 
the entire ethnos.398 Alongside this elite group, there is always a majority who 
experience a more instinctive and situational sense of ethnicity. One must also 
assume the presence of peripheral groups, whose relations with a particular 
ethnos were based solely on violence, and who are therefore willing, if circum-
stances are favourable, to break away from the community. At its core are elites 
who express aristocratic tendencies towards the rest of the ethnos.399 Similar 
phenomena are also visible in nomadic communities. An example of this 
is the division into ‘white bone’ and ‘black bone’, the latter applying to con-
quered tribes.400
In the centralized model described above, the formation of an ethnos is 
perceived as the incorporation of particular groups into a strong centre, repre-
sented by a charismatic leader or clan, who in order to justify their domination, 
create and nurture an orthodox version of the ethnic tradition. Ethnogenesis, 
however, can take a more complicated route, making it more difficult to 
describe and understand. An example of this is the origins of the Slavs, which 
usually lack a clear centre of integration. The creation of community traditions 
in this case was a dispersed process, difficult for one group to monopolize.401
It seems that in the case of the Pecheneg, the latter model provides a 
more accurate picture. The presence of three tribes called ‘Kangar’ (Κάγγαρ) 
with a segmented political structure was confirmed in De administrando 
imperio. Those who enjoyed the aforementioned designation were considered 
to be braver (ἀνδρειότεροι) and higher born (εὐγενέστεροι) than other Pecheneg 
tribes.402 Elsewhere Constantine VII adds that in the earlier period of their 
397 Wenskus 1961.
398 Geary 2012, 27; Wolfram 1990, 111–112; 1993, 27–39.
399 F.G. Schultheiss identified and defined two types of distinctiveness experienced by indi-
vidual nations: national sentiment (Nationalgefühl), more common, but primary and 
instinctive, and national consciousness (Nationalbewusstsein), strongly developed, and 
based on a conscious understanding of what distinguishes a given (my) nation from 
others and of the source of this distinctiveness. This applies to only a small group and 
involves treating the factors determining its separateness as a common good. A very simi-
lar model, based on Stanisław Ossowski’s sociology, is presented by Aleksander Gieysztor. 
(1972, 20–21). Cf. Geary 2012a, 46–47; Pohl 2008a, 19.
400 Moszyński 1996, 29.
401 Geary 2012a, 47–48.
402 DAI, XXXVII 68–71 (p. 170/1).
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history all Pechenegs were called ‘Kangar’.403 This group should therefore be 
seen as the core of the ethnos, which were integrated around the ‘Braver’.404 
It is noteworthy, however, that John Skylitzes does not know anything about 
them in the mid-11th century. He traces the origins of the Pechenegs back to 
the Royal Scythians, thus replacing the steppe-dwellers’ native genealogy with 
a Byzantine ‘systematics’ of barbaric ethne, based on the traditions of ancient 
Greek ethnography.405 The tradition of which the ‘Kangar’ tribes were holding 
at that time may have either lost its importance or been significantly modified 
with the changes which affected the political organization of the Pechenegs 
during the century between the mid-10th and mid-11th centuries.406 Skylitzes 
notes, however, that each of the 13 Pechenegs geneai had its own name, inher-
ited from its ancestor and proto-parent.407 This information clearly indicates 
that individual tribes nurtured their own genealogy, although it is difficult 
to say whether this was legendary in nature. Constantine Porphyrogenitus 
knows the names of the heads of eight Pechenegs tribes who were in charge of 
them at the time when the whole ethnos was expelled from its former home-
land east of the Volga.408 This event had taken place 55 years before the rel-
evant chapters of De administrando imperio were written. This information 
had to come from the steppe people themselves, more specifically, from their 
elites, for whom a knowledge of these ancestors provided legitimacy for their 
social position.
Traditions concerning origins were thus cultivated within individual tribes. 
We do not know anything about an analogous phenomenon that would have 
concerned the whole ethnos. Meanwhile, legends about the common origin 
of a given people, including their genealogy or the genealogy of the family 
ruling over them, are common among steppe societies. From Herodotus we 
have several versions of the Scythian origines.409 The Blue Turks (Tūjué) were 
said to have originated from the Ashina clan, which was said to be part of the 
Xiongnu people. The Ashina are said to have descended from a 10-year-old, 
mutilated prince (his feet were cut off), who was the sole survivor of a bloody 
raid that wiped out his village. He was rescued by a she-wolf, who fed the boy 
with meat, and when he grew up, had carnal relations with him. Their progeny 
403 DAI, XXXVIII 20, 25 (p. 170/1).
404 Cf. Chapter 3 of the present book.
405 Io.Scyl., 455 (v. 32–34); Wortley 2010, 426.
406 Cf. the first part of this chapter.
407 Io.Scyl., 455 (v. 34–37); Wortley 2010, 426.
408 DAI, XXXVII 19–24 (p. 166/7).
409 Hdt., IV 5–16 (pp. 202–217).
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gave rise to the Turks.410 One of the rulers of the Wusen, a people conquered 
by the Xiongnu, owed his salvation to a raven and a wolf, because these ani-
mals fed him as a child when he was hiding in the desert from his enemies.411 
According to The Secret History of the Mongols, the progenitors of the Temujin 
family were quua maral (fallow doe) and börte činō (blue-grey wolf).412 The 
Turkmens believe that their common ancestor was Oghuz Khan. In a series of 
legends describing his achievements, there are also stories about the progeni-
tors of other Turkic ethne, including the Uyghurs, Kipchaks, and Karluks.413
This type of tradition most likely also existed among the Pechenegs, 
although due to a lack of data we do not know the details of its content. It 
was most likely cultivated mainly by individual tribes. Due to the necessity of 
frequent migration, a knowledge of the genealogy of one’s ancestors and their 
achievements became one of the basic factors that made it possible to create 
and preserve one’s identity. True or fictitious stories about the achievements of 
prominent ancestors also regulated the behaviour of contemporaries, consti-
tuting a kind of supplement to the common law.414
The memory of ancestors was also strengthened by certain aspects of reli-
gious beliefs, especially the cult of ancestors, which is a common phenomenon 
among nomads. According to ethnologists of religion, apart from the cults of 
Heaven, Earth, and various spirits of the steppe, it is one of the basic elements 
of the nomadic religious system.415 Some Turkic ethne worshiped their ances-
tors as heroes, and thus as persons of merit to the entire community.416 It is 
also known that in Inner Asia there was a custom of erecting stone statues in 
honour of outstanding leaders. This custom was carried over to the Black Sea 
steppe, where they are known as stone ‘babas’.417 These statues date back to the 
mid-11th century at the earliest, for which reason they are usually attributed 
410 Liu Mau-Tsai 1958, 5–6. Cf. Sinor 1982, 223–237; Tryjarski 1995, 60–63.
411 Watson 1961, 271–272. Cf. Sinor 1982, 237–240; Tryjarski 1995, 65–66.
412 Rachewiltz 2004, I, 1. Cf. Sinor 1982, 240–246.
413 Rašid ad-Din, I 2, 76–91; Abu-l-Gazi, 40–43.
414 Moszyński 1996, 27; Tryjarski 1993, 215, 226.
415 Szyjewski 2001, 426.
416 Gumilev 1993, 82.
417 The purpose of these stone statues is not entirely clear. Some researchers assume that 
they are not representations of prominent deceased persons, but of the enemies they 
killed. The latter function was supposed to dominate in the eastern part of the Great 
Steppe. Sometimes, however, these ‘stone babas’ are distinguished from stone balbals. 
The latter are supposed to represent enemies who were killed by the deceased, while the 
former are statues of prominent persons. Cf. Tryjarski 1991, 294–305.
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to the Cumans. Stone statues may have also been made by earlier nomadic 
peoples, including the Pechenegs.418
A spectacular manifestation of this people’s distinctiveness was noted by 
Constantine Porphyrogenitus. The emperor described the behaviour of a group 
of Pechenegs, which at the end of the 9th century separated from its ethnos:
At the time when the Pechenegs were expelled from their country, some 
of them of their own will and personal decision stayed behind there and 
united with the so-called Uzes, and even to this day they live among them, 
and wear such distinguishing marks as separate them off and betray their 
origin and how it came about that they were split off from their own folk: 
for their tunics are short, reaching to the knee, and their sleeves are cut 
off at the shoulder, whereby, you see, they indicate that they have been 
cut off from their own folk and those of their race.419
This story, which probably came from the Pechenegs themselves, sounds rather 
anecdotal, but there is no reason to question its credibility. The manifestation 
of ethnic identity through elements of clothing is a widely confirmed phenom-
enon in the Eurasian steppe. Clothing was a form of everyday ‘ethnic practice’ 
because it allowed people to clearly differentiate themselves from their sur-
roundings, and, as some apparel scholars claim, it may have served as a kind 
of identity card.420 The presence of some sort of Pecheneg grouping within 
the Uze community, or rather on its periphery, is confirmed by a passage from 
Ahmad ibn Fadlan’s Risala.421 The manifestation of distinctiveness described 
by Constantine Porphyrogenitus is also a proof of a strong ethnic bond among 
the Pechenegs. Nomads who were detached from their native ethnos must 
have taken pride in their origins, since they decided to build their identity on 
418 Pletneva 1974; 1990a, 100; Daszkiewicz, Tryjarski 1982, 195–196; Tryjarski 1991, 300; 
Waklinow 1984, 158 (the author attributes to the Pechenegs two stone figures depicting 
a woman and a man, discovered in Bulgaria, near the village of Endzhe, near Shumen); 
Fiedler 2013, 253–260.
419 DAI, XXXVII 50–57 (p. 168). ‘[…] κατὰ τὸν καιρόν, ὅν οἱ Πατζινακῖται ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας χώρας ἐξεδι-
ώχθησαν, θελήσει τινς ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ οἰκείᾳ γνώμῃ ἐναπέμειναν ἐκεῖσε, καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις Οὔζοις 
συνῴκησαν, καὶ μέχρι τοῦ νῦν εἰσιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἔχοντες τοιαῦτα γνωρίσματα, ὣστε διαχωρίζεσθαι 
αὐτοὺς καὶ νοεῖσθαι, τίνες τε ἦσαν, καὶ πῶς αὐτοὺς ἀποσπασθῆναι τῶν ἰδίων συνέβη· τὰ γὰρ 
ἱμάτια αὐτῶν εἰσιν κόντουρα μέχρι γονάτων καὶ τὰ μανίκια ἀπὸ τῶν βραχιόνων ἀποκεκομμένα, 
ὡς δῆθεν ἐκ τούτου δεικνύντες, ὅτι ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων καὶ ὁμοφύλων ἀπεκόπησαν’.
420 Szymański 1979, 95; Iatsenko 2012, 111–112.
421 ibn Fadlan: ibn Fadlan, 212–215; Zeki Validi Togan 1939, 33; Kovalevskii 1956, 130; Frye 
2005, 42.
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it in their new living situation and demonstrate the fact they were separated 
from their native community.
The above-mentioned fragment of De administrando imperio also points 
to the circumstances in which one’s sense of ethnic identity manifests itself: 
contact with outsiders. In such a situation, elements of one’s native culture – 
lifestyle, common law, beliefs, and language – which in everyday conditions 
might go unnoticed, suddenly become the centre of a community’s iden-
tity. The relations between nomads and agricultural communities, it can be 
assumed, created the necessary conditions for the occurrence of a radical 
experience of otherness, which was probably accompanied by an intensive 
re-evaluation of one’s own identity.
Differences in lifestyles were certainly the first to be noticed. A nomadic life-
style was, from the perspective of settled communities, the main feature that 
distinguished and defined the world of steppe people; for the latter it was the 
main facet of their identity and a guarantee of independence. A nomadic or 
semi-nomadic way of life, which involved travelling across vast spaces, allowed 
a nomad to experience unrestricted freedom. The type of economy that was 
the main source of income for the steppe people did not require much physi-
cal effort and was not very absorbing. According to some researchers, such a 
state of affairs could have been the cause of the ‘laziness’ often observed by 
outsiders in nomads.422 What is certain, however, is that this way of life, as a 
source of true freedom, filled them with pride. Compared to this existence, the 
life of a farmer bound to the land, and forced to perform unchanging and dif-
ficult labour, not only did not appeal to nomads, but even filled them with con-
tempt, as an existence worthy only of a slave. Those who cultivated the land 
had to break their backs and struggle with everyday hardships which, in con-
trast to the sweet idleness of nomads, seemed to embody the agrarian struggle 
for survival. The steppe dwellers also considered their way of life to be fully 
in harmony with nature, as they did not alter the space in which they lived. 
The Mongols used to say that their land had skin (körösü), as opposed to the 
ploughed, or even ‘skinned’ land of farmers (körösü-ugei).423 Agrarian societies 
seemed to have the exact opposite view, according to which only by cultivating 
the land was a special bond formed between it and people.424 The natural state 
desired by steppe people implied that the land belonged to nobody because 
nobody worked on it. This sometimes led agricultural communities to 
occupy pastures, abandoned for some time by nomads, which in turn led to 
422 Moszyński 1996, 26–27; Tryjarski 1975a, 528.
423 Jagchid, Hayer 1979, 310; Jagchid, Symons 1989, 175–176.
424 Nowicka 2001, 327; Modzelewski 2004, 259–263.
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conflicts.425 A nomadic way of life was also perceived as a combination of a 
state of temporary idleness, or outright laziness, with a state of military activ-
ity. The latter was supposedly impossible for hard-working farmers, which 
made them practically defenceless.
The set of beliefs outlined above must have given birth to aristocratic ten-
dencies among the nomads. They believed that settled communities, deprived 
of freedom and unable to defend it, were by nature predestined to recognize 
the power of the nomads and satisfy their needs.426 This way of thinking is 
observed e.g., in the Royal Scythians427 and the Avars.428 It seems, however, 
that the stereotype of the farmer-slave may have existed in a more or less 
developed form in the mentality of most nomadic ethne, among which the 
Pechenegs would have been no exception. We can recall the account by John 
Skylitzes describing the efforts of Constantine IX Monomachos to ensure that 
the members of the Pechenegs’ ethnos who settled in the thema of Bulgaria 
would engage in agricultural activity. However, at the first opportunity that 
arose, they organized a rebellion and abandoned the farming they had been 
forced to perform.429 The Byzantine ruler did not realize that from the per-
spective of a nomadic society, the abandonment of the old way of life and liv-
ing off the land was understood as a type of degradation, a transition from 
being a free man to a state of slavery. As a consequence, it had to lead to a loss 
of identity.
The nomadic way of life was important for yet another reason, one that was 
realized by more perceptive leaders of the steppe people and by keener out-
side observers. Nomadism was a guarantee of the independence of nomadic 
political organisms, especially when they entered into relations with powerful 
agricultural states. Only as mobile riders could they stand up to much richer 
and more numerous settlements. Herodotus understood this fact,430 and so 
did his Chinese counterpart Sima Qian. The latter recognized the Chinese ren-
egade Zhonghang Yue as the one who discovered the importance of nomadism 
and a culture based on it as a guarantee of the Xiongnu’s independence from 
China.431 The Turkic statesman Tonyukuk, an advisor to Bilge Khan (716–734), 
425 Noonan 1992, 303.
426 Moszyński 1996, 30, 32; Kałużyński 1970, 9.
427 Herodotus states that the Royal Scythians considered the rest of the Scythians to be their 
slaves, including the Scythian-tillers and Scythian-farmers. Hdt., IV 20 (p. 220).
428 Szymański 1979, 42; Pohl 1988, 112–117.
429 Io.Scyl., 459 (v. 79–83), 461 (v. 27–42); Wortley 2010, 430, 431.
430 Hdt., IV 46 (p. 246), 120–144 (pp. 320–344).
431 Watson 1961, 170–175. Cf. Paroń 2012, 89–93.
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was aware of this fact as well.432 Genghis Khan himself was said to claim that 
the Mongols would be lost if they started living in clay houses.433 These exam-
ples seem to explain the stubbornness with which the Pechenegs tried to pre-
serve their former way of life after they entered the Balkans.
Nomads, including the Pechenegs, strongly emphasized their independence 
when interacting with other peoples. Constantine Porphyrogenitus confirms 
that when Pechenegs performed services for the emperor or the inhabit-
ants of Kherson, they always demanded payment for the completed task as 
free people.434 Similarly, an emperor’s envoy sent to them on a mission had 
to pay remuneration for their help by offering gifts to the Pechenegs’ repre-
sentatives and their families.435 On such occasions, the Pechenegs were said 
to demand such rare luxury items that Constantine was prompted to associ-
ate them with unrestrained greed. This tendency, though often described in 
a caricatured manner, seems to indicate the rather ambivalent attitude of the 
steppe-dwellers towards settled peoples. Yet, while they despised their way of 
life and occupations, nomads often desired or were simply forced to obtain the 
goods produced by farmers. External symbols of wealth, luxury, and comfort 
that were abundant in highly developed civilizations, fascinated the steppe-
dwellers. This admiration unleashed a desire to acquire these riches, ones 
extremely scarce in the harsh conditions of steppe life, by any means available. 
This desire is reflected in written sources providing the earliest historically 
documented contacts between settled communities and nomads.
Chinese chronicles speak of the great thirst for wealth found in the Xiongnu, 
as well as among the Blue Turks, who were equally dangerous to the Middle 
Kingdom. We learn from these sources that both ethne particularly valued 
silk.436 In characterizing the European Huns, Ammianus Marcellinus claimed 
that ‘they burn with an infinite thirst for gold.’437 The history of the Eastern 
Roman Empire’s relations with Attila’s empire confirms this account. Under 
the peace agreement of 447, the court in Constantinople had to pledge to pay 
432 Liu Mau-Tsai 1958, 172–173.
433 Jagchid, Hayer 1979, 19–20.
434 DAI, VI (p. 52/3).
435 DAI, VII 8–17 (p. 54/5). Cf. Paroń 2007a, 107–108.
436 At their peak, the Han people sent the Xiongnu nearly 95,000 metres of silk a year; in 
553–572 the Zhou Dynasty sent the rulers of the Blue Turks 100,000 bales of silk a year; 
The Uyghurs received 500,000 pieces of silk a year from the Tang. These are examples of 
the most spectacular tributes. Cf. Liu Mau-Tsai 1958, 395–396; Dąbrowski 1975, 34; Barfield 
1992, 47, 64–67, 133, 154; Gumilev 1997, 33; 1992, 23; 1993, 146.
437 Amm.Marc., XXXI 2.11 (p. 386).
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the Huns an annual tribute of 2,100 pounds of gold.438 The Avars managed to 
extort literally tons of gold from the Byzantine Empire.439 Less powerful steppe 
ethne were not able to loot such huge amounts of gold, but they also eagerly 
coerced generous tribute. The Pechenegs were said to be ‘shameless in their 
demands for generous gifts.’440
The above-mentioned tendencies among nomads were eagerly exploited by 
neighbouring states, which offered ‘generous gifts’ as a means for using the 
steppe peoples to achieve their political aims. Byzantine diplomacy in par-
ticular excelled in this. It is sufficient to recall the instructions of Emperor 
Constantine Porphyrogenitus, who emphasized that in order to win and main-
tain the friendship of the Pechenegs, a diplomatic agent had to be sent to them 
each year with sufficient gifts.441 From Rus’ writings, we also know that the 
Pechenegs who participated in Igor’s expedition against the Greeks were neu-
tralized by Byzantine diplomats with the help of expensive gifts.442 There are 
many other similar examples concerning other ethne as well.
As noted earlier, the value of the ‘gifts’ received, or even coerced, by the 
Pechenegs did not match the great wealth of goods supplied to the steppe 
empires. The Xiongnu, Huns, Blue Turks, and Avars all received regular trib-
utes, which may have been presented by the diplomats of neighbouring states 
as voluntary gifts or even manifestations of being in good graces. To stop pay-
ing, however, posed the risk of invasion, which the steppe people’s leaders 
did not hide. It is also worth remembering that such a transfer of goods was 
possible within the framework of the special mutual relationship that existed 
between a steppe empire and a rich agricultural one.443 The Pechenegs did not 
constitute an imperial organism, so the ‘gifts’ they received were probably not 
as lavish and could have arrived in an irregular manner. Ahmad ibn Fadlan, 
an emissary of caliph al-Muqtadir (908–932) to the ruler of the Volga-Kama 
Bulgars, provides interesting comparative material. Before he reached the 
main destination of his diplomatic journey, he visited several elders of the 
Uzes. During a visit to Atrak, one of the elders, the Abbasid envoy presented 
438 Prisc. 9.3 (p. 236). The amount mentioned in the treaty is the equivalent of 688 kg of gold. 
Cf. Hardt 2003, 97.
439 At the peak of this practice, the Avars were said to receive a tribute of 200,000 solidi, 
that is, over 900 kg of gold. According to various estimates, they were supposed to have 
coerced from Byzantium between 13.7 and 36.3 tons of gold. Pohl 1988, 178–185, 205–215; 
Hardt 2003, 99; 2004, 42–44, 175; Polek 2007, 243.
440 DAI, VII 9–10 (p. 54/5).
441 DAI, I 16–24 (p. 48/9).
442 PVL 1, AM 9452 (944), col. 45–46.
443 Barfield 2001, 10–41; Paroń 2013, 224–233.
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gifts from the ambassador Nadhir al-Harami, who had sent 50 dinars, three 
mitqals of musk, [pieces of] red leather, two bolts of cloth from Merv, from 
which were cut two jackets, as well as a pair of boots of red leather, a coat of 
brocade, and five coats of silk. Al-Harami gave Atrak’s wife a head shawl and a 
ring.444 These gifts were expensive, but far from the riches regularly received 
by the rulers of steppe empires. The fact that the donor was an ambassador 
and not the caliph himself does not change anything, because the gifts of 
al-Muqtadir to the ‘king’ of the Bulgars were not that glamorous either.445 The 
level of the material culture and political significance of the Pechenegs and 
the Uzes were most likely similar, so we can assume that the gifts received from 
their political partners were comparable in terms of both the types of goods 
(expensive fabrics, perfumes, precious metals) and their value.446
The gift-giving described by ibn Fadlan was part of a diplomatic rite which 
communicated the nature of the relations between political partners. For the 
steppe people, this was not just another opportunity to acquire wealth. Such an 
interpretation, though partly true, omits certain features of the steppe people’s 
mentality, including that of the Pechenegs. Receiving expensive gifts was for 
them a matter of prestige; it meant they were being treated as free people. In 
diplomatic terms, for individual tribal chiefs who were reluctant to recognize 
any power above themselves, this meant that a potential ally was treating them 
as sovereign leaders. The goods acquired could also be redistributed within a 
particular community, which further strengthened the authority of its chief.
Giving gifts to the Pechenegs was most likely a means used by diplomats of 
all states who wanted to establish political ties with them or ensure their neu-
trality, although extant written sources seem to indicate that such a method 
was used mainly by the Byzantine Empire. Its diplomats were convinced that 
they were fully capable of exploiting the barbaric peoples’ fascination with 
external manifestations of the empire’s power.447 Indeed, the potential of 
Byzantium and its arsenal of methods for influencing neighbouring peoples 
developed over the centuries seem to justify this belief. Frequent complaints 
444 Fadlan: ibn Fadlan, 210; Zeki Validi Togan 1939, 29; Kovalevskii 1956, 129; Frye 2005, 40. 
Some authors of translation of ibn Fadlan believe that in the case of the red leather, 
he simply meant leather which had been tanned (ibn Fadlan, 211; Kmietowicz, Lewicki 
1985, 96).
445 ibn Fadlan: ibn Fadlan, 216–218; Zeki Validi Togan 1939, 41; Kovalevskii 1956, 132; Frye 2005, 
45. Ahmad ibn Fadlan writes about gifts consisting of fragrances, robes, and pearls.
446 Cf. DAI, VI (p. 52/3).
447 For more in general on Byzantine diplomacy, its rituals and Byzantine imperial doctrine: 
Treitinger 1938; Dölger 1953; Ohnsorge 1958; Ostrogorski 1973, 119–141; Shepard 1985, 233–
293; 1992, 41–71; Obolensky 1994, 1–22; Udal’tsova 1989, 241–275.
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by Byzantine authors about ‘unfaithful and wicked’ barbarians seem to indi-
cate, however, that they sometimes remained resistant to the persuasion of 
imperial diplomats. Perhaps they were willing to accept the goods and conces-
sions offered to them, but did not always behave as Constantinople wished. 
This observation also applies to the Pechenegs, as proved by the history of 
prince Sviatoslav Igorevich. The Steppe people did not agree to allow his safe 
return to Rus’, despite the efforts of Emperor John I Tzimiskes.448
The political behaviour of the Pechenegs, which harmed the interests of 
neighbouring countries, was bound to cause irritation among their politi-
cal elites, which in turn was reflected in written sources. Works by Byzantine 
authors, as well as Rus’ chronicles,449 convey the theme of the godless nomad, 
i.e., an individual deprived of any religious sense that would constitute the 
basis for a coherent ethical system for governing the behaviour of individuals 
and communities. In fact, the looting and cruelty attributed to steppe people 
easily led one to the conclusion that they were committing such acts because 
they were not held back by a deity like the Christian God who would punish 
them for their crimes. This kind of reasoning is particularly visible in Michael 
Psellos’ characterization of the Pechenegs:
Taken in the mass, this is a nation to be feared, and a treacherous one. 
Treaties of friendship exercise no restraining influence over these barbar-
ians, and even oaths sworn over their sacrifices are not respected, for they 
reverence no deity at all, not to speak of God. To them all things are the 
result of chance, and death they believe to be the end of everything. For 
these reasons they make peace with great alacrity and then, when they 
find it necessary to resort to war, they at once violate the terms of their 
treaty. If you conquer them in war, they invoke a second treaty of friend-
ship; if it is they who win the combat, they massacre some of their cap-
tives and hold a magnificent sale of the rest. For the rich prisoners they 
fix the price high, and if they fail to get ransom, they kill them.450
A few decades earlier, John Mauropous described the Pechenegs in a similar 
way. The metropolitan of Euchaita presented them as wild barbarians deprived 
of any basis for social order in the form of religion, law or knowledge.451 The 
448 Io.Scyl., 309–310; Wortley 2010, 293; Io.Zon., XVII 3 (p. 535); Trapp 1986, 40. Cf. also 
Chapter 5 of the present book.
449 Chekin 1992, 9–28.
450 Mich.Psell., VII 69 (pp. 241–242); Sewter 1953, 243.
451 Io.Maur., 144 (§ 9, 1961).
219Structures and Forms of Existence
motif of godlessness and the complete anomie of nomads, quite common in 
Byzantine historiography, often substituted for reflection on the principles gov-
erning steppe societies. Scholars reduced them to the status of hordes of wild 
animals, capable only of incomprehensible aggression. They were ignorant of 
any kind of order built on the foundations of law, custom and religion. This 
kind of perception has, of course, devastating consequences for our knowledge 
of nomadic customs. In the case of the Pechenegs, scientific reflection on the 
institutions fundamental to any community is almost entirely absent.
Meanwhile, customs and the laws derived from them are probably the most 
important elements of the traditions and identity of a particular ethnos. They 
are strongly connected with native beliefs and mythology, which are insepa-
rable. All the categories listed here are of fundamental significance for the 
existence and continuation of an ethnic community. Reinhard Wenskus sees a 
people, above all, as a community sharing a common law. Adherence to it and 
to past beliefs allows one’s identity to be preserved even if the group united by 
these customs loses the knowledge of its mother tongue as a result of remain-
ing in a foreign environment.452 The great importance of customs was also 
understood by the Turkic peoples. It suffices to recall here an aphorism noted 
by the famous 11th-century encyclopaedist Mahmūd of Kashgar: ‘The realm 
may be left behind but not custom’ (ēl qalir törü qalmās).453
The word törü in Kāšgarī’s quotation means ‘custom’, but also ‘law’, which 
seems to correspond closely to the Old Greek word nomos (νόμος) and Latin 
mos. There is no indication, therefore, that nomadic communities were in prin-
ciple anomic. This is also confirmed by information from less biased observ-
ers who stayed among the nomads. John of Pian de Carpini notes that ‘Tatars’ 
are honest towards each other, rarely resort to violence in their interactions, 
and in times of hunger share food and help one another. The Franciscan also 
emphasized the good manners of their women and very severe punishment for 
adultery.454 It is worth noting, however, Carpini’s comment that these righ-
teous customs of the ‘Tatars’ apply only within their community. The use of 
violence, killing, robbery or trickery was purportedly allowed when it was 
directed against strangers.455 A similar state of affairs, one which likewise 
assumed the observance of strict norms of coexistence within the native eth-
nos, but loosened them in relations with the outside world, could also have 
been found in the Pechenegs. The Byzantines most likely experienced this, 
452 Wenskus 1961, 38–44; Zientara 1985, 31; Modzelewski 2004, 66, 67.
453 Al-Kāšgarī, I, 264. Cf. Tryjarski 1993, 215.
454 di Carpine, IV 2–3 (pp. 245–246).
455 di Carpine, III 8 (p. 240).
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especially since the latter half of the 11th century, which must have influenced 
their perception of these steppe-dwellers. They did not understand the world 
of nomads, which does not change the fact that the acts of aggression directed 
by the Pechenegs against the empire when they were officially part of it could 
not have been assessed positively by Byzantine historians and rhetoricians.456
Traditional beliefs, whose connection with common law has been indicated 
earlier, were also a very important tool for maintaining the distinctness of 
nomadic communities in their contacts with the outside world. The Danube 
Bulgars clearly contrasted their identity to that of the Byzantines based on reli-
gious differences. In an inscription dating back to the 820s attributed to the 
Khan Presian I, the Bulgars were contrasted with Christians, who were rightly 
considered synonymous with ‘subjects of the empire’.457 This opposition 
reveals a logic of identification, according to which religious affiliation defines 
social and political affiliation. A Mongol whom William of Rubruck met on his 
journey to Karakorum seems to have shared a similar way of thinking. He was 
a subject of Sartach, son of Batu Khan. He was said to object categorically to 
calling his master a Christian, since according to him, Sartach was a Mongol.458
In the case of such a strong link between ethnic identity and religion, con-
version, especially when it was carried out by representatives of the elite, was 
frowned upon. From the account of Ahmad ibn Fadlan, we learn that one of 
the Uze leaders had to remain faithful to the religion of his ancestors, although 
he wanted to convert to Islam. This was because his subjects threatened that 
after his conversion he would not be allowed to remain their leader.459
Much more dramatic events are said to have affected the Pechenegs. Al-Bakrī 
reports that in the Hijri year 400 they were to receive a Muslim prisoner-of-
war familiar with sharia law who would spread the faith of Mohammed. After 
some time, when the number of believers had reached 12,000, a conflict broke 
out between them and the Pechenegs who remained faithful to the religion 
of their fathers; the latter, despite a twofold advantage, suffered a defeat and 
were killed.460
456 Cf. Chapter 7 of the present book.
457 PI, no. 14, p. 165; Petkov 2008, 13. A fragment of the inscription reads as follows: ‘When 
someone speaks true, god sees. And when someone lies, god sees as well. The Bulgars did 
many favours for the Christians, and the Christians forgot them. But god sees.’ The inscrip-
tion comes from southern Thrace and dates back to the year 837.
458 Rubruc, XVI 5 (p. 205). ‘Nolite dicere quod dominus noster sit christianus. Non est chris-
tianus, sed Moal’.
459 ibn Fadlan: ibn Fadlan, 206/207; Zeki Validi Togan 1939, 25–26; Kovalevskii 1956, 127; Frye 
2005, 37.
460 Bakrī: Кunik, Rozen 1878, 59–60; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 222–223. Cf. Zakhoder 1967, 
75–76.
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In the early 11th century, the Pecheneg nomads would thus became orthodox 
Muslims, with a scholar, expert on sharia law, and teacher of the Quran per-
manently residing among them. This information seems quite mysterious and 
should be treated with great caution, for no other source confirms its truthful-
ness. Some scholars, however, do consider it to be credible. According to them, 
the rapid spread of Islamization among nomads is supposed to prove this.461 
Indeed, as the aforementioned remark by ibn Fadlan shows, the followers of 
the new religion, especially those who tried to impose their faith on the rest of 
their tribe, had to expect to encounter strong resistance. However, it is difficult 
not to notice in al-Bakrī’s account a narrative schema, which reflects elements 
of the ideology of the jihad (e.g., the twofold advantage of the disbelievers 
over the Muslims, who nevertheless win).462 The date of the conversion of the 
Pechenegs raises doubts as well.463 It is difficult to explain why they would have 
adopted Islam in the 11th century, when their territories were so far from the 
most important Muslim political and cultural centres.464 Finally, it should be 
noted that mass conversion is not confirmed by archaeological sources either. 
According to this data, between the 9th and 11th centuries the vast majority 
of steppe-dwellers continued with their native burial practices.465 One should 
therefore maintain a certain degree of scepticism about the possibility of the 
conversion of the whole ethnos, while recognizing as probable the existence 
of a small group of Islamic neophytes who appeared among the Pechenegs as 
461 Tryjarski 1972, 146; 1975a, 589–590.
462 DeWeese 1994, 79; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 223 (n. 14).
463 Josef Marquardt had already expressed doubts in this matter and proposed to correct 
the date for conversion of the Pechenegs to Hijri year 300 (912/13 CE). Marquardt 1903, 
72–74. The German scholar refers to al-Masudi’s account, according to which among the 
Pechenegs who invaded the Byzantine fortress of Walandar (probably Debeltos) around 
934, there were said to be many followers of Islam. al-Mas’ūdī, Les Prairies, II, 58–64; 
Pellat 1962, 177–179. Cf. also Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 222 (n. 12).
464 Cf. Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 222–223 (n. 13). The authors try to explain the late conver-
sion of the Pechenegs as being rooted in politics. The steppe dwellers are said to have 
become the object of a Muslim missionary campaign, the aim of which was to gain an ally 
in the escalating struggle of the Arab world with Byzantium under Basil II and Rus’ under 
Vladimir, a newly converted Christian. The tension between the Rus’ and the Pechenegs, 
which reached its peak at the turn of the 10th and 11th centuries, resulted in an increase 
in the influence of Islam among the Pechenegs. The mission of Bruno of Querfurt is also 
said to have served primarily political purposes, i.e., appeasing the Pechenegs and incor-
porating them into the alliance of Christian rulers (cf. below). This hypothesis, however, 
has very little foundation in historical sources.
465 During the excavations in a mixed Pecheneg and Uz cemetery, located not far from 
the former Khazar stronghold of Sarkel, only one (female) grave showed elements of a 
Muslim funeral rite (including the orientation of the deceased’s head towards Mecca, the 
arrangement of the body on the side, and the lack of inventory). Pletneva 1990, 11–13.
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early as the 9th century and continued to remain with them.466 Most of the 
conversions probably took place in the Transvolga region, where the existence 
of strong Islamic influences is confirmed by the account of ibn Fadlan. It also 
shows what this ‘faith’ actually looked like among some steppe people who less 
insightful observers might have considered to be orthodox Muslims. During 
his journey through the land of the Uzes, the Abbasid diplomat noted:
I have heard them [i.e., Uzes – A.P.] declare: ‘There is no god but God! 
Muhammad is God’s emissary.’ But it was a way of ingratiating them-
selves with the Muslims passing through their lands and not out of 
conviction.467
Elsewhere ibn Fadlan mentions an incident he considered offensive, i.e., 
when he was asked by one of the nomads whether Allah had a wife.468
Upon entering the Black Sea steppe, the Pechenegs found themselves sur-
rounded by Christian states or states that were soon to be Christianized. This 
provided the nomads with an opportunity for intensive contact with the fol-
lowers of yet another monotheistic religion. They most likely first came into 
contact with Christianity through their relations with the Byzantines. This 
could have occurred in individual contacts during the trading of goods, and 
in official contacts during the conclusion of political agreements, when each 
party affirmed their pledge to respect the agreement by invoking its own cus-
tomary sources.469 Until the mid-11th century, however, we know nothing 
about any organized attempts by Constantinople to Christianize nomads, 
nor about any individual endeavors of this type. The first Christian mission 
among the Pechenegs confirmed by written sources is the expedition of Bruno 
of Querfurt, dating back to 1008.470 The missionary briefly described his stay 
466 Some researchers assume that followers of Islam were present among the Pechenegs as 
late as the mid-12th century. This is based on the account of an Arab traveller, Abu Hamid 
al-Garnati, who, during his stay in Hungary, said he came into contact with two groups 
of Muslims. One of them, described by him as the Maghreb, is sometimes identified as 
the Pechenegs. Bol’shakov, Mogait 1971, 38–39, 75 (n. 112); Uzelac 2010, 70. However, this 
identification is questionable. Cf. Lewicki 1937, 111–114; Berend 2001, 66.
467 ibn Fadlan: ibn Fadlan, 202/203; Zeki Validi Togan 1939, 20; Kovalevskii 1956, 125; Frye 
2005, 33–34.
468 ibn Fadlan: ibn Fadlan, 202/203; Zeki Validi Togan 1939, 21–22; Kovalevskii 1956, 126; Frye 
2005, 34.
469 DAI, VIII 15–18 (pp. 54–57).
470 The most recent studies on St. Bruno of Querfurt’s expedition to the Pechenegs: 
Tyszkiewicz 2009, 71–89, 95, 101–103; Dudek 2010, 241–254; Paroń 2013a, 161–178; Kollinger 
2013, 187–202. Cf. also considerations in Chapter 6 of the present book.
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with ‘the most cruel of all pagans’ in his Letter to King Henry II.471 He writes 
about the conversion of 30 souls, which should be interpreted as a symbolic 
number communicating his having planted a sufficient number of seeds to 
ensure the independent existence of a Christian community,472 whose fur-
ther existence and development would require the consecration of a bishop, 
which soon followed. The new bishop was most likely an individual connected 
with Kievan Rus’.473 Bruno also noted that he was able to bring about peace 
between the Pechenegs and Vladimir the Great. The latter sent one of his sons 
to the nomads as a hostage in order to secure the new agreement. Later, close 
contacts between Sviatopolk I and the Pechenegs suggest that he was the 
one sent. We do not know anything further about the lives of this bishop and 
his Pecheneg neophytes. It is thus difficult to say whether this new Christian 
community survived. Bruno claimed that he visited three out of four ‘parts’ 
of the Pecheneg lands, while ‘emissaries of the better [ones]’474 came to see 
him from the last one, which would indicate that the seeds of the Gospel had 
been widely sown. New conflicts between the Rus’ and the Pechenegs and the 
gradual retreat of the nomads from the Black Sea steppe, however, must have 
weakened the contacts between the new bishop and Kiev, and destroyed the 
fruits of Bruno’s missionary work.
A mass conversion of the Pechenegs was recorded in the mid-11th century 
by Byzantine sources. The first to be baptized (together with his followers) 
was Kegenes, an ambitious leader who was in conflict with bulk of the ethnos. 
The ceremony took place on the banks of the Danube and was performed by 
Euthymios, a pious monk. Soon afterwards, the main group of the Pechenegs 
moved onto the territory of the empire. In their case, only members of the 
elite, including Tyrach, the leader of the whole ethnos, were considered ‘wor-
thy of baptism’.475 There is no surviving information on the conversion of the 
remaining Pechenegs. The smooth and peaceful course of the ceremony and 
the large number of neophytes baptized have been seen by contemporaries 
as a great success for the Church and the Byzantine Empire.476 A comparison 
with the seemingly modest results of St. Bruno’s mission seems to strengthen 
471 Bruno, 99–101.
472 Paroń 2013a, 177. Cf. Rosik 2010, 209–210 (interesting comparative data).
473 Cf. Poppe 1968, 188–189; 1999, 228; 2008, 56.
474 Bruno, 100 (v. 6–7). ‘[…] tres partes circuiuimus, quartam non tetigimus, de qua meliorum 
nuntii ad nos venerunt […]’. Cf. Chapter 6.
475 Io.Scyl., 457 (v. 10–14), 459 (v. 80–85); Wortley 2010, 428, 430; Io.Zon., XVII 26 (p. 643); 
Trapp 1986, 107. Cf. Ivanov 2003, 226–227; 2008, 328.
476 Io.Maur., 143–144 (§ 7–8), 145 (§ 12–13). Cf. Malamut 1995, 121; Ivanov 2007, 255–256. See 
also Chapter 7 of the present book.
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this impression. However, the history of the later relationship between St. 
Bruno and the Byzantine Empire shows that Constantine Monomachos did 
not achieve very much. This baptism did not bring about any significant spiri-
tual or mental change in the Pechenegs.477 The enthusiasm of some witnesses 
to this event should therefore be contrasted with the bitter realism of the state-
ments of later authors, in particular, Michael Attaleiates and Michael Psellos. 
Their disappointment resulted mainly from the fact that the baptism did not 
change the attitude of nomads towards the empire in any significant way. 
Although they formally became a part of the empire, there was no increase 
in the degree of their loyalty to the empire.478 The lack of data indicating any 
pastoral activity among the new subjects of the empire, however, is puzzling. 
Meanwhile, it would seem that the metropolis of Dristra, with its five suffra-
gan dioceses, would have had sufficient potential to successfully Christianize 
the Pechenegs.
The passivity of the Byzantine Church could have been exploited by dual-
ist sects operating in the Balkans. Vasili Vasilievskii notes seeing the early 
influences of Manicheanism among the Pechenegs. The peoples living north 
of the Aral Sea, including the Pechenegs, were said to have fallen under the 
influence of followers of Mani’s teachings, who were numerous and active in 
Transoxiana.479 It is much more likely that the Pechenegs were influenced by 
the Paulicians. This seems to be proven by their close political contacts with 
representatives of this religious community. As Dimitri Obolensky has rightly 
assumed, the arrival of the Pechenegs in the Balkans may have aroused the 
interest of the heretical Paulicians, who saw them as potential converts.480 
Although we know nothing about the Paulicians’ missions among the nomads, 
political cooperation between them, facilitated by the anti-Byzantine attitudes 
shared by both communities, has been confirmed. Mentions of Paulician lead-
ers marrying the daughters of prominent Pechenegs date back to the 1070s and 
1080s, and these marriages strengthened the alliance that had been formed 
between the two groups.481 It is very possible that the nomadic mentality was 
477 Cf. Tryjarski 1975a, 592–593.
478 Mich.Att., 54/55. Cf. Ivanov 2003, 230.
479 Vasil’evskii 1908, 40–41.
480 Obolensky 1948, 192–193.
481 Lekas, who was Greek and a follower of Paulicianism, was married to a Pecheneg woman. 
In 1078 he agitated people living near Serdica and Niš to rebel against the Byzantine 
Empire. Mich.Att., 550/1; Scyl.Cont., 184. In 1084, a rebellion was sparked by Traulos, 
another Paulician, was also associated with the Pechenegs. An.Kom., VI 4.2–4 (p. 174); 
VI 14.2 (pp. 199–200); Sewter 2009, 158–159, 182–183. Cf. Obolensky 1948, 189–192 and 
Chapter 7 of the present book.
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well suited to the Paulicians’ activism, which made them a militant commu-
nity. The teachings of Bogomilism, which involved asceticism and withdrawal 
from life, probably seemed much less attractive, although the Pechenegs could 
have also been exposed to this sect in the Balkans.482 This applies especially 
to those groups of nomads who, after the battle of Lebounion, settled in the 
Moglena region, east of Vardar, where followers of this latter heretical sect 
were relatively numerous.483
Byzantine authors, however, considered the Pechenegs adamant pagans 
or completely godless people, which is clearly indicated by the passage by 
Michael Psellos quoted earlier. In regard to nomadic peoples, the latter view 
was very widespread and probably stemmed from a misunderstanding of the 
nature of their beliefs or a deliberate disregard for them.484 However, despite 
clear revulsion towards the Pechenegs expressed by Byzantine writers in the 
11th and 12th centuries, we must admit that their harsh diagnosis reflected to a 
good extent the actual state of affairs. The majority of nomads probably held 
to their native Turkic beliefs.485 Other religions they encountered in the course 
of their history may have influenced them, but they probably did not cause 
the Pechenegs to abandoned their original beliefs in any important respects. 
Traditional beliefs continued to shape the Pecheneg system of values to a sig-
nificant degree.
The fact that we know so little about these beliefs is truly unfortunate. The 
scarcity of narrative sources is not compensated for by archaeological material. 
For this reason, we are able to recreate only a general outline of the Pechenegs’ 
funeral rites and put forward a few elementary hypotheses concerning their 
482 On Bogomilism in general: Obolensky 1948; 1994b, 259–280; Angelov 1961. On the 
Manichean heresy: Runciman 1947; Schmaus 1951, 271–299.
483 Io.Zon., XVIII 23 (p. 741); Trapp 1986, 167. Cf. Obolensky 1948, 193.
484 Cf. Ammianus Marcellinus on the Huns: ‘[…] nullius religionis vel superstitionis reveren-
tia aliquando districti […]’. Amm.Marc., XXXI 2.11 (p. 386). A less radical stance towards 
the Mongols, although in many respects a related one, is taken by Giovanni da Pian del 
Carpine. Although they are not completely godless, because they believe in one God, who 
is the creator of all that is visible and invisible, as well as the giver of punishment and 
rewards (bonarum), they do not worship him in any way (di Carpine, III 2 (p. 236)). They 
know nothing about eternal condemnation or eternal life, and imagine the afterlife as a 
visible world. (di Carpine, III 9 (p. 240)).
485 According to al-Bakrī, before they converted to Islam, the Pechenegs practiced the reli-
gion of ‘magi’ (mağūs). Bakrī: Кunik, Rozen 1878, 59; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 222. Cf. 
Zakhoder 1967, 75. Some researchers consider this information to be a cause for consider-
ing the influence of old Iranian religions, mainly Mazdaism and Zoroastrianism, among 
the Pechenegs. Tryarski 1972, 140, 142–146; 1975a, 583, 585–589. The word used by al-Bakrī 
may mean simply an ethnic, pagan religion, or most probably the native beliefs of steppe 
dwellers. See Shcherbak 1959, 372; Lewicki 1954, 164; Göckenjan, Zimonyi 2001, 222 (n. 11).
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ideas about the afterlife. There are also very few traces of their symbolic 
culture – a phenomenon that is extremely important for understanding 
the religiosity of any community. Due to this lack of sources, the Pechenegs’ 
native beliefs have thus far been merely inferred, mainly on the basis of 
comparative analyses. It has been assumed, for example, that as a Eurasian 
nomadic people, they must have shared a number of religious traditions 
typical of the Great Steppe. On that basis, the Pechenegs are attributed the 
practice of shamanism.486 However, this religious phenomenon tends to be 
understood in different ways. Some researchers treat it as a set of specific reli-
gious phenomena and common practices, such as rites of passage, the cult of 
ancestors, mysticism and sacrifice. Shamanism perceived in this way may, in 
various forms, play a role in various religious systems, including monotheistic 
ones. This view is contrasted with another, according to which shamanism is 
a separate religious system that originated in Siberia, from where it spread to 
the steppe.487 Both positions only seem to be distant from one another. The 
belief that ecstatic experience – perceived to be a fundamental element of 
the shamanic complex – was universal is compatible with the conviction that 
such experiences have had a fundamental and constitutive importance for the 
beliefs of some communities, including the peoples of the steppe.488
Shamanism is based on a characteristic cosmology, which assumes the divi-
sion of the cosmos into two or three vertically arranged zones (heaven and 
earth, or heaven, earth and the underworld), which can communicate with one 
another.489 This kind of ‘journey’ to heaven or underground is accomplished 
by going into a trance. Shamanism accepts the existence of special relation-
ships between animals and zoomorphic spirits. It also applies a specific ‘escha-
tology’, according to which one’s departure from this world, as well as falling 
ill, is always due to supernatural factors, i.e., the influence of evil spirits. The 
dead do not end up in heaven or hell, since the original beliefs of the Altai 
peoples did not involve the notion of punishment for the crimes committed 
and rewards for the good deeds performed during the course of one’s lifetime. 
Only under the influence of monotheistic religions, mainly Christianity, did 
the beliefs of some inhabitants of Inner Asia incorporate a conviction that 
good people were headed ‘up above’, while bad people – ‘down below’.490
486 Macartney 1929, 354; Tryjarski 1972, 140–141; 1975a, 584–585; Spinei 2003, 107; 2009, 274.
487 Szyjewski 2001, 288.
488 Roux 1984, 61–98; 1988, 519; Eliade 1971, 504, 507; Szyjewski 2001, 288–289; 2005, 5–6.
489 Roux 1984, 62; Szyjewski 2005, 153–184.
490 Kałużyński 1968, 131; 1983, 96; Roux 1984, 254, 258; 1963, 106 (the researcher stresses that all 
the terms used by the Turks to describe hell were of foreign origin); Tryjarski 1991, 62–64, 
72–74.
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The central figure in this religious system is the shaman, who, according to 
Mircea Eliade, ‘plays an essential role in the defense of the psychic integrity of 
the community’.491 He has the ability to heal by bringing the soul of a sick per-
son abducted by demons back. The shaman also fights black magic, and works 
as a mediator between the realm of the living and the realm of the dead, gods 
and demons.492
As the nomads imagined it, life after death was an almost exact copy of life 
on Earth. After passing to the other side, they would have to, as they did ear-
lier, graze their herds, fight, rob, and love.493 A common cultural phenomenon 
among steppe peoples was therefore equipping the deceased with what they 
would need in the underworld. This custom was reflected in the contents of 
funeral inventories discovered by archaeologists. A funeral ceremony included 
the sacrifice of a horse, the remains of which were often found in burials attrib-
uted to the Pechenegs.494 Comparative data seems to suggest that the animal 
was supposed to be a guide and a means of transport by means of which the 
soul of the deceased would be transported to the afterlife.495 In the funeral 
inventories of the Pechenegs there have also been found elements of horse 
tack (most often stirrups and bits), weapons (arrowheads, bow covers, spear-
heads, and sabres – the latter relatively rarely), parts of belts (including buckles 
and ornaments, most often made of bronze), knives, flints, and mutton bones, 
which may constitute a trace of the funeral banquet, and occasionally clay pot-
tery, usually made without the use of a potter’s wheel.496 These modest relics 
were probably the deceased’s equipment for the afterlife.
The concept of the lack of punishment in the afterlife for crimes committed 
on earth, commonly attributed to steppe peoples, is an interesting issue. Such 
a state of affairs would indicate that the ethical aspect of the native beliefs 
of the Altai peoples was noticeably limited or completely non-existent. They 
491 Eliade 1988, 19.
492 Eliade 1988, 20.
493 Roux 1963, 107; 1988, 518, 527–528; Tryjarski 1991, 70–71; 195–197, 199, 201.
494 The remains of horses were usually placed next to the human body on a step elevated for 
that purpose or at the bottom of the grave. The skeleton of the animal, usually incomplete 
(usually the head with anterior and posterior limbs, cut off at the second or third joint, 
and then arranged in anatomical order), was sometimes saddled and bridled. Pletneva 
1958, 153–155; 1981, 218; Dobroliubskii 1986, 49–50; Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 94–95; Atavin 
2008, 84–86 (in the material collected by Atavin, horse remains were found in more than 
half of the burials attributed to the Pechenegs).
495 ibn Fadlan 208/209; Zeki Validi Togan 1939, 27–28; Kovalevskii 1956, 128; Frye 2005, 39. ibn 
Fadlan described the sacrifice of the dead man’s horse on which, according to the Uzes, 
he was to reach ‘paradise’.
496 Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 94–95, Atavin 2008, 82–84, 85.
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probably lacked the notion of sin and of an inevitable divine punishment that 
threatens believers for committing sinful acts. Both of these notions, in con-
trast, were central to the monotheistic religions (Christianity, Islam) professed 
by the authors who described the Pechenegs. Observing their political behav-
iour, which these writers saw as often being expressed in unfounded breaches 
of faith, pillaging and cruelty, they may have assumed that steppe dwellers 
were committing them because they were not restrained by a deity, who, like 
the Christian God, would punish them for their crimes. The matter, however, 
appears to be more complex. The notion of sin and an ethical system built 
upon it probably replaced a variety of taboos that previously functioned in 
Pecheneg communities, and which prescribed certain behaviours as elements 
of their relations with numerous spirits and deities. Within the framework of 
such a religious outlook, all misfortunes, whether affecting an individual or 
the whole community, were interpreted not as a punishment for offences com-
mitted against one’s neighbour, but as a punishment for offending one of the 
supernatural beings by violating a taboo concerning them.497 Such a means 
of reasoning among the steppe people was noticed by the keener observers 
who came into contact with them. John of Pian de Carpini attributes to the 
Mongols a number of religiously motivated prohibitions, the violation of 
which was punished very severely for fear of the consequences.498
Their attitude towards other people is a separate issue. Pecheneg commu-
nities, like those of other nomads, were not anomic. Customs and legal rules 
regulated relations within the community; however, outside of it, as we noted 
above, these rules were more loosely applied. Violence in relations with out-
siders was not strictly forbidden. Likewise, plunder, severely punished when it 
was committed against members of the native community, was admissible or 
even accepted when the victim was a stranger.499 Of course, for practical rea-
sons, the most extreme behaviours were limited. Attacking and robbing every 
newcomer who appeared in areas controlled by the Pechenegs would have led 
to a disruption of trade, which, as we have seen, was of considerable impor-
tance to the steppe peoples. The case of Bruno of Querfurt, whose first contact 
with the Pechenegs seemed to confirm all the flaws attributed to nomads, also 
497 Kałużyński 1968, 141; 1986, 108–118.
498 According to Carpine it was a sin (peccatum) among the Mongols to put a dagger into fire 
or to touch fire with a dagger, lean on a whip while driving a horse, touch arrows with a 
whip, catch or kill young birds, spill milk on the ground, urinate in a yurt, spit out a bite 
of food received during a feast, or step on the entrance to the yurt. The last three offences 
were punishable by death. di Carpine, III 7 (pp. 239–240).
499 Kamocki 2003, 62. For the Bedouins and the Kyrgyz, property acquired through robbery 
was a source of pride.
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seems significant. However, when they became aware of his intentions, they 
allowed him to stay and did not interfere in Bruno’s missionary activities, or 
at least we do not know anything about this.500 Personal relationships estab-
lished through trade or diplomatic contacts were also a mitigating factor in the 
behaviour of the steppe dwellers towards people from outside their commu-
nity. A stranger could become the ‘comrade’ (drug’) of a particular Pecheneg, 
as shown by the account in The Primary Russian Chronicle of the friendship 
between an unnamed Pecheneg and Pretich, the governor of Prince Sviatoslav 
Igorevich.501 Close relations of some kind also connected the nomad Tatranes 
and Emperor Alexios I Komnenos. The Pecheneg switched sides numer-
ous times; he would support the Byzantines, then return to his kindred peo-
ple. Nevertheless, he seems to have always remained personally loyal to the 
Emperor.502 The relations between the Khersonites and the Pechenegs who 
traded with them, as described in the second part of this chapter, were also 
conducive to making personal contacts based on friendship.
Such ties were valuable not only for political or economic reasons; some-
times they simply saved lives, as the story of the Byzantine commander 
Katakalon Kekaumenos, who later became the duke of Antioch, clearly 
shows.503 He was seriously injured in the battle of Diakene (1049), which was 
lost by the Byzantine forces.504 As he lay on the battlefield, unconscious from 
the loss of blood, he was recognized by Koulinos (Goulinos), most probably 
the son of the famous Kegenes. The Pechenegs seated Katakalon on his horse, 
took him to a tent and cared for his wound, thanks to which the Byzantine 
commander survived.505 It seems that Koulinos was not motivated solely by a 
desire to receive a ransom. The Katakalon’s injuries were so serious that hopes 
for his survival, and thus any gratification, were in fact low. If Koulinos was 
only interested in profit, he would have probably simply killed and robbed the 
wounded commander.506
500 Bruno, 100–101.
501 PVL 1, AM 6476 (968), col. 66–67.
502 An.Kom., VII 10.1 (pp. 229–230); Sewter 2009, 210.
503 He was not the author of Strategikon. Shepard 1992, 171–181.
504 According to John Skylitzes: ‘one [of his wounds] laid bare his skull […] from the peak 
to the eyebrow, another on the collar had cut the neck at the root of the tongue, right 
through to the mouth […]’.
505 Io.Scyl., 469 (v. 50–60); Wortley 2010, 439.
506 Jonathan Shepard suggests a lasting friendly relationship existed between Koulinos and 
Katakalon. This would be evidenced by the seal of an imperial commander, dated 1054/55, 
discovered on the lower Danube. Katakalon Kekaumenos had already become a duke of 
Antioch by that time. Shepard 2013, 222–224.
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However, the Pechenegs were ruthless towards their enemies and did not 
refrain from exercising extreme, even bestial cruelty. The rules of war on the 
steppe, which assumed the complete destruction of the enemy, did not allow 
for mercy to be shown to the defeated. The nomads did not hesitate from kill-
ing captive warriors, and their murdering of prisoners aroused considerable 
disgust among Byzantine authors. Michael Psellos writes about this practice 
among the Pechenegs with a similar revulsion.507 A very characteristic exam-
ple, described by John Skylitzes, was the behaviour of Kegenes, who crossed 
the Danube together with two of the thirteen Pecheneg tribes and entered into 
the service of Constantine IX Monomachos.508 Shortly afterwards, when the 
remainder of the ethnos moved onto Byzantine lands, Kegenes together with 
the imperial troops inflicted a devastating defeat on them. These Pechenegs 
and their leader Tyrach were taken captive and were at the mercy of their con-
querors. Kegenes strongly advised the Byzantine commanders, almost plead-
ing with them, to slaughter the captured Pechenegs, starting with the young 
men. He referred to a certain barbarian adage (παροιμία βάρβαρος), which suc-
cinctly expressed that a snake should be killed in winter, when it cannot move 
its tail, before it causes suffering and trouble when heated by the sun.509 The 
captives – it should be emphasized that this included both warriors and their 
families – could have numbered from several dozen thousand up to a hundred 
thousand. Kegenes’ proposal was probably in fact to murder the elites of the 
individual tribes, and to spare the rest of the people, as the ambitious leader 
probably wanted to assume leadership over the entire ethnos.510 Such a course 
of action would seem to correspond to the logic of steppe battles, during which 
only members of the aristocracy were ruthlessly eliminated, since, if left alive, 
they could have attempted to retaliate. However, the Byzantine commanders 
considered the solutions proposed by Kegenes to be ‘a barbaric and impious 
act, unworthy of Roman civilization’.511
507 Cf. note 60.
508 Cf. the conclusion of Chapter 6 of the present book.
509 Io.Scyl., 459 (v. 67–70); Wortley 2010, 430.
510 Genghis Khan ordered the murder of all Tatars taller than the axel of a carriage, which in 
practice meant the fulfillment of Kegenes’ idea, i.e., the killing of the whole population 
with the exception of children (starting with young men). In The Secret History of the 
Mongols, however, there is a statement that those of the Tartars who survived were to 
become slaves. The conclusion is that only the elites were exterminated. Genghis Khan 
dealt with the Taiči’ut in a similar way, i.e., he murdered the aristocrats and subjugated 
the people who used to be their subjects. Rachewiltz 2004, I, 70, 77.
511 Io.Scyl., 459 (v. 71–72). Cf. Bonarek 2003, 95–96.
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John Skylitzes also mentions the ruthless murder of the inhabitants of 
Thrace and Macedonia by the Pechenegs after their victory in the Battle of 
Adrianople (June 1050). At that time, the entire people fell victim to their 
atrocities, and not even infants were spared (τὰ θηλάζοντα νήπια).512 Michael 
Attaleiates writes about another manifestation of incredible barbarity, the 
victim of which was the patrician Michael Dokeianos, one of the Byzantine 
commanders taken captive at Adrianople. When he was brought before an 
unidentified leader of the Pechenegs, he managed to grab his sword and kill 
him. In retaliation, he was summarily executed. His abdomen was then cut 
open, his intestines pulled out, and his severed hands and legs placed inside.513 
Yet, Dokeianos’ behaviour had indeed been reckless. Although he proved his 
incredible courage and contempt for the enemy, which, of course, was appre-
ciated by Michael Attaleiates, we can assume that such a deed by a prisoner-
of-war would have met with harsh retaliation by any army. Finally, Anna 
Komnena mentions that the Pechenegs, after they won the battle with Alexios 
Komnenos, had intended to murder their Byzantine captives. Ultimately, how-
ever, this desire was outweighed by the pragmatic stance of the common war-
riors, who opposed such a mass extermination and hoped to obtain a large 
ransom instead.514
In order to avoid excessive one-sidedness, it is worth noting that the 
Byzantines also succumbed to a kind of ‘moral fatigue’. The uplifting spirit 
of Skylitzes’ story about the imperial commanders’ behaviour towards 
Tyrach’s Pechenegs should be contrasted with the history of the captives from 
Lebounion (1091). On the night after the battle, a significant part of the steppe 
people were murdered allegedly without Alexios I’s knowledge.515 This cir-
cumstance raises the question of whether the demise of the Pechenegs as an 
independent ethnos, which occurred at that time, was a consequence of losses 
suffered during the battle itself, or rather a ‘final solution’ on the night after it?
A long-lasting conflict with any enemy inevitably leads to the dehumaniza-
tion of the opponent, which in turn leads to the weakening of all moral bar-
riers. In the 1080s, the Pechenegs became a very serious threat to the empire. 
Their attitude must have aroused particular frustration among the Byzantine 
elites, who witnessed the total failure of their earlier hopes to assimilate the 
steppe dwellers. Given this situation, a conviction must have arisen that the 
512 Io.Scyl., 471–472 (v. 23–26); Wortley 2010, 440.
513 Mich.Att., 60/61. Skylitzes knows about Dokeianos’ death, but does not include the grue-
some details. His accounts seem to indicate that the patrician fell in battle. Io.Scyl., 470 
(v. 88–89); Wortley 2010, 439.
514 An.Kom., VII 4.4 (p. 216); Sewter 2009, 197.
515 An.Kom., VIII 6.1–2 (pp. 249–250); Sewter 2009, 227–228.
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only possible solution was the total extermination of the Pechenegs. Anna 
Komnena’s shameful way of handling the Lebounion night massacre proves, 
however, that it was seen, at least by some parts of the Byzantine public, as a 
violation of moral standards.
The steppe people understood this in the exact opposite way. Killing a 
defeated enemy was not a sign of helplessness when no other means were 
available, but a standard, preventive measure which ruled out the possibility of 
retaliation. The slaughters attributed to the Pechenegs seem trivial compared 
to the feats of Genghis Khan or Amir Timur (Tamerlane). During their cam-
paigns against the political powers of Central Asia and the Middle East, entire 
cities were razed to the ground and their inhabitants, if they did not have skills 
sought after by the aggressor, were often exterminated.516 The atrocities they 
committed, which can only be attributed in part to the demands of politics 
or military strategy, lead researchers to look for explanations in the realm of 
their beliefs.
It is a fact that in nomadic communities, military prowess, measured by 
the number of enemies killed, was probably the most cultivated virtue. This 
is hardly surprising given the fact that these were communities in which every 
man capable of carrying a weapon was a warrior. Herodotus recalls that only 
those Scythian warriors who brought the heads of the enemies they had killed 
to their leader received a share of the plundered booty. They could also take 
part in community ceremonies, during which they received a cup of wine.517 
According to Sima Qian, an almost identical custom was known to the Xiongnu 
people.518 The Chinese historian adds that the one who brought the body of 
a Xiongnu warrior killed in battle received his possessions.519 Virtus militaris 
was therefore the main, if not sole, source of wealth. Possessing it also guaran-
teed one’s membership in the community, while its absence meant exclusion 
from it.
516 On the performance of the army of Genghis Khan in Khwarazm, Khorasan, Armenia, 
Georgia, and Shirvan: Rašid ad-Din I 2, 209–213, 218–219, 227–228, 240–245. On the 
conquest of Iran by Hulagu Khan and the resulting destruction and massacres: Rašid 
ad-Din III, 25–43. Cf. Malowist 1976, 540–544. On Timur’s expeditions and atrocities in 
connection with them: Gafurow 1991, 504–507; Małowist 1991, 41–46; Grousset 2006, 541, 
545. Timur’s inclination to cruelty distinguished him from other steppe rulers. In 1387, 
after capturing Isfahan, he ordered the heads of 70,000 inhabitants of the city to be cut 
off and a pyramid erected out of them. The same happened after the suppression of an 
uprising in Baghdad. At that time, the number of victims was said to amount to 90,000. 
120 pyramids were constructed from these heads.
517 Hdt., IV 65–66 (pp. 262, 264).
518 Watson 1961, 164–165.
519 Watson 1961, 165.
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The bravery of a particular warrior was also emphasized in funeral rites. In 
Chinese chronicles, we find the following information about the funeral rites 
of the Blue Turks (Tujue):
In the grave they make a space where they place a painted portrait of the 
deceased and battle scenes in which he participated. If the deceased had 
ever killed a man [in battle], they place a stone [in front of the grave], i.e., 
or each man killed they erect a stone.520
A similar way of accentuating the courage of fallen warriors was also found in 
the Black Sea and Caspian steppe. The Persian poet Nizami (12th/13th century) 
mentions stone figures, most probably stone babas, which are surrounded 
by a forest of wooden arrows, as numerous as ‘the grass on the seashore’.521 
According to Wacław Kotwicz’s interpretation, these arrows symbolized killed 
enemies, like the stones used in the Turkic ceremony.522 A fragment of the 
Ahmad ibn Fadlan’s account takes us a step further. He writes about the funeral 
rites of the Uzes:
If he has shown great bravery and killed someone, they carve wooden 
images, as many as the men he has killed, place them on top of his grave 
and say, “His retainers who serve him in the Garden.”523
Ibn Fadlan’s observation is of particular value to our discussion, not only 
because of the cultural proximity of the Uzes to the Pechenegs (archaeologists 
tend to almost equate the two), but above all because of their shared belief 
that after death a slain enemy became the slave of the warrior who killed him. 
It seems that this belief was quite common among the steppe peoples.524 It 
is also found in Hungarian chronicles, which report on the adventures of 
two Old Hungarian warriors named Bulchu and Leel. During the invasion of 
Bavaria they are said to have been captured by the army of Conrad I (911–918). 
Before their death, one of the two, the chronicles usually point to Leel, craftily 
killed the German ruler. At the time of the murder, he is supposed to have said 
to his victim: ‘You will go before me and you will serve me in the afterworld.’ 
The chronicles comment on this legendary story by saying that the ‘Scythians’ 
520 Liu Mau-Tsai 1958, 42. English translation: Šmahelová 2014, 104–105.
521 Kotwicz 1928, 5.
522 Kotwicz 1928, 6.
523 ibn Fadlan: ibn Fadlan, 208/209, Zeki Validi Togan 1939, 27; Kovalevskii 1956, 128; Frye 
2005, 39.
524 Małowist 1991, 46.
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believe that the dead are slaves of their murderers in the afterlife.525 The fear 
of such a fate prompted warriors to commit suicide, as a last resort in a hope-
less situation. This is evidenced by Leo the Deacon’s account on the beliefs 
of members of the warriors (druzhina) of prince Sviatoslav Igorevich.526 
If the Byzantine author had in mind here mainly the Rus’, this would be 
proof that the set of beliefs in question was not typical only of the peoples of 
the steppe.527
These beliefs belonged, however, to the warrior ethos, which differed funda-
mentally from the ideal of the soldier or knight developed by the Roman and 
Judeo-Christian traditions. In the portrayals of the steppe dwellers written by 
Byzantine authors, but not only by them, the image of nomads as hordes of 
predatory animals that owe their strength in combat mainly to their wildness 
was very common. They did not prevail thanks to their tactics, strategy and 
weaponry – in a word, the art of war – but rather to their primeval, ‘animal 
fierceness’.528 This image is undoubtedly a stereotype, but to a certain extent, 
it appears to be based on real-life events. The military skills of steppe societies 
were highly developed in many respects, but the fact remains that in combat, 
like other barbarian peoples, they sought to become something akin to wild 
carnivorous beasts. Certain rituals, such as drinking the blood of a defeated 
enemy or human blood in general,529 and perhaps cannibalistic practices,530 
were meant to achieve this goal. By means of such actions, a warrior renounced 
his humanity, and therefore the limitations, laws and customs that regulated 
525 Leel was said to ask to be allowed to blow the horn before his death. When they agreed 
and the instrument was handed over to the prisoner, he unexpectedly hit Conrad’s fore-
head with it, which killed the German king. Sim.Kéza, 169; Chr.Hung., 308; Chr.Mon., 65; 
Chr.Müg., 142–143; Chr.Ryth.Müg., 253–254; Joh.Thur., § 243–244 (p. 71).
526 LeoDiac., IX 8 (pp. 151–152); Talbot, Sullivan 2005, 195.
527 Most researchers assume, however, that these beliefs were typical of the steppe dwellers, 
which Leon mistakenly attributed to the Rus’. Moravcsik 1955, 74–76; Terras 1965, 401.
528 Paroń 2011, 127–128.
529 According to Herodotus, a Scythian drinks the blood of the first opponent he felled in 
battle (Hdt., IV 64 (pp. 260, 262)). Drinking human blood was commonly attributed to 
Hungarians in the early period of their history. Regino, sub anno 889 (p. 133), and many 
Latin chroniclers after him. Cf. Paroń 2011, 131–132. See also Liutprand., II 2 (p. 37).
530 The Hungarians reportedly devoured the hearts of the people they captured (Regino, 
sub anno 889 (p. 133)); the Pechenegs were also said to practice cannibalism and eat the 
flesh of corpses (cf. part two of this chapter). Generally speaking, ascribing cannibalistic 
practices to various Eurasian nomadic peoples was a fairly common motif in medieval 
European literature. It is usually difficult to determine whether we are dealing with slan-
der, a real ritual that has been greatly exaggerated, or an extreme hunger-driven necessity. 
Cf. Guzman 1991, 31–68; Schmieder 2005, 159–179; Gießauf 2006, 118, 123, 129; Paroń 2011, 
131–132.
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human behaviour ceased to apply to him, as he had become a wild beast pos-
sessed by furor heroicus.531 The opponent was also dehumanized and was 
granted the status of game. If he were a particularly dangerous and power-
ful enemy, when he died, he would provide a trophy in the form of specially 
processed skull.532 This custom, common among the steppe peoples, was also 
practiced among the Pechenegs.533
During a military expedition, steppe warriors would become a horde of wild 
animals, a pack of wolves that would tear to pieces everything and everyone 
they encountered. Their actions were controlled only by their specific tactical 
and strategic goals. Glaring displays of cruelty could be interpreted as an ele-
ment of their terror tactics, aimed at weakening the will to fight in the com-
munity under attack. A shock dose of terror atomizes a society, turning it into 
a group of intimidated individuals incapable of resistance. Explanations of 
this kind, however, should not obscure the fact that an attack on another 
community could have been understood by the steppe dwellers as a kind of 
primeval hunt, during which warriors pursued prey like a horde of wild ani-
mals. From such a perspective, every military expedition was a re-creation, 
a renewal, of a primeval myth, with every warrior becoming a wolf, a hunter 
and a predator.534 Crossing beyond the boundaries of humanity, becoming 
a wild beast, and unleashing its distinctive murderous impulses was exactly 
the opposite of the military ethos typical of the Byzantine Empire and Latin 
Europe. The Roman and Judeo-Christian traditions assumed that a primeval 
warrior would be tamed and his thirst for murder curbed. He was to turn into a 
soldier or knight who turns to violence in strictly defined situations, and never 
against the defenceless or those who, like prisoners-of-war, relied on his grace.
The military prowess of the Pechenegs, though frightening, prompted 
neighbouring political powers to ally with them or simply benefit from their 
short-term military support. Emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus was 
in favour of close cooperation with these nomads. Other rulers were more 
inclined to treat them as useful mercenaries. Even the most short-lived cooper-
ation required a guarantee of loyalty from the steppe people. They were often 
required to hand over hostages, which is what the Byzantine patrician John 
Bogas did when he formed an alliance with the Pechenegs against Simeon, the 
531 Eliade 1972, 5–8, 18–20.
532 Ma Yong 1989, 184–190.
533 The Pecheneg prince Kuria supposedly made a cup out of the skull of Prince Sviatoslav 
Igorevich after he was killed at the Dnieper Rapids. PVL 1, AM 6480 (972), col. 74.
534 Cf. Eliade 1988, 1.
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ruler of Bulgaria.535 Constantine VII advised following the same procedure.536 
The Rus’ also demanded hostages, as evidenced by the example of Prince Igor, 
who benefited from the help of Pecheneg mercenaries during his expedition 
against the Greeks (944).537 Such agreements were confirmed with solemn 
vows, which, as Constantine Porphyrogenitus writes, the steppe people swore 
according to their own customs.538 Unfortunately, we do not know what the 
text of the oath sworn by the Pechenegs or the related ceremony was like, but 
its form can be inferred from comparative data. For example, it is known that 
the Danube Bulgars swore an oath on their swords.539 The ceremony may have 
been accompanied by a sacrifice, as indicated by the passage from Michael 
Psellos cited earlier in the chapter.540 While taking the oath to adhere to a 
peace agreement with Byzantine, the Bulgars representing Omurtag chopped 
up bodies of dogs they had sacrificed earlier.541 The Mongols preceded their 
taking of a ‘supreme oath’ with the sacrifice of a stallion, an ox and a male dog. 
The animals were killed with a sword, and the following pledge was uttered:
Oh God! Oh Heaven! Oh Earth! Listen to us. We are taking an oath […]. 
If we do not keep our word and break our oath, we should become like 
these animals.542
However, even the most solemnly sworn agreements could be broken. 
Byzantine and other authors constantly complained about betrayals of trust 
by the Pechenegs. This was an element present in almost every description of 
them. It is difficult to resist the impression that attributing breeches of faith to 
steppe peoples was a kind of topos. Pechenegs, as pagans and barbarians, by 
definition deserved epithets like ‘unfaithful and infamous’. In some cases, how-
ever, we are dealing with more than just a stereotypical quality. Nikephoros 
Bryennios, duke of Dyrrachion and a contender for the imperial throne after 
the overthrow of Michael VII Dukas, enjoyed a peculiar form of loyalty from 
the steppe dwellers. Though the Pechenegs were allies in his struggle for 
535 Th.Cont., 386–387; Io.Scyl., 201–202 (v. 49–55); Wortley 2010, 196.
536 DAI, VII–VIII (pp. 54–57).
537 PVL 1, AM 6452 (944), col. 45.
538 DAI, VIII (p. 56/7).
539 Nic.Pap., LXVII (p. 591). Cf. Zlatarski 1972a, 181–189; Tryjarski 1975, 327.
540 Cf. note 60.
541 Th.Cont., 31. Cf. Tryjarski 1975, 327. The sacrifice of dogs while swearing to abide by politi-
cal treaties was also practiced by the Hungarians and the Cumans. Sinor 1992, 301–307.
542 Rašid ad-Din, I 2, 189; Togan 1998, 94. Cf. Kałużyński 1983, 99. Another oath-taking ritual 
recorded in The Secret History of the Mongols was the cutting in half crosswise of a stallion 
and a mare. Rachewiltz 2004, I, 63.
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power, this did not prevent them from surrounding Adrianople, home of the 
Bryennios family, and threatening to attack the city. They left only after obtain-
ing a handsome ransom.543 They behaved equally viciously during the Battle 
of Galabrye (1078), which was a decisive conflict in the struggle for control of 
the empire. In it the nomads fought as allies of Nikephoros Bryennios. Their 
role was to attack the rear of the army commanded by Alexios Komnenos, 
who was then serving as Commander-in-chief (domestikos tōn scholōn) under 
Emperor Nikephoros Botaneiates. Initially, the nomads dutifully fulfilled this 
task, forcing some of the enemy units to flee. However, when they saw the 
enemy retreating in panic, they did not purse them, but instead, led by a lust 
for spoils, attacked Bryennios’s rear guard, which created confusion in the 
ranks of the army, as warriors fled from them.544 This act of betrayal contrib-
uted to the defeat of the former duke of Dyrrachion. Another example is pro-
vided by Thietmar, who describes an episode during Bolesław I the Brave’s first 
expedition to Kiev (1013) involving the rebellion of a Pecheneg auxiliary unit. 
Unfortunately, we do not know the reason for their mutiny, but this time, their 
turning against their ally was severely punished. The Polish ruler ordered the 
execution of the steppe-dwellers.545 Finally, during the last war between the 
Pechenegs and the Byzantine Empire, which took place in the years 1087–1091, 
the Pechenegs regularly violated agreements.546
Behaviour of this kind inevitably led to the construction of an image of the 
Pechenegs as extremely disloyal and unpredictable political partners. Such a 
perception of them, as we have seen, was dictated by actual experiences and 
not only by literary traditions. Another situation that contributed to the cre-
ation of the image of the Pechenegs as lacking a political shape was the lack of 
an overt decision-making centre. Their segmented political structure indeed 
made it difficult for neighbouring states to develop a means of communicating 
with them. In order for any political agreement to be binding for the whole 
community, it had to be accepted by all the tribes of the community, or at least 
the most important ones. These circumstances also made it more difficult for 
the nomads to hold to an agreement.
This multi-headed organism might have seemed to the elites of the neigh-
bouring monarchies to be something akin to a horde of wild animals with which 
one could not make an arrangement, one which could not be controlled, and 
543 Mich.Att., 476/7–478/9; Io.Zon., XVIII 18 (p. 717); Trapp 1986, 153. Cf. Chapter 7 of the pres-
ent book.
544 Mich.Att., 528/9; Nic.Bryenn., IV 6–7, 9–13 (pp. 269–279); An.Kom., I 5–6 (pp. 20–27); 
Sewter 2009, 17–23. Cf. Chapter 7 of the present book.
545 Thietmar, VI 91 (p. 382).
546 Cf. Chapter 7 of the present book.
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which used and only understood the language of violence. It must be admit-
ted, however, that the Pechenegs themselves contributed to this perception. 
At decisive moments they opted for instinctive solutions, which most often 
involved following native traditions and emphasizing their independence. 
Due to the absence of a strong decision-making centre, however, they did not 
understand the consequences of their choices, nor were they able to develop a 
far-reaching political strategy.
Their sense of community was based on an ethnic awareness that was 
experienced and manifested in various ways. Traditions were the main factor 
bonding the Pecheneg community. Unfortunately, little is known about these. 
Comparative material allows us merely to affirm the attachment of the people 
in question to a nomadic lifestyle and the activities associated with it. We know 
very little about the Pechenegs’ native beliefs, although they were probably – 
through institutions typical of steppe religions (e.g., the cult of ancestors) – one 
of the main determinants of their sense of community. The lack of data on a 
common origo gentis is troubling and puzzling. Apart from information about 
the ‘Kangar’ tribes, we do not know anything about the traditional version of 
the story of the origins of the Pechenegs. It is difficult to say whether this is 
due to gaps in our source base or to the true absence of such a story, stemming 
from the nature of their political organization, which shifted the cultivation of 
community traditions to the level of the individual tribe. The Pechenegs cer-
tainly cultivated their genealogy, though this also mostly occurred within the 
individual units of their political organization.
The strength of the ethnic solidarity among the Pechenegs is often 
questioned.547 Researchers emphasize in particular the alleged tendency 
of nomads to work in the service of foreign political powers (especially 
Byzantium) and the abundance of internal feuds that split their political 
organism. This kind of argument is not very convincing because such problems 
affected every community. Nothing here proves the particular susceptibility 
of the Pechenegs to the influence of various centrifugal tendencies. Even the 
betrayal of Kegenes, who could seemingly be considered an almost exemplary 
renegade, should be seen as an example of attachment to the community. The 
fact that he acted against it, or more specifically, against its leaders, should not 
obscure the fact that this community remained an important reference point 
for his actions to the very end. In fact, he consistently sought to gain power 
over the entire Pecheneg ethnos. His initial defeat in his rivalry with Tyrach 
resulted in Kegenes’ finding himself outside the community. Together with his 
547 Cf. first part of this chapter.
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supporters, he became an outcast, a lone wolf. His entering into Byzantine ser-
vice was not a break or a change in identity, but rather a means to continue 
carrying on his challenge.548 Of course, there were cases of voluntary or forced 
abandonment of the native ethnos among the Pecheneg tribes. However, these 
were not always irreversible; moreover, they were often associated with cul-
tivating the old (Pecheneg) identity in the new community. Although we do 
not know much about the components of the Pechenegs’ ethnic traditions, it 
is worth remembering that for about 300 years these steppe-dwellers existed 
as an independent political organism, despite having experienced a number 
of severe crises that could have shattered their community. It would not have 
been possible to survive for such a long period of time without the existence 
and constant renewal of a strong sense of identity.
548 Cf. Chapters 6 and 7.
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chapter 5
The Apex of the Pechenegs’ Political Importance
5.1 Borders and Internal Territorial Divisions of the Newly-Created 
Patzinacia
As a result of the events described in Chapter Three, the Pechenegs assumed 
control over vast stretches of the Black Sea steppe. We owe our knowledge of 
their move to a new homeland to Constantine Porphyrogenitus, who wrote in 
Chapter 37 of De administrando imperio:
Four tribes of the Pechenegs, that is to say, the thema of Kouartzitour 
and the thema of Syroukalpeï and the thema of Borotalmat and the 
thema of Boulatzopon, lie beyond the Dnieper river towards the eastern 
and northern parts that face Uzia and Chazaria and Alania and Cherson 
and the rest of the klimata. The other four tribes lie on this side of the 
Dnieper river, towards the western and northern parts, that is to say that 
the thema of Giazichopon is neighbour to Bulgaria, the thema of Kato 
Gyla is neighbour to Tourkia, the thema of Charaboï is neighbour to Rus’, 
and the thema of Iabdiertim is neighbour to the tributary territories of 
the country of Rus’, to the Oultines and Dervlenines and Lenzenines and 
the rest of the Slavs. Patzinacia is distant a five days journey from Uzia 
and Chazaria, a six days journey from Alania, a ten days journey from 
Mordia, one day’s journey from Rus’, a four days journey from Tourkia, 
half a day’s journey from Bulgaria; to Cherson it is very near, and to 
Bosporus closer still.1
1 DAI, XXXVII (p. 168/169). ‘᾽Ιστέον, ὅτι αἱ τέσσαρες τῶν Πατζινακιτῶν γενεαί, ἤγουν τὸ θέμα 
Κουαρτζιτζοὺρ καὶ τὸ θέμα Συρουκαλπέη καὶ τὸ θέμα Βοροταλμὰτ καὶ τὸ θέμα Βουλατζοπόν, κεῖνται 
πέραν τοῦ Δανάπρεως ποταμοῦ πρὸς τὰ ἀνατολικώτερα καὶ βορειότερα μέρη, ἐναποβλέποντα πρὸς 
τε Οὐζίαν καὶ Χαζαρίαν καὶ Ἀλανίαν καὶ τὴν Χερσῶνα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κλίματα. Αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι τέσσαρες 
γενεαὶ κεῖνται ἔνθεν τοῦ Δανάπρεως ποταμοῦ πρὸς τὰ δυτικώτερα καὶ ἀρκτικώτερα μέρη, τουτέστιν 
τὸ θέμα Γιαζιχοπὸν πλησιάζει τῇ Βουλγαρίᾳ, τὸ δὲ θέμα τοῦ κάτω Γύλα πλησιάζει τῇ Τουρκίᾳ, τὸ δὲ 
θέμα τοῦ Χαραβόη πλησιάζει τῇ Ῥωσίᾳ, τὸ δὲ θέμα Ἰαβδιερτὶμ πλησιάζει τοῖς ὑποφόροις χωρίοις 
χώρας τῆς Ῥωσίας, τοῖς τε Οὐλτίνοις καὶ Δερβλενίνοις καὶ Λενζενίνοις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς Σκλάβοις. 
Ἀπῴκισται δὲ ἡ Πατζινακία ἐκ μὲν Οὐζίας καὶ Χαζαρίας ὁδὸν ἡμερῶν πέντε, ἐκ δὲ Ἀλανίας ὁδὸν 
ἡμερῶν ἕξ, ἀπὸ δὲ Μορδίας ὁδὸν ἡμερῶν δέκα, ἀπὸ δὲ Ῥωσίας ὁδὸν ἡμέρας μιᾶς, ἀπὸ δὲ Τουρκίας 
ὁδὸν ἡμερῶν τεσσάρων, ἀπὸ δὲ Βουλγαρίας ὁδὸν ἡμέρας τὸ ἥμισυ, καὶ εἰς Χερσῶνα μέν ἐστιν ἔγγι-
στα, εἰς δὲ τὴν Βόσπορον πλησιέστερον.’
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In Chapter 42, the learned Basileus adds:
From the lower reaches of the Danube river, opposite to Distra, Patzinacia 
stretches along, and its inhabitants control the territory as far as Sarkel, 
the fortress of the Chazars […].2
A key issue and one that offers a starting point for our discussion in this chap-
ter is the problem of the borders of Patzinacia. In light of the two above pas-
sages, the most obvious interpretation is that the newcomers occupied the 
area from the Lower Danube to the Don. This territory roughly corresponds to 
the former domain of the Magyars, called by them Etelköz.3 This information 
leads to the conclusion that the Pechenegs extended their rule over this area 
relatively quickly in the late 9th or early 10th century.
However, this interpretation has long been controversial. A number of pri-
marily Bulgarian and Romanian researchers question the value of the writ-
ten sources used to reconstruct the borders of the territory occupied by the 
Pechenegs at the turn of the 9th and 10th centuries.4 The information contained 
in De administrando imperio, especially Chapter 42, is supposed to describe the 
state of political affairs at the time the work was written, i.e., the mid-10th cen-
tury. This suggests that the steppe peoples conquered the territories west of the 
Dniester as late as around 950 or shortly before. Bulgarian scholars also refer 
to certain fragments of De administrando imperio that apparently indicate the 
existence of a Bulgarian state dominating the left bank of the Danube even in 
the times of Constantine Porphyrogenitus. In the initial part of Chapter Eight, 
we find a reference that some Pecheneg tribes supposedly inhabited some part 
of Bulgaria, located near the Dnieper, Dniester and ‘the other rivers of those 
parts.’5 This account clearly shows, however, that the part of Bulgaria across 
the Danube was already in the hands of the Pechenegs, so it is difficult to 
consider the passage as a decisive argument in this dispute. One can attempt 
on its basis to prove the existence of Bulgarian control over some part of the 
Black Sea steppe region, but not during the time De administrando imperio was 
2 DAI, XLII (p. 182/183). ‘᾽Απὸ δὲ κάτωθεν τῶν μερῶν Δανούβεως ποταμοῦ τῆς Δίστρας ἀντίπερα 
ἡ Πατζινακία παρέρχεται, καὶ κατακρατεῖ ἡ κατοικία αὐτῶν μέχρι τοῦ Σάρκελ, τοῦ τῶν Χαζάρων 
κάστρου, […].’ The English translation of R.J.H. Jenkins in both quoted passages has been 
slightly modified.
3 DAI, XXXVII 68–71 (p. 170); XXXVIII 64–71 (p. 174); XL 23–25 (p. 176). Cf. Chapter 3 of the pres-
ent book.
4 Diaconu 1970, 11–25; Bozhilov 1973, 37–62; Dimitrov 2011, 208–216; Cf. Mladjov 1998, 85–128.
5 DAI, VIII 5–7 (p. 54/55). Cf. Bozhilov 1973, 55–59; Mladjov 1998, 87; Dimitrov 2011, 209.
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written. In the following chapter, devoted to navigation along the trade route 
‘from the Varangians to the Greeks’, there is a brief mention that the Rus’ were 
no longer under any threat from the Pechenegs after passing by the island of 
St. Gregory situated on the Dnieper River. The nomads posed a danger to them 
again only in the vicinity of Sulina, the middle branch of the Danube Delta.6 
This information was also the basis for speculation about the Bulgarians pos-
sessing territory across the Danube. It was assumed that since the Pechenegs 
could not reach the Rus’ while sailing between the mouths of the Dnieper 
and the Danube, some part of the Black Sea coast and its interior must have 
been under the political control of Bulgarian groups situated between the two 
rivers.7 However, it is easy to agree with Dimitri Obolensky that the only con-
clusion that can be drawn from the above mention in De administrando impe-
rio is that the Rus’ sailed on the open sea between the mouth of the Dnieper 
and Sulina, where they were safe from attack by the Pechenegs.8
The possibility of Bulgarian dominion over areas north of the Danube in 
the 10th century is also supposedly proven by a passage in John Skylitzes’ 
chronicle in which the author describes events accompanying the restoration 
of the Byzantine border on the lower Danube. Emperor John I Tzimiskes is 
said to have met with the commanders of border strongholds to accept tribute 
from them. It is rightly assumed that these were the commanders of Bulgarian 
fortifications, which the chronicler describes as ‘Constantia and the other for-
tresses established beyond the Danube.’9 However, this passage raises serious 
doubts. In Skylitzes’ wording there is clear logical conjunctive link between 
‘Constantia and the other fortresses’, which leads us to conclude that they 
should be located on the same, north bank of the river. The problem here is 
that Romanian researchers have located the above-mentioned fortification 
in Dobrudja, south of the Danube.10 This renders interpretation of Skylitzes’ 
passage problematic. Finally, we should note that the existence of Bulgarian 
fortresses in the foreground of the Danube has not been archaeologically 
6  DAI, IX 78–79, 93–98 (pp. 60–63).
7  Dimitrov 2011, 208.
8  DAI-Com., 56.
9  Io.Scyl., 301 (v. 97–98); Wortley 2010, 287. ‘πρέσβεις ἐκ Κωνσταντείας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φρουρίων 
τῶν πέραν ἱδρυμένων τοῦ ᾽Ίστρου.’ Cf. Diaconu 1970, 23–24 (also n. 40).
10  Diaconu 1970, 24 (also n. 40); Madgearu 2013, 32–35. The latter assumes that the quoted 
passage refers to some strongholds located in the foreland of Dorostolon (Dristra), which 
would mean that they would be located at the borders of the Pecheneg sphere of influ-
ence described by Constantine Porphyrogenitus.
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confirmed.11 The absence of the Bulgarian centres of power in this region also 
seem to be very revealing.12
One last argument for a Bulgarian presence is the creation of a military 
province called ‘Western Mesopotamia’ (Μεσοποταμία τῆς Δύσεως) in the last 
quarter of the 10th century, after the restoration of the Byzantine border on the 
Danube. On the mere basis of this fact, it has been assumed that it was estab-
lished in formerly Bulgarian territory, which was probably located north of the 
lower reaches of the Danube. Today, however, the dominant view seems to be 
that this ‘interfluve’ was located in northern Dobrudja.13
A review of the interpretations above seems to indicate that the informa-
tion from available narrative sources do not provide grounds for questioning 
the notion of Pecheneg dominance over the Black Sea steppe from the Don to 
the Lower Danube at the turn of the 9th and 10th centuries.
A more complicated picture is drawn by analyses of archaeological data. It 
has long been noted that the oldest archaeological sites possibly associated 
with the Pechenegs, of which the vast majority are burial sites, are located 
between the Prut and Dniester Rivers and date back to the latter half of the 
10th century.14 A characteristic feature of these sites is that they often occur in 
the vicinity of findings attributed to the agricultural population of the Dridu 
culture. Only in the early years of the following century did the settled popula-
tion begin to gradually withdraw to mountain and upland areas, less typical of 
the nomads or simply more difficult for them to access.15 More to the west, in 
11  The only fortress that can be associated with the Bulgarian state is the Slon fortification, 
located on the southern ridge of the Carpathian Mountains and abandoned in the first 
decades of the 10th century. Cf. Ciupercă 2010, 281. In addition, the Giurgiu fortification, 
dating back to the late 10th century, is located west of Dristra. Cf. Ioaniţă 2005, 49–54, 174 
(fig. 2).
12  It is worth mentioning that fortifications enable effective control of a particular region. 
Movable remains of a people’s presence, although they undoubtedly indicate a cultural 
influence, cannot be treated as evidence of political domination. Cf. Comşa 1960, 395–
422. Comşa assumes that findings from the northern bank of the Danube, dating from the 
9th or 10th century show similar features to those from the south (Pliska, Madara, Preslav, 
Rasgrad, Popina, etc.), which proves the political control Bulgarian rulers exerted over 
this region, and which supposedly only ceased during the reign of Tsar Peter, around 950.
13  Madgearu 1999, 421; 2013, 41–42. The ‘Western Mesopotamia’ thema is considered to have 
been located between the Danube, the Caraș valley and the Black Sea.
14  Diaconu 1970, 15–17; Bálint 1989, 142, 144; Ioaniţă 2004, 469 (21 burials, which the researcher 
dates to the 11th or 12th centuries and considers to be of Pecheneg or Cuman origin); 2010, 
115–134; Postică 2007, 91.
15  Diaconu 1970, 37–48; 1975, 237; Spinei 1975, 274; 1986, 103. Cf. Chapter 6.2 of the present 
book.
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the area of the Bărăgan Plain (eastern Wallachia), Pecheneg burial sites are 
much less frequent and usually date back to the 11th century. Researchers 
working in the area between the Lower Danube and the southern arch of 
the Carpathians point to a clear drop in the number of open agricultural 
settlements during that century. This phenomenon persists in the following 
centuries.16
The findings presented above are very important, but it is essential to clarify 
what they actually prove, and, to be more precise, whether they indicate the 
increasing presence of nomads in areas west of the Dniester, and whether they 
might also indicate the nature of the process by which this political penetra-
tion took place. It is difficult to question the first point. The Pechenegs, who 
in the late 10th century most likely began to withdraw under pressure from 
the Uzes, most likely lost some of their encampment areas east of the Dnieper 
River. As a result, a part of this people was forced to move onto the steppe 
of the Prut-Dniester interfluve, which in turn led to the exodus of the local 
agricultural population.17 In terms of the Pechenegs’ political influence, the 
situation is somewhat different. Available comparative material provides a suf-
ficient basis for concluding that the introduction of nomad political domina-
tion over such settled communities did not necessarily result in a disturbance 
in the lives of the latter, as confirmed by archaeological material. It was usually 
in the interest of the nomads to subordinate the agricultural population and 
take advantage of its labour, and never to destroy these communities without 
legitimate cause. It is worth noting that the Avar Khaganate, the heart of which 
comprised the river valley of the Tisza and the central Danube, had under its 
control numerous Slavic and Germanic (mainly Gepids) communities, and 
even a post-Roman population.18 The existence of an enclave of such a group 
is confirmed by findings from the area south of Lake Balaton.19
This same phenomenon is even more evident in the case of the Khazar 
Empire. In addition to a heartland centre located on the steppe between the 
Caucasus, Caspian Sea, Don and lower Volga and inhabited by the state’s politi-
cal elites, the imperial rulers controlled huge stretches of land that transcended 
the borders of the steppe and forest steppe and was inhabited by a very cul-
turally diverse population.20 Finally, there is the example of ‘Old Scythia’ 
or, following the classification of Anatoly Khazanov,21 the Second Scythian 
16  Comşa 1960, 422; Ioaniţă 2005, 110; Spinei 2009, 105–106, 198.
17  Cf. Chapter 6.1 of the present book.
18  Szymański 1979, 52–63; Pohl 1988, 225–236; Vida 2008, 13–46.
19  Müller 1992, 278–281; Heinrich-Tamáska 2012, 228–232.
20  Dunlop 1954, 140–142; Noonan 2001, 77. Cf. also Chapter 2 of the present book.
21  Khazanov 1978b, 427–429.
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Kingdom, which stretched across the Black Sea steppe, between the Don and 
the Danube. Its political centre, inhabited by the Royal Scythians, was located 
on the steppe to the east of the Dnieper-Borysthenes, while the territories 
to the west of the river were occupied by agricultural communities.22
This last analogy is quite revealing. It seems to clarify uncertainties about 
the Pechenegs’ abilities to the quickly bring areas west of the Dniester River 
under their control. They were most likely mainly based more to the east, but 
this does not change the fact that relatively early on, probably in the early 
10th century, they extended their control west all the way to Dristra, onto the 
Bărăgan Plain. They did all the more easily because the only political power 
capable of stopping them at the turn of the 9th and 10th centuries was Bulgaria, 
which under Simeon’s rule (893–927) was engaged in a fierce rivalry with 
the Byzantine Empire, which obviously had to limit its activity on the Black 
Sea steppe.
The Pechenegs thus controlled wide stretches of land from the lower Don 
and the Khazar stronghold of Sarkel to the lower Danube. The southern border 
of their sphere of influence ran from the mouth of the Don along the northern 
shores of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea to the Danube Delta, all the way to 
Dristra. It is not clear however whether the areas around the estuaries of the 
Don, Dnieper, Dniester and Danube were also controlled by the Pechenegs.23 
It is believed that the island of St. Eterius, located at the mouth of Dnieper, 
was in the hands of the Byzantine Empire.24 In the case of the Danube, the 
Pechenegs had access to Sulina, the middle branch of its mouth. There is also 
contradictory information about the presence of these nomads in the Crimea. 
Their permanent settlement in its northern, steppe regions seem to be con-
firmed by De administrando imperio (passage cited above). A reference in 
Chapter 42, however, seems to suggest another interpretation. Constantine VII 
mentions here that the ancients (οἱ παλαιοί) dug a canal across the Isthmus of 
Perekop, connecting Crimea with the continent. However, as time passed, the 
canal they created became filled with silt, and a large forest grew in its place, 
through which two roads led to the peninsula. These were supposedly used 
by the Pechenegs when they travelled to Kherson or the Bosporus.25 The last 
statement would suggest that northern Crimea was not (at least in the time 
of Constantine VII) yet inhabited by them.26 This troublesome contradiction 
22  Cf. Chapter 2 of the present book.
23  Cf. Shcherbak 1959, 368.
24  DAI-Com., 56.
25  DAI, XLII 78–83 (p. 186).
26  Cf. Romashov 1999, 26.
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seems impossible to solve. We can only posit that the Pechenegs may have 
controlled northern Crimea, but may have also used it as an occasional site 
for their nomadic settlements.27 The western border of Patzinacia was most 
likely the arching belt of the Carpathians, in the east the Pechenegs’ political 
influence most likely reached the Don, though here too archaeological materi-
als complicate the conclusions we can draw from the account of Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus. Communities associated with the Saltovo-Maiaki culture 
(connected with the Khazar Khaganate) in the forest steppe interfluve of the 
middle Don and upper Donets survived the migration of the Pechenegs. Their 
destruction came only in the latter half of the 10th century and was probably 
brought about not by the Pechenegs, but by the Rus’.28 Some researchers also 
assume that the Black Bulgars lived on the northern shores of the Sea of Azov 
as early as at the early 10th century. Although they later moved to the north 
in the mid-10th century, their migration was gradual, so it did not represent 
a sudden flight from the Pechenegs.29 In order to reconcile the image cre-
ated by advancements in archaeological research with the data from written 
sources, it should be recognized that the situation at the eastern end of the 
Pechenegs’ territory could have been analogous to that on the western end, i.e., 
the political expansion of the nomads may not have been accompanied by the 
expansion of their settlements. In some areas between the Don and Donets, 
cohabitation between the Saltovo-Maiaki population and nomads could have 
occurred.30 The close proximity of the still strong Khazar Khaganate could also 
have led to the establishment of a division in terms of political influence, a 
sort of Khazar-Pecheneg condominium, especially in the forest steppe part of 
this area.
The northern border of Patzinacia is the most difficult to outline. Petr 
Golubovskii was among the first to express the seemingly accurate view that 
the border was really never clearly delineated during the Pechenegs’ presence 
on the Black Sea steppe.31 This could have been a frequent cause of tensions 
between the nomads and their settled neighbours.32 Since the natural environ-
ment of the nomads were steppe and forest steppe areas, their borders can be 
used to determine the furthest extent of their political domination, which most 
27  Contrary to the account of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, the Pecheneg burials found in 
this area seem to indicate this. Pletneva 1958, 154 (map); Garustovich, Ivanov 2001, 128–9 
(map 1); Makarova, Aibabin 2003, 74–81.
28  Zhivkov 2015, 132–133.
29  Artamonov 1962, 358; Zhivkov 2015, 128–129.
30  Mikheev 1985, 99; Zhivkov 2015, 219.
31  Golubovskii 1884, 70; Cf. Shcherbak 1959, 375.
32  Noonan 1992, 303. Cf. also Chapter 4.4 of the present book.
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likely was the northern end of the forest steppe zone. This border is currently 
drawn along the following line: Rivne-Zhitomir-Kiev-Konotop-Briansk-Tula.33 
Topomastic data seems to indicate a Pecheneg presence as far as the vicin-
ity of today’s Kaluga,34 as well as Przemyśl, Sokal, and Volodimir-Volins’kii, 
and thus crossing the boundaries of the forest zone.35 The last cases, however, 
most likely represent instances of late settlement, when the Pechenegs had 
already lost their independence and were dispersed. The northern boundary 
of the Pecheneg sphere of influence was probably marked by the territories 
occupied by the young Rus’ state and the East Slavic tribes subordinate to 
it. It is assumed that the Severians and Viatichi, who inhabited areas east of 
the Dnieper River, were forced to abandon their southernmost settlements. 
The Viatichi left an area on the upper Don that extended to the mouth of the 
Voronezh River. The Severians moved across the Sula River. The reason for both 
migrations was most likely the expansion of the Pechenegs.36 The Uliches and 
Tiverians shared a similar fate. The former originally inhabited the territory 
on the right bank of the Dnieper River, from the rapids to the Tiasmin River, 
the settlements of the latter stretched between the Dniester, Prut and Danube 
to the Black Sea. As a result of the Pechenegs’ arrival, the main centres of 
Ulich settlement moved to areas by the Stugna River, in the immediate vicin-
ity of Kiev. Today it is known as the site of the Peresechen’ stronghold. The 
Tiverians moved north of the estuary of the Reut, a right-bank tributary of the 
Dniester.37 Therefore, based on data on the migration of East Slavic tribes, we 
can assume that the territory controlled by the Pechenegs in the north-east 
33  Szymański 1990, 475. Cf. Chapter 1 of the present book.
34  Shcherbak 1959, 375.
35  Kucharski, Lewicki 1934, 45–46; Rasovskii 1933, 7; Kuczyński 1965, 42; 1954–56, 274.
36  Szymański 1990, 480, 484; 1973, 46; 1977, 412–413; Łowmiański 1975a, 177; Sedov 1982, 142; 
Timoshchuk 1995, 185; Zhivkov 2015, 219. Researchers, however, suggest different dates 
for when the Slavs supposedly left their homes by the Don River. Wojciech Szymański 
assumed that this had already happened by the end of the 9th century and connected 
this fact with the migration of the Pechenegs (especially in the case of the Viatichi). In 
the case of the Severians, Szymański suggested that the collapse of the ‘Romny’ culture 
associated with them occurred only in the 10th century and that this process was linked 
to the collapse of the Khazar Khaganate. Henryk Łowmiański dates the collapse of the 
Severian settlement process to the last decades of the 10th century and claims it was 
clearly connected with Pecheneg aggression against Rus’. Valentin Sedov makes similar 
points, though he places stronger emphasis on archaeological premises. Timoshchuk, 
meanwhile, dates the abandonment of the Severian settlements to the end of the 
9th century.
37  Szymański 1973, 47; 1990, 478–479; Sedov 1982, 130, 132; Romashov 1999, 30–31; Spinei 
2009, 87 (also for further literature on the subject). Spinei locates the Uliches a little fur-
ther south, in the area of the central basin of the Boh River.
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probably reached the confluence of the Voronezh and Don Rivers. Its border 
then moved westwards through areas around the sources of the Donets and 
Vorskla, up to Sula, which it probably never crossed. On the right bank of the 
Dnieper, the Pechenegs were originally separated from Kiev by Ulich settle-
ments, but in the mid-10th century, when due to a fierce rivalry with the Rurik 
dynasty, they moved onto the basin of the upper Boh and Dniester,38 while 
the territory controlled by the nomads most likely moved closer to the capital. 
Next, the border of the Pechenegs’ lands crossed the middle course of the Boh, 
the Dniester south of the mouth of the Reut, and the Prut and Siret, also in the 
middle course of both rivers, ultimately reaching the Carpathian Mountains.
This is what the borders of Patzinacia looked like; its internal divisions 
between the eight tribes mentioned by Constantine Porphyrogenitus is a sepa-
rate issue. There is no certainty as to when the boundaries of the territories 
occupied by Pechenegs were finally established. It can only be assumed that 
this happened shortly after the conquest of Etelköz. The most successful pro-
posal thus far for establishing the location of the Pecheneg tribes has been 
that presented by György Györffy.39 The Hungarian scholar based his conclu-
sions not only on the contents of Chapter 37 of De administrando imperio cited 
above, but also on information from other parts of this work concerning how 
contacts with the Pechenegs were established. Constantine Porphyrogenitus 
claims that the Pechenegs could be found most often in the vicinity of riv-
ers, because this is where they camped.40 Györffy also refers to observations 
made by William of Rubruck and John of Pian de Carpini, according to which 
Mongolian chiefs, who lived a nomadic life on the Black Sea steppe several 
hundred years after the departure of the Pechenegs, would also move in an 
oscillating pattern of movement along the right or left bank of a river between 
their summer and winter encampment sites. The latter were located not far 
from the sea, and the former in the north, deep in the forest steppe.41
Therefore, taking into account all the factors described above, Györffy 
assumes that the Giazichopon tribe, which lived a nomadic life in the region 
close to Bulgaria, occupied the area between the Lower Danube and the south-
ern arc of the Carpathian Mountains; the Kato Gyla/Chabouxingyla tribe, who 
were a four-day march from Tourkia, inhabited the area near the Prut and Siret 
38  Sedov 1982, 132.
39  Györffy 1975, 283–292.
40  DAI, VIII 5–7, 34–35 (pp. 54, 56).
41  Györffy 1975, 290. Notably, this way of nomadic life corresponds not only to Mongol cus-
toms, but also to the majority of Eurasian steppe peoples. Cf. Chapters 1 and 4.2 of the 
present book (economic considerations).
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Rivers; the Iabdiertim tribe, adjacent to the Slavic tribes under Rus’, controlled 
the area between the Dniester and Boh; and finally, the Charaboï tribe lived on 
the right bank of the Dnieper River. Constantine’s information on the location 
of the tribes of Eastern Patzinacia is somewhat less precise; however, based 
on the same premises, the Hungarian researcher places the nomads of the 
Kouartzitzour tribe on the left bank of the Dnieper River, the Syroukalpeï tribe 
on the Donets River, the Boulatzopon on the right bank of the Don, and the 
Borotalmat on the coasts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, from the mouth 
of the Dnieper river to the mouth of the Don.42
Györffy’s conclusions, although quite inspiring, are not without flaws. The 
researcher ignores certain archaeological data in his considerations, point-
ing to their questionable dating.43 However, the information provided by 
these sources cannot be ignored. Therefore, Györffy’s interpretation needs to 
be revised. It is difficult to assume that the Giazichopon tribe already inhab-
ited Wallachia in the first half of the 10th century. It is equally unlikely that 
the Borotalmats would move along the northern shores of the Sea of Azov all 
year round. In this case, Györffy ignores the main premise underlying his own 
conclusions. However, many of his assumptions should be considered accu-
rate. With some revisions, his placement of the left-bank Pechenegs, i.e., those 
inhabiting areas east of the Dnieper River, can be considered acceptable. The 
Kouartzitzour tribe could indeed have moved along the left bank of the Dnieper, 
the Syroukalpeï along the left bank of the Donets, and the Boulatzopon along 
the right bank of the Don. The Borotalmat tribe, on the other hand, could have 
42  Györffy 1975, 290–291. Cf. Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, map no. 1 (pp. 8–9). For other attempts to 
locate tribes based on data provided by Constantine Porphyrogenitus: Csebe 1922, 209–
219; Pletneva 1958, 154; Pritsak 1975, 218–219; Romashov 1999, 25–32; Kniaz’kii 2003, 24–30; 
Parczewski 2007, 168 (fig. 3). Csebe’s reasoning is based on the order in which the names 
of the various tribes are mentioned by Constantine Porphyrogenitus. The researcher 
focuses mainly on the tribes living on the right bank of the Dnieper River (cf. Tryjarski 
1975a, 570–571; Kurat 1937, 52–55). Pletneva suggests a very general localization. Unlike 
Györffy, Pletneva does not place any of the tribes by the Danube. Pritsak allocates indi-
vidual tribes mainly on the basis of data concerning the Pechenegs’ neighbours, which 
makes his method highly debatable. Kniaz’kii is only concerned with the right-bank 
Pechenegs. He does not place any of the tribes on the Dniester, but locates as many as two 
tribes on the Danube (Giazichopon, Chabouxingyla). Although Michał Parczewski takes 
into account natural conditions, he completely ignores the realities of nomadic lifestyle. 
The last defect also applies to the other authors, which leads to acceptance of a funda-
mentally erroneous concept, according to which individual tribes among the nomadic 
community, such as the Pechenegs, would live only in the area of the steppe or forest 
steppe all year round, when in fact they had to move between them.
43  Györffy 1975, 287.
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had their encampments on the right bank of the Donets or on smaller rivers 
flowing into the Sea of Azov. The location of the western tribes requires greater 
correction. The Charaboï most likely camped on the right bank of the lower 
Dnieper River. The location proposed by Györffy is supported by Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus’ information that this tribe was a neighbour of the Rus’ (most 
likely Kiev). In my opinion, the presumed location of the Iabdiertim should 
be moved to the right bank of the Boh. This location is also determined by 
archaeology. According to the information found in De administrando imperio, 
this tribe was supposedly located in close vicinity to groups which paid tribute 
to Rus’, including the Uliches, who are usually thought to have inhabited an 
area by the Boh. The Gyla/Chabouxingyla tribe’s nomadic habitat stretched 
along the right bank of the Dniester, which in its upper course approaches the 
arc of the Carpathians, which seems to explain mentions that this group of the 
Pechenegs was adjacent to Tourkia. The problem of the Giazichopon tribe’s 
location raises the most doubts. Archaeological data and the reality of steppe 
life do not allow us to accept the Lower Danube as a location for their encamp-
ments. At the same time, however, this group’s very close proximity to Bulgaria 
(half a day away) requires recognition of its presence in the area of the lower 
course of the river, close to its delta. Moreover, in the vicinity of Sulina, as men-
tioned above, the Pechenegs posed a threat to Rus’ sailors. Both premises con-
stitute hard evidence for the permanent presence of one of these Pecheneg 
groups in the area of the Prut-Dniester interfluve in the times of Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus.
At that time, the Giazichopon tribe most likely already had encampments 
there (mainly in Budjak, on the left bank of the Lower Dniester, and along the 
middle course of the Prut). This was not one of the most prominent Pecheneg 
groups, which suggests that it was also not very numerous. This made it rela-
tively easy for members of the tribe to find a modus vivendi with local farming 
communities, as indicated by archaeological data proving the cohabitation of 
both populations. The location of the Giazichopon also gave them control over 
the Pechenegs’ western sphere of influence.
To conclude our consideration of the territorial divisions of Patzinacia, it 
should be noted that the reconstruction presented here remains valid for the 
first three-quarters of the 10th century. The collapse of the Khazar Khaganate, 
dated on the basis of data from The Tale of the Bygone Years to the year 965, 
which was accompanied by the expansion of the Uzes, brought about funda-
mental political changes on the Black Sea steppe. As a result of these changes, 
the image of Patzinacia in De administrando imperio in the last decades of the 
10th century would become less and less accurate, and by the beginning of the 
next century, would already have become history.
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5.2 Political Relations between the Pechenegs and Their Neighbours
Once the Pechenegs gained control of a large part of the Black Sea Steppe, the 
borders they shared with numerous powers of varying significance gave them 
the ability to play a pivotal role as a balancing force in regional affairs. Based on 
the factors discussed earlier in the chapter, it is clear that the Pechenegs faced 
significant hindrances to fully exploiting their favourable geopolitical position. 
The most important of these was the lack of a clearly established centre of 
power, which meant that the Pechenegs’ behaviour in relations with the out-
side world sometimes involved impulsive behaviours, rather than deliberate 
political actions aimed at achieving some broader strategy. It is sometimes dif-
ficult to resist the impression that the role played by the Pechenegs in their 
external relations, although often significant, was mainly a negative one, i.e., a 
map 3 The Black Sea steppe in the Pecheneg Period, 1. Border of the steppe zone; 2. Border of the 
forest steppe zone; 3. Seasonal migrations of the Pecheneg tribal groups; 4. Saltovian hillforts 
and fortresses; 5.500–1000 m a.s.l.; 6. 1000–1500 m a.s.l.; 7. 500–2000 m a.s.l.; 8. Above 2000 m 
a.s.l.
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force posing a threat to neighbouring political powers. However, this percep-
tion seems to be an oversimplification.
The relationship best evidenced in the sources is that between the 
Pechenegs and the Byzantine Empire, a power that had a keen interest in 
developments on the Black Sea steppe. Initially, i.e., until the 970s, Crimea 
was the only place of contact between the nomads and the Byzantine Empire. 
The safety of Kherson and other Greek colonies on the southern shore of the 
peninsula depended on the quality of the relationship they maintained with 
the peoples who controlled their foreground. The city and thema of the same 
name were an important point from which Constantinople could observe the 
state of political relations north of the Empire’s borders and provided a base 
for carrying out possible diplomatic action.44 This situation is reflected in the 
writings of Constantine Porphyrogenitus.45 However, the key importance of 
the Pechenegs became most evident in connection with Rus’-Byzantine rela-
tions. The Scandinavian founders of the Kievan state, before they were ‘domes-
ticated’ and incorporated into the Byzantine Commonwealth, had long posed 
a potential threat to the Empire. This was particularly strongly demonstrated 
by the first Varangian invasion in 860.46 It showed that Rus’, using the waterway 
‘from the Varangians to the Greeks’, could easily threatened Constantinople. 
This fact distinguished them from other barbarians, who were able to attack 
the capital of the Empire, but always reached its walls by land. Meanwhile, the 
Rus’ were also capable of organizing a sea expedition. The safety of the capital 
city would decrease dramatically if the Kievan princes managed to establish 
settlements in Crimea. Evidence that they had made such attempts earlier can 
be found in one of the conditions of a treaty concluded in 944, in which Prince 
Igor pledged not to wage war on the peninsula.47 Success in such an endeavour 
would create a permanent threat not only to Constantinople, but also to the 
northern coast of Anatolia, which was the economic and demographic back-
bone of the Empire.48 This situation required that increasing priority be given 
to all political actions that could: 1) limit or completely halt Rus’ invasions, 
44  On the importance of Kherson for Byzantine politics in the Black Sea Steppe region: 
Wozniak 1979, 115–126; 1984, 301; Obolensky 1979, 123–133; 1993, 108–113; 1994, 7ff.; 1994a, 
55–57; 2000, 171–177; Romanchuk 1993, 58–64; Shepard 1998a, 172–174; 2009, 429 et passim.
45  DAI, I 25–28 (p. 48/49); VII (p. 54/55).
46  Vasiliev 1946; Ostrogorski 1967, 202; Levchenko 1956, 43–90; Pashuto 1968, 57–88; 
Obolensky 1994a, 42–43; 2000, 182–184; Sacharov 1980, 48–82; Petrosian 1998, 41–43; 
Duczko 2004, 83–86.
47  PVL 1, AM 9453 (945), col. 50–51.
48  Ostrogorski 1967, 290; Browning 1992, 106; Treadgold 1997, 371–380; Laiou, Morrisson 
2007, 43–49.
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2) keep the Rurikids’ state as far away as possible from the northern shores of 
the Black Sea, 3) be used to keep Rus’ in check from the Black Sea steppe side 
if they were to settle in the Crimea.
Ever since the Bulgarians settled there, the Balkan Peninsula, i.e., the 
region located between the lower Danube and the Balkan mountains, had 
become crucial to the interests of the Byzantine Empire.49 The presence of 
a strong and independent state in the foreground of Constantinople (the 
Byzantine border fortress at Debeltos was eight days away from the capital of 
the Empire50) was a considerable challenge for the Empire, which was often 
forced to engage its forces in fights against enemies violating its borders to 
the east. The Christianization of the Bulgarians (865 or 866) during the reign 
of Boris-Michael and the subordination of the young church organization, 
despite its far-reaching autonomy, to the authorities in Constantinople (870), 
seemed to form the basis for long-term peaceful cooperation between the two 
states.51 The rule of Simeon I (893–927) put an end to these overly optimistic 
expectations. Throughout most of his reign, the Byzantine Empire was forced 
to fiercely defend its territorial integrity and political primacy in the Balkans.52 
In such a situation, the inhabitants of the steppe could theoretically have been 
an important factor in counterbalancing the military power of Simeon’s state. 
The Bulgarian ruler was probably also interested in, if not cooperating with 
the nomads, then at least in ensuring their neutrality in the event of a conflict 
with the Empire. The Pechenegs’ taking control of the Black Sea steppe was 
therefore an event of great importance for both Constantinople and Preslav.
For Rus’ and many East Slavic tribes the changes that took place on the 
Black Sea steppe initially had negative consequences. Their territories most 
likely became subject to armed incursions by their bellicose neighbours,53 
with the intensity of these attack probably exceeded those experienced by 
the Byzantine Empire. In the case of Rus’, the Pecheneg encampments were 
located on the border of the forest steppe, close to the capital city of Kiev. 
Moreover, the settlements established by war-like nomads on the lower course 
49  Generally on Bulgarian-Byzantine relations: Browning 1975, 48–78; 1989, 23–32; Giuzelev 
1996, 219–236.
50  Browning 1991, 615–616; 1997, 102.
51  Ostrogorski 1967, 203–204; Browning 1975, 56; Wasilewski 1988, 52–53; Bozhilov, Giuzelev 
1999, 183–186; Leszka, Marinow 2015, 32–36, 43–52.
52  On Byzantine-Bulgarian relations and the political concepts of the Bulgarian ruler: 
Zlatarski 1927, 278–500; Runciman 1930, 133–177; 1988, 81–101; Ostrogorski 1967, 221–222, 
224–229; Browning 1975, 57–67; Bozhilov 1983; Fine 1983, 132–158; Bozhilov, Gjuzelev 1999, 
239–270; Leszka 2011, 55–70; 2013; Marinow 2011, 155–190; Leszka, Marinow 2015, 81–148.
53  This seems to be evidenced by the migrations of Slavic tribes, especially the Tiverians and 
the Uliches, discussed in the first part of this chapter.
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of the Dnieper River created a significant impediment to both trade and mili-
tary expansion by Rus’. Considering that one of the Rurikids’ main motives for 
conquering Kiev and the territory of the Polans was most certainly the desire 
to control the longest possible section of the trade route ‘from the Varangians 
to the Greeks’, the emergence of any obstacle limiting its use for trade was per-
ceived by the Kievan rulers as an extremely undesirable circumstance.54
Little is known about the relationship between the Pechenegs and the 
Khazar Khaganate. There are few reasons to suppose that after the Pechenegs 
settled on the Black Sea steppe, relations between the recent enemies 
improved. It seems significant that Constantine Porphyrogenitus does not 
include the Pechenegs among the peoples likely to attack the Khazars.55 
Meanwhile, another source mentions the formation of an anti-Khazar coali-
tion established by Constantinople’s diplomats during the reign of the Khazar 
ruler Benjamin. The coalition launched an attack, but was defeated with the 
help of the Alans. The Pechenegs were supposedly part of this group.56 It is 
difficult to date these events precisely. They probably took place in the late 9th 
or early 10th century.57 Regardless of how the relationships between these two 
peoples developed, the continued existence and ultimate fall of the Khazar 
state was of great importance for the history of the Pechenegs.
54  On the importance of trade for the Rus’ state: Pashuto 1968, 62ff; Shepard 1974a, 27. 
Sakharov 1980, 84–134; Litavrin 1992, 48; 1999, 442; Franklin, Shepard 1996, 118–120, 133; 
Szymański 1973, 119–123. Cf. also chapter 4.2 of this study.
55  Among the enemies of the Khazar were said to be the Alans, the Black Bulgars, and 
the Uzes. DAI, X–XII (p. 62–65). Cf. Huxley 1984, 79–80, 86–87; S. Runciman (1988, 115) 
assumed that the Pechenegs were not mentioned among the peoples capable of attacking 
the Khazars because an attack by them, according to the fears of Byzantine diplomats, 
could completely destroy the weakened Khaganate, which in turn, would have led to a 
political imbalance in the region. Such an explanation can hardly be considered satisfac-
tory, since the enemies of the Khazars included the Uzes, who were as dangerous as the 
Pechenegs, if not more so. Recently, James Howard-Johnston recognized the Pechenegs 
as clients of the Khazars. Both in the period preceding and following their migration to 
the Black Sea steppe, they were likely to have been part of the Khazar system, as were the 
Kama Bulgars and the Magyars. However, the British researcher presents practically no 
evidence to support his thesis. Howard-Johnston 2000, 349–350, 355–356; 2007a, 183–186, 
188–190, 191–192; 2007, 170, 172, 174.
56  Golb, Pritsak 1982, 112–115.
57  Cf. Golb, Pritsak 1982, 132–134 (Omelian Pritsak dates these events to 880–900). Cf. Golden 
1972, 77; Noonan 1992a, 115; Zuckerman 1995, 254 (just before 921–922). The last researcher, 
based on a very similarly sounding fragment of al-Gardizī, considers the possibility that 
the above-mentioned Khazar source recorded one of many clashes typical of the steppe.
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5.3 The History of the Pechenegs before 945. At a Political Crossroads
The relationships between the nomads and their neighbours outlined above 
involved geopolitical factors that potentially could, but didn’t necessarily have 
to, lead to an alliance or war. The Black Sea steppe in that period was an area 
where the interests of neighbouring countries intersected, a fact which natu-
rally increased the importance of the nomads who ruled over it. The nature of 
the Pechenegs’ political organization and some elements of their culture may 
have discouraged political powers potentially interested in an alliance with 
them. Moreover, their arrival in the Black Sea region had been extremely vio-
lent. The Magyars who were banished from Etelköz were not the only one who 
experienced its dramatic consequences. The Pechenegs’ raids, the main motive 
of which was most likely the desire to compensate for the material losses they 
had suffered during their clashes with the Khazars and Uzes, not only nega-
tively impacted the East Slavic tribes, for they also affected the Kherson thema 
as well. Although no available source provides information on when and under 
what circumstances the nomads invaded the southern Crimean colonies of the 
Byzantine Empire, their wealth was probably a significant factor in motivating 
the nomads to attack. The claims of Constantine Porphyrogenitus contained 
in the first chapter of De administrando imperio were most likely based on 
concrete historical observations and cannot be treated as purely theoretical 
digressions.58 These expeditions may have brought significant material ben-
efits to the Pechenegs, but they must have had a deeply negative impact on the 
quality of the relations between the nomads and the Byzantine Empire.
Apart from the attacks on Kherson, mutual distrust and hostility also 
resulted from a series of events that led to the arrival of the Pechenegs on the 
Black Sea steppe. We need to remember that their victory over the Magyars 
was achieved in alliance with the Bulgarian ruler Simeon I.59 With the help of 
the Pechenegs, he rid himself of troublesome neighbours who threatened his 
country from the north, which allowed him to defeat the Byzantine Empire at 
Boulgarofygon (896) and bring the war the two had been waging since 894 to 
a victorious end.60 The warring ruler’s later contacts with the Pechenegs are 
unclear. It is not impossible that these relations were friendly for some time. 
According to Constantine’s accounts, the Bulgarians, fearing nomad invasions, 
58  DAI, I 25–28 (p. 48/49).
59  Cf. Chapter 3 of the present book.
60  Leszka 2011, 64; 2013, 76–95.
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tried to maintain a peace with them.61 This very general statement, however, 
does not give us sufficient grounds to assume the existence of a permanent 
alliance between Bulgaria and the Pechenegs. The events of the second decade 
of the 10th century, when the nomads decided to enter into a short-term mili-
tary alliance with the Byzantine Empire, also raise doubts.62 The thesis that 
the Pechenegs occupied the lands north of the Danube with the consent of 
Bulgaria as its foederati is nothing but pure speculation.63 The concept of 
close relations existing between these two peoples based on ethnic affinities 
is even less likely. Even if the Pechenegs spoke Turkic, a language close to Old 
Bulgarian, the formerly nomadic Bulgar elites had already undergone a far-
reaching process of Slavicization and acculturation in the early-10th century. 
Thus, between the Bulgarians and the Pechenegs there were many more dif-
ferences than similarities, especially after the Christianization of the former. 
Linguistic or cultural similarities, especially in that period, by no means deter-
mined the political choices of individual rulers or the communities they rep-
resented. In view of the reservations above, one should be very sceptical about 
the view shared especially by some Bulgarian historians about the existence of 
a strong and lasting Bulgarian-Pecheneg alliance.64
This does not change the fact, however, that cooperation, though prob-
ably quite short-lived, between the nomads and Simeon I during the 890s 
weakened the Byzantine Empire. Tensions in Bulgarian-Byzantine relations 
continued throughout the decade, with the conflict finally ending in 904. It 
cannot be ruled out that Simeon used the invasion of the Arab pirates led 
by Leo of Tripoli and Damian of Tarsus on Thessaloniki as an opportunity to 
impose advantageous changes in the border on the Byzantine Empire. Some 
researchers assume that the Bulgarian ruler incorporated part of the thema 
of Thessalonica into his country. Henceforth, the Bulgarian-Byzantine border 
would run just 22 kilometres north of this provincial capital.65
61  DAI V 10–13 (p. 52/53). However, Constantine’s statement is unclear; it can be concluded 
that periods of peace were interrupted by fighting between the Bulgarians and the 
Pechenegs. The Emperor clearly states that the Bulgarians ‘were sorely defeated by the 
steppe people many times (πολλάκις ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καταπολεμηθῆναι).’
62  See below.
63  Tăpkova-Zaimova 1970, 71–72; Mladjov 1998, 95–96.
64  Bozhilov 1973, 52–53, 61; 1983, 123–124 (the researcher suggests that the Bulgarian-Pecheneg 
alliance in the times of Simeon was most likely strengthened by marriages between repre-
sentatives of the elites of both peoples); Dimitrov 2011, 205–210.
65  Zlatarski 1927, 321–342; Ostrogorski 1967, 222; Runciman 1930, 151–2; Wasilewski 1972, 225–
226; Browning 1975, 61; Bozhilov, Giuzelev 1999, 249; Stephenson 2000, 21; Leszka 2013, 
100–115 (for a more careful stance).
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The events of 894–904 clearly showed that political relations between 
Constantinople and Preslav were far from harmonious, which was far from 
what one would have expected after the Christianization of Bulgaria. Moreover, 
the agreement reached in the early 10th century offered no guarantee that a 
new phase in their conflicts and rivalry would not soon begin. The conquest 
of the Black Sea steppe by the Pechenegs must therefore have been seen by 
Byzantine diplomats as an extremely unfavourable occurrence, as it deprived 
them of an ally in the event of subsequent clashes with Simeon I.
In hopes of strengthening its position in its contacts with Bulgaria, as well 
as of limiting the political significance of the new neighbours of its southern 
Crimean colonies, the court in Constantinople decided to resort to a diplo-
matic ploy, described by Constantine Porphyrogenitus and carried out by an 
unknown cleric named Gabriel. The Byzantine emissary is said to have called 
on the Magyars to attack the Pechenegs and drive them from their new home 
on the Black Sea steppe. After recovering these lands, the Magyars would be 
in close proximity to the imperial court, which would enable faster and bet-
ter contacts, allowing Constantinople to more easily delegate political tasks to 
the Magyars.66 The manner in which Byzantine diplomatic sources referred to 
their ally, or rather, judging from their tone, their political underling, is quite 
puzzling. It seems to prove that the Magyars were not perceived by them as 
an independent ethnos.67 However, establishing the approximate date of 
this mission is more crucial. The outstanding Hungarian Byzantinist Gyula 
Moravcsik assumed that it took place around 927, i.e., at the time of the peace 
treaty with Bulgaria.68 It would indeed seem that after Simeon’s death, when, 
under the reign of Tsar Peter I, Bulgaria ceased its previous political expansion, 
Byzantium would be able to exercise greater influence over the political situa-
tion in the area north of the Black Sea. The sole aim of the cleric Gabriel’s trip, 
therefore, according to Moravcsik’s interpretation, would have been to curb the 
Pechenegs, because Bulgaria had already ceased to pose a threat.69 It seems, 
however, that the diplomatic move described by Constantine Porphyrogenitus 
would have been more justified earlier on.70 At that time, Byzantium would 
66  DAI, VIII 23–33 (p. 56/7).
67  Cf. Moravcsik 1970, 54.
68  Moravcsik 1970, s. 54; DAI-Com., 16. Moravcisk’s dating is also accepted by: Obolensky 
2000, 155; Litavrin, Novosel’tsev 1989, 290 (note 8); Shepard 1995, 111; 1999a, 270. Runciman 
(1988, 108 (note 3)) proposed an even later dating for the Gabriel’s mission (948).
69  On Bulgaria during this period of Peter’s rule: Runciman 1930, 177–202; Zlatarski 1927, 
516–590; Browning 1975, 67–72; Fine 1978, 88–95; 1983, 159–179; Bozhilov, Gjuzelev 1999, 
271–307; Stephenson 2000, 23–25; Leszka, Marinow 2018.
70  Cf. Bury 1906, 567. The author dates Gabriel’s mission to the years 898–906.
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either have found itself in a fierce rivalry with Simeon or have faced the danger 
of the imminent resumption of one. The treaty of 904 thus may have been seen 
in Constantinople as merely a temporary solution. Moreover, the shifts in the 
border dictated by the treaty made it easier for the Bulgarians, in the event of 
the outbreak of a new armed conflict, to take effective offensive action.
The Empire must therefore have been particularly committed to seeking a 
strong ally against Simeon in the last phase of its conflict with Bulgaria, and 
even shortly afterwards, if we assume that the 904 treaty was regarded by 
Constantinople’s diplomacy as merely a momentary cessation of hostilities. An 
additional factor that may have raised the Byzantine administration’s aware-
ness of the negative effects of the Magyars’ absence on the Black Sea steppe 
was a Rus’ invasion dated to 907.71 The reconquest of the Black Sea steppe by 
the Magyars would have provided Constantinople with an ally capable of stop-
ping the aggression of the Rus’.
Finally, the vigorous and very emotional reaction to the imperial order from 
the Magyars, who sent a threatening warning to a Byzantine diplomat, indicate 
they still clearly remembered the devastation the Pechenegs had inflicted on 
them.72 All of these issues seem to indicate that the cleric Gabriel’s mission 
took place during the reign of Leo VI the Wise, in the late 9th century or the 
first decade of the 10th century.
This diplomatic failure and the outbreak of a new war with Bulgaria forced 
the court in Constantinople to attempt to establish some form of cooperation 
with the Pechenegs. This time the casus belli according to Simeon I was the 
refusal of Emperor Alexander I to pay the tribute guaranteed by earlier agree-
ments.73 The situation in Byzantium was further complicated by the immi-
nent death of the emperor (June 913) and the fact that the regency council, 
initially led by Patriarch Nicholas Mystikos, assumed power in the name of 
the young Constantine VII. Mystikos supported a policy of reconciliation with 
the Bulgarian monarch, who soon arrived to Constantinople with his armies 
(August 913). An agreement was concluded that gave Simeon the title of 
basileus of the Bulgarians and called for the marriage of his daughter to the 
71  PVL 1, AM 6415 (907), col. 29–32. Cf. Jenkins 1949, 403–406; Sakharov 1980, 84–104; 
Obolensky 2000, 184–5; Franklin, Shepard 1996, 103–105.
72  DAI, VIII 29–33 (p. 56).
73  According to most sources, Simeon only demanded confirmation of the conditions of the 
already existing peace, which Alexander I recklessly rejected. The only author who men-
tions tribute being paid to the Bulgarians is John Skylitzes. Th.Cont., 380; LeoGramm., 287; 
Sym.Magist., 134.8 (p. 296–297); Io.Scyl., 195; Wortley 2010, p. 190. Cf. Ostrogorski 1967, 225; 
Runciman 1988, 46; Leszka 2013, 118–123; Leszka, Marinow 2015, 100–107.
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young Constantine.74 The terms of the agreement, especially the planned mar-
riage aroused strong opposition from some Byzantine elites, who gathered 
around Empress Zoe Karbonopsina, widow of Leo VI and the young emper-
or’s mother. Eventually, the arrangements made by Nicholas Mystikos were 
disavowed and his role in the Regency Council was limited. This placed the 
Empire once again on a path to military confrontation with Bulgaria, espe-
cially given that Simeon I had taken military action against the Empire upon 
hearing that the treaty had been broken. Zoe and her circle are said to have 
responded with military operations by a coalition composed of Byzantium 
and its allies, including the Pechenegs.75 The person responsible for the alli-
ance with the nomads was John Bogas, the strategos of the Kherson thema. 
He pledged, in exchange for the title of Patrician, to persuade the Pechenegs 
to take military action against Simeon I. With the required customary gifts 
in hand, the Kherson strategos travelled to the various Pecheneg tribes and 
reached an arrangement with them.76 The brief mentions by Byzantine chron-
iclers seem to indicate that this mission was not a difficult one. In particular, 
the regular pattern in the delivery of gifts suggests that Bogas’ actions were 
considered part of a diplomatic routine. However, events most likely took a 
completely different turn. Correspondence between Nicholas Mystikos and 
Simeon I, provides us with cause to take a closer look at the circumstances 
in which the agreement with the Pechenegs was concluded. A letter written 
74  The first provision of the agreement is universally accepted in modern scholarship, while 
the second one raises doubts. For the traditional position (the 913 agreement included 
both provisions): Ostrogorski 1967, 226; Browning 1975, 62; Runciman 1930, 156–157; 1988, 
51; Treadgold 1997, 473; Stephenson 2000, 22; Cheynet 2006, 28. Criticism: Leszka 2013, 
142–146; Leszka, Marinow 2015, 108–111.
75  Zlatarski 1927, 374–380; Ostrogorski 1967, 226; Runciman 1930, 158–159; Bozhilov 1983, 
120–125; Treadgold 1997, 473–475. This traditional perception of the events is contrasted 
with another one, according to which Simeon did not act as the aggressor. The provisions 
of the 913 agreement fully satisfied him and were in no way violated by the Byzantine 
side. The latter, however, decided to break the peace treaty by undertaking military 
action in 917. Cf. Shepard 2011, 34–45; Leszka 2013, 160–176; Leszka, Marinow 2015, 118–121. 
However, such a version of events raises doubts. First of all, it poorly explains the reasons 
why Nicholas Mystikos lost his influence to Zoe Karbonopsina. It seems that the reason 
the Patriarch was banished to the political periphery was his concessions, which must 
have gone further than merely accepting the title of “Basileus of the Bulgarians” granted 
to Simeon. Secondly, the reasons that led the Byzantine court to take aggressive action 
against the Bulgarian monarch are unclear. If the latter had not undertaken any armed 
actions, it seems unreasonable for Constantinople to have dispatched a complicated and 
probably very expensive war expedition to the Balkans.
76  Th.Cont., 387; Georg.Mon., 879; LeoGramm., 293; Sym.Magist., 135.14 (pp. 302–303); 
Io.Scyl., 201–202; Wortley 2010, 196.
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by Nicholas to Simeon I shortly after the Battle of Anchialos, which had been 
catastrophic for the Empire (20 August 917) clearly shows that in the period 
preceding the clash, the nomads had been the target of diplomatic efforts 
by the Bulgarian ruler. The strategos of the Kherson thema reported that the 
Pechenegs informed him many times about proposals for an alliance from 
Bulgaria. Simeon’s subjects were ready to secure such an alliance through mar-
riages, which seems to indicate how important such a union was to them.77 
Ultimately, however, the Byzantine side gained the upper hand.
The Patriarch’s letter contains additional facts worth noting here. First, the 
head of the Byzantine Church shows a clear reluctance towards the arrange-
ment between the Pechenegs and its executor.78 The tone of Nicholas Mystikos’ 
description of Bogas’ actions suggests he felt a need to justify them. According 
to his account, Constantinople agreed to negotiate with the Pechenegs only 
because it had learned about the earlier actions of Bulgarian diplomats. The 
diplomatic efforts of the Byzantine court were therefore defensive in nature.79 
However, this does not change the fact that the Patriarch considered the agree-
ment with the nomads to be wrong, exacerbating a great injustice, that is, 
the Bulgarian-Byzantine conflict itself.80 This observation seems to explain 
to some extent the attitudes of some Byzantine elites of that period. Perhaps 
it constitutes an additional explanation as to why the agreement with the 
Pechenegs was not consumed at the decisive moment.81 Nicholas Mystikos 
also mentions the arrival of some 16 Pechenegs in Constantinople, who also 
reported on the actions of Simeon’s diplomats.82 This mention is particularly 
interesting. A problem worth considering here is who organized the visit of 
the nomads to the capital of the Empire. In other words, was it initiated by the 
Pecheneg elites or by the strategos of the Kherson thema. In the light of avail-
able source data, both options seem equally possible. However, it should be 
noted that the nomads benefited greatly from the diplomatic rivalry between 
the Byzantine Empire and Bulgaria. It is therefore not unlikely that it was their 
decision to inform the imperial court of the intentions of the Bulgarian ruler, 
77  Nic.Mist., Ep. 9, p. 58 (v. 98–112); Cf. Malamut 1995, 107–108.
78  Nic.Mist., Ep. 9, p. 60 (v. 148). The Patriarch calls Bogas and the Pecheneg emissaries 
wretches (ἀθλίοι ἀνθρώποι).
79  Nic.Myst., Ep. 9, pp. 60, 62 (v. 142–152).
80  Nic.Myst., Ep. 9, p. 62 (v. 163–172). Cf. Nic.Myst., Ep. 183, p. 514 (v. 22–26).
81  Cf. interesting observations by Mirosław J. Leszka concerning the views of Nicholas 
Mystikos and Theodore Dafnopates (a.k.a. Romanos Lekapenos) on the spilling of 
Christian blood and the use of pagans in the fight against Christians. The latter is sup-
posed to have been a manifestation of the greatest evil. Turning to pagans for help is 
allowed only in extraordinary cases (a threat to one’s independence). Leszka 2006, 14; 
2008, 36–38.
82  Nic.Myst., Ep. 9, p. 58 (v. 105–107).
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with the aim of initiating a kind of political bidding war.83 The Kherson strat-
egos most likely merely acted as an intermediary.
Bogas’ mission, or rather his negotiations, should be dated between summer 
or early autumn of 914 and mid-917. It was part of much broader preparations 
for a military offensive against the Bulgarians. The Magyars and Serbs also 
became objects of Constantinople’s diplomatic efforts.84 Zoe Karbonopsina 
also decided to enter into a peace agreement with the Arabs, as she sought 
to move more troops from the eastern border. These forces, supported by the 
armies of the West, were supposed to attack Simeon.85 After long prepara-
tions during the summer of 917, Byzantine troops led by Leo Phokas finally 
entered into enemy territory and moved north along the Black Sea coast. The 
second part of the plan was to move the Pechenegs across the Danube. This 
task was assigned to Romanos Lekapenos, the great droungarios of the fleet. 
The nomads were to link up with the main Byzantine forces and join the fight 
against the Bulgarians. However, such a coordinated action never took place. 
According to Byzantine sources, the Pechenegs could not complete this task 
due to misunderstandings between Lekapenos and John Bogas. Due to this 
conflict, the nomads returned to their homes without engaging in combat.86 
Blame for this course of events fell on the droungarios of the fleet, who refused 
to carry out orders. The reason for his behaviour may have been his distrust of 
the Empire’s newly recruited ally.87 However, political rivalry was an equally 
important motivation. It cannot be ruled out that Lekapenos had initiated a 
risky gambit aimed at discrediting the regent’s current policy. He may have 
assumed that the failure of the 917 campaign would undermine the power of 
Zoe and her political clients.88
The reason for the Pechenegs’ withdraw, however, was not likely to have 
been some other sub-group of the nomads allying itself with Simeon. Some 
researchers have suggested that the nomads, bound by an alliance with 
Byzantium, retreated in order to avoid a fratricidal war once they learned 
that kindred nomads were fighting on the Bulgarian side. Pechenegs who had 
 
83  Cf. Malamut 1995, 108.
84  DAI, XXXII 86–91 (p. 156); Cf. Bozhilov 1983, 122–123; Leszka 2013, 169; Leszka, Marinow 
2015, 121–122.
85  Th.Cont., 388; Georg.Mon., 880–881; Sym.Magist., 135.18 (p. 304); LeoGramm., 294; Io.Scyl., 
202–203; Wortley 2010, 197.
86  Th.Cont., 389–390; Georg.Mon., 882; Sym.Magist., 135.21 (p. 305); LeoGramm., 295–296; 
Io.Scyl., 204; Wortley 2010, 198–199.
87  Cf. above, Nicholas Mystikos’s clear objections to cooperation with the Pechenegs.
88  The struggle between political factions as a reason for the failure of the Byzantine cam-
paign of 917 clearly appears in the narrative of Leo the Deacon, who was writing more 
than half a century later. LeoDiac., VII 7 (pp. 122–124); Talbot, Sullivan 2005, 170–172.
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chosen to ally themselves with Simeon I are said to have stood by him and 
supported his forces at Anchialos.89 This interpretation is not very convinc-
ing. It seems unlikely that Byzantine sources were unaware of the fact that 
during the 917 campaign a significant number of Pechenegs fought on the 
side of the Bulgarian monarch. While such a lack of knowledge might have 
been true for the chroniclers, the same cannot be said of the well-informed 
Nicholas Mystikos, who lived at the time of these events. If he had considered 
it necessary to explain the reasons and circumstances behind the formation of 
a Pecheneg-Byzantine alliance, it is difficult to imagine that he would not have 
pointed to and criticized Simeon’s actions. The presence of the Pechenegs in 
his ranks would have, after all, bolstered the concerns of Zoe and her followers, 
which were given as the official justification for the alliance with the nomads.
The source data referred to by researchers who claim that a group of 
nomads entered into an alliance with Bulgaria does not provide sufficient 
grounds to support their thesis. The rebellion (ἐπανάστασις)90 mentioned in 
The Martyrdom and Miracles of St. George of Cappadocia, which western bar-
barians were said to have launched against the Byzantine Empire, among 
which the Bulgarians (Βούλγαροι), were mentioned, does not have to be iden-
tified with the events that culminated in the Battle of Anchialos. The ethn-
onyms of the barbarian coalition partners are particularly difficult to interpret. 
Apart from the Bulgarians, the author of the biography also mentions the 
Ungroi (Οὔγγροι, perhaps Magyars), Scythians (Σκύθαι), Medes (Μῆδοι) and 
Turks (Τοῦρκοι). These archaic ethnonyms leave much room for interpretation. 
Only the a priori assumption that the Pechenegs were among them allows us 
to link them to the Scythians mentioned by the text’s author. However, such an 
assumption cannot be considered methodologically valid. The supporters of 
the Bulgarian-Pecheneg alliance also refer to al- Masʿūdī’s account of the inva-
sion of the Walandar fortress by four barbarian peoples. The claims of the Arab 
historian will be addressed below. Here it is worth stating merely that consid-
ering the description of the Battle of Walandar and the siege and conquest 
of that fortress to be the same as the events described as part of the Battle of 
Anchialos in August 917 faces two obstacles, which in my opinion are impos-
sible to overcome. First, none of the four peoples mentioned by Masʿūdī can be 
identified as the Bulgarians. The only researcher who had made an attempt to 
89  Bozhilov 1973, 46–52; 1983, 124. Ivan Bozhilov’s interpretation has gained some recogni-
tion: Dimitrov 2011, 198–205; Marinow 2007, 384; Leszka 2013, 171–173. However, the posi-
tions of both Polish researchers are much more cautious.
90  Miracula, 20–1.
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do so was Carlile A. Macartney.91 His identification, however, has been rejected 
by scholars. The second is related to chronology. Masʿūdī claims that the events 
he described occurred in the year 932 or later. The participation of the Magyars 
means the year was 934, when their invasion (also known from Byzantine 
sources) reached the walls of Constantinople (this fact was also noted by the 
Arab historian). An additional fact that confirms the above dating of the Battle 
of Walandar is an indication that the Emperor of Rome (ar-Rūm) was then 
someone named ‘Armanos.’ He should be identified as Romanos I Lekapenos, 
whose reign, as we know, began only in 920.92
Therefore, during the 917 campaign, the Pechenegs ultimately did not 
support any sides in the conflict, which to a large extent determined the 
Byzantine Empire’s defeat. On 20 August, Leo Phokas’ army was completely 
destroyed in the Battle of Anchialos. After this defeat, another, at Katasyrtai, 
near Constantinople, soon followed. The Empire was no longer able to defend 
itself, which was eagerly exploited by Simeon. A year later he invaded northern 
Greece and reached the Gulf of Corinth during a looting expedition.93
Romanos Lekapenos’ risky political manoeuvring out him in great danger. At 
one point, he even faced the risk of having his eyes put out. It was only through 
the intervention of Magister Stephen and Patrician Constantine Gongyles, two 
people with significant influence over Zoe, that he managed to avoid such a 
punishment.94 Meanwhile, the days of the regent’s power were numbered. Her 
downfall finally came about in the spring of 919. Romanos Lekapenos became 
the new regent with the title of basileopator, which he soon changed to kai-
sar (Caesar), and on 17 December 920, his son-in-law Constantine VII elevated 
him to the position of co-emperor.95
The first Pecheneg-Byzantine agreement recorded in sources proved to be 
short-lived, and its provisions were never implemented. Romanos I Lekapenos, 
who was largely responsible for breaking the alliance of 917, did not assign the 
Pechenegs a significant place in the system of Byzantine alliances. Ideas on how 
to make use of the steppe people during the prolonged conflict with Simeon 
91  Macartney 1930, 162. Cf. below.
92  Cf. below.
93  Zlatarski 1927, 385–392; Runciman 1930, 160–162; 1988, 161–163; Ostrogorski 1967, 226; 
Treadgold 1997, 475; Leszka 2013, 177–180, 182–185, 188–190. The last scholar is seemingly 
rightly inclined towards a more nuanced assessment of the Battle of Katasyrtai. It was not 
a failure for the Byzantine armies; they suffered serious losses (the death of one of the 
commanders), but they stopped the advance of the Bulgarians.
94  Th.Cont., 390; Georg.Mon., 882; LeoGramm., 296; Sym.Magist., 135.22 (pp. 305–306); 
Io.Scyl., 204–205; Wortley 2010, 199. Cf. Runciman 1988, 56.
95  Io.Scyl., 209, 212; Wortley 2010, 202, 205. Cf. Ostrogorski 1967, 228; Runciman 1988, 58–62.
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were most likely put forth by those around the emperor. This is evidenced by 
information contained in another letter from Nicholas Mystikos, dated 922, 
to the ruler of Bulgaria. The Patriarch calls for a cessation of fighting, threat-
ening otherwise to form an anti-Bulgarian coalition under the patronage of 
Constantinople. This coalition was to comprise various ‘Scythian’ peoples, i.e., 
the Pechenegs, Rus’, Magyars and Alans.96 The tone of the letter, which sounded 
like a reprimand and a call for improvement, and, as the author makes clear, to 
work in concert with the court in Constantinople, leads us to the conclusion 
that the idea of a vast alliance against Bulgaria was more of a diplomatic bluff 
than a real threat.97 Moreover, it would seem unwise to have informed Simeon 
about the real plans of the Byzantine court, as it could have led to diplomatic 
moves on his part to thwart them. What is more, the Pechenegs are portrayed 
here as one of several possible partners of the Empire, and not as the main 
one. Thus, it seems that the Pechenegs did not play a major role in the political 
plans of Constantinople, not only until the death of Simeon, which ended the 
Bulgarian-Byzantine conflict, but almost to the end of Romanos I Lekapenos’ 
reign. There is also nothing to indicate the existence of any particularly close 
relations between Preslav and the nomads. On the contrary, it would seem that 
the strong involvement of Simeon’s Bulgaria in the Balkans could even have 
resulted in losing its political influence in the Danube areas to the Pechenegs.98
Events connected with the mission of John Bogas can be considered evi-
dence of a change in the attitude of the Pechenegs towards the population 
of Kherson. It is difficult to determine whether their trade contacts, well 
documented in De administrando imperio in the mid-10th century,99 led to an 
attempt at political cooperation. However, this seems quite likely. Plans for 
a political alliance were made in response to Simeon’s previously described 
diplomatic activity, which indicates that no such relationship had existed 
earlier between the nomads and Byzantium. This attempt at political coop-
eration could have been facilitated by the trade ties that existed between the 
two sides. They were most likely also the source of the knowledge possessed 
by the Kherson strategos about the efforts of Bulgarian diplomats. The failure 
of the Byzantine-Pecheneg alliance, however, did not necessarily end the 
economic cooperation between the inhabitants of the thema with their 
steppe neighbours.
96  Nic.Myst., Ep. 23, p. 158 (v. 15–21), 160 (v. 66–72).
97  Bozhilov 1983, 139; Dimitrov 2011, 206; Shepard 1998, 29.
98  Cf. Runciman 1930, 150; Browning 1975, 68; Treadgold 1997, 479. Cf. also the considerations 
in the first part of this chapter.
99  Cf. Chapter 4.2 of the present book.
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The relationship between the Slavic peoples and the Pechenegs had a dif-
ficult start as well. There is a number of reasons to suppose that Pecheneg 
looting raids affected their northern neighbours particularly severely. In delin-
eating the borders of Patzinacia, we could notice that almost all the Eastern 
Slavic tribes who were adjacent to the steppe were forced to move their resi-
dences to the forest zone, which provided greater protection against attacks 
by the nomads. The range of the Pechenegs’ armed penetrations sometimes 
extended past the northern border of forest steppe, which proves that even 
there the Slavs did not enjoy a complete state of peace. The situation was par-
ticularly unfavourable for the Uliches and Tiverians, who, due to their close 
proximity to other Slavic tribes, could not leave the forest-steppe zone com-
pletely, and thus faced a permanent threat from their bellicose neighbours. 
It seems, however, that over time, the Slavs were able to find a modus vivendi 
with the nomads. A flexible tribute payment policy most likely helped them to 
establish a more peaceful relationship. A sign of these relations can be found 
in Chapter Two of De administrando imperio, according to which the inhabit-
ants of Rus’ bought sheep, horses and cattle from the Pechenegs.100 A state-
ment by Witold Hensel was quoted above;101 according to him the trade in 
goods described by Constantine Porphyrogenitus was mostly beneficial for the 
nomads, which makes it a form of tribute.102 This was most likely one of the 
ways the Pechenegs’ attacks were limited, which could have brought at least a 
partial normalization to their relations.103
Another factor limiting the Pechenegs’ aggression was the Rus’ political 
organism, although it was still in a nascent state. The Varangians constituted 
a military counterbalance to the warrior steppe people. The Rus’ princes only 
began to settle permanently in the area of the middle Dnieper at the end of the 
first third of the 10th century; however, this does not change the fact that they 
most likely had been interested in this area since well before this time. The Rus’ 
gradually filled the place once occupied by the Khazar Khaganate, assuming 
control of the eastern Slavic tribes. The Ledzanians, Uliches, and Derevlians 
were all described as tributaries of the Rus’ state in De administrando imperio. 
This seems to indicate that the Rus’ domination could have provided some 
form of protection against potential aggression by the Pechenegs.104
100 DAI, II 5–8 (pp. 48–51).
101 Cf. Chapter 4 (section 2) of the present book.
102 Hensel 1987, 113, 688.
103 Cf. Łowmiański 1973, 126–127.
104 DAI, XXXVII 43–45 (p. 168/169). Cf. Franklin, Shepard 1996, 97–98, 110, 121–130; Duczko 
2004, 217–225.
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The expansion of control over the eastern Slavic tribes and the trade routes 
running toward the Byzantine Empire therefore had to lead to a rivalry between 
the Rus’ and the Pechenegs. Evidence of the existence of such a rivalry can be 
found in Rus’ chronicles. Judging from these records, this conflict was initially 
not particularly fierce, but then, they note, around the year 915:
The Pechenegs entered the land of Rus’ for the first time, but when they 
made peace with Igor’, they went their way to the Danube.105
This is followed by a description of a military expedition organized against 
Simeon which ended in failure due to mistakes made by the Byzantine com-
manders. The combination of these two events seems to prove that the afore-
mentioned expedition by the nomads was a preventive measure, aimed at 
securing the Pechenegs’ home base from a counterattack by Igor while their 
forces were away fighting on Bulgarian territory. The latter fact would seem to 
indicate that the date of the Pecheneg expedition against the Rus’ should be 
changed to 917. Their actions provide evidence that, contrary to the chroniclers’ 
accounts, the nomads had been at war with the Rus’ Prince for some time. It 
is not clear at what date these hostilities began. It is likely that the Pechenegs 
attacked Rus’ around 914, when a part of the Rus’ forces were on a looting expe-
dition along the southern coast of the Caspian Sea.106 The short period of time 
separating the two events would justify the nomads’ fears that the Rus’ ruler 
would use their temporary vulnerability to organize a retaliatory expedition 
against them for the harm they had recently inflicted upon his people.
The next clashes probably took place around 920. This time the mention in 
the chronicles is even more laconic:
Romanus was set up as Emperor in Greece. Igor’ waged war against the 
Pechenegs.107
105 PVL 1, AM 6423 (915), col. 42–43; Cross, Scherbowitz-Wetzor 1953, 71.
106 The date of this expedition has been a subject of controversy. Masʿūdī states that it 
took place after 300 Hijra (912–913 of the Christian era); he forgot the exact date. The 
Rus’ seized ample loot, half of which, according to an earlier agreement, was given to 
the Khazar ruler. On their way back, however, after passing through the Volga estuary, 
they were attacked by Muslim mercenaries of the khagan, and then by the Burtas and 
Bulgars of the Volga. Most of the Varangians were murdered. al-Masʿūdī, Les Prairies, II, 
18–24; Pellat 1962, 165–167; Dunlop 1954, 209–212. Cf. Łowmiański 1973, 197; PVL 2, 282; 
Novosel’tsev 1990, 212–213; Zuckerman 1995, 256.
107 PVL 1, AM 6428 (920), col. 43; Cross, Scherbowitz-Wetzor 1953, 71.
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It is difficult to deduce from this passage – assuming the information con-
tained in it is reliable – who was acting here as the aggressor. It was possibly 
the Rus’ prince.108 If this was the case, it is still difficult to say what motivated 
Igor to take military action against the steppe people. Accepting the standard 
hypothesis that this was a punitive expedition presupposes that it was pre-
ceded by some kind of Pecheneg provocation. It is also quite probable that 
it did not take place on Rus’ territory, but somewhere along the part of the 
Dnieper trade route controlled by the nomads. The fighting mentioned above 
could also have been a consequence of Rus’ activity on this waterway that was 
either seen as undesirable by the Pechenegs or which had not previously been 
negotiated with them.
For nearly half a century, i.e., until 968, the sources remain silent about the 
armed actions taken by the nomads against the Rus’. It would be extremely 
risky, however, to conclude that relations between the Pechenegs and Kiev 
were perfectly peaceful during that time. Confrontations provoked by both 
sides most likely took place. Their frequency and intensity, however, was clearly 
not high. The proximity of the territories of the Rus’ and Pechenegs would 
not have been so close (only a day’s journey in the times of Constantine VII) 
if a fierce rivalry had continued to exist between the two political powers. 
However, the establishment of settlements along the middle course of the 
Dnieper could have led to a violation of the borders of the spring and summer 
encampments of the Pechenegs located in the forest-steppe zone. Such a situ-
ation would clearly have provoked conflicts. This was also the case in terms of 
Pecheneg looting raids on lands inhabited by tributaries of Kiev or merchants 
active on the Dnieper route. Events of this kind most likely also took place and 
weighed on the quality of the relations between the steppe-dwellers and Rus’. 
Nevertheless, their importance was not sufficient to leave a trace in written 
sources. Moreover, short-term armed conflicts did not necessarily exclude the 
possibility of temporary cooperation. It is hard to imagine that the Rurikids 
could lead a four-month expedition against Byzantium in 941 without ensuring 
at least the benevolent neutrality of the nomads beforehand. Three years later, 
Igor even managed to persuade the Pechenegs to engage in military coopera-
tion against Constantinople.109
Before this happened, however, the Pechenegs were said to have joined 
forces with another political partner in order to stand up militarily against the 
Empire. These events, dated to 934, were described by al-Masʿūdī. In Chapter 17 
of Meadows of Gold he writes:
108 A similar interpretation is adopted by S.A. Pletneva (1958, 215).
109 Cf. below.
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We will therefore return to the account of the nations which live in the 
neighbourhood of Bab el-Abwab, the wall, the Caucasus, the country of 
the Khazar, and the Alans. On the frontiers of the Khazar towards the 
west, live four Turkish nations, which derive their origin from the same 
forefather. Some of them are settled, whilst others are nomads. They are 
all brave and can resist any nation.110 Each of them has its own king, whose 
dominions have an extent of several days, and they are contiguous to 
each other. Some of them are on the Pontus. They extend their predatory 
excursions as far as Rome which is in the direction towards Spain.111 They 
are victorious over all the nations who live there. Between the king of the 
Khazar and the lord of Alan a friendship exists.112 They are immediate 
neighbours of the former. The first of these nations has the name Bajna. 
The second is called Bajghird the next following nation is called Bajnāk, 
and is the bravest of the four. The fourth is called Nūkardah. Their kings 
have sovereign power, they had wars with the Byzantines after the year 
320 A.H. or in that year.113 The Byzantines have, on the frontiers towards 
these four nations, a large Greek city which is called Walandar which has 
a great population (garrison), and is protected by the sea on one side, 
and by mountains on the other. The inhabitants (garrison) of this town 
defended the country against the invasions of the before mentioned 
four Turkish nations, and they were unable to penetrate into the coun-
try of the Byzantines, being precluded by mountains, the sea, and this 
town. These four nations have been at war with each other, on account 
of a dispute respecting a Muslim merchant of Ardabīl, who, although he 
enjoyed the protection of hospitality of one of these nations, was injured 
by another. This gave rise to disunion. The Byzantines of Walandar took 
advantage of it, invaded their country whilst they were disunited; they 
took many of their children prisoners, and plundered their property. 
When they heard of this, as they were occupied in their war, they united 
under one commander, proclaimed a mutual amnesty, remitting blood 
110 Cf. de Meynard and de Courteille (al-Masʿūdī, Les Prairies, II, 58): Elles sont puissantes et 
belliqueuses; Douglas Morton Dunlop (1954, 212): They […] are difficult of approach and 
very courageous.
111 Cf. de Meynard and de Courteille (al-Masʿūdī, Les Prairies, II, 58): Elles poussent leur 
excursions jusque sur les terres de Roum et les provinces voisines de l’Espagne; Dunlop 
(1954, 212): Their raids extend to the lands of Rome and almost as far as Spain.
112 Cf. de Meynard and de Courteille (al-Masʿūdī, Les Prairies, II, 58–59): […] ells vivent en 
paix avec le roi des Khazars, […], et avec le roi des Alans; Dunlop (1954, 212): Between 
them and the king of the Khazars is a truce, and so with the ruler of the Alans.
113 Cf. de Meynard and de Courteille (al-Masʿūdī, Les Prairies, II, 59; Pellat 1962, 178): durant 
l’année 320, ou peu aprés.
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revenge; and the whole nation, about sixty thousand horse strong,114 at 
once repaired to the town of Walandar, and this without being called 
out, and without collecting the men. If they had called out their men, 
they would have mustered about one hundred thousand horsemen. 
When Romanus who is the present emperor of the Byzantines, that is 
to say, in 332 AH, had received intelligence, he sent against them twelve 
thousand (Arabic) horsemen who had embraced the Christian religion, 
with spears in the Arabic costume and fifty thousand Byzantines. They 
came in eight days to the town of Walandar encamped beyond the town, 
and took (partly) their quarters in the houses of the inhabitants. The 
Turks had already killed a vast number of the population of Walandar, 
but they defended themselves with their walls till this reinforcement 
reached them. When the four kings had observed that their enemies 
had received the aid of those (Arabs) who had turned Christians, and of 
the Byzantines, they sent unto their own country, which lies towards the 
country of the Khazar, Alans, Bab el-Abwab, and others, and collected 
the Muslim population who did not enlist except in wars against unbe-
lievers. When the two armies had drawn up in battle array, the Christian 
Arabs advanced in front of the ranks of the Byzantines; and, on the side 
of the Turks, the merchants who were in their army proceeded from the 
ranks, and invited them to the Mohammedan religion, promising to bring 
them into the Muslim territory, if they would take quarter from the Turks. 
They refused to accept these terms, and they fought a general battle, in 
which the Christian Arabs and Byzantines were superior to the Turks; for 
their number was many times greater than that of their enemies. They 
remained that night at their posts. The four Turkish kings held a council, 
in which the king of the Bajnāk said, “Give me the command tomorrow 
morning.” They agreed to give it to him; […].115
The ‘Turks’ prevailed over the Byzantine army. The bodies of 60,000 dead Greek 
soldiers said to have remained on the battlefield were stacked up and used to 
scale the walls of Walandar. The conquered city was plundered and a large part 
of its inhabitants were murdered or taken into captivity. Masʿūdī adds:
114 An unauthorized revision by a translator. In the original 60,000 warriors. Cf. al-Masʿūdī, 
Les Prairies, II, 60; Marquart 1903, 62; Dunlop 1954, 213.
115 The English translation of A. Sprenger (1841, 446–450) has been slightly modified. Other 
modern translation of this passage: al-Masʿūdī, Les Prairies, II, 58–62; Pellat 1962, 177–179; 
Marquart 1903, 61–62; Dunlop 1954, 212–214; Konovalova 1999, 5–6; Konovalova, Perkhavko 
2000, 147–148.
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After three days, the Turks proceeded towards Constantinople. They 
passed a number of cultivated districts, meadows, and estates, spread-
ing slaughter and taking prisoners, till they came to the walls of 
Constantinople. There they staid for about forty days, and sold the cap-
tive women and children for linen, cloths of brocade, and silk. They put 
the men to the sword, none received quarter; sometimes they did not 
spare even women and children. They made predatory excursions all 
over these countries, and as far as the country of the Sclavonians and 
Rome. At present their invasion extends even to the frontiers of Spain,116 
France, and Galicia. The predatory incursions of the above-mentioned 
Turkish nations continue to this day to infest Constantinople, and the 
above-mentioned kingdoms.117
Both passages cited above have long been of interest to researchers. There is a 
consensus among them that Masʿūdī’s account describes, albeit in a distorted 
form, events that actually took place. In a manner typical of Muslim writers, 
the author draws attention to the achievements of his fellow believers, some-
times resorting to obvious exaggerations. The scale of the battle of Walandar 
in Masʿūdī’s narrative must also arouse scepticism in the critical reader. It is 
hard to imagine that a battle in which, if we believe the Arab historian, well 
over 100,000 warriors fought, would have gone unnoticed by Byzantine histo-
riography. Finally, the chronology of the account is questionable. These events 
took place during the reign of Romanos Lekapenos, but their exact dating is 
unclear. Masʿūdī claims that the invasion of the ‘Turks’ took place in the Hijri 
year 320 or a little bit later, but a few verses later he moves this event to 332. 
It is hard to resist the impression that he has combined two separate facts in 
his account, namely two events known to Byzantine sources, dated to 934 and 
943.118 A circumstance conducive to such a mistake was the fact that both 
expeditions ended in the same manner: the invaders reaching Constantinople.
116 Josef Marquart: ‘Andalus’ (1903, 63).
117 English translation by Sprenger (1841, 452). Cf. al-Masʿūdī, Les Prairies, II, 64; Pellat 1962, 
179; Marquart 1903, 63; Konovalova 1999, 6–7; Konovalova, Perkhavko 2000, 148. ibn al-
Athir also briefly mentions the attack on Walandar (12th–13th century.). Cf. Konovalova, 
Perkhavko 2000, 149.
118 On the 934 invasion: Th.Cont., 422–423; Georg.Mon., 913–914; Sym.Magist., 136.69 (p. 334); 
Io.Scyl., 228; Wortley 2010, 220–221; On the 943 invasion: Th.Cont., 430–431; Georg.Mon., 
917; Sym.Magist., 136.77 (p. 337); Io.Scyl., 231; Wortley 2010, 223. Cf. Moravcsik 1970, 55–56; 
Antonopoulos 1993, 258–261. Both invasions took place in April, which raises suspicions 
that what we are dealing with here is a topos, which served to show the wickedness of the 
invaders, ready to attack the empire close to Holy Week and Easter.
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Josef Marquart was among the first researchers to carry out a critical analy-
sis of Masʿūdī’s data. The German researcher assumed 934 to be the date of 
the invasion of these ‘Turkish peoples’, which meant connecting the events 
from Walandar with the first Magyar expedition.119 Marquart also convincingly 
demonstrated that the coalition of invaders consisted of two, rather than four 
ethne. Their having multiplied can be explained by the fact that the author of 
Meadows of Gold used a number of different sources that contained different 
variants of the names of both peoples.120 Walandar is in all likelihood Debeltos 
(Δεβέλτος), a fortress located on the Bulgarian-Byzantine frontier. Its location 
by the Black Sea proves that the concentration of allied armies had to take 
place near the lower course of the Danube. This would suggest the participa-
tion of the Pechenegs in the expedition, because if the Magyars invaded on 
their own, the route of the expedition would most likely have been different. It 
would have led towards Constantinople through today’s Serbia, Bulgaria (near 
Sofia) and Thrace.121
Despite their rather widespread acceptance, Marquart’s findings have been 
questioned, at least in part. Carlile A. Macartney assumes that among the peo-
ples mentioned by Masʿūdī, the name Bağnà includes the Bulgarians as well. On 
the basis of this statement, Macartney claims that the battle of Walandar took 
place in 917 and was a part of the Bulgarian-Byzantine war described above, in 
which the Pechenegs are said to have fought for Simeon. The presence of the 
Magyars in Masʿūdī’s narrative is supposedly the result of the author’s merging 
two separate events: a joint Bulgarian-Pecheneg attack on the border fortress 
(917) and a Magyar invasion which reached as far as to Constantinople (934).122 
Macartney’s concept, although interesting, is based on a philological premise 
that is considered false. The British researcher identified the ethnonym Bağnà 
with the Bulgarians on the basis of the supposition that it is a distorted version 
of the ethnic name Borğan.123 However, this kind of reasoning has no philolog-
ical or palaeographic justification,124 which deprives Macartney’s hypothesis 
of its foundations.
A few years later, Vladimir Minorsky proposed that the name Nūkardah may 
actually refer to the Novgorodians, or more precisely to Novgorodian outcasts, 
119 Marquart 1903, 63–64. For other interpretations of al- Masʿūdī’s report: Macartney 1930; 
Bozhilov 1930, 48–53; Runciman 1988, 106–109; Kniaz’kii 2003, 15–16.
120 Marquart 1903, 65–68.
121 Marquart 1903, 69–71.
122 Macartney 1930.
123 Macartney 1930, 162.
124 Cf. Golden 1975, 29.
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who lived among the ‘Turks’.125 Irina A. Konovalova has recently explicitly 
referred to his findings. She claims that the attacks on Italy, Muslim Spain and 
France, which Masʿūdī generally attributes to a Turkic people in his reports, 
were mainly carried out by the Nūkardah.126 The researcher also believes that 
the Rus’ were active in the Lower Danube region and Bulgaria as early as the 
late 9th century,127 and were likely to have travelled through this area on their 
way to Constantinople. It is difficult to question this last claim, but it does 
not explain why the Masʿūdī used the name of one Rus’ sub-group instead of 
the general term ‘Rus’. Konovalova explains that this resulted from increasing 
knowledge in the Muslim world about the political and ethnic relations in 
Rus’.128 This argument is not convincing, however, because Masʿūdī included 
Nūkardah among the ‘Turkish peoples’, so he was not aware of their alleged 
Rus’ ancestry.
Despite the fact that more than 100 years have passed since their first pub-
lication, Marquart’s findings are still widely accepted. It should be noted, how-
ever, that they do not explain all the unclear points in Masudi’s account. This 
is because the German researcher seems to ignore the double dating of the 
expedition of the ‘Turkish peoples’ and the accompanying events. If Masʿūdī 
combined two Magyar invasions, one of which (or perhaps both!) was said to 
be aided by the Pechenegs, the question arises as to whether his account is not 
in fact a conflation of information concerning a number of attacks carried out 
by nomadic peoples on Byzantium, the only common feature of which was the 
fact they occurred during Romanos Lekapenos’s rule.
A further question should be asked here: what prompted the Magyars and 
Pechenegs to cooperate? This question is all the more justified because this 
expedition was probably not a retaliatory action. Marquart believed that such 
a military undertaking would have been recorded by Byzantine sources. He 
also believed that information about a dispute between the Magyars and 
the Pechenegs arising from the poor treatment of a Muslim merchant from 
Ardābil was a distorted echo of past conflicts between these two ethne on the 
Black Sea steppe.129 The German scholar also claimed that information about 
peaceful relations with the Alans and Khazars only concerns the Magyars, and 
can hardly be applied to the Pechenegs.130
125 Minorsky 1958, 113, 160 (note 2).
126 Konovalova 1999, 11–12.
127 Konovalova 1999, 12.
128 Konovalova 1999, 15; Konovalova, Perchavko 2000, 153–157.
129 Marquart 1903, 71–74.
130 Marquart 1903, 74.
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Indeed, the joint invasion carried out by these two nomadic peoples was 
most likely not preceded by Byzantine provocations in the border region. It can 
be assumed that minor incidents not recorded in sources were probably a nor-
mal phenomenon in border areas. The problem is that Walandar, if identified 
as Debeltos, was on the Byzantine-Bulgarian border, which in practical terms 
makes it impossible for the expeditions against the Pechenegs or Magyars 
to have been organized by the fortress garrison. Moreover, undertaking any 
wide-scale expeditions against the steppe-dwellers, especially in the 930s, was 
not in the interests of Byzantium. Such behaviour on the part of the Empire 
would have been incompatible with the direction of foreign policy being pur-
sued during Romanos Lekapenos’ reign, the basic aim of which was to avoid a 
simultaneous conflict with two enemies. After calming relations with Bulgaria, 
the emperor could afford to concentrate all the state’s energies to fighting the 
Arabs. As a result, Byzantium was soon able to take the initiative militarily, 
which ultimately resulted in the successful retaking of Melitene in 934.131
The incursion described by Masudi can potentially be seen as the result 
of the diplomacy of a third-party state. The fact that knowledge about events 
which took place along the northern borders of Byzantium could reach rather 
distant parts of the Arab world seems quite amazing. The chronological con-
currence of the invasion of the ‘Turkish peoples’ and the Byzantine offensive, 
the crowning achievement of which was the conquest of Melitene, is also quite 
very curious. Romanos Lekapenos’ problems along his state’s north-western 
border were also an extremely fortunate circumstance for the Hamdanids who 
ruled in Mosul and Aleppo. Such tempting hypotheses are not, however, the 
sole explanation for the Muslims’ interest in the events that took place in dis-
tant lands. After all, Muslim merchants trading in Eastern Europe were most 
likely the primary medium for spreading knowledge about these parts. The 
Byzantine-Arab conflicts of the mid-10th century, during which the Islamic 
world was put on the defensive, were most likely conducive to interest in 
accounts in which the infidels were defeated by armies comprised in part of 
Muslims.132 In Masʿūdī’s works, we find elements of jihadist ideology in the 
form of stories about the numerous followers of Mohammed who took part 
in the expeditions of the ‘Turks’, but only those waged against infidels, as well 
as information about attempts to convert Byzantine soldiers to the ‘faith of 
the prophet’.
The attack described by Masudi need not have been, and probably wasn’t, 
the result of diplomatic intrigues on the part of the Hamdanid dynasty, but 
131 Ostrogorski 1967, 236; Treadgold 1997, 481–3.
132 Cf. El Cheikh 2004, 165–167.
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was most likely an ordinary looting raid. Debeltos-Walandar was not only a 
border fortress, it was also an important commercial centre and the seat of the 
bishopric. The city’s wealth provided sufficient reason to attack it. However, if 
the raid (or raids) in question was a simple attack, free of any hidden agenda 
or political motivations, the question inevitably arises if there was a need to 
form an entire coalition of attacking forces. If it were merely a looting raid, 
inviting others to cooperate would seem senseless, as it would necessitate a 
division of the booty. The only justification would be the Magyars’ fear that 
the Pechenegs would use the absence of their main forces as an opportunity to 
invade their territories. Such concerns would not be groundless, as evidenced 
by the events of the 890s, though at that time, the Pechenegs were searching 
for new territories, and were much more dangerous than in the first third of 
the 10th century. Yet the potential threat of an attack on a smaller scale than 
their catastrophic incursion in the late 9th century did indeed exist. It is also 
worth noting that the Magyar expedition of 934, which is usually associated 
with the events described in Masʿūdī’s account, is considered by Byzantine 
sources to be the first Magyar invasion of the Empire.133 It is therefore possible 
that this change in the direction of the Magyars’ expansion prompted them to 
attempt to mitigate the threat of an attack by their former enemy by proposing 
a joint invasion of the Balkans. They also knew that once Byzantium realized it 
faced a new threat, it might call on the Pechenegs for support.
However, one key fact renders such an interpretation problematic. 
Byzantine chronicles do not mention the involvement of the Pechenegs in the 
Magyar expeditions of either 934 or 943. This silence is telling, because every 
invasion that reached the walls of Constantinople was accompanied by diplo-
matic negotiations. It is unthinkable that imperial officials would have com-
pletely ignored another participant in the expedition when drawing up a peace 
agreement with Magyars. Of course, it is very possible the Pechenegs were less 
active in the final stage of the invasion or had completely withdrew their main 
forces after the conquest and pillaging of Walandar. Only smaller Pecheneg 
units would have reached the capital of the Empire, acting as hostages and 
guaranteeing the peaceful intentions of their compatriots.
Another hypothesis, one that is equally probable, can be contrasted with 
this first one. If Masʿūdī merged two separate pillaging Magyar expeditions in 
133 After their migration to Pannonia, the Magyars directed their looting-expeditions mainly 
to the west. In March 933 they were severely defeated by Henry I, king of East Francia, 
in the battle of Riade on the Unstrut River (an unidentified site somewhere in northern 
Thuringia). This defeat seems to have prompted the Magyars to make Byzantium the tar-
get of their future predatory expeditions. Cf. Bíró, Langó 2013, 284–285, 311.
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his work, it cannot be ruled out that he also included a third one, one chrono-
logically close to these first two. Such an expedition might simply not have had 
such a spectacular conclusion, reaching its culmination point in the Byzantine 
borderlands. According to the chronology of the Rus’ chronicles, in 944 the 
Pechenegs aided an expedition by Igor against the Greeks. However, this cam-
paign was cut short by the diplomatic efforts of Constantinople, which led 
the Rus’ prince to make peace and withdraw.134 Before his retreat, Igor was 
said to have ordered the steppe warriors supporting him to attack and pil-
lage Bulgaria. It is possible that the Pechenegs carried out this mission, first 
ravaging Dobrudja,135 then clashing with imperial troops at the Byzantine 
border, and finally, taking and plundering Debeltos. Masʿūdī’s account would 
thus describe three separate events that took place during the last decade of 
Romanos Lekapenos’ rule (934–944): two Magyar invasions which reached 
Constantinople and a Pecheneg expedition during which part of western 
Bulgaria and the Byzantine border region were ravaged.
Regardless of which hypothesis one accepts, the presence of the Pechenegs 
in Walandar itself should be considered probable. They stood before the 
fortress either in 934 as allies of the Magyars or a decade later on their own. 
Masʿūdī’s description of the battle seems credible. The combat methods used 
by the invaders did not differ substantially from standard steppe practices.136 
On the other hand, data on the size of the imperial army and the number of 
casualties it sustained raises doubts. It is difficult to believe that Byzantium 
was able to concentrate such a large number of troops (65,000 men) in such 
a short period of time. All the more so given that its mobilization capabilities 
were significantly reduced by its involvement in fighting against the Syrian 
Hamdanid emirate.137 The description presented earlier of the events of the 
134 Cf. below.
135 Bozhilov 1973, 60; Dimitrov 2011, 228–229; Polovoi 1958, 138–147; Madgearu 2013, 26. The 
Pecheneg invasion is said to be evidenced by the ‘zhupan Dimitr’ inscription, discovered 
in Mircea Vodă, near Constantia. Its meaning, however, is quite unclear. Igor’s expedition 
against the Greeks and the subsequent Pecheneg invasion of Dobrudja are dated to 943 
by Dimitrov and Polovoi. This chronology led the latter scholar to adopt the rather dubi-
ous interpretation that Igor was at the head of an entire coalition of ‘peoples of the north’, 
which, apart from the Pechenegs, the Rus’ and Slavic tribes, also included the Magyars. 
However, the reasoning of the Russian researcher is noteworthy, as it may reflect the man-
ner of thinking of Masʿūdī, who due to a chronological coincidence, may have combined 
two separate expeditions.
136 Cf. Chapter 4.3.
137 Ostrogorski 1967, 236; Treadgold 1997, 481–3. According to the estimates of contemporary 
scholars, in the 10th century the Byzantine army consisted of just over 80,000 soldiers 
(Cheynet 2006b, 164–165). However, for logistical reasons, the Empire never operated with 
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year 917 showed that a more extensive offensive against Simeon required dip-
lomatic efforts aimed at tactically freeing up troops stationed in the East. It 
was only after the signing of a peace treaty with the Arabs that these forces 
could be transferred to the Balkan region. This example shows that Romanos 
Lekapenos, while militarily engaged in Syria, could not have immediately sent 
such a strong army to defend Walandar. Thus, the Byzantine army that faced 
the nomad hordes not only did not outnumber them, but was even signifi-
cantly smaller in numbers. However, Masʿūdī’s information on the number of 
nomads should be approached with caution.138 The imperial army’s losses 
were certainly substantial, but Masʿūdī’s story about the tremendous number 
of dead and their bodies being used by the attackers to climb the walls of the 
besieged city was most likely a product of his informants’ vivid imaginations.
Marquart is wrong, however, when he claims that it was only the Magyars 
who established good relations with the Khazars. Although the Pechenegs’ 
encroachment on the Black Sea steppe greatly affected the functioning of Pax 
Chazarica, with time, the rulers of the khaganate have come to terms with the 
consequences of this migration and established a working relationship with 
their new western neighbour. Seeking to improve relations with a recent enemy, 
especially when it was powerful, would not have been an unusual situation.
The expedition of 934, regardless of whether or not the Pechenegs took part 
in it, points to a change in Byzantine-Magyar relations. This people, who had 
previously acted as an ally of Constantinople, unexpectedly proved that they 
were ready to take hostile action against the Empire. Less than a decade later 
a second invasion took place, which again proved that the Balkan provinces 
of the Byzantine Empire were not completely safe. Of course, the new enemy 
did not threaten the interests of the Empire as much as the Bulgarian state 
had during the reign of Tsar Simeon. However, the expeditions of the Magyars, 
especially when accompanied by the Pechenegs, could have been extremely 
troublesome. The latter people proved that they posed a threat not only to the 
southern Crimean estates of Byzantium, but also to its Balkan provinces. During 
the reign of Tsar Peter, the Bulgarian state was unable or unwilling to act as a 
buffer to protect the Empire from the armed incursions of the nomads.139 The 
all its forces. Moreover, in the 10th century, despite its division into Eastern and Western 
parts, Byzantium had only one army capable of resisting a mass invasion. Therefore, 
before a major expedition, the troops of the East and the West usually joined forces.
138 However, Masʿūdī’s information is sometimes used to estimate the mobilization potential 
of the peoples who supposedly participated in the Battle of Walandar. Cf. Zimonyi 2014a, 
176–177.
139 I do not intend to enter into a discussion here about what Bulgaria was during the 
reign of Tsar Peter. Regardless of its condition, Byzantine diplomats, especially after the 
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events of 934 were therefore the first in a series of events that raised Byzantine 
politicians’ awareness of the Pechenegs’ significance, and, over time, forced 
them to change their attitudes towards this people.
5.4 The Pechenegs as Allies of the Byzantine Empire
The events of 941–944, which began with an unexpected Rus’ invasion of 
Byzantium, would be a turning point.140 Its causes have long been the object 
of speculation. Older historiography pointed to disagreements that were likely 
to have stemmed from differences in the two sides’ interpretations of the pro-
visions of the first Rus’-Byzantine treaty, traditionally dated to 912. It was also 
assumed that improved relations with Bulgaria following the peace of 927 
changed the attitude of the court in Constantinople to the Rus’. The Rurikids 
were no longer needed as a potential ally of the Empire against the Bulgarians. 
Finally, it was assumed that Rus’ had resumed its expansion in the Black Sea 
region after a long pause during which it extended its rule over a number of 
Slavic tribes. On the eve of its military campaign against Byzantium in 941, Rus’ 
is said to have expanded onto the Taman Peninsula.141
The actions of the Rus’ in this region would seem to have been connected 
with their planned attack in 941. However, the circumstances surround-
ing these events were much more complicated. From Khazar sources (writ-
ten in Hebrew), we know that the Rus’ appeared on the peninsula as part of 
a diplomatic arrangement with the Byzantines.142 This was an attack, above 
all, on the interests of the Khazar state and was carried out in retaliation for 
the persecution of Christians in the khaganate. For the sake of clarity, this 
oppression, in turn, had been in retribution for the earlier persecution of Jews 
in Byzantium, in particular, Romanos Lekapenos’ forcing them to convert to 
experiences of the decade 934–944, must have seen that it did not provide protection 
against armed penetration by the ‘northern and Scythian peoples’. Of course, this kind of 
observation did not have to and probably did not lead to the conviction that it was imme-
diately necessary to liquidate the Bulgarian state. According to Skylitzes, Nikephoros 
Phokas accused Peter of failing to react to the invasions of the Magyars. Io.Scyl., 276–277; 
Wortley 2010, 265. John Zonaras cites the sharp response of the Bulgarian Tsar to Phokas’s 
accusations. Io.Zon., 513. For one reason why Peter let the Magyar expeditions through: 
Zlatarski 1927, 541–544; Dimitrov 1998, 72–77; Mladjov 1998, 120–123.
140 PVL 1, AM 6449 (941), col. 44–45.
141 Levchenko 1956, 139; Łowmiański 1973, 201–202; Litavrin 2000, 69.
142 Golb, Pritsak 1982, 114–119, 136–137.
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Christianity in the early 930s.143 The first attack by Rus’ on the Khazar pos-
sessions in Taman more precisely, on the city of S-m-k-r-ts, must have taken 
place at the end of the 930s.144 The attackers initially managed to move onto 
the peninsula, but were later defeated by a Khazar commander named Pesah, 
who reclaimed this territory and forced them to attack the Byzantine Empire.
In 941 the Rus’145 landed their forces in Bithynia and plundered its coasts 
with impunity for four months. Finally, after being cornered by the Byzantine 
army and suffering several defeats, the Rus’ were forced to retreat. Although 
they managed to escape onto the Black Sea, they encountered a Byzantine 
fleet commanded by Theophanes near the Thracian coast. With the aid of 
‘Greek fire’ he managed to destroy many Rus’ ships.146 Despite this defeat, Igor 
attacked Byzantium again soon afterwards. This time, however, apart from a 
large Slavic-Varangian contingent, he also brought with him the Pechenegs.147 
Their involvement made the expedition of 944 very dangerous for the Empire, 
as it posed a threat to the capital both from land and sea. The allied armies 
reached the Danube, where their invasion forces probably split into two 
groups: the Pechenegs would march to Constantinople through Bulgaria, 
while the Rus’ would sail to the Bosporus along the western shores of the Black 
Sea. The Byzantine Empire’s military involvement in Mesopotamia, where 
John Kourkouas enjoyed spectacular victories,148 had left it without an army 
capable of resisting the invaders in the west; nor could it count on the help of 
any allies. Its diplomatic influence remained the imperial court’s only weapon. 
143 Łowmiański 1973, 198–199; Zuckerman 1995, 255–256; Shepard 1998, 30. The persecution 
initiated by Romanos Lekapenos was supposed to have resulted from the failure of the 
Christian mission in Alania, from which the Christian clergy were expelled.
144 Shepard 1999a, 266; 2006, 26.
145 According to Khazar sources, the commander of the Rus’ expedition, called Helgu (or 
Oleg in the Slavic version of this name), withdrew after the defeat to the east and died in 
Persia (Frs). Constantin Zuckerman links this information with Miskawajhi’s account of 
the Rus’ expedition to the lands of the Berdaa on the Caspian Sea. Initially, the invaders 
were successful, but later almost everyone was killed, including the commander. They 
fell victim to dysentery and successful attacks by one of the local rulers. According to 
Zuckerman, Miskawajhi gave the last details about the expedition led by Helgu/Oleg, who 
after suffering a defeat on the Black Sea to the Byzantines, made his way to the Caspian 
Sea, where he died. Zukerman identifies the aforementioned Helgu with Prince Oleg, 
known from Rus’ chronicles, who, according to Rus’ tradition, died in quite unclear cir-
cumstances. In 941 the empire was supposedly then attacked by Igor and Oleg. After his 
initial failures, the young prince most likely abandoned the old prince and returned to 
Rus’. Golb, Pritsak 1982, 118–119; Miskawajhi, 67–69. Cf. Zuckerman 1995, 256–268.
146 PVL 1, AM 6449 (941), col. 44–45.
147 PVL 1, AM 6452 (944), col. 45.
148 Ostrogorski 1967, 237; Cheynet 2006, 30; El Cheikh 2004, 165.
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This diplomacy followed two paths. Agents of Constantinople attempted to 
persuade the Pechenegs to withdraw from their alliance with Igor by offering 
generous gifts. Igor, in turn, was offered a tribute greater than that collected 
by Oleg and the renewal of the previous peace treaty, which also regulated the 
terms of trade.149 The Kievan prince decided to accept the Byzantine offer and 
halt his march. Then, having ordered the Pechenegs to plunder the Bulgarian 
lands, he set off on his way back to Kiev.150
The expeditions of 941 and 944 were the last in a series of events that made 
the Byzantine elites aware of the political importance of the Pechenegs. The 
peace that prevailed in their relations with Rus’ between 911 and 941, as well 
as the pacification of relations with the Bulgarian state had turned the atten-
tion of Constantinople’s diplomats away from the Black Sea steppe zone. 
Improved relations with both states facilitated the Empire’s eastward expan-
sion, indirectly helping to secure its borders in Asia Minor, and thus promoted 
Byzantine interests; however, the safety of the northern and north-western 
borders was not likewise secured. Meanwhile, the events of the first half of the 
10th century proved that the Byzantine Empire needed an ally in this region to 
help it deal with recurring threats. It is possible that in the late 9th century the 
Magyars played such a role. However, the year 896 changed this situation. The 
court in Constantinople initially failed to come to terms with this fact, as evi-
denced by its attempts, probably no later than 907, to encourage the Magyars 
to return to their previous homeland. These attempts by Byzantium to coop-
erate with the Magyars’ former conquerors, dating back to 917, did not bring 
the expected results. Instead, it appears to have contributed to a spreading of 
mistrust between Byzantium and the Pechenegs. A political vacuum was cre-
ated by the departure of the Magyars. Initially, this did not imperil Byzantine 
interests in the region, but the 930s brought new threats. The first was a change 
in relations with the Magyars, who had transformed from a client into an 
independent ethnos ready to take hostile action against the Empire. The Rus’, 
whom Romanos Lekapenos wanted to see as the military arm of Byzantium 
in the Black Sea region, proved to be a dangerous and troublesome partner. 
Attempting to use them against the Khazars appears to have been a serious 
political mistake, as shown by the course of events, which ultimately resulted 
in this recent ally becoming a dangerous enemy. A permanent Rus’ presence 
in Tmutarakan threatened over the long term the security of Byzantine pos-
sessions in Crimea. Despite its initially negative consequences for the Empire, 
Pesah’s victory should be considered an event that helped restore equilibrium 
149 PVL 1, AM 6452 (944), col. 45–46.
150 PVL 1, AM 6452 (944), col. 46; AM 6453 (945), col. 46–54.
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along the northern shores of the Black Sea. The invasion of 941 rendered 
the atmosphere in Constantinople reminiscent of that which emerged after 
the Rus’ expedition of 860.151 These incidents were of particular concern to 
Bulgaria, which did not want to act as a buffer to protect the outskirts of the 
Empire’s capital. The events of 934–944 were therefore a reminder of the 
importance of the Lower Danube area and the Black Sea steppe for the safety 
of Byzantium, thus highlighting the role of the Pechenegs.
When was a second, more permanent Byzantine-Pecheneg alliance con-
cluded? This had probably already taken place when Constantine VII was 
editing his De administrando imperio. The years 949–951 should therefore be 
regarded its terminus ante quem. The information provided by the learned 
emperor in chapters one to eight seem to indicate that relations between the 
two political partners were very tense at the time. Constantine VII writes about 
the need to send an imperial diplomatic agent to the Pechenegs every year with 
appropriate gifts and letters, and of ensuring the nomads’ loyalty by securing 
hostages from them, who were detained in Constantinople under the care of 
a government minister. We also read here about how relations with Pecheneg 
leaders were established and other diplomatic rituals.152 It seems, therefore, 
that the date when the alliance was established can be safely moved back a 
few years. It is possible that it was formed near the end of Romanos Lekapenos’ 
reign, i.e., in 944. This would mean that the court in Constantinople, as it was 
deciding whether or not to renew the treaty with Rus’, was also holding politi-
cal negotiations with the Pechenegs aimed at forming an alliance that could 
help secure the agreement they were planning to sign with the Rurikids. Since 
we know that this followed the same procedure as Byzantine diplomacy in 971, 
when a peace agreement with Sviatoslav was accompanied by a renewal of 
a political alliance with the Pechenegs, it can be assumed that twenty-seven 
years earlier the case was no different. However, it seems more probable 
that the idea of an alliance with the nomads was conceived by Constantine 
Porphyrogenitus, who strongly emphasized its importance in De administ-
rando imperio, especially as a tool to stop the Rus’, Magyars and Bulgarians. The 
alliance with the Pechenegs should therefore be dated back to the beginning of 
his independent rule, i.e., around 945.153
In view of the findings presented above, a question arises as to what kinds 
of changes may have arisen in the relationship between the Pechenegs and 
151 This was surely both surprising and dangerous. Liutprand., V 15 (p. 137–139); Georg.Mon., 
914–916. Cf. Franklin, Shepard 1996, 113–114; Shepard 1999a, 269.
152 DAI, I–VIII (pp. 48–57).
153 Shepard 1999a, 273; Paroń 2007a, 103–105.
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Rus’ as result of improved relations between the nomads and the Byzantine 
Empire. Did the end of Pecheneg attacks on Kherson coincide with a resump-
tion of armed incursions against Rus’? No such changes were recorded by the 
Rus’. Although Constantine Porphyrogenitus writes about the possibility of the 
Pechenegs attacking the Rurikids’ possessions, and later, about the devastation 
they wreaked while Rus’ armies were away on a military expedition,154 Igor’s 
death in 945 resulted in a 20-year break in Rus’ expansion. Constantine VII 
also notes that the nomads maintained trade relations with the inhabitants 
of Rus’.155 This last fact seems to prove that in the mid-10th century relations 
between the Pechenegs and Kiev could have been quite good, or at least good 
enough not be dominated by military confrontation.
A change that would severely affect the Pechenegs’ situation occurred in the 
latter half of the 960s. The Primary Russian Chronicle states that Sviatoslav I 
assumed power over Kievan Rus’ in 964.156 Virtually all of his reign was char-
acterized by dynamic expansion, the first victim of which was the Khazar 
Khaganate. Rus’ chronicles report that the Khagan’s army was defeated, allow-
ing the Kievan prince to seize the fortress of Sarkel, and most likely Itil, the 
capital of the Khazar state.157 In that same year (965), Rus’ also defeated the 
Kasogians and Yassians. The first people are identified as the Cherkess, who 
inhabited the Taman Peninsula, and the latter as the Alans, who lived in the 
North Caucasus.158 Ibn Hawqal, a 10th-century Arab author, provided addi-
tional information about these events:
At the present time, the Rūs have left nothing to the Bulghār, Burtās 
and Khazars but a few worthless ruins. They fell upon them and looted 
everything, obtaining in their territories more than they could have 
hoped for.159
154 DAI, II (pp. 48–51).
155 Cf. Chapter 4.2 of the present book.
156 PVL 1, AM 6472 (964), col. 64–65.
157 PVL 1, AM 6473 (965), col. 65. Cf. Golden 1980, 82; 2000, 297.
158 PVL 1, AM 6473 (965), col. 65. Cf. Artamonov 1962, 426; Pletneva 1976, 71.
159 Quote from: Lunde, Stone 2012, 178. Cf. Dunlop 1954, 241–242; Grekow 1955, 480. Rus’ 
chronicles and ibn Hawqal seem to describe the same event. Differences in dating 
(Hawqal claims that the Rus’ invasion took place in 968/9) incline some researchers 
to accept the hypothesis of Sviatoslav having undertaken two expeditions against the 
Khazars. Cf. Kalinina 1976, 100 (the researcher adopts the following sequence of expedi-
tions: 965 – invasion of the White Tower-Sarkel, the Kasogians and Yassians; 967 – an 
expedition against the Danube Bulgarians; 968/9 – second invasion of Khazaria, and 
the conquest and destruction of its main cities); Novosel’tsev 1990, 225–227 (accepts 
T.M. Kalinina’s reasoning). Most scholars, however, believe that there was only one Rus’ 
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The Muslim writer is most likely confusing the Volga Bulgars with the 
Danube Bulgars, who were also victims of Sviatoslav’s aggression, though not 
in 965.160 However, it is true that Itil and Samandar, the main centres of the 
Khazar state, were indeed devastated. The last fact and the attack on peoples 
of the Caucasus subordinate to the khaganate signalled the definitive dismem-
berment of the Pax Chazarica. Although the Pechenegs had inflicted a serious 
blow to it in the late 9th century when they occupied the Black Sea steppe, 
later events evidenced the continued vitality of the Khazars. In his description 
of the return of Rus’ troops from the Caspian expedition of 913–914, Masʿūdī 
shows that the khaganate still controlled the Volga route. Igor’s raiding forces 
learned this in a dramatic way when they were attacked by Muslim mercenar-
ies hired by the Khagan and his allies, the Burdas and Volga Bulgars.161 The vic-
tory of Pesah over the Rus’ commander Oleg-Helgu (HLGW) described above 
also confirms the strength of the khaganate in the first half of the 10th century. 
Although the Bulgars began their struggle for independence in the early 920s, 
similar processes were not yet present in other parts of the Empire. Joseph ben 
Aaron, the khaganate’s last ruler, still controlled a vast territory.162 Ibrahim ibn 
Yaqub, whose account was probably written in the mid-960s, and therefore 
just before the fall of Khazaria, also mentions its inhabitants among the most 
significant peoples of the north.163
The collapse of the khaganate, therefore, occurred suddenly. Sviatoslav’s 
aim, apart from seizing spoils, was most likely to eliminate it as a competing 
political and commercial centre. Igor’s successor would subject the Viatichi, 
the last East Slavic tribe to still recognize the sovereignty of the khaganate, 
to his rule. He additionally took control of at least a part of the Don, a major 
transportation route. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that the Rus’ 
established themselves in Sarkel, while there is less certainty about their 
permanent presence in Tmutarakan.164 Such territorial acquisitions made it 
expedition, which, moving along the Volga, first destroyed the Burdas, then captured and 
sacked Itil, and then attacked the northern Caucasus, finally sailing via Kerch Strait and 
the Sea of Azov into the Don. Sailing upstream, they reached Sarkel, which they also con-
quered. Cf. Bartol’d 1963, 851; Artamonov 1962, 427; Dunlop 1954, 243–244; Gadlo 1979, 207; 
1994, 56–57; Golden 1980, 82.
160 Marquart 1903, 474–475; Bartol’d 1963, 850–851; Kalinina 1976, 96; Novosel’tsev 1990, 225.
161 Cf. above, note 103.
162 Perepiska, 81–83, 98–102. The area controlled by Khagan Joseph allegedly stretched over 
an area that took four months’ travel to cross.
163 Ibn Yaqub, 52; Mishin 1996, 190.
164 The scale of Sviatoslav’s territorial acquisitions and length of possession is unclear. 
From the information provided by ibn Hawqal, it seems that he took over all the lands 
of the Khazars and the peoples subordinated to them. However, a literal reading of the 
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possible to reduce traffic on the route ‘from the Varangians to the Greeks’, 
which was controlled by the Pechenegs along parts of the Lower Dnieper.
However, another consequence of the fall of the Pax Chazarica is equally 
important. It has been repeatedly mentioned that the raison d’état for the kha-
ganate had been to organize and secure the development of trade. The political 
system built to fulfil these tasks limited the migration of the warrior nomads 
who came from Inner Asia to the Volga region. Although in the late 9th century 
the Khazars and their allies did not manage to stop the Pechenegs from moving 
onto the Black Sea steppe, this did not mean that their system had been dis-
mantled. It was not until the invasion in 965 that the barrier protecting them 
from attacks of the nomads who lived in the Volga region was destroyed. The 
situation that ensued would put the Pechenegs in serious danger,165 as they 
were about to be forced to fight a bitter conflict with their old enemies, the 
Uzes, which would significantly weaken their position on the Black Sea steppe.
It is unclear whether the Pechenegs realized how important the buffer 
the khaganate provided was to their security. The exact shape of their rela-
tions with the Khazars in the 10th century is also unknown. In the Schechter 
Text dated to the mid-10th century, the Pechenegs were not listed among 
the Khagan’s allies.166 In De administrando imperio, an almost contemporary 
source, Constantine Porphyrogenitus did not classify them as enemies of the 
Khazars who might attack them.167 It is therefore likely that in the first half of 
the 10th century, relations between the Pechenegs and Khazars improved. The 
Pechenegs were most likely involved in a system of trade relations established 
information supplied by the Arab writer is not justified. Most researchers assume that 
the Rus’ prince conquered only part of the attacked lands. Cf. Łowmiański 1973, 217 
(seizure of Tmutarakan); Artamonov 1962, 429, 430–431 (Sviatoslav conquered only the 
Don region, to Kerch Strait); Gadlo 1979, 57; 1994, 207 (assumes that Sviatoslav did not 
conquer any territories apart from Sarkel. His reaching the Don region, the Volga region 
or the northern Caucasus was allegedly prevented by the Pechenegs). For a different inter-
pretation: Novosel’tsev 1990, 224, 227 (extensive territorial acquisitions, among which 
there were also areas around the Volga estuary, allegedly controlled by the Rus’ at the 
beginning of the 980s). However, there are researchers who date the strengthening of the 
Rurikids’ presence in Tmutarakan only to the 980s. Cf. Chapter 4.2 of the present book, 
footnote 134.
165 Łowmiański 1973, 217 (one cannot accept his theses. The fall of the khaganate did not 
embolden the Pechenegs, as much as it struck a blow to their interests); Golden 1980, 
85 (he claims that Byzantium was most severely affected by the fall of the khaganate); 
Romashov 1999, 35.
166 Golb, Pritsak 1982, 120–121.
167 DAI, X–XII (p. 62–65).
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by the Khazars,168 which cannot, however, be regarded as proof of their politi-
cal dependence on the khaganate.
The position taken by the Pechenegs during the events of 965 therefore 
remains a mystery. According to some Russian researchers, on his expedi-
tion against the Khazars, Sviatoslav had to secure his rear by forming an alli-
ance with the Pechenegs, which is said to be evidenced by the fact that the 
nomads took part in the attack on Khazaria.169 This interpretation is allegedly 
supported by Miskawajhi (932–1030), a Persian historian and philosopher. 
In his world history, The Experiences of Nations, he recorded an invasion of 
Khazaria in 965 supposedly carried out by some ‘Turks’.170 This extraordinary 
chronological coincidence suggests that they acted in collusion with Rus’, or 
that they simply spontaneously took advantage of the khaganate’s weakened 
state. However, it is the identity of the aggressors that is crucial here. Most 
researchers rightly assume that they were most likely not the Pechenegs, but 
the Uzes,171 known to have been potential enemies of the Khazars in the mid- 
10th century.172 The Pechenegs probably took a neutral, cautious attitude 
towards the events of 965. Perhaps they assumed that the khaganate would 
be able to overcome Rus’ aggression, as they had many times before. The 
Pechenegs most likely only became concerned as a result of the consequences 
of the fall of Khazaria. This included, above all, Sviatoslav establishing settle-
ments in Sarkel, on the eastern borderlands of Patzinacia. The presence of 
the Rus’ in the valley of the Don was most certainly seen as dangerous and 
provocative. The collapse of trade relations, which most likely followed the 
fall of the Pax Chazarica, would also have negative economic consequences. 
The Pechenegs benefited from this trade, so they must have suffered from 
its absence as well. Concerns about Rus’ expansion may have prompted the 
nomads to attempt an assault on Kiev in 968.
This was one of a number of episodes that had their start three years ear-
lier, in the highly eventful year of 965, when Bulgarian emissaries arrived in 
Constantinople to demand the tribute paid by previous basileis. In response, 
Emperor Nikephoros Phokas had the emissaries publicly ridiculed and flogged. 
Such a highly undiplomatic gesture was certain to lead to armed conflict with 
Bulgaria. Phokas himself did not take serious military action, however, as this 
168 Cf. Chapter 4.2 of the present book.
169 Tolstov 1948, 252; Pletneva 1958, 215; Kalinina 1976, 94; Gadlo 1979, 57; 1994, 207 (Sviatoslav 
made an alliance not only with the Pechenegs, but also with the Uzes).
170 Miskawajhi, 223. Miskawajhi’s information is also repeated by ibn al-Athir, who was writ-
ing in the 13th century. Cf. Dunlop 1954, 244.
171 Artamonov 1962, 431; Golden 1980, 83 (note 261); 1972, 77–80; Novosel’tsev 1990, 225.
172 DAI, X 3–4 (p. 62).
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would have forced him to cease his military activity in the east. He merely 
destroyed a few border fortresses, and entrusted Sviatoslav with the task of 
persecuting Bulgaria.173 The Byzantine Emperor’s choice of ally is quite puz-
zling. Above all, it begs the question why he did not choose the Pechenegs, 
who could easily have attacked Bulgaria due to their geographical proximity. 
Moreover, they were tied by a political alliance to the Byzantine Empire and 
did not appear to have any greater political ambitions. The Emperor’s behav-
iour is quite telling, as it reveals the position of the Pechenegs among the 
allies of Byzantium at that time. It is clear that the ruler preferred political 
and military cooperation with the Rus’ prince rather than with the nomads, 
who, although militant, were seen by him as being too wild and unpredict-
able. Nikephoros Phokas’s choice helped Kiev and Constantinople establish 
a closer relationship than that which had previously been achieved through 
the regent Princess Olga. During the reign of Constantine Porphyrogenitus, she 
had visited the court in Constantinople and been baptized there.174 Her visit 
increased the chances for consolidating the peaceful relationship between the 
two countries.175
However, it soon turned out that the hopes of Byzantine diplomats were 
misplaced. Sviatoslav readily complied with the request of the basileus, and 
in 967 launched his first attack on the Balkans, but after his victory he did 
not intend to leave Bulgaria, choosing Pereiaslavets (Little Preslav), situated 
on the Lower Danube, as his new base of operations.176 An attack on Kiev by 
the Pechenegs in 968 forced the Rus’ ruler to abandon this new territory and 
head for his capital with reinforcements to save the city from the nomads.177 
173 Ostrogorski 1967, 246; Treadgold 1997, 502; Leszka, Marinow 2015, 181–182.
174 DCB, I, 594–598; PVL 1, AM 6463 (955), col. 60–64. The time of Olga’s visit (visits?) in 
Tsar’grad and the time and place of her baptism is the subject of debate. In addition 
to the traditional chronology according to which the duchess came to Constantinople 
in 957, some researchers assume that this event took place 11 years earlier, in 946. Cf. 
Obolensky 2000, 189–190; 1994a, 56–57; Sakharov 1980, 272–292; Litavrin 1981, 35–48; 1986, 
49–57; Nazarenko 1989, 66–83 (the researcher considers both dates to be equally prob-
able); Franklin, Shepard 1996, 142–143 (researchers generally avoid giving the exact date 
of Olga’s visit in Constantinople); Zuckerman 2000, 647–672; Kresten 2000.
175 Ostrogorski 1967, 240–241; Grekow 1955, 479; Litavrin 1986, 57. Apart from hopes for the 
Christianization of Rus’, Olga’s visit (visits?) to Constantinople probably also resulted in 
the fact that Byzantium was using Varangian forces to fight the Arabs. The Rus’ warriors 
were said to be already fighting during the siege of Khadat (955) and during the expedi-
tion of Nikephoros II Phokas to Crete (960–61).
176 On the chronology of Sviatoslav’s expeditions to the Balkans: Kryshkovskii 1952, 127–138; 
Stokes 1962, 44–57; 1962a, 466–496; Sakharov 1991, 122–156; Leszka, Marinov 2015, 184 
(researchers suggest that the first of Sviatoslav’s expeditions took place in August 968).
177 PVL 1, AM 6476 (968), col. 65–67.
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The Pecheneg expedition is usually assumed178 to have been inspired by 
Byzantine diplomacy. Indeed, if one assumes that the Byzantines sought to 
drive Sviatoslav out from the Danube region, a Pecheneg attack would have 
greatly benefited them. However, it is noteworthy that The Primary Russian 
Chronicle, the only source reporting the invasion of 968, does not mention any 
external political influences. It is worth recalling that the Pechenegs’ attack 
was carried out according to their standard military tactics, i.e., while the main 
Rus’ forces were far from Kiev.179 Moreover, the destruction of the Khazar 
Khaganate had aroused concern and irritation among the Pechenegs. Their 
expedition to the Rus’ capital may have been dictated by the desire to weaken 
Sviatoslav, who was aggressive and posed a threat to their interests. Therefore, 
it seems that the nomads did not need any external political power to find a 
reason to attack Kiev.
The loos of the capital city, most likely involving its destruction and the 
murder of the majority of its inhabitants, including the members of the ruling 
dynasty, would have been catastrophic for Rus’. However, Sviatoslav managed 
to arrive in time, defeat his enemies and chase them into the steppe. Soon 
after his victory, the prince embarked on a second expedition to the Balkans, 
assumed to have begun in 969. This time he led an army supported by the 
Magyars, Bulgarians and Pechenegs.180 It is quite surprising that the Pechenegs 
took part in an invasion aimed at harming the interests of Byzantium. In the 
light of available source data, one can only offer a hypothetical explanation as 
to why they were involved. It is important first to estimate how many Pecheneg 
units were fighting for Sviatoslav. It seems they were not very numerous in 
size, because they did not constitute the bulk of the Kievan prince’s army, but 
merely provided it with support. Moreover, they represented a people who had 
recently had been in a violent conflict with Olga’s son, so he could not be cer-
tain about their loyalty. Observations made in the previous chapter show that 
it was not a virtue the Pechenegs particularly valued.181 Therefore, if Sviatoslav 
wanted to have full control over his nomad forces, they could only constitute 
178 Pletneva 1958, 215–216; Stokes 1962a, 482; Obolensky 2000, 129; 1994a, 58; Sakharov 1991, 
123, 132; Wozniak 1984, 310; Treadgold 1997, 503; Spinei 2009, 98. Some scholars, mainly 
Bulgarian, believe that the invasion of Kiev was inspired by the Bulgarians: Zlatarski 1927, 
587–588; Koledarov 1979, 53; Dimitrov 2011, 233–234 (here also a review of views on the 
subject). Finally, some researchers believe that they were initiated by the dying Khazar 
Khaganate: Kalinina 1976, 97.
179 This model is discussed by Constantine Porphyrogenitus: DAI, II, IV (pp. 48–53). Cf. 
Chapter 4.3 of the present book.
180 Io.Scyl., 288; Wortley 2010; s. 275–276; Io.Zon., 524; Trapp 1986, 33. According to these 
authors, Sviatoslav brought to the Balkans an army of 308,000 and 300,000 warriors 
respectively. However, these figures raise understandable doubts.
181 Cf. Chapter 4.4.
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a small fraction of his entire army. Poland’s Bolesław Chrobry (the Brave) had 
most likely adopted a similar approach in his 1018 expedition to Kiev. Only 1000 
Pecheneg warriors supported the Polish ruler at that time.182 According to Rus’ 
chronicles, during its second expedition against the Bulgarians, the Kievan 
prince’s army consisted of 10,000 men.183 Experts on the subject consider this 
number reliable, and most likely refers to the Slavic-Varangian units led by 
Sviatoslav.184 The number of allied troops was probably no higher than half 
of this number, which, taking into account the fact that this also included the 
Magyars and Bulgarians, suggests that no more than 1,500 to 2,000 Pechenegs 
took part in Sviatoslav’s expedition. Such a number was only a fraction of the 
mobilization potential of this ethnos.
This last finding provides a basis for two hypotheses for determining the 
nature and motivation of the Pechenegs’ participation in the expedition of the 
Kiev Prince. The first one would assume the formation of an alliance between 
the Rus’ and just one tribe among the nomads, that which had inhabited 
the western extremes of Patzinacia (tribe Giazichopon). This tribe may have 
already attacked Bulgaria earlier, which would have justified its participation 
in the Kievan expedition. In addition, it was peripheral in relation to other 
Pecheneg tribes, as well as being located far from the main Rus’ cities, which 
meant it rarely threatened the centre of the Kievan state. Presumably it also 
did not take part in the invasion of 968, so it was not at war with Sviatoslav. 
This cooperation with Giazichopon was important since it could protect the 
rear of the Rus’ army. Byzantium could have tried to persuade the Pechenegs 
who lived near the Danube to carry out sabotage actions against the rear 
of Sviatoslav’s army in Bulgaria. The alliance with this tribe prevented such 
a possibility.
However, there is also a second possibility, according to which the Pecheneg 
auxiliary unit would act as hostages, guaranteeing the neutrality of the 
Pechenegs during the Byzantine-Rus’ war. The Primary Russian Chronicle 
describes Sviatoslav’s victory in 968 in a brief passage:
He [Sviatoslav – A.P.] therefore collected an army, and drove the 
Pechenegs out into the steppe. Thus there was peace.185
182 Cf. Chapter 6.1. of the present book.
183 PVL 1, AM 6479 (971), col. 70.
184 Runciman 1930, 205 (note 4); Łowmiański 1973, 218. According to Leo the Deacon, 30,000 
‘Scythians’ fought against 10,000 Byzantines, commanded by Bardas Skleros, in the Battle 
of Arcadiopolis. The number of Sviatoslav’s soldiers is probably overestimated. The forces 
of both sides, judging by the outcome of the battle, were probably equal, or the barbarians 
had a small advantage. LeoDiac., VI 12 (p. 109); Talbot, Sullivan 2005, 159.
185 PVL 1, AM 6476 (968), col. 67; Cross, Scherbowitz-Wetzor 1953, 86.
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However, if relations between the Pechenegs and Rus’ had actually become 
peaceful, i.e., the nomads had ceased their attacks on Kiev, then driving the 
Pechenegs ‘into the steppe’ alone could not have been the main reason for this 
peace. Sviatoslav had most likely defeated his southern neighbours in 968 in 
a rather spectacular fashion, forcing them to agree to an alliance and provide 
auxiliary forces for the planned expedition.186 Only such a solution would have 
guaranteed the safety of Kiev. The alliances with Hungary and Bulgaria served 
similar purposes. Their participation in the expedition against Byzantium 
limited or even excluded the chance of diplomatic intervention on the part 
of Constantinople aimed at using these two ethne against Sviatoslav. The sec-
ond hypothesis therefore seems to be more justified, as a forced alliance with 
the Pechenegs would have secured the rear of the Rus’ forces. The promise 
of abundant spoils in the Balkans would certainly have helped overcome any 
doubts or objections.187
The second expedition began with a number of successes for the Rus’, at 
least up until their defeat in the Battle of Arcadiopolis (970). Contrary to the 
accounts found in Byzantine historiography, which described the clash as a 
defeat for the barbarians, Sviatoslav’s army was not completely crushed, but 
the Rus’ prince was forced to stop his march on Constantinople. A fact of par-
ticular importance for our discussion is that in the first phase of the battle, the 
Byzantine troops managed to cause considerable losses among the Pecheneg 
forces.188 It is even possible that they was completely annihilated. Sviatoslav 
thus lost his hostages, which resulted in even greater anger and an increased 
desire for revenge among their kinsmen.
The further course of the war was unfavourable for Rus’. During the course 
of his brilliant campaign, Emperor John Tzimiskes forced Sviatoslav to with-
draw to the Danube and take refuge within the walls of Dristra. After a long 
siege, and one final failed attempt to break through the ring of Byzantine 
troops in July 971, the Rus’ ruler capitulated.189 John Tzimiskes forced his 
defeated opponent to accept harsh peace conditions, which, however, did 
186 It is worth noting that Sviatoslav’s behaviour is very similar to the behaviour of the com-
mander Pesah towards the defeated Rus’ forces led by Helgu, mentioned in the Schechter’s 
Text. He ordered them to attack Byzantium, which was to be a form of reprisal for attack-
ing the territory of the khaganate. Cf. above.
187 Some Bulgarian researchers find the participation of the Pechenegs in the second expe-
dition as allies of Sviatoslav difficult to accept. They suggest that the nomads formed an 
alliance only with the Bulgarians. Cf. Dimitrov 2011, 237–238. Bozhilov 1973, 60.
188 Io.Scyl., 289–290; Wortley 2010, s. 277; Io.Zon., 524–525; Trapp 1986, 33–34.
189 Ostrogorski 1967, 248–249.
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not exclude the possibility of further cooperation. Sviatoslav had to pledge to 
withdraw from Bulgaria and never return to the Balkans, to stop his attacks 
on Kherson, and provide military support to the Empire in the event of a con-
flict with a third country. In return, Tzimiskes renewed the trade privileges of 
Rus’ merchants.190
It is significant that after the treaty was signed, the Archbishop (archiereus) 
of Euchaita, Theophilos was sent to the Pechenegs. His task was to renew the 
alliance with the nomads, which had been undermined by their forced alliance 
with the Rus’ prince. As allies of the imperial court, the Pechenegs were told not 
to invade Bulgaria, which, since much of it had come under the direct control 
of the Byzantine Empire, was a reasonable demand. Theophilos also asked the 
nomads, on behalf of the Rus’ ruler, to allow Sviatoslav to pass safely through 
their territory as he returned to his homeland.191 The Pechenegs agreed to ful-
fil all of the archbishop’s requests with the exception of the last one, which 
clearly indicated their intentions towards the Kievan prince.192
Theophilos’ mission seems to prove that the court in Constantinople 
intended to continue the policy towards the Pechenegs and Rus’ formulated 
in the mid-10th century by Constantine VII. Although Byzantine diplomats 
wished to maintain peaceful relations with Kiev, they were still concerned 
about the excessive growth of its power. Good relations with the inhabitants 
of the Black Sea steppe served as a factor in suppressing Rus’ expansion. The 
events of 965–971 confirmed the possibility of a renewal of such a policy. 
However, the hostile stance of the nomads now provided Byzantine diplomacy 
with an important lesson, one that would most likely be long remembered. 
By denying Sviatoslav a safe return, the Pechenegs unequivocally stated that 
they did not intend to be an obedient tool of Constantinople. This observa-
tion most likely reduced the value of the nomads as a political partner in the 
eyes of the Byzantine elites. The fact that for the next nearly half-century (until 
1017) there is no mention of any Byzantine-Pecheneg contact seems to confirm 
this hypothesis.
190 Io.Scyl., 309; Wortley 2010, 293; Io.Zon., 534–535; Trapp 1986, 40; PVL 1, AM 6479 (971), 
col. 72–73.
191 Io.Scyl., 309–310; Wortley 2010, 293; Io.Zon., 535; Trapp 1986, 40.
192 Io.Scyl., 310; Wortley 2010, 293; Io.Zon. 535; Trapp 1986, 40. John Skylitzes clearly states 
that the Pechenegs became angry with the agreement concluded between Byzantium 
and Sviatoslav. The anger of the nomads was probably triggered by the fact that the Rus’ 
ruler, who had caused them to get involved in a terrible war with the Empire, then made 
peace with it. Cf. Paroń 2009b, 496–497.
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After the peace treaty, Sviatoslav embarked on his return to Rus’. Having 
ignored the warning of the voivode Sveneld, he decided to sail to Kiev on 
monoxyla canoes. However, at the rapids in the lower reaches of the Dnieper 
River, the Rus’ ruler encountered Pecheneg forces, which forced him to stop 
his further journey and winter in Belobereg. Since his forces were not prepared 
for this stay, hunger undermined their strength and morale.193 In the spring of 
972, Sviatoslav attempted to cross the rapids again. This time it ended in trag-
edy. The prince perished, along with the majority of his forces. Only the units 
commanded by Sveneld, who probably chose to travel on land, returned safely 
to Kiev.194
As in the case of the invasion of Rus’ in 968, many scholars have tried to iden-
tify an external power that may have inspired this attack. It is quite commonly 
assumed, especially by Russian researchers, that it was the result of diplomatic 
efforts by the court in Constantinople.195 However, since this hypothesis contra-
dicts the report of John Skylitzes about the mission of Archbishop Theophilos, 
it should be rejected. The Pechenegs planned the attack on Sviatoslav on their 
own. A desire for revenge, resulting from the failure of the Kiev expedition 
of 968, as well as the death of their people in the Battle of Arcadiopolis, was 
most likely sufficient to make them attack an enemy they hated. Adding to 
these reasons was most certainly the fear of the Rus’ state becoming even more 
powerful.196 Wilhelm Barthold, based on his analysis of numerous Muslim 
sources, once stated that the damage done by the forces of Sviatoslav in 
Khazaria had a profound impact on the Islamic world.197 It must have also 
made a significant impression on the nomadic neighbours of Rus’, further 
intensified by the two expeditions to Bulgaria.
The victory of the Pecheneg ruler Kuria, who had killed Sviatoslav Igorevich, 
was the greatest and most spectacular victory by the nomads over the Rus’ state. 
It provided proof that the Black Sea steppe were still their natural domain. 
193 PVL 1, AM 6479 (971), col. 73–74.
194 LeoDiac., IX 12 (p. 157); Talbot, Sullivan 2005, 200; Io.Scyl., 310; Wortley 2010, 294; Io.Zon., 
536; Trapp 1986, 40–41; PVL 1, AM 6480 (972), col. 74.
195 Karamzin 1899, 181–182; Grekow 1955, 487; Levchenko 1956, 288–289; Pletneva 1958, 215; 
Tăpkova-Zaimova 1976, 35; Fine 1983, 187; Karpov 1997, 64–65; Kniaz’kii 2003, 32. Christo 
Dimitrov (2011, 240) assumes that Bulgarians, inhabitants of Little Preslav, inspired the 
murder of Sviatoslav. It should be admitted that this hypothesis has a stronger basis in 
the sources than claims about the alleged involvement of Byzantine diplomacy. Cf. Paroń 
2009b, 495.
196 Cf. Paroń 2009b, 494–499 (detailed analysis examining responsibility for the death of 
Sviatoslav Igorevich).
197 Bartol’d 1963, 688; Grekow 1955, 481.
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However, there were already indications foreshadowing the impending end of 
their rule in this region, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
…
For three quarters of the 10th century, the Pechenegs had been an important 
element of political relations in Eastern Europe. This is evidenced by the fact 
that authors from distant lands noted their presence in the region.198 This eth-
nos played such an important role because of its considerable military poten-
tial as well as the fact that it occupied an area of strategic importance. In the 
10th century, the Black Sea steppe became a niche of sorts, encircled by politi-
cal entities that for various reasons had interests in it and its inhabitants. One 
can hardly resist the impression that the Pechenegs were often quite passive 
in these political manoeuvrings and relied mostly on their instincts in their 
external relations. This was largely determined by their segmented and ace-
phalic internal organization. This does not mean, however, that the nomads 
were merely tools to be used by neighbouring countries. Their relations with 
the Byzantine Empire demonstrate this very clearly. They were never clients of 
Constantinople, and became a lasting ally relatively late, i.e., early during the 
independent reign of Constantine Porphyrogenitus. This alliance most likely 
lasted until the death of the Emperor, that is, until the end of 959. Earlier, they 
cooperated only on an occasional basis (the attempt to use the nomads against 
Simeon in 917). It is difficult to say whether the Byzantine-Pecheneg alliance 
continued during the reign of Romanos II and Nikephoros II Phokas. It was 
clearly strained during the reign of John Tzimiskes, but soon, thanks to the 
mission of Archbishop Theophilos, it was restored. The murder of Sviatoslav, 
committed against the advice of the Constantinople emissary, however, clearly 
showed that the Pechenegs did not intend to obey the orders of the Emperor 
when they did not suit their interests. The relations of the nomads with other 
political powers were no different.
When they attacked Kiev in 968, or four years later when they murdered the 
Rus’ prince, their actions were primarily motivated by their own interests. In 
the absence of hard source data, there is no justification for trying to prove the 
intervention of any external power, such as Byzantium or the declining Khazar 
Khaganate. The relationship between the Pechenegs and the khaganate in its 
198 Apart from Masʿūdī, who considered the Pechenegs to be the most militant of the Turkic 
peoples, they are named by Ibrahim ibn Yaqub and Liutprand of Cremona as one of the 
most important ethne in south-eastern Europe. Cf. ibn Yaqub, 51, 52; Mishin 1996, 189, 190; 
Liutprand., I 11 (p. 9).
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final years is unclear. The nomads most likely benefited from the trade con-
tacts which had developed within the Pax Chazarica, but this does not prove 
their dependence on the Khazars. But the Pechenegs were not their enemies 
either. In 965, when Sviatoslav was destroying the foundations of the Khazar 
system, they most likely took a neutral stance. They were soon to suffer the 
consequences of their passivity.
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chapter 6
Decline of the Pechenegs’ Power on the  
Black Sea Steppe
6.1 The Rus’, Pechenegs and Uzes (972–1036)
The murder of Sviatoslav did not initiate a series of bloody confrontations 
between Kievan Rus’ and the Pechenegs. The prince’s death seems para-
doxically to have contributed to a brief restoration of a balance in relations 
between this steppe people and the Rurik Dynasty. Such a state of affairs can 
be explained to some extent by the political situation which had developed in 
Kievan Rus’ after 972. This was the result of an earlier decision by Sviatoslav 
to divide the principality among his three sons. The oldest, Iaropolk, took 
the throne in Kiev, Oleg received the lands of the Derevlians, and Vladimir, 
having accepted an invitation from the Ilmen Slavs, ruled in Novgorod.1 
Following a period marked by an uneasy balance, Iaropolk’s aspirations to 
consolidate power became increasingly apparent. Late in the 970s, he attacked 
the lands of the Derevlians and, after murdering Oleg, extended his rule into 
this area. Upon hearing news of these events, and probably lacking suffi-
cient military power to effectively counter his brother’s attacks, Vladimir fled, 
temporarily handing over Novgorod to Iaropolk.2 He soon returned at the 
head of a Varangian mercenary army. After regaining control of the lands 
he had inherited, he set off for Kiev and quickly conquered the capital.3 
Iaropolk took refuge in Rodnia, a town on the Ros’, from where he was lured 
out and murdered by the Varangians. In ca. 980 Vladimir became ruler of all 
of Kievan Rus’.4
The rivalry among Sviatoslav’s sons had most likely limited the expansion 
of Kievan Rus’. In addition, the eldest son wished to protect his home front 
against attacks by the Pechenegs, so he most likely entered into some kind 
of agreement with them. It is difficult to say whether the war-like steppe-
dwellers participated in any of Iaropolk’s military expeditions, but there are 
1 PVL 1, AM 6478 (970), col. 69; AM 6481 (973), col. 74.
2 PVL 1, AM 6485 (977), col. 74–75.
3 PVL 1, AM 6488 (980), col. 75–77.
4 PVL 1, AM 6488 (980), col. 77–78.
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reasons to believe that he maintained friendly relations with them.5 The words 
of Iaropolk’s courtier Variazhko, who during the siege of Rodnia warned the 
prince against his brother Vladimir’s malevolent intentions, seem to testify 
clearly to this fact: ‘My Prince,’ he said, ‘they will kill you. Flee rather to the 
Pechenegs and collect an army.’6 After Iaropolk’s assassination, Variazhko sup-
posedly fled to the nomads and later fought alongside them against Vladimir.7
The ascension of a new ruler did not necessarily result in an immediate 
flaring of tensions on the southern borders of Kievan Rus’. Accounts from The 
Primary Russian Chronicle concerning the first years of Vladimir’s independent 
rule, indicate intensive efforts on his part aimed at bringing back under Kievan 
rule, which had been weakened as a result of internal fighting, certain East 
Slavic tribes (expeditions against the Viatichi8 and Radimichi9 dated to the 
early 980s), as well as an expansion of Rus’ westwards and northwards (expe-
ditions against the Liakhs10 and the Iatvingians11). It was not until the end of 
the 980s that a substantial change supposedly took place in relations with the 
steppe-dwellers. Rus’ chronicles point to 988 as the year the prince of Kiev 
initiated the construction of a system of fortifications protecting Kiev’s dis-
tant foreground in the south and southeast. At about the same time fortifica-
tions were most likely also constructed on the Sula, Stugna, Oster and Trubezh 
5  The Nikon Chronicle contains a record, dated 979 (AM 6487), according to which kniaz’ 
Ildeia, of Pecheneg descent, enlisted to serve Iaropolk. PNL, 39; Sielicki 1968, 264–265 
(note 1). However, the reliability of this information, as well as much other data on the 
Pechenegs in the Nikon Chronicle, compiled in the first half of the 16th century, is often 
questioned. Cf. Melnyk 2013, 151–158.
6  PVL, 1, AM 6488 (980), col. 78. Cross, Scherbowitz-Wetzor 1953, 93.
7  PVL 1, AM 6488 (980), col. 78.
8  PVL 1, AM 6489 (981), col. 81–82.
9  PVL 1, AM 6490 (982), col. 82.
10  PVL 1, AM 6489 (981), col. 81 The purpose and character of this expedition is subject to 
controversy. In Polish historiography, mainly due to the works of Stefan M. Kuczyński, 
there is a perception that this expedition was of a peaceful nature. At the same time, the 
researcher questions the credibility of the part of the chronicle that concerned Vladimir’s 
capturing the so-called Cherven’ Towns. In his opinion, no Polish-Rus’ fighting took place 
in 981. The aim of the expedition was merely to conclude a peace agreement. In his later 
works, the scholar adds that the arrangement was directed against the Pechenegs, who 
were supposedly particularly dangerous to both Rus’ and Poland. See Kuczyński 1949, 114–
122; 1953, 1–13; 1962, 233–252. The majority of researchers, however, accept the purpose of 
the expedition as stated in the chronicle, although its dating, identification of the ‘Liakhs’ 
mentioned in it and the borders of the area seized by Vladimir have been discussed. See 
Franklin, Shepard 1996, 157; Kowalczyk 2000, 55–65; Matla-Kozłowska 2008, 324–5, 328–9; 
Wołoszyn 2010, 89–91; Jusupović 2017, 38–46.
11  PVL 1, AM 6491 (983), col. 82. Cf. Łowmiański 1973, 219.
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Rivers.12 Rus’ sources also record in the year 991 the building on the Irpin’ River 
of Belgorod, a fortified stronghold intended to be the centre-piece of Kiev’s 
southern defences.13 An in-depth, detailed analysis is not required to conclude 
that the task of this defence system was to contain the Pechenegs’ attacks. This 
is revealed in information provided in The Primary Russian Chronicle:
He gathered together the best men of the Slavs, and Krivichians, the 
Chuds, and the Vyatichians, and peopled these forts with them. For he 
was at war with the Pechenegs, and when he fought with them, he often 
overcame them.14
There is no doubt that the most frequent and engrossing events in the last 
decade of the 10th century for the inhabitants of Kievan Rus’ were nomad 
raids. According to The Nikon Chronicle, the Pechenegs invaded the Kievan Rus’ 
in 990, but were repelled, incurring significant losses.15 They launched another 
invasion threatening Vladimir’s rule in 992, attacking from the side of the Sula 
River. Rus’ troops blocked their path near fords on the Trubezh and were once 
again victorious.16 The defeat of the Pechenegs must have been a devastating 
one, because they abstained from further incursions for three years, resuming 
their attacks in 996. This time the nomads proved they remained formidable 
opponents, defeating Vladimir’s army near Vasil’evo on August 6th. The scale 
of the Kievan prince’s defeat seems to be confirmed by his later erecting the 
Church of the Sacred Transfiguration as a votive offering for his miraculous 
salvation.17 An expedition to Novgorod ‘after upland troops with which to 
fight the Pechenegs’ organized the following year additionally indicates that 
Vladimir’s soldiers must have suffered significant losses at Vasil’evo.18 The Rus’ 
ruler’s absence provided an opportunity for the Pechenegs, who began a siege of 
Belgorod. His nomadic adversaries ultimately withdrew into the steppe after a 
prolonged blockade, having achieved nothing.19 The Nikon Chronicle mentions 
another attack on Belgorod, dated to 1004. Vladimir dispatched relief forces 
under the command of Aleksandr Popovich and Ian Usmoshvets, but no battle 
12  PVL 1, AM 6496 (988), col. 121. Cf. PVL 2, 343; Kuchera 1987, 175.
13  PVL 1, AM 6499 (991), col. 122. Belgorod covered an area of 105 hectares. Cf. PVL 2, 346; 
Kuchera 1987, 71–3; Franklin, Shepard 1996, 172.
14  PVL 1, AM 6496 (988), col. 121. Cross, Scherbowitz-Wetzor 1953, 119.
15  PNL, 58 (AM 6498). Cf. PVL 2, 345.
16  PVL 1, AM 6500 (992), col. 122–124.
17  PVL 1, AM 6504 (996), col. 124–127.
18  PVL 1, AM 6505 (997), col. 127.
19  PVL 1, AM 6505 (997), col. 127–129.
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took place, because the Pechenegs, having learned about the approaching Rus’ 
army, ended their siege and withdrew to their own settlements.20 The presence 
of Aleksandr Popovich, one of the main heroes of the Rus’ bylina, indicates that 
these oral epic poems were a main source of information about these events.21 
Such a state of affairs calls for scepticism in terms of the dates and historicity 
of the events they describe. Nevertheless, in the first years of the 11th century 
Rus’-Pecheneg relations were still characterized by fierce hostility. Not even a 
short relaxation in tensions would take place until 1008, following the mission 
of St. Bruno of Querfurt.22
During the decades marking the turn of the 10th and 11th centuries there 
were a number of fierce military clashes between Kievan Rus’ and the 
Pechenegs. The almost complete lack of information in The Primary Russian 
Chronicle about other forms of political activity by Kievan Rus’ seems to be a 
sign of the fierce intensity of these clashes. The sole exception is mention of 
an expedition by Vladimir against the Croats in 992.23 All of this proves that 
the war with the Pechenegs was the Rus’ prince’s main concern during these 
two decades.
It is thus worth looking into the reasons behind the nomads’ fierce aggres-
sion. The standard hypothesis, one definitely overused by researchers, is the 
influence of some external entity. This explanation, however, should be firmly 
rejected. It is difficult to identify a political entity that could have been inter-
ested in the outbreak of a drawn-out conflict between the Pechenegs and 
Kievan Rus’. It was certainly not the Byzantine Empire. Vladimir’s problems 
with the Pechenegs began at the time when Rus’-Byzantine relations were 
closer than ever, culminating in the baptism of Kievan Rus’ and a marriage that 
united the Macedonian dynasty and the Rurikids. This allowed for a period 
of long-term cooperation between Constantinople and Kiev.24 Given such a 
situation, it seem unlikely that Byzantium would have harboured a desire to 
provoke a conflict between the Pechenegs and Kievan Rus’.25
20  PNL, 68 (AM 6512); PVL 2, 354.
21  PVL 2, 354; Sielicki 1968, 302 (note 1). Cf. Melnyk 2013, 152–153. In the Nikon Chronicle there 
is a mention, dated 1001 (AM 6509), of both heroes killing some outstanding Pecheneg 
(bagatyr) and many of his brethren, and about the arrival of a Pecheneg Prince, Rodman, 
with his three sons to Rus’. However, the reliability of this data is questionable. PNL, 68.
22  Bruno, 100. Cf. Morgunov 2010, 62.
23  PVL 1, AM 6500 (992), col. 122.
24  PVL 1, AM 6496–6497 (988–989), col. 109–122. Levchenko 1956, 340–385; Ostrogorski 1967, 
255; Łowmiański 1973, 222–223; Poppe 1976, 197–244.
25  Paul Stephenson (2003, 111, 129) suggests it is likely that Basil II’s diplomacy was intended 
to create antagonisms between Kievan Rus’ and the Pechenegs. However, to confirm 
his assumptions the researcher, refers to accounts in De administrando imperio, which 
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One must therefore look for another cause for the escalation in the 
Pechenegs’ aggression. Its source most certainly lies in the bilateral relations 
between Kievan Rus’ and the Pechenegs, and more specifically, Vladimir’s poli-
cies towards them. The prince was often contrasted with his father: opposite 
a great warrior, worthy of the epic tradition, whose life was suddenly inter-
rupted, stood the founder of the new order, a ‘new Constantine’.26 Such a jux-
taposition, although it holds a great deal of truth, should not obscure the major 
similarities between the two rulers. The same reasons that led Sviatoslav to 
leave Kiev and attempt to settle on the Lower Danube led Vladimir to anchor 
himself in the ‘mother of Rus’ cities’. Trade was an important source of income 
for both rulers. Some of the military expeditions organized by Vladimir in the 
early period of his independent rule clearly seem to have served the purpose 
of bringing Kiev into a wider circle of trade. This could have been the purpose 
of his campaign against the Ledzanians, especially if we combine this with 
his conquest of the so-called Cherven’ Towns and his expedition against Volga 
Bulgaria in 985.27 The Rus’ ruler could, of course, also count on benefiting from 
trade along the route that ran ‘from the Varangians to the Greeks’, particularly 
during the period of his close political cooperation with Constantinople. Due 
to its location, Kiev had the assets required to become an important trade 
centre. However, it also faced one major stumbling block: its location on the 
border of the forest and forest-steppe zones. This made the city a kind of a 
forward outpost, a point of contact between settled and nomadic peoples. We 
need to remember that according to information provided by Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitus, Kievan Rus’ was a one-day march from Patzinacia.28 In 
terms of the development of trade, such a position in a state of peace was a 
blessing, but in times of war – a curse, especially given that a well-developed 
trade centre attracted potential attackers. Bearing in mind Vladimir’s own and 
his father’s experiences, he probably understood these circumstances per-
fectly well. Therefore, if he intended to make Kiev a great capital and trad-
ing centre for his country, he had anchor himself in it.29 This task had to be 
accomplished at the expense of the nomads. A huge investment project was 
initiated by Vladimir that included not only the expansion of the city and its 
fortifications,30 but also the creation of an extensive protective foreground for 
reflect the general, timeless principles of Byzantine policy towards the empire’s northern 
neighbours.
26  PVL 1, AM 6523 (1015), col. 130–131. Cf. Poppe 1999, 229; 2007, 1–3; Shepard 2010, 176.
27  PVL 1, AM 6493 (985), col. 84.
28  DAI, XXXVII 47 (p. 168/169).
29  Cf. Franklin, Shepard 1996, 169–180.
30  Ioannisyan 1990, 288–294; Franklin, Shepard 1996, 154.
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the capital, which consisted of several lines of ramparts with a total length of 
more than 500 kilometres, more than 100 fortified settlements, and numer-
ous open settlements inhabited by the agricultural population. The latter 
were located in the vicinity of fortifications and served as an economic base 
for new strongholds.31 As a result of this immense investment project and the 
social engineering that accompanied it, there was a permanent shift in the Rus’ 
state’s borders of more than 100 kilometres to the south of Kiev, to the banks 
of the Ros’ and Sula Rivers.32 The new borders isolated large areas of the forest 
steppe that had previously been the sites of the Pechenegs’ summer encamp-
ments. This most likely pushed the nomads further south. Bruno of Querfurt 
writes that during his missionary journey, he first encountered nomads on the 
third day after passing the Rus’ border-area fortifications, to which he had been 
escorted by Vladimir for two days.33 It is not known where exactly he crossed 
them, but it seems that the missionary meant their southernmost extension.
These phenomena were accompanied by the development of water transit 
on the Dnieper River. River harbours were built in the vicinity of Viatichev on 
the Dnieper, and the strongly fortified stronghold of Voin’ was established on 
the Sula River, not far from its confluence with the Dnieper.34 A considerable 
intensification of inland shipping is also evidenced by the establishment of a 
large Rus’ settlement on Velikopotemkin Island at the mouth of the Dnieper 
River.35 The existence of this settlement indicates a permanent Rus’ presence 
on the northern shores of the Black Sea, another manifestation of which was 
the capture of Tmutarakan. It is unknown exactly when this took place, but 
probably not later than the early 11th century.36
31  Kuchera 1987, 71–3; Franklin, Shepard 1996, 172; Morgunov 2010, 64–65. Kowalczyk 1969, 
149–156, 157–158; 1989, 180–187. Elżbieta Kowalczyk rightly points out that a significant 
part of the so-called Zmievy Valy (Serpent’s Wall) already existed before Vladimir’s times, 
which means that the Rus’ ruler and his successors did not always build new ones, but 
often adapted old fortifications to their own needs. The researcher also criticizes the 
chronology of the construction of ramparts proposed by Mikhail Kuchera, who associ-
ates their construction almost exclusively with the rule of Vladimir the Great and Iaroslav 
the Wise. Despite these generally accurate remarks, it should be stated that during the 
reign of both rulers extensive investments took place, the aim of which was to broaden 
and protect the foreground of Kiev.
32  Morgunov 2010, 65.
33  Bruno, 99.
34  Kuchera 1987, 56, 79 (fig. 44), 80; Franklin, Shepard 1996, 170–171.
35  Sokul’skii 1980, 71; Franklin, Shepard 1996, 178. The settlement on the island, which at 
the peak of its development reached a size of four hectares, is sometimes identified with 
Oleshe, present in Rus’ chronicles. PVL 1, AM 6592 (1084), col. 205.
36  The Primary Chronicle mentions the ‘positioning’ of Prince Mstislav in Tmutarakan in 
an entry dated 988 (PVL 1, AM 6496, col. 118). However, this information is presented 
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Vladimir is said to have briefly captured the Byzantine city of Kherson 
around 989.37 The city could have been seized by order of Emperor Basil II38 or 
against his will in order to enforce the fulfillment of matrimonial obligations 
previously accepted by Constantinople, concerning the marriage of Vladimir 
to the emperor’s sister Anna.39 Regardless of which interpretation we adopt, it 
is worth remembering that the Rus’ ruler attacked a city that maintained trade 
contacts with the Pechenegs.40
The southward shift of the Kievan Rus’ border into the steppe in itself had 
to be considered casus belli by its war-like neighbours. Added to this, however, 
were other activities by Vladimir that further irritated the nomads. The inten-
sification of political and trade contacts with the Byzantine Empire at the end 
of the 10th century led the Rus’ to more frequently cross the steppe, which the 
Pechenegs considered their exclusive dominion. Events such as the Kherson 
expedition or the Rurikids’ settling in Tmutarakan clearly harmed the eco-
nomic interests of the Pechenegs. Of course, it is difficult to determine unam-
biguously which party bears greater responsibility for the outbreak of fighting. 
The traditional interpretation assumes that the expansion of the fortification 
as a part of the characteristics of the 12 sons of Vladimir the Great and the territories 
assigned to them. Such a situation does not allow for precise dating of the capture of 
Tmutarakan by the Rus’. The chronicler’s intention was rather to connect this mention 
with the whole period of Vladimir’s reign. At another point, Mstislav is mentioned as the 
master of Tmutarakan only in 1022, (PVL 1, AM 6530, col. 146), but it is very likely that the 
prince already ruled there earlier. Many researchers date the time when the city was cap-
tured to the end of the 980s. Cf. Iakobson 1964, 59–60; Gadlo 1994, 79–81 (late 986–half of 
987); Chkhaidze 2008, 286 (year 988). For a more cautious dating, closer to 1022: Shepard 
1977–1984, 205; 2006, 33. Cf. also chapter 5.4 of the present book.
37  PVL 1, AM 6496 (988), col. 109–112; LeoDiac., 175. The dating of this event in the Rus’ tradi-
tion is probably incorrect.
38  Poppe 1976, 197–244; 1978, 3–22. The researcher assumes that Vladimir stood at the walls 
of Kherson by orders of Emperor Basil II, in order to subjugate the rebellious city, which 
had previously been supported by the usurper Bardas Phokas.
39  This is a traditional interpretation, supported by Rus’ writings, which assumes that 
Basil II tried to withdraw his consent for the marriage between Anna Porphyrogenita 
and Vladimir, which led the latter to attack Kherson. Recently, this view was defended by 
Dimitri Obolensky. See Obolensky 1989, 244–256; 1993, 108–113.
40  The scale of damage caused by Vladimir’s invasion is subject to discussion. Researchers 
of older generations were inclined to assume that the city, which never regained its for-
mer glory, was completely destroyed at that time. See Talis 1958, 114 (note 54); Iakobson 
1959, 65–66, 283; Poppe 1976, 239; 1978, 18; Bartoli, Kazanski 2002, 663. However, these 
interpretations are challenged by Alla Romanchuk, who claims that significant damage to 
Kherson should not be associated with Vladimir’s expedition, but with a natural disaster – 
an earthquake. Romanchuk 1989, 182–188; 2008, 406–409. On trade, cf. Chapter 4.2 of 
this work.
300 chapter 6
system in the foreground of Kiev was a consequence of the nomads’ aggres-
sion. It is impossible not to notice, however, that the plans the Rus’ ruler car-
ried out threatened the Pechenegs’ interests. It is also worth remembering that 
we are viewing the Rus’-Pecheneg conflict from the perspective of a biased 
source, representing only Kiev’s point of view. It is therefore risky to deduce 
the sequence of events solely on its basis. On the other hand, the implemen-
tation of Vladimir’s plans required carrying out the investments described 
above. Moreover, Kiev’s hopes for peaceful coexistence with the Pechenegs 
were largely dashed following the experiences with the nomads during the 
military campaigns fought between 968 and 972.
The changes on the Black Sea-Caspian steppe caused by the collapse of 
the Khazar Khaganate benefited the Rus’ prince but clearly weakened the 
Pechenegs. The fall of the Khazars, as pointed out in the previous chapter, 
meant the disappearance of a barrier hindering the migration of nomads. As 
a consequence, at the end of the 10th century, the Uzes, long-time rivals of 
the Pechenegs, were able to move onto the eastern stretches of the Black Sea 
steppe. The Primary Russian Chronicle records their cooperation with Vladimir 
during his expedition against the Volga Bulgars.41 This fact raises the question 
of whether the cooperation between these groups during the expedition in 
985 was an isolated case or the result of a standing alliance. If the Torks, as 
the Uzes were called in Kievan Rus’, were Vladimir’s standing allies, then we 
have the right to assume that the Rus’ monarch benefited from their assistance 
against the Pechenegs. This hypothesis is probable, but it is difficult to confirm 
it on the basis of available sources. Rus’ chronicles do not mention an alliance 
between the Kievan prince and the Torks against the Pechenegs. In the context 
of the information about a joint expedition against the Bulgars, the lack of 
information on this subject seems meaningful. On the other hand, it is hard to 
imagine that Vladimir was unaware of the benefits to him of a conflict between 
the Uzes and the Pechenegs. The latter limited their attacks against Kiev most 
likely due to the threat their own steppe neighbours began to pose. But did 
Uzes act under the influence of Kievan diplomacy? This question must be left 
unanswered. There is an irritating tendency by some researchers to treat the 
steppe-dwellers as puppets in the hands of powerful political players who were 
behind even the most obvious political behaviour. They would have seen in 
this case an external impulse for the Pechenegs’ actions, dictated by an outside 
party’s interests. But would they need an order from a neighbouring political 
41  PVL 1, AM 6493 (985), col. 84. It cannot be ruled out that the first instance of Rus’-Uzes 
cooperation took place in 965, during Sviatoslav’s attack on the Khazars. Cf. chapter 5.4, 
footnotes 1350–1351.
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power, possibly backed by an offer of gifts, to attack a weakened opponent in 
order to seize his flocks or parts of his nomadic encampment areas? It seems 
that answering this question in the affirmative would be an insult to the com-
mon sense of the nomads, who may have not been very ethical, but who were 
clearly pragmatic. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that the Uzes found 
themselves under pressure from another ethnos, the Cumans, a pressure that 
had been visible since the first half of the 11th century.42
In order to analyze the clashes between the Pechenegs and the Uzes that 
eventually forced the former to leave the Black Sea steppe, we must make use 
of indirect data. Rus’ sources do not allow us to investigate the chronology of 
the changes that were taking place on the steppe. The data found in Byzantine 
historiography, on the other hand, refers to the relatively late stage of the fight-
ing, when the Pechenegs had already lost half of their territory to the Uzes.43 
Given this situation, it is difficult to overestimate the value of archaeological 
data. The material gathered mainly by Romanian and Moldovan researchers 
seems to indicate that sites of Dridu culture, especially in the region between 
the Prut and Dniester Rivers, begin to disappear in the early 11th century. While 
earlier we can speak of cohabitation between farmers and nomads, in the 
period in question there is a pronounced exodus of the former from the steppe 
and forest-steppe.44 Their place was probably assumed by the Pechenegs. A 
similar course of events has prompted some researchers to accept the thesis 
that the nomad control of areas west of the Dniester River came relatively late. 
While this may be true in terms of a permanent presence, the nomads’ politi-
cal domination could have occurred, and probably did, much earlier. However, 
losses incurred in the east, and perhaps also in the north due to Vladimir’s 
politics, caused the nomads to take control of less attractive areas in Moldavia. 
Political domination thus began to be accompanied by settlement (if this word 
can be used for nomads). Needs arising from their extensive herding activates 
also made the previous state of cohabitation impossible.
The start of these changes dates back to the first half of the 11th century. The 
fighting between Kievan Rus’ and the Pechenegs discussed above reached its 
peak in the late 10th century. By the beginning of the 11th century, the situation 
had clearly become calmer. If not for information recorded in bylina, we would 
not know about any major Pecheneg invasion of Kievan Rus’. It is also puz-
zling that the steppe-dwellers were inclined to enter into the peace agreement 
42  Cf. Pritsak 1968, 163.
43  See Io.Scyl., 455 (v. 37–38); Wortley 2010, 426–427.
44  Diaconu 1970, 37–48; 1975, 237; Spinei 1975, 274; 1986, 103; Mănucu-Adameştanu 2001, 87; 
Postică 2007, 102–103, 126–127, 142; Cf. Paroń 2009, 459–460.
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arranged by Bruno of Querfurt. Although accounts of the 1010s include charac-
teristic references to wars between Kievan Rus’ and the Pechenegs, the nomads 
were most often caught up in the struggles among rival factions of Rurikids. 
The Pechenegs would launch their final, unaided expedition against Kiev 
in 1036.45
The beginning of the 11th century brought marked changes to the Black Sea 
steppe. The Pechenegs were the group most affected by these changes. They 
had steadily reduced their activity in the north and elements of the ethnos 
had begun to migrate to the western periphery of the Black Sea steppe. These 
events should be associated not only with failures they experienced in their 
conflict with Kievan Rus’, but also, and perhaps above all, with pressures from 
the Uzes. The first clashes with this tribe may have taken place as early as the 
late 10th century, but they most likely intensified during the early 11th century. 
It is not possible to describe the Pecheneg-Uzes conflict during this period in 
detail. It is also impossible to say exactly when and what part of the Pechenegs’ 
eastern encampments might have been lost to the Uzes. We know that in the 
1030s at the latest they were forced off the left bank of the Dnieper River. Some 
researchers assume this displacement could have occurred much earlier, as 
early as the late 10th century,46 but the basis for such an interpretation is weak. 
Meanwhile, it is certain that the socio-political organization of the Pechenegs 
described by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus had been severely weakened as 
a result of defeats suffered at the turn of the 10th and 11th centuries.
It was during this turbulent period that Bruno of Querfurt appeared among 
the pagan Pechenegs with the intention of converting them to Christianity. 
There is a strong view in Polish historiography that this missionary project was 
undertaken in close cooperation with Bolesław I the Brave. It was also sup-
posed to involve tasks that were par excellence political in nature. This was 
because Bruno, allegedly acting as an intermediary of the Polish ruler, helped 
negotiate an alliance with the Pechenegs that brought substantive results over 
the next decade. The agreement with the Pechenegs was most likely aimed at 
Kievan Rus’ and was designed to protect the eastern flank of the Piast state 
against a potential attack at a time when Bolesław I the Brave’s main forces 
were involved in a war with Henry II, which had been ongoing since 1007.47
45  PVL 1, AM 6544 (1036), col. 150–151.
46  Pletneva 1958, 215.
47  A similar perception of Bruno’s of Querfurt mission definitely dominates in Polish his-
toriography. See Zakrzewski 1925, 223–225, 306; Grabski 1964, 250–252; Strzelczyk 1999, 
163–165; Tyszkiewicz 1997, 48, 51–2, 54, 58; 1998, 42–45; 1999, 222–224. Recently, how-
ever, the latter researcher stopped attributing non-religious goals to Bruno’s expedition, 
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The problem of Bruno’s possible entanglement in Bolesław I the Brave’s 
eastern politics, to which we will return below, raises questions about the ear-
lier relations between the Piasts and the Pechenegs. Almost one hundred years 
ago, Stanisław Zakrzewski went so far as to state that ‘Bolesław maintained 
friendly relations with the Pechenegs’.48 This view needs to be verified, how-
ever. The history of the Piast dynasty’s contacts with the Pechenegs seems to 
be shorter and much less eventful than is usually believed. Let us start with 
the fact that it is unclear whether the Piast state neighboured the Pechenegs. 
This inevitably evokes a still unsettled dispute over the formative processes 
that shaped the territorial boundaries of the early Polish state, and particu-
larly its eastern and southern borders. This dispute seems to be far from being 
resolved, yet it can be assumed that the Piasts took control of the most south-
eastern region, between the upper Bug and the San, relatively late. Researchers 
who date this event the earliest assume that it took place at the end of the 970s. 
However, Mieszko probably quickly lost a part of this territory, referred to as 
the so-called Cherven’ Towns (ca. 981).49 At the same time, the furthest north-
western ends of the Pecheneg territory were, as Michał Parczewski proves, 
located in the northern end of the Podolian and Dniester Uplands, on both 
sides of the watershed separating the Dniester and Bug river basins.50 This 
observation – especially when we take into account the fact that we are dealing 
in particular, diplomatic actions against the Rus’. See Tyszkiewicz 2009, 70, 103–104. 
Some representatives of Russian-language historiography (especially Soviet historiog-
raphy) also saw Bruno as a tool of Piast or Western European (Latin) politics: Pashuto 
1968, 34–35; a gentler version: Karpov 1997, 327–332. Similar views can also be found in 
German-language historiography based on a Marxist paradigm: Widera 1959, 374–375. For 
recent attempts to re-evaluate the missionary’s intentions: Paroń 2013a, 167–178; Kollinger 
2013, 187–202; 2014, 61–86.
48  Zakrzewski 1925, 224, 307. Alexander V. Nazarenko assumes the existence of an early 
(at least since 992) alliance between the Pechenegs and the Piast dynasty. However, the 
researcher does not present any hard arguments based on sources. Nazarenko 1993, 155; 
2001, 473.
49  Matla-Kozłowska 2008, 324–325, 328–329; Kowalczyk 2000, 58–59 (dates this event to 
992); Jusupović 2017, 45–46 (the Piasts lost the so-called Cherven’ Towns at the end of 
the 10th century). Nearly all researchers assume, however, that in 981 Vladimir attacked 
the territory of the Ledzanian tribe: Labuda 1988, 209–211; Parczewski 1991, 27–31; Poleski 
2005, 33; Wołoszyn 2013, 91.
50  It is worth remembering, however, that in his reasoning the researcher refers not to 
archaeological premises, but to geographical ones (the range of the forest steppe area): 
Parczewski 2007, 170.
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with a mobile community which spent only a part of the year in the forest 
steppe zone – justifies acceptance of the thesis that the territory of the steppe-
dwellers in question was not adjacent to that of the Piast dynasty, or that the 
only period when the two shared a common border was during the brief rule of 
the Piasts over the territory known as the Cherven’ Towns (late 970s–981(?) and 
from 1018 to ca. 1031). Therefore, the importance of the Pechenegs to the for-
eign policy of the first rulers of Poland should be assessed with great caution.
There is no extant data on the times of Mieszko I concerning his relation-
ships with the Pechenegs. Henryk Łowmiański, however, considered Bishop 
Thietmar of Merseburg’s mention that a camel was offered as a gift to the 
young Otto III by Mieszko during the Diet of Quedlinburg (986)51 to be indi-
rect proof of the existence of a relationship between the Polish ruler and the 
world of the steppe. Łowmiański also allowed for the possibility that an alli-
ance between Poland and the Pechenegs against Kievan Rus’ could have been 
made as early as the 980s. However, it is unreasonable to consider Thietmar’s 
remark about the exotic animal to be evidence of Mieszko’s political contacts 
with the nomads, as it is difficult to prove that the aforementioned camel was 
delivered by the Pechenegs.52 Even Łowmiański himself admitted that his 
hypothesis was not well-founded.
Toponomastic data seems to confirm the Pechenegs’ presence in Poland. 
The number of toponyms assigned to them, especially in comparison with 
other nomadic peoples, however, is very modest. This is limited to five locali-
ties in the area of the Upper Vistula River.53 The alleged existence of an area 
known as Silva Pieczyngarum, which, according to Tadeusz Lewicki was located 
between the Łukiew and Strwiąż Rivers, right-bank tributaries of the Dniester 
River, is doubtful.54
The territory of today’s southern Poland may have been the target of 
Pecheneg military expeditions. Groups of nomads could have rather easily 
51  Thietmar, IV 9 (p. 141). Cf. Łowmiański 1973, 567.
52  Cf. Chapter 4.2 of this work.
53  Cf. part of the following chapter devoted to the presence of the Pechenegs on the Polish 
lands.
54  Lewicki 1948, 32. S.M. Kuczyński also followed the doubtful suggestions of this outstand-
ing arabist: 1962, 243; 1965, 42–45. For a critical position: Parczewski 1991, 42–43; 1996, 27; 
Fenczak 2010, 43–44; Nalepa 2001, 37 (note 232). The last researcher rightly pointed out 
that the phonetic form of the toponym sounds highly suspicious. The author of these 
words, for his part, wishes to add that none of the Latin sources known to him has pre-
served the name of the Pechenegs in a similar form.
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reached this area travelling along the watershed of the Dniester and the Bug, 
and then through the Przemyśl Gate.55 It is probable that expeditions of this 
kind were undertaken as early as the 10th century. The rationale for such a con-
clusion is information, though somewhat indirect, provided by Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitus about Pechenegs invasions of ‘White Croatia’.56 It was also 
supposedly attacked by Magyars, called ‘Turks’ in the source, and ‘Franks’, 
which should be identified with the Kingdom of Germany, the successor state 
to East Francia. In De administrando imperio there is also information that this 
land was located far inland, 30 days’ journey from the nearest sea, known as 
the ‘dark’ sea. The location of White Croatia cannot be defined precisely on 
the basis of the above description, and thus, various claims have placed it in 
today’s Czech Republic and Slovakia, in Lesser Poland (by the upper Vistula 
river), and in eastern Subcarpathia.57 This land can also be identified with the 
Přemyslid monarchy, which some researchers claim could have extended its 
influence in the mid-10th century to areas of today’s southern Poland. Czech 
rulers allegedly controlled a significant part of the trade route which led from 
the east through Kraków and Prague to Regensburg.58 The latter circumstance 
would have made White Croatia an attractive target for the nomads’ armed 
raiding expeditions. However, if this was the case, in the mid-10th century it 
would have been the Přemyslids, and not the Piasts, who had to deal with the 
Pechenegs’ invasions.
Nevertheless, the conquest of Lesser Poland and Silesia by Polish rulers 
probably did not lead to any significant changes. There are even indications 
that suggest the Pechenegs’ activity in this region might even have increased. 
Since the nomads, under increasing pressure from the Uzes, had sent forces to 
the south-western borders of their territories to attack the Byzantine Empire,59 
it seems likely that a similar situation could have occurred in the north-western 
borderlands. However, a complete lack of any such mention in written sources 
raises doubts. And while this does not rule out the possibility of Pecheneg inva-
sions in the southern territories of the Piast dynasty in the late 10th and early 
11th centuries, the intensity of such activity could not have been substantial, 
55  Tryjarski 1975a, 614–615; Tyszkiewicz 1986, 316; Makohonienko 2011, 41–42.
56  DAI, XXXI 83–91 (p. 152).
57  DAI-Com., 130; Labuda 1961, 255–256; Swoboda 1990, 69; Maiorov 2006, 79.
58  Matla-Kozłowska 2008, 219–239. For a sceptical position on the size of the Czech state 
and its influences in southern Poland: Kowalczyk 2000, 65–73.
59  See below.
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since it left no record.60 The presence of armed nomads, however, appears to 
have been confirmed by archaeological evidence.61
Therefore, the Pechenegs were most probably known to the court of 
Bolesław I the Brave. The question remains, however, whether the Polish 
monarch considered them valuable allies and whether he used the mission 
of Bruno of Querfurt to make an alliance with them. The latter refers several 
times to the Polish ruler in honourable terms in his writings, which has inspired 
a conviction among contemporary researchers that there was a particularly 
close relationship between these two great figures. Rhetorical hyperbola aside, 
it should be noted that the high level of respect that Bruno seems to have had 
for the Piast monarch was a product of his commitment to missionary work.62 
This does not mean that Bruno supported the objectives of Bolesław’s political 
plans, much less that he was ready to carry them out.63 He was a sufficiently 
strong personality with extensive contacts among the European elites of the 
time to act independently and reject tasks that did not correspond with his 
aspirations or were incongruous with his spiritual formation. It is therefore 
unlikely that he would have undertaken purely political projects that could 
have made his missionary activity more difficult. Meanwhile, persuading the 
Pechenegs to form an alliance with the ruler of a neighbouring country could 
have aroused distrust in Vladimir, without whose support it was impossible to 
succeed in his conversion efforts among the steppe-dwellers. The Rus’ prince 
60  The Chronicle of Greater Poland includes an interesting mention. After the death of 
Mieszko II, in the period of the actual fall of the Piast dynasty, the Polish lands suppos-
edly were subject to invasions by the Tatars (Tartari) and other pagan nations. The author 
of the note, written in the 13th century, certainly committed a serious anachronism. 
In the 1030s, the Tatars certainly could not have invaded Polish lands, which prompts 
contemporary researchers to emend the chronicle record and assume that the cause of 
the misery was another nomadic people. Witold Świętosławski assumed that the actual 
aggressors were the Pechenegs. Thus, he corrected the completely unfounded suggestion 
of Brygida Kürbis, according to whom the invaders were the Cumans. Świętosławski’s cor-
rection is definitely more justified, but it cannot be accepted without reservations. It is in 
particular the context in which the invasions of pagans on Polish lands were mentioned 
that raises doubts. This information was included in the chronicle as one of the argu-
ments presented to Pope Benedict in order to obtain his acceptance for Prince Casimir to 
leaving the monastery and return to Poland. This means that the whole story is part of the 
legend of Casimir I the Restorer becoming a monk, which is now considered improbable. 
Chr.Pol.Mai., 19, 143 (note 126); Świętosławski 2006a, 24–25.
61  Świętosławski 2006a, 20–27, 120–122.
62  Karwasińska 1972, 100–103; Michałowski 2016, 205–206.
63  On differences in the plans and intentions (including political ones) of Bruno and 
Boleslaw the Brave: Wenskus 1956, 179, 182–3, 190, 194f.; Karwasińska 1972, 100–101; Lotter 
1997, 173; Michałowski 2016, 194–204; Trawkowski 2005, 86–88, 91–92; Pleszczyński 2011, 
160–162.
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did indeed benefit, including in a purely political sense, from Bruno’s mission-
ary work. Not only did he make peace with his troublesome neighbours, but 
in the event of further progress in the Christianization of the Pechenegs, he 
counted on gaining influence with them, as the bishop ordained by Bruno to 
serve them was closely connected with the Rus’ church.64 It should be noted 
that the fruits of Bruno’s mission were in sharp contrast to the tasks originally 
assigned to him, allegedly carried out for the benefit of Bolesław the Brave. His 
behaviour would be clearly traitorous to his principal, who would consider him 
to be a persona non grata.65 Meanwhile, it is known that after completing his 
mission with the Pechenegs, Bruno visited the court of the Polish ruler.66 This 
stay, dated to the turn of 1008/9, is the only certain, i.e., the source-certified, 
case of Bruno staying in Poland,67 which also suggests that the view that the 
Saxon missionary’s cooperation with the Piast monarch was particularly inti-
mate should be verified.
Bruno of Querfurt probably decided to go to the Pechenegs on his own. He 
made this decision during his stay in Hungary, where, as he writes in his Letter 
to King Henry, he ‘sat for a long time in vain’.68 Having not received support for 
his missionary plans at the court of Stephen I, he made his way to Kievan Rus’ 
to seek it there. His direct journey from Hungary to Kiev can be supported by 
Bruno’s own accounts. The logical premise for such a missionary itinerary is to 
seek support at European courts which maintained contacts with the world of 
the steppe, so that they could provide organizational support for the evangeli-
zation mission and, in case of success, support the budding church organiza-
tion among pagans. The omission of Bolesław the Brave seems to be significant, 
it might suggest that his relationship with the nomads was not very intense. 
Vladimir’s attitude, as Andrzej Poppe already wrote, indicates that a specific 
kind of ecumenism was still predominantly present at the Kiev court, which 
meant Bruno was simply seen as a Christian clergyman, and not as an agent 
representing the interests of Rome.69 A month’s delay before the missionary 
left for the steppe could have been caused by the Rus’ prince’s concern about 
his safety. Political reasons or Vladimir’s alleged mistrust of the Latin mission-
ary, causes too often suggested in contemporary historiography, can safely be 
rejected as the reason for the delay. This delay, or rather period of waiting, may 
have been due to a very prosaic cause: bad travel conditions on the steppe. 
64  Bruno, 100. Cf. Poppe 1968, 188–189; 1999, 228; 2007, 16–17; 2008, 56.
65  See Paroń 2013a, 164, 177.
66  Bruno, 100, 103.
67  Cf. Strzelczyk 1997, 220, 222; Pleszczyński 2011, 149–150.
68  ‘[…] ubi diu furstra sedimus […]’. Bruno, 98.
69  Poppe 1999, 227–229; 2007, 18; 2008, 57.
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Contrary to the opinion of Rev. Walerian Meysztowicz, it is clear that Bruno did 
not cross into the lands of the Pechenegs on February 22, 1008.70 The forest-
steppe then was covered with a thick layer of snow and the nomads had moved 
their flocks far to the south. An expedition to the steppe at that time of the 
year would have been a suicide mission. Bruno probably did not set out until 
the spring. His time in Kiev should be attributed, at least to a certain extent, 
to the necessity of having to wait for spring to arrive. His missionary activity 
would therefore continue for five months between late April/early May and 
late August/early September.
An attempt to recreate the route followed by Bruno leads for the most part 
to strictly hypothetical conclusions.71 The missionary himself confirmed that 
he left Kiev and was led to the border by Prince Vladimir.72 We do not know if 
he crossed the river and arrived on the left bank of Patzinacia. In Bruno’s Letter 
to King Henry II, we find an enigmatic statement that he ‘travelled around 
three parts of their land, though we did not touch the fourth’, from which came 
‘messengers of the more noble people (meliores)’.73 By the latter phrase he may 
have meant representatives of the aristocracy of one of the Pecheneg groups, 
or ‘better’ in the moral sense, i.e., ready to be baptized.74 Both interpretations, 
however, are not mutually exclusive, which inclines us to conclude that the 
messengers from the fourth part of Patzinacia not visited by the missionar-
ies were representing members of the local aristocracy who wanted to declare 
their readiness to accept the Gospel.
The question of why Bruno and his collaborators did not reach one of the 
Pecheneg regions is bound to pique the interest of researchers. It may have 
merely been due to their relatively short stay on the steppe, or the region could 
have been the site of military activity or other disturbances at the time. The 
only area where armed conflict would seem to be likely to occur, due to pres-
sure from the Uzes, would be the encampments on left-bank Patzinacia. This 
70  Meysztowicz 1958, 491. The researcher gives a similar date for Bruno’s arrival in the land 
of the Pechenegs based on the fact that the missionary chanted the Petre amas me? Pasce 
oves meas! responsory (John 21:15–17). Its content allegedly referred to the feast of the 
Chair of St. Peter, which supposedly was on the day when he crossed the Rus’ border. In 
fact, the words of the responsory in this case carried a much broader missionary symbol-
ism. See Poppe 1999, 229–230; 2007, 20–21; 2008, 59–60; Paroń 2013a, 176.
71  The last project of this kind: Dudek 2010, 241–254. The structure offered by the researcher 
is, unfortunately, quite controversial and based on a weak premises.
72  Bruno, 99 (v. 2–12).
73  Bruno, 100 (v. 6–7).
74  Alexander V. Nazarenko (1999, 315) seems to adopt the first of these interpretations as 
well. Meliores in the Russian translation were rendered as seniors, elders (stareishiny).
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hypothesis, although not without basis, is nevertheless merely speculative. It 
is impossible to propose even the most general theories about the Pecheneg 
tribes that Bruno visited. Defeats in their conflicts with Kievan Rus’ and the 
Uzes may have upset the socio-political order that existed previously among 
these nomads, which makes it impossible to determine the exact shape of their 
society in ca. 1008.
As mentioned above,75 Bruno’s mission was a success, but Vladimir also 
benefited from it greatly. This is evidenced by his readiness to send his own son 
to the nomads as a hostage to guarantee a peace agreement he had concluded 
with the Pechenegs.76 Since the time of Nikolai Karamzin it has been tradition-
ally assumed that this son was Sviatopolk.77 Indeed, his close ties later with the 
Pechenegs seem to confirm this assumption. The behaviour of Senior Ruzorum, 
as Bruno of Querfurt referred to Vladimir, made a strong impression on the 
missionary. It cannot be ruled out, of course, that his actions were dictated in 
part by religious motivations, but purely political considerations clearly played 
an important role. Of course, Bruno performed a great service for the Prince of 
Kiev in both regards.
75  See Chapter 4.4 of this work.
76  Bruno, 100.
77  Strzelczyk 1999, 165, 167; P.P. Tolochko 1999, 67; Poppe 1995, 13; 2007, 17 (note 35). 
Concerning a similar identification, doubts were raised by A.V. Nazarenko (1999, 316). 
The Russian researcher claimed that Sviatopolk, as the eldest son of Vladimir, alleg-
edly already ruling his own local duchy in 1008, could not have been taken into account. 
According to A.V. Nazarenko, it was usually underage sons who were sent as hostages. The 
last statement seems doubtful, because in similar circumstances the decision depended 
on the political interest and not on any custom. We also do not know when Sviatopolk 
took residence in Turov. Alexei Karpov (1997, 330) presents a similar line of reasoning to 
A.V. Nazarenko and suggests that some son of the Rus’ ruler, unknown by name, was sent 
to the Pechenegs. Alexander Holovko (2000, 46) also shares the view held by Nazarenko. 
The Ukrainian researcher also assumes that Boris could have been the hostage taken in 
1008. This is indicated by his supposedly good contacts with the steppe people. However, 
the basis for this hypothesis is even weaker than in the case of Sviatopolk. The fact that 
Boris was sent by his dying father to face the Pechenegs ‘going to Kievan Rus’’ is hardly 
proof of good relations between the young Rurikid and the nomads. A much more con-
vincing hypothesis is that Boris’ presence in Kiev with his terminally ill father and his 
entrusting his son with command over the units sent against the steppe people proves 
Vladimir’s intention to make him his successor. Hrushevs’kii 1905, 3; Poppe 2003, 143; 
Karpov 2001, 71. Cf. Kollinger 2011, 72–73; 2014, 38–41. The last researcher considers 
Sviatopolk’s presence among the Pechenegs an unprovable hypothesis, but proposes to 
identify Vladimir’s unknown son as Mstislav of Tmutarakan, even though there is abso-
lutely no available information about his relationships with the nomads in question (!). 
Kollinger 2014, 160–161 (note 252).
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It seems rather unlikely that Bolesław the Brave was involved in Bruno’s 
mission. However, the Pechenegs twice supported his military expeditions 
against Kievan Rus’. This raises the question of how the Polish ruler’s coopera-
tion with the nomads came about. The link seems to have been Vladimir’s son 
Sviatopolk. In the Rus’ tradition, where he was given the nickname okaiannyi – 
‘the accursed’ – he is portrayed as a typical villain. The son of a former nun, 
Iaropolk’s Greek concubine who was ‘inherited’ by Vladimir after his brother’s 
death, was presented as a son of two fathers.78 He was also accused of mur-
dering Vladimir’s sons Boris, Gleb, and Sviatoslav during a fight for succes-
sion in 1015.79 Sviatopolk’s close contacts with the Pechenegs and conflicts 
with Vladimir seem to complement his negative portrayal. His stay among the 
nomads certainly allowed him to establish ties of friendship with some of their 
leaders, and these ties were probably maintained after Sviatopolk’s return to 
Kievan Rus’. It is difficult to say when he made this return. If the motive behind 
sending him as a hostage to the Pechenegs was to get rid of one of the pretend-
ers to the throne and open the road to succession to the children of Vladimir 
and Anna Porphyrogenita, her death in 1011 probably made it easier for him 
to return to Kievan Rus’.80 Soon after his return, Sviatopolk granted rule over 
the Dregovichi and took residence in their main stronghold of Turov.81 The 
location of his domain, which comprised the western part of the Rus’ lands, 
made him a neighbour of the Piast state. Sviatopolk quickly established con-
tacts with Bolesław the Brave, which were cemented by his marriage to the 
daughter of the Polish ruler.82 This alliance was meant to strengthen the forces 
of the Rus’ prince in the upcoming rivalry for the Kievan throne. Sviatopolk 
began to conspire against Vladimir, who proved strong enough to imprison 
him along with his wife and Bishop Reinbern.83 These events, dated to 1013, are 
perceived by contemporary researchers as the first phase of the struggle for the 
Vladimir’s legacy.84 It cannot be ruled out that Iaroslav, who ruled Novgorod 
and openly defied his father a year later, was also involved in the conspiracy.85
78  PVL 1, AM 6488 (980), col. 78. Cf. Franklin, Shepard 1996, 190–191; Poppe 2003, 142.
79  PVL 1, AM 6523 (1015), col. 132–140. Cf. Poppe 2003, 146–147 (critical of the Russian tradi-
tion attributing all the blame to Sviatopolk, points to the fact that well-informed Thietmar 
remained silent); Nazarenko 2001, 453–455 (does not question the traditional version of 
the events in question).
80  PVL 1, AM 6519 (1011), col. 129. Cf. Poppe 1995, 13; 2003, 143.
81  PVL 1, AM 6496 (988), col. 121.
82  Thietmar, VII 72 (p. 487). Cf. Grabski 1956, 175–176, 178–180.
83  Thietmar, VII 72 (p. 488). Cf. Poppe 1995, 14.
84  Poppe 1995, 13–15; Franklin, Shepard 1996, 184–185.
85  PVL 1, AM 652 (1014), col. 130.
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However, what is most important here is the fact that the imprisonment of 
Sviatopolk and his immediate circle led Bolesław the Brave to undertake an 
expedition against Kievan Rus’86 (usually dated to the summer of 1013) with 
the support of the Pechenegs. Thietmar calls the nomads allies ( fautores) of 
the Polish ruler, but it seems that their participation in the expedition resulted 
from an alliance with Sviatopolk, not Bolesław. The allies of the Rus’ prince sim-
ply banded together to aid him, laying waste to large swaths of the Riurikid’s 
realm during their invasion.87 This intervention, however, did not yield any 
significant results, and none of those imprisoned regained their freedom as a 
result of it.88 Moreover, misunderstandings arose between the Pechenegs and 
Bolesław which ended tragically for the nomads.89 It is usually assumed that 
the cause of the Pecheneg revolt was dissatisfaction due to the lack of spoils or 
that they had received insufficient quantities of loot.90 Indeed, in the nomadic 
mentality, one of the basic motives for undertaking a military expedition was 
plunder. If acquiring an abundance of spoils was synonymous with a success-
ful invasion, then failure to achieve this goal was bound to raise objections.91 
The events surrounding this first military expedition against Rus’ would deter-
mine quite unambiguously the attitude of Bolesław the Brave toward the 
Pechenegs. There are numerous indications that the Polish ruler treated them 
as short-term subordinates who were required to obey him unconditionally, 
while any symptoms of insubordination were to be punished mercilessly. It 
was definitely not a political partnership of equals in which the interests of 
both parties would be taken into account. From the perspective of Bolesław 
the Brave, the Pechenegs were mercenaries, the murder of whom did not entail 
any serious consequences. It seems, therefore, unlikely that the Piast monarch 
maintained contacts with the nomads in question either before or after the 
1013 expedition.
Bolesław’s retreat, however, did not alleviate the situation in Kievan Rus’. 
The invasions of the Pechenegs continued. It is difficult to say whether the 
nomads demanded that Sviatopolk, as their ally, be handed over to them, or 
whether they only exploited the growing succession crisis for the purpose 
of looting. The Primary Russian Chronicle includes a remark that in 1015 the 
Pechenegs invaded Kievan Rus’ once again. Vladimir, who was dying at that 
time and could not fight against the aggressor, sent his son Boris in his place. 
86  Thietmar, VII 73 (p. 488); Cf. Grabski 1956, 181–182; Poppe 1995, 14.
87  Thietmar, VI 91, (p. 383).
88  Grabski 1956, 190; Poppe 2003, 144.
89  Thietmar, VI 91, (p. 383).
90  Zakrzewski 1925, 251; Cf. A remark by Z.M. Jedlicki (1953, 445, note 481).
91  See Chapter 4.4 of this work.
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But unable to locate his opponent, he returned to Kiev.92 It is difficult to say 
why the Pechenegs withdrew without a fight. It is possible they did so upon 
learning of Vladimir’s death and the seizure of power by their ally Sviatopolk. 
Perhaps their task was only to draw soldiers loyal to Vladimir and Boris out 
of Kiev. In fact, the rebellious Iaroslav also benefited from the nomads’ inter-
vention, because the army gathered against him ultimately did not march 
on Novgorod.93
The death of Vladimir the Great was the start of an all-out struggle for 
succession. Circumstances benefited Sviatopolk, who was supported by the 
Pechenegs. He was freed from prison and managed to arrive in Kiev ahead 
of the other pretenders to the throne, though if the Rus’ chronicles can be 
trusted, the inhabitants of the capital city treated him with reserve.94 However, 
Sviatopolk had sufficient support to take the throne. The murder of three of 
his rivals, Vladimir’s sons Boris, Gleb, and Sviatoslav, allowed Sviatopolk 
to become the ruler of Kiev.95 His main rival for full sovereignty over all of 
Kievan Rus’ was Iaroslav, who resided in Novgorod. The year 1016 brought the 
first clash between them. The battle took place near Liubech, on the left bank 
of the Dnieper River in the Principality of Chernigov. Despite the support of 
the Pechenegs, Sviatopolk was defeated,96 which forced him to flee to Poland 
shortly afterwards.97 This course of events gave Boleslaw the Brave justification 
to undertake another military expedition against Kievan Rus’.
The 1018 campaign involved a wider range of political considerations than 
the previous expedition in 1013. Boleslaw had become more deeply involved in 
Rus’ affairs thanks to the enthronement of Sviatopolk, with whom the Polish 
ruler shared close connections. He also had the military and political support 
of Henry II. The Holy Roman Emperor had granted his support because a suc-
cessful attack on Kiev would give him an important advantage in his rivalry 
with the Byzantine Empire for control of southern Italy. Finally, Boleslaw the 
Brave’s delegation to Constantinople helped him incorporate his political proj-
ect into the mainstream of European politics.98
92  PVL 1, AM 6523 (1015), col. 130, 132.
93  Cf. Karpov 2001, 76–77. The researcher rightly notes that the Pecheneg diversion served 
the interests of Sviatopolk and Iaroslav, but his thesis that the main culprit was Boleslaw 
the Brave, allegedly allied with the nomads, is doubtful.
94  PVL 1, AM 6523 (1015), col. 132.
95  PVL 1, AM 6523 (1015), col. 132–140.
96  PVL 1, AM 6523 (1015), col. 140–141.
97  See below note 1486.
98  Zakrzewski 1925, 300–305; Grabski 1956, 202–208; Poppe 1995, 17; Salamon 1993, 114–120; 
Kollinger 2014, 211–226.
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According to Bishop Thietmar of Merseburg, the expedition included a 
nomad force numbering 1000 Pechenegs. Its task was most likely to attack 
the city of Kiev from the south. The steppe people carried out this attack, but 
despite significant damage from fires caused by their siege, the inhabitants of 
Kiev did not surrender the city. Thietmar gives credit for this city’s determined 
defence to ‘swift Danes’ (veloces Dani) who were in Kiev at that time, and who 
effectively resisted the nomads, then opened the city gates only after the arrival 
of the main forces led by Bolesław the Brave (14 August 1018).99 Judging by 
the ethnonym, these may have been Scandinavian merchants who were active 
along the trade route ‘from the Varangians to the Greeks’, and who thus had 
prior experience with nomadic groups.100
The participation of the Pechenegs in the Kiev expedition of 1018 seems to 
prove that the events of the first Rus’ campaign did not disrupt their contacts 
with Bolesław the Brave. A similar interpretation seems to be supported by 
information from Thietmar, according to whom the Pechenegs’ attack on Kiev 
had been solicited by Bolesław (hortatu Bolizlavi).101 However, a more likely 
explanation for their participation is one involving Sviatopolk, who main-
tained close contacts with the Pechenegs both before and after the expedi-
tion of 1018,102 and so most probably provided their military support for this 
expedition. The campaign was carried out under Bolesław’s command, which 
would help explain the information provided by Thietmar. Moreover, it seems 
that during the 1018 campaign the Pechenegs were a secondary factor and had 
no significant influence on the course of events in its aftermath.
Disagreements between the Polish ruler and his son-in-law resulted in the 
retreat of the Polish forces. The Primary Russian Chronicle contains infor-
mation about actions carried out against the ‘Liakhs’ (Poles) on the orders 
of Sviatopolk himself.103 Bolesław, realizing that his further presence in 
Kievan Rus’ was pointless and even dangerous, decided on a planned retreat. 
Sviatopolk thus regained his political freedom, but lost the support of the 
99  Thietmar, VIII 32 (pp. 621, 623).
100 It was suggested, however, that these could also have been mercenaries Iaroslav provided 
to Kiev. Cf. Riasanovsky 1964, 288–297.
101 Thietmar, VIII 32 (p. 530).
102 The second time he was expelled from Kiev, Sviatopolk undoubtedly escaped to the 
Pechenegs (cf. below). It is not impossible, however, that during his first exile he also 
escaped to the steppe first, and only from there make his way to Poland. The first escape 
to the Pechenegs is mentioned in The Novgorod First Chronicle. NPL, AM 6524 (1016), 15. Cf. 
Franklin, Shepard 1996, 186.
103 PVL 1, AM 6526 (1018), col. 143–144.
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Poles, without which, it turned out, he was unable to maintain power in Kiev. 
The Rus’ chronicles describe his fall in a concise account:
Svyatopolk thus reigned alone in Kiev, but Iaroslav attacked him again, 
and Svyatopolk fled among the Pechenegs.104
On the basis of the above passage, it is difficult to determine whether Bolesław’s 
recent ally even attempted to challenge the forces marching from Novgorod.
The final outcome came the following year, when Sviatopolk made his final 
attempt to seize Kiev. This time the Pechenegs were his only allies.105 The 
clash took place by the Alta River, a tributary of the Trubezh. After a long and 
extremely bloody battle, Iaroslav achieved victory.106 The scale of the defeat of 
the Pechenegs can be indirectly ascertained by the fact that they once again 
halted their invasions of Kievan Rus’.
The events of the years 1013–1019 indicate a clear change in the balance 
of power between Kievan Rus’ and the Pechenegs. The majority of nomadic 
invasions dating to that period ended in failure for the nomads. The 1018 
expedition ended up being their only moderate success, though its outcome 
104 PVL 1, AM 6526 (1018), col. 144; Cross, Scherbowitz-Wetzor 1953, 132.
105 An interesting matter, although very difficult to verify, is the participation of the Vlachian 
population in the struggle for succession after the death of Vladimir the Great. Victor 
Spinei has claimed for many years that the Vlachs fought for Sviatopolk together with the 
Pechenegs. The Romanian researcher refers to information found in the story of Eymund 
(Eymundar þáttr), which is a subplot in the Scandinavian literary tradition, based around 
the person of Olaf the Holy, the King of Norway. The protagonist of the story, related to the 
Norwegian monarch, konung Eymund, is a mercenary in the service of a Rus’ ruler named 
Jerizleifr, whose main enemy is his brother Búrizlafr. The identification of the first of the 
antagonists is not a challenge – it is probably Iaroslav the Wise; the second person seems 
to have the traits of Bolesław the Brave and Sviatopolk. It is particularly important for the 
present discussion that in the decisive phase of the struggle Búrizlafr was supported by 
Tyrkir, Blökumenn ‘and other numerous evil peoples’. Priad, 98 (text), 112 (Russian transla-
tion). V. Spinei identifies the first ethnonym as the Pechenegs, the second as the Vlachs, 
and dates this event to 1018–19. Spinei 1973, 65–66; 1975, 270–271; 2003, 125; 2009, 104–105. 
The nature of the source, however, requires reservations. The story of Eymund, although 
it seems to refer to the events of the 11th century, could have been written in the 12th or 
even at the end of the 13th century. Its text is known from a manuscript dating back to 
the end of the 14th century (Flateyarbók). In addition, Eymundar þáttr recreates historical 
events very loosely. The figure of Búrizlafr, who is killed by the protagonist, is a very clear 
example of this. The story of Eymund is therefore not suitable for recreating the course of 
the succession struggle in Kievan Rus’ in the years 1015–1019, which in consequence, also 
raises doubts about the information about the involvement of the Vlachs in these events. 
Cf. Poppe 1995, 8 (note 19); Żmudzki 2004, 15–19.
106 PVL 1, AM 6527 (1019), col. 144–145.
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was largely determined by their cooperation with the army commanded by 
Bolesław. Their own expeditions no longer posed a major threat to Kievan Rus’, 
whereas their later defeat on the Alta River proved that Kiev had finally gained 
the upper hand militarily.
A sixteen-year period with no mention of the Pechenegs in The Primary 
Russian Chronicle begins in 1019. This gap is partly filled with information 
from Byzantine sources, which as of 1027 resumed reporting on their military 
undertakings. However, the period between 1019 and 1027 remains a complete 
mystery. This is even more telling since the rivalry among Vladimir’s prog-
eny for the dominance over Kievan Rus’ did not end with Sviatopolk’s defeat. 
Another pretender who manifested aspirations to reign over Kiev was Mstislav 
of Chernigov, who ruled in distant Tmutarakan, near the Strait of Kerch.107 
His position was by no means hopeless in his rivalry with Iaroslav, but he 
was unable to take control of Kiev mainly due to opposition from the city’s 
inhabitants.108 In 1026 the brothers came to an agreement and divided power 
over Rus’ between themselves, setting the border between their domains 
along the Dnieper River. Iaroslav received the left-bank part along with Kiev, 
while Mstislav took the right-bank part and Chernigov, which he expanded 
significantly.109
This rivalry between the two princes was not exploited in any way by the 
Pechenegs. Neither of the Rus’ rulers turned to them for help, which is addi-
tional proof that the combat and political value of the nomads had declined 
significantly.110 It can be assumed that one circumstance that added to state of 
affairs was fighting between the Pechenegs and the Uzes, who were increas-
ingly pressuring the former from the east. It is possible that as a result of pres-
sure from the Uzes, the Pechenegs lost their remaining encampments on the 
left bank of the Dnieper River. A battle between the Pechenegs and Rus’ forces 
on the Alta River in 1019 provides weak support for the hypothesis that the 
nomads still dominated the areas east of the Dnieper River. In the period that 
follows, we hear nothing more about the Pechenegs ‘coming to Kievan Rus” 
from the left bank of this river.
107 PVL 1, AM 6531 (1023), col. 147. Cf. Pashuto 1968, 319 (note 156); Shepard 1977–1984, 204–
207; 2006, 31; Franklin, Shepard 1996, 200–201. The quoted researchers assume that 
Mstislav could have enjoyed the support of Constantinople. Jonathan Shepard further 
suggests that the Tmutarakan prince and the Byzantine Empire fought together against 
Khazar survivors in 1016 (Io.Scyl., 354 (v. 90–94); Wortley 2010, 336).
108 PVL 1, AM 6532 (1024), col. 147.
109 PVL 1, AM 6532 (1024), col. 148–149. Cf. Shepard 1977–1984, 208–209; Franklin, Shepard 
1996, 206; Karpov 2001, 210–240.
110 In 1023 Mstislav made use of the help of the Kasogians and Khazars.
316 chapter 6
The attacks of the Uzes, as well as defeats in their clashes with Kievan Rus’ 
most likely led to a shift in the direction of the Pechenegs’ armed incursions. 
Their attacks may now have also been directed at Poland, as well.111 Łowmiański 
pointed out years ago that defensive settlements were at around this time 
established in the vicinity of the Kraków-Sandomierz borderlands. The chro-
nology of their construction was supposedly determined by two events: the 
conquest of the so-called Cherven’ Towns by Bolesław the Brave and the with-
drawal of the Pechenegs from the Black Sea steppe some time after 1036.112 
The Piast ruler may have also intended to seize this region in order to protect 
Poland from invasions by the Pechenegs. According to some historians, their 
migration to the north and south-west could have begun much earlier. Dmitrii 
Rasovski and Geza Feher argue that the Pechenegs had already begun infiltrat-
ing Hungary in the 950s or 960s.113 However, this migration process probably 
intensified as a result of pressure from the Uzes and the Pechenegs’ first defeats 
in their fight with Kievan Rus’, and thus no earlier than the early 11th century. 
As has already been pointed out, the late 1020s and early 1030s brought about 
an increase in Pecheneg activity in the Lower Danube region.114
Despite the changes described above, the threat of Pecheneg invasions of 
Kievan Rus’ was still very real in the 1030s. The steppe-dwellers still posed a 
threat to the border territories in the area of the Ros’ River. Thanks to informa-
tion from The Primary Russian Chronicle dated to 1031, we know115 that this 
region was to serve as an area for settlement by the military, which played 
a role analogous to that of Vladimir the Great’s settlements in the fortified 
strongholds along the Stugna, Desna, Trubezh, Irpin’ and Sula Rivers. The set-
tlers were prisoners of war brought to Kievan Rus’ during Iaroslav’s military 
expedition to Poland.
The military fortification of the river Ros’ region may even indicate that the 
Pechenegs resumed their attacks on this area. The events of 1036 should there-
fore be understood as the culmination of a rise in the Pechenegs’ activity on 
the borders of Kievan Rus’, which was spurred by political instability follow-
ing the death of Mstislav.116 The Pechenegs attacked following their rules for 
the art of war. After breaking through the system of border fortifications, they 
reached Kiev while the Rus’ ruler was absent from the city. The city withstood 
111 Cf. above.
112 Łowmiański 1975, 47–48.
113 Feher 1921–25, 130; Rasovskii 1933, 5–7.
114 On Hungarian-Pecheneg relations, see the following chapter.
115 PVL 1, col. 150 (AM 6539 (1031): placement of Polish prisoners of war by Ros; AM 6540 
(1032): construction of strongholds by Ros). Cf. Karpov 2001, 261–262, 264–265.
116 PVL 1, AM 6544 (1036), col. 150–151. Cf. Franklin, Shepard 1996, 207.
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the siege until Iaroslav returned from Novgorod, and the battle fought on the 
city’s foreground ended in a severe defeat for the Pechenegs, who are said to 
have then ceased their attacks on Kievan Rus’.117
6.2 The Byzantine Empire and the Pechenegs on the Eve of Their 
Migration to the Balkans
After Sviatoslav’s second expedition to the Balkans, there is no mention of the 
Pechenegs in Byzantine sources for nearly half a century. It is only during a 
recounting of events dated to 1017 that John Skylitzes mentions an attempt 
to enlist the support of the Pechenegs in an armed conflict between Bulgaria 
and the Byzantine Empire. Having joined forces with Krakras of Pernikos, the 
Bulgarian ruler John Vladislav planned to invade unspecified Byzantine territo-
ries. The two leaders tried to persuade the Pechenegs to join them. When news 
about John and Krakras’ offer reached Basil II, he grew alarmed, but his fears 
proved unfounded, as the nomads decided not to provide the Bulgarian ruler 
with military forces.118 It is difficult to say what guided their decision. It can 
be assumed that they may have lacked confidence in the ability of the forces 
of the waning Bulgarian state to carry out a successful campaign against the 
Byzantine Empire. Skylitzes makes no mention of any diplomatic efforts on the 
part of Constantinople that might have influenced the Pechenegs, so we can 
assume that Byzantine diplomacy was not a major factor in their decision.119
The nature of the Pechenegs’ relationship with the Byzantine Empire at that 
time is rather unclear. There is little information as to whether their alliance, 
renewed during the mission of Archbishop Theophilos in 971, survived beyond 
the reign of Emperor John I Tzimiskes (d. 976). The actions of the Pechenegs 
between 968 and 972 indicate that they remained difficult, even unpredictable 
partners, which may have discouraged Byzantine diplomats from cooperat-
ing with them. Virtually nothing is known about the relationship between the 
Pechenegs and the Byzantine Empire under the rule of Basil II. The first years 
of his reign were full of domestic turmoil, which significantly limited the state’s 
external dealings. In theory, however, Constantinople’s long-standing conflict 
117 PVL 1, AM 6544 (1036), col. 151. Cf. Tolochko 1999, 70–71; Karpov 2001, 294–297.
118 Io.Scyl., 356 (v. 28–30, 24–36).
119 Paul Stephenson (2000, 81; 2003, 129) assumes that the Pechenegs decided not to sup-
port John Vladislav and Krakras as a result of the intervention of Byzantine diplomacy. 
However, this is only guesswork.
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with the Kometopouloi Dynasty ruling Bulgaria120 should have prompted Basil 
to seek assistance from the Pechenegs. However, there is no evidence of such 
a request. The events of the late 980s led to a strengthening of the relations 
between Kievan Rus’ and Byzantium. The military aid provided to Basil II 
by Vladimir during the rebellion of Bardas Skleros bore fruit in the form of 
a marriage between the Kievan ruler and Anna Porphyrogenita that united 
the Rurik and Macedonian dynasties. This marriage, along with the resulting 
baptism of Kievan Rus’, ensured a lasting peaceful relationship between the 
two states.121 Both the danger of attacks on Constantinople and that posed by 
Kiev’s efforts to conquer southern Crimea were reduced to nearly nothing. In 
addition, the empire was given the opportunity to enlist large contingents of 
Rus’ Varangians for its military expeditions. Such an army, comprised of six 
thousand nomad warriors, was sent against Bardas Skleros and later remained 
under the command of Basil II. We also know that a Varangian-Rus’ army took 
part in the campaign against the Kometopouloi Dynasty in Bulgaria (991–995) 
and participated in battles in Syria (999).122 Such a close relationship between 
these two empires undermined the raison d’être of the Byzantine-Pecheneg 
alliance. During the reign of Stephen I (998–1038), one of the principles of 
the Hungarians’ foreign policy was maintaining peaceful relations with 
Constantinople.123 Byzantium’s victory over Bulgaria and annexation of its ter-
ritory in 1018 marked the final elimination of the threat of Bulgarian attacks.124 
This meant that the events of 989–1018 eliminated all the reasons listed by 
Constantine VII to justify maintaining an alliance with the Pechenegs. It is 
very possible that their weakened position, caused by increasing pressure from 
the Uzes and defeats in their battles with Kievan Rus’, would have been seen 
in Constantinople as a neutral if not favourable circumstance for Byzantine 
interests.125 Imperial diplomats could not, of course, cease all contacts with 
the Pechenegs. Moving the border to the lower and middle Danube regions 
forced them to maintain such contacts in order to obtain information about 
their warlike neighbour’s intentions and stymie their aggression by either dip-
lomatic or military means. But these new circumstances changed the nature 
120 Ostrogorski 1967, 250–252; Treadgold 1997, 514, 516–517, 520, 522–523, 525–528; Stephenson 
2000, 58–76 (The last researcher criticises the existing findings on Basil II’s policy towards 
Bulgaria, Samuel and his successors).
121 Ostrogorski 1967, 254–255; Poppe 1978, 3–22. Cf. above note 1408.
122 Levchenko 1956, 382–383; Treadgold 1997, 518, 522; Bonarek 2003, 163–165.
123 Urbansky 1968, 20; Moravcsik 1970, 62; Fine 1983, 196.
124 Ostrogorski 1967, 259; Madgearu 2013, 63.
125 Cf. Angold 1997, 37.
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of their relationship with the Pechenegs; after a period of peaceful isolation, 
there began a period where they became once again ‘difficult neighbours’.
Up until the death of Basil II (1025) no armed incidents on the empire’s 
Danube border are reported. Constantine VIII’s independent reign, how-
ever, brought the first foreboding events. In 1027, the Pechenegs attacked the 
thema of Bulgaria. Their victims included not only the local people, some of 
whom were murdered or taken captive, but also local Byzantine troops. Some 
unnamed stategoi and tagmatarchoi shared the fate of the civilian population. 
However, the invaders were quickly overwhelmed by Constantine Diogenes, 
a strategos of Sirmium who had recently been named duke of Bulgaria by the 
Emperor. The Byzantine commander forced the nomads to withdraw beyond 
the Danube.126 Petre Diaconu assumed that the purpose of the Pecheneg 
invasion was the Niš-Serdica-Eutzoplon region;127 however, contemporary 
researchers believe that fortresses on the Danube (most likely Garvăn and 
Capidava) were also attacked.128 This expedition may have come as a surprise 
to the empire, whose elites had grown accustomed to enjoying a relatively 
good relationship with the Pechenegs. The effects of this first attack after many 
years of quiet appear to have been quite serious, though not catastrophic. The 
Pechenegs managed to take a significant number of prisoners, some of whose 
freedom was purchased the following year by the new Byzantine Emperor 
Romanos Argyros (1028–1034).129
The paying of ransom for abducted subjects may have been accompanied 
by a peace agreement, because for the next four years the nomads carried 
out no aggressive actions against the empire. The ascension of a new ruler in 
Constantinople was also conducive to a realignment of the Byzantine Empire’s 
relationship with the Pechenegs. However, the year 1032 marked the begin-
ning of a series of much more devastating and violent attacks. The first one 
was directed at Moesia, an area between the Danube and the mountains of 
the Balkans.130 The same area was ravaged again two years later, though it was 
probably plundered much more thoroughly. Next, the Pechenegs, most likely 
moving west across the northern Balkans and circumventing the mountains, 
reached the borders of the Thessalonica thema.131 The following year (1035), 
most likely in winter, the Pechenegs invaded Moesia once again; then, bypassing 
126 Io.Scyl., 373; Wortley 2010, 351–352.
127 Diaconu 1970, 41.
128 Mănucu-Adameştanu 2001, 88–91; Madgearu 2013, 116.
129 Io.Scyl., 375 (v. 57–58); Wortley 2010, 354.
130 Io.Scyl., 385 (v. 56–57); Wortley 2010, 364; Io.Zon., 579; Trapp 1986, 67; Mic.Glyc., 584.
131 Io.Scyl., 397 (v. 43–44); Wortley 2010, 374.
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the Balkans to the east, they marched to Thrace and likewise ravaged it.132 In 
the spring of 1036, they invaded the Dobrudja region three times, taking five 
Byzantine commanders into captivity and murdering numerous inhabitants of 
the area before withdrawing behind the Danube.133 The fact that during their 
expeditions between 1032 and 1036, the Pechenegs expanded into ever more 
distant provinces of the empire seems to confirm that pillaging was the main 
goal of these ventures. Such an invasion strategy guaranteed the greatest mate-
rial benefits, since constant attacks on the same areas would only cause the 
population to flee to regions less vulnerable to attack.134 The long distances 
covered by the Pechenegs during these expeditions is confirmed by archaeo-
logical data.
The border regions, however, were the most badly affected. In the course 
of their devastating expeditions, the Pechenegs virtually dismantled the 
Byzantine defence system along the Danube: Tulcea, Isaccea, Garvăn-Dinogetia, 
Turcoaia-Troesmis, Capidava, Oltina, Dervent, Popina-Gradiščeto, Gigen, and 
even Dorostolon (Dristra) fell victim to their raids. Moreover, the following for-
tresses far from the Danube were also attacked: Constantia, Car Asen, Skala, 
Središte, Rujno, Okroš, Kladenci, Odărci, Šumen, Kavarna, and Balčik.135 The 
events of 1032–1036 share yet another striking feature. The Pechenegs did not 
display any tendency to settle on the far side of the Danube. They probably 
realized that the establishment of settlements on Byzantine territory would 
have forced Constantinople to undertake more decisive military actions, which 
would have been much more determined than the weak resistance of the gar-
risons located in the northern Balkans. Having a large Byzantine army directed 
against them would have meant a long fight for the invading nomads, the end 
result of which was difficult to predict. As long as the Pechenegs could feel safe 
on the left bank of the Danube, there was no reason to take unnecessary risks. 
132 Io.Scyl., 399 (v. 3–5); Wortley 2010, 376; Io.Zon., 589; Trapp 1986, 73.
133 Io.Scyl., 399 (v. 7–13); Wortley 2010, 376. John Skylitzes gives the names of the leaders taken 
captive, which were: John Dermokaites, Bardas Pitzes, Leo Chalkoutzes, Constantine 
Pterotos, and Michael Strabotrichares. Io.Zon., 590, Trapp 1986, 74. Cf. Diaconu 1970, 
45–49; Bonarek 2011, 73–74 (note 341); Karpov 2001, 297–298.
134 Diaconu 1970, 43.
135 Madgearu 1999, 435–436; 2013, 117–118; Borisov 2007, 74–75. The data provided by the last 
researcher seems to prove that the Pecheneg invasions in the years 1032–36 were cata-
strophic for the Byzantine provinces located north of the Balkan Mountains. Suffice it 
to say that out of 121 settlements discovered in the present-day Dobrich district, only 11 
supposedly survived the raids of the nomads. In the Silistra region (medieval Dristra) out 
of 72 open settlements and 8 fortified settlements there remained only 3 (sic!). It seems, 
however, that this destruction resulted not only from the invasions of the 1030s, but also 
from later migrations and battles, dated 1046–1053.
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All the more so given that in the face of the weakened state of the Byzantine 
forces along the border, crossing the river to carry out further looting expedi-
tions did not involve much risk.
However, constant fighting with the Uzes to maintain the already tenuous 
territorial status quo in the Black Sea steppe region meant that the Pechenegs’ 
encampments between the Danube, the Carpathian arch and the Dnieper 
might soon no longer be safe. The Pechenegs’ repeated expeditions across 
the Danube probably led these nomads, like the Bulgars three and a half cen-
turies earlier, to realize that the region resembled the Black Sea steppe in 
terms of its natural environment, which made it a logical choice for further 
migration.136 Thus, according to the iron logic of the migration of peoples, it 
was clearly only a matter of time before Pechenegs established settlements in 
the Balkans.
6.3 Pecheneg Migration to the Balkans
The catalyst for such a move was a power struggle within the ethnos, which had 
been preceded by a new stage in the continuing conflict between the Pechenegs 
and the Uzes. In addition to their successful expeditions to Dobrudja, the year 
1036 also brought the Pechenegs a spectacular defeat near Kiev, after which 
they ceased to be a threat to Kievan Rus’. The Pechenegs’ weakness was due 
not only to this defeat, recounted in the Rus’ chronicles, but also due to pres-
sure from the Uzes. By the 1040s, Pecheneg encampments were already located 
west of the Dnieper River and, according to information from Skylitzes, they 
reached as far as the Danube and Pannonia.137 This mention by the Byzantine 
chronicler indicates how far west the Pechenegs had been pushed after having 
lost at least half of their territory to the Uzes. This process of displacement was 
probably also accompanied by demographic losses. Adding to the problems of 
these nomads, whose ranks had been decimated by military defeats, in the early 
1040s, internal unrest began to spread. Their defeats in clashes with the Uzes 
seem to have aroused an aversion to the inept and passive tribal aristocracy. 
The leader of the ethos at that time was most likely Tyrach, son of Bilter, a high-
born leader lacking in military skills. According to Byzantine historiography, 
in times of danger he would seek refuge in the swamps and floodplains of the 
Lower Danube.138 Given this situation, which arose as a result of the indolence 
136 Waklinow 1984, 45.
137 Io.Scyl., 455 (v. 37–38); Wortley 2010, 426–427.
138 Io.Scyl., 455 (v. 39–47); Wortley 2010, 427. Io.Zon., 641; Trapp 1986, 105.
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of the ‘highborns’, a talented rival from outside their circle was bound to appear. 
This rival was Kegenes, son of Baltzar, who came from a family of commoners, 
but proved to be an effective leader in battles with the Uzes, which earned him 
widespread respect.139 Tyrach understood that a skillful leader was a threat to 
his power, so he decided to eliminate his rival. After several unsuccessful assas-
sination attempts, Tyrach’s supporters openly attacked Kegenes, who managed 
to avoid death and fled into the swamps along the Dnieper. He made contact 
with various tribes and enlisted the support of two out of thirteen of them.140 
Although Tyrach’s forces greatly outnumbered his own, Kegenes launched an 
attack, possibly hoping that some of the Pechenegs would refuse to fight. His 
calculations were wrong. The defeated Kegenes and his followers anxiously 
sought protection from Tyrach’s retribution. They took refuge on a small island 
on the Danube located near Dorostolon (Dristra). From there Kegenes was able 
to make contact with the Byzantine duke Michael Arianites of Paradunavon, 
and offer his services to the Emperor through him.141 These last events should 
be dated to the year 1045.142
Most likely motivated by the desire to strengthen his northern border, 
Emperor Constantine Monomachos (1042–1055), decided to accept the offer of 
the Pecheneg leader. Kegenes went to Constantinople, where he was received 
with honours and given the title of patrician (patrikios). He was additionally 
entrusted with three fortresses on the Danube, given a large parcel of land, and 
accepted as a friend and ally of the Romans. For his part, Kegenes promised to 
be baptized together with his followers. The ceremony celebrating the accep-
tance of these new subjects of the empire into the Church was performed in 
the waters of the Danube by the monk Euthymios.143
According to Byzantine sources, 20,000 nomads crossed into the empire.144 
Such a relatively modest number seems trustworthy.145 The fact that this prob-
ably included Kegenes’ warriors and their families makes it even more cred-
ible. Probably some 4,000–5,000 of them were capable of bearing arms. This 
139 Byzantine chroniclers claim that the Pechenegs nearly worshipped Kegenes because of 
his military talents: Io.Scyl., 455 (v. 47–50); Io.Zon., 641.
140 Io.Scyl., 455–456 (v. 50–60); Wortley 2010, 427; Io.Zon., 641; Trapp 1986, 105–106.
141 Io.Scyl., 456 (v. 60–71); Wortley 2010, s. 427; Io.Zon., 641; Trapp 1986, 106.
142 Michael Arianites became the dux of Paradunavon in the same year, in 1045. See 
Madgrearu 1999, 424; 2013, 122.
143 Io.Scyl., 456–457 (v. 1–14); Wortley 2010, 428; Io.Zon., 641–642; Trapp 1986, 106.
144 Io.Scyl., 456 (v. 66–67); Wortley 2010, 427. A little further on, the same chronicler reports 
that Kegenes would make expeditions against the followers of Tyrach leading a unit of 
about 1,000–2,000 people. Io.Scyl., 457 (v. 16–18); Wortley 2010, 428.
145 See Vasil’evskii 1908, 10. Its radical verification is postulated by Oliver Schmitt (2006, 477 
(note 32)) and Jarosław Dudek (2007, 119; 2007a, 112).
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was a significant number, which, under a nimble commander could effectively 
defend part of the empire’s Danube border. The settlements of these new 
allies were said to be concentrated around three fortresses on the Danube.146 
Byzantine sources do not provide any details that would make it possible to 
locate them more precisely. It is usually claimed that the location of the for-
tifications assigned to Kegenes’ Pechenegs are unknown or that they were 
located near Dorostolon (Dristra), in the vicinity of the area now known as 
the ‘Ialomița Wetlands’ (Balta Ialomiţei). Some researchers place them at fords 
in the river located at Dinogetia, Dervent and Capidava. The last of these was 
destroyed during an invasion by Tyrach in the winter of 1046/7, which would 
confirm the accuracy of these speculations.147
Once he felt secure, the new subject of the Byzantine Empire immediately 
began to use his newly acquired resources to combat his former compatri-
ots. He attacked the Pecheneg encampments across the Danube in sudden 
attacks involving 1,000–2,000 armed fighters, killing their warriors and sell-
ing women and children as slaves to the Byzantines.148 It is worth considering 
here what aim Kegenes might have had in his actions. Did he really consider 
himself a subject of the emperor, meaning his actions should be interpreted 
as not merely revenge, but also an indication of a change in his identity? Such 
an interpretation would mean that Kegenes, as a patrician, friend and ally of 
the Romans, treated his former brethren as enemies of the empire who had 
to be combated. There would therefore be no goal behind his actions other 
than personal revenge and demonstrating his loyalty to the new order of which 
he had become a part.149 However, it is also possible to follow a different line 
of reasoning, one which assumes that Kegenes’ military activity after he set-
tled in Byzantium was merely another stage in his struggle for power over the 
entire Pecheneg ethnos. By switching his allegiance and serving the empire, 
he gained access to political and material resources that he could use to unite 
the Pecheneg people under his leadership. Such an ambition seems to be indi-
cated by preserved bronze seals (bulla) of Kegenes which were discovered in 
the citadel in Dorostolon (Dristra). All known copies of the seal feature the 
figure of St. John the Baptist, referred to as Prodromos on the obverse, while 
146 Io.Scyl., 456 (v. 9–10); Wortley 2010, 428.
147 Diaconu 1970, 58 (note 162: location unknown, somewhere west of Dristra); Madgearu 
1999, 435; 2013, 123 (here, however, Madgearu considers the abovementioned strongholds 
to be unidentified); Dudek 2007, 118; 2007a. 111–112.
148 Io.Scyl., 457 (v. 15–20); Wortley 2010, 428; Io.Zon., 642; Trapp 1986, 106.
149 In my previous studies I was inclined to see Kegenes’ motivation exactly in this way, and 
thus to treat his behaviour as an example of cultural change and a change in identity. See 
Paroń 2009, 47–48; 2009a, 472–473.
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the reverse contains a supplication: ‘God aid John, magistros and archōn of 
Patzinacia, Kegenes’.150 However, the meaning of this seemingly unambiguous 
demonstration of a claim to power over the entire ethnos is complicated by 
a number of circumstances. Namely, all known copies of this seal date back 
to 1050/51, i.e., the very end of Kegenes’ life. Between 1045, when the ambi-
tious Pecheneg crossed the Danube, and the time the seal was fashioned, many 
events took place that could have led him to change his political plans.151 The 
words on the seal are also telling.152 Kegenes presents himself as a Christian 
and Byzantine dignitary. He uses his Christian name with his title, while his 
native pagan name is pushed to the end of the supplication. It is also worth 
noting that the owner of the seal describes himself as the magistros and archōn 
of Patzinacia, and not of the Pechenegs. Kegenes therefore presents himself as 
the ruler of a territorial district, located in Byzantium, over which he exercises 
power conferred upon him by the Emperor.
The information we obtain from an analysis of the relic described above 
is very important, yet it does not provide a sufficient basis for accepting the 
thesis that this eminent Pecheneg leader became a Roman. Barbarian chiefs 
accepting Roman honours is a phenomenon known since late antiquity. Their 
level of willingness to do so was based on the material and political benefits 
associated with a given position or honorary title.153 The same could have 
been the case with Kegenes. It is worth noting that at the time the seal was 
pressed, the vast majority of the Pechenegs already lived within the territory 
of the empire. Their settlements could have been referred to as ‘Patzinacia’ 
although it should be stressed that the toponym does not appear in Byzantine 
literature of that time.154 However, by gaining the right to rule over the area 
inhabited by the Pechenegs, Kegenes also gained power over the ethnos itself. 
Kegenes’ acceptance of the above-mentioned titles was, therefore, above all an 
act of political pragmatism, one in which he adapting the methods used in his 
struggle for power to the circumstances in which he found himself.
150 Jordanov 1992, 79–82; Seibt, Zarnitz 1997, 131–132 (no. 3.2.9); Dudek 2005, 327–328; 
Madgearu 2013, 123.
151 Cf. Chapter 7 of this work.
152 Dudek 2005, 329–330.
153 Attila held the title of magister militum, which justified the tributes paid to him. Cf. 
Maenchen-Helfen 1973, 182. Frank Arbogast supposedly used his position in the Roman 
Empire to fight the enemies he had in his home community across the Rhine. Cf. Geary 
2012a, 54.
154 Among 11th-century authors it was used only by John Skylitzes, but he meant an area 
beyond the borders of the empire (Io.Scyl., 375, v. 57–58). Cf. Moravcsik 1983a, 247 (s.v. 
Πατζινακία).
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It therefore seems that we can cautiously assume that Kegenes’ political goal, 
the details of which might have been subject to tactical modifications depend-
ing on the conditions, was nevertheless to gain power over the whole of the 
Pecheneg ethnos. The logic of political struggle requires, above all, eliminat-
ing one’s rivals and their closest allies. The attacks Kegenes carried out shortly 
after settling in the territory of the Byzantine Empire were directed mainly 
against Tyrach and his most trusted warriors. Kegenes had now become a seri-
ous threat to Tyrach in part because he was able to draw upon resources avail-
able within the empire to draw a large part or the majority of the Pechenegs to 
his side. Tyrach was therefore in a very difficult situation. Forced to constantly 
defend against Uzes attacks from the east, he was now additionally exposed 
to constant attacks from across the Danube, being carried out by a militant 
rival. Defending against both threats effectively exceeded his capabilities, so 
he decided to try to solve the problem by diplomatic means. Tyrach’s emissar-
ies who went before the emperor accused him of providing shelter to a ren-
egade who was carrying on a conflict with a people allied with the Byzantine 
Empire. According to the emissaries, if Constantine wanted to accept Kegenes’ 
service, he should forbid him from attacking his recently abandoned kinsmen. 
Tyrach ultimately demanded that Kegenes be held in check. If this condition 
was not met, he threatened to go to war.155 His arguments are somewhat sur-
prising. The leader of the Pechenegs refers to an alliance with Constantinople, 
while known events from the 1030s would indicate that both sides were rather 
in a state of heated conflict. After 1036, however, their relations may have been 
brought to order. A peace agreement was badly needed both by the empire, 
which had lost its fortifications along the Danube border, and by the steppe 
people, who had been weakened by their defeat at Kiev and were threatened 
by invasion by the Uzes.156
However, Constantine Monomachos did not accept the arguments pre-
sented by Tyrach’s emissaries and did not satisfy his demands. He was fully 
aware of the fact that such a course of action would result in war, so he began 
to make preparations for a conflict. He appointed Kegenes and Michael, duke 
of the Paradunavon thema, to observe Ister closely and immediately report 
any attempts to cross the river. In addition, Constantine sent 100 ships to the 
Danube to carry out observations of the banks of the river. However, Tyrach 
waited for Ister to freeze and at the turn of 1046 and 1047 he moved onto the 
Byzantine coast accompanied by his people. The scale of this migration is 
155 Io.Scyl., 457 (v. 20–27); Wortley 2010, 428; Io.Zon., 642; Trapp 1986, 106.
156 The existence of such an arrangement is assumed by Diaconu 1970, 51f.; Malamut 1995, 119; 
Madgearu 2013, 122.
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confirmed by information provided by Byzantine authors. According to John 
Skylitzes, 800,000 (sic!) Pechenegs entered the territory of the empire.157 This 
number must be treated with great reserve. The chronicler probably wanted to 
emphasize the great significance of this nomadic migration, but it is hard to 
believe that its participants were so numerous. Cautious estimations suggest 
that Tyrach brought up to 100,000 Pechenegs to the Balkans. If one assumes, 
on the basis of data on Kegenes’ migration, that each Pecheneg tribe could 
have been made up of roughly 10,000 people, i.e., warriors and their families, 
then a simple calculation shows that the remaining 11 tribes headed by Tyrach 
could have consisted of more than 100,000 nomads. However, tribal groups are 
not tactical army units, so their numbers can vary greatly. It cannot be ruled 
out that not all the Pechenegs entered the territory of the Byzantine Empire as 
a result of migration between 1045 and 1047. Some nomads probably remained 
on the left bank of the Danube. Taking these caveats into account, we can esti-
mate that the main bulk of the ethnos that invaded the Balkans, led by Tyrach, 
consisted of no more than the aforementioned 100,000 people.158
The migration of winter 1046/47 was therefore not merely an invasion of 
the empire, with the additional aim of curbing Kegenes’ activities. The need 
to escape Uzes pressure also played an important role. Skylitzes does not men-
tion this, but this fact was confirmed by Michael Psellos.159 The rivalry between 
Tyrach and Kegenes and its later consequences should be considered as a cata-
lyst that accelerated the process of the Pechenegs’ leaving the Black Sea steppe.
Having learned about the invasion, Constantine sent the forces from the 
themata of Macedonia and Bulgaria to assist Kegenes and Michael. Meanwhile, 
after entering the Balkans, the Pechenegs followed their tradition of carrying 
out wide-scale plundering in the regions through which they marched. Having 
found a large amount of food in these areas, including wine and especially 
honey, which was previously unknown to them, they began to greedily satisfy 
the hunger they had been suffering. New kinds of food and drink, most likely 
consumed in excess, caused an epidemic of dysentery among the Pechenegs 
157 Io.Scyl., 457–458 (v. 27–46); Wortley 2010, 428–429; Io.Zon., 642; Trapp 1986, 106; Io.Maur., 
142–147. On the subject of dating this event and subsequent ones, see Kazhdan 1963, 
177–184; 1977, 65–77; Shepard 1974, 61–89. J. Shepard defended the traditional chronol-
ogy, according to which the Pecheneg invasion led by Tyrach took place in the winter 
of 1048/1049. However, the interpretation of Alexander P. Kazhdan seems to be more 
justified.
158 Cf. Diaconu 1970, 62 (100,000 newcomers); Ferluga 1979, 54 (over 100,000); Schmidtt 
2006, 479 (note 53: no more than 20,000); Dudek 2007a, 113 (in total, 50,000–80,000 
Pechenegs entered the empire in the 1040s); 2007, 120 (80,000–100,000 accompanied by 
their families).
159 Mich.Psell., VII 67 (p. 240); Sewter 1953, 241–242.
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which took a deadly toll on them. Those nomads who survived the disease, 
were unable to fight for a long time afterward. News of the epidemic reached 
Kegenes, who persuaded the other chiefs to launch an immediate attack. The 
surprised nomads were at the mercy of their conquerors.160 The most radi-
cal solution was proposed by Kegenes, who urged the Byzantine commanders 
to kill all adult men.161 It seems however that Tyrach’s adversary was mainly 
interested in eliminating the Pecheneg aristocracy.162 Deprived of their elites, 
the steppe people would become a relatively harmless, easily controlled eth-
nos. The Byzantines found Kegenes’ suggestion ungodly and barbaric. The 
Byzantines themselves chose another solution, which consisted of disarming 
the Pechenegs and settling them on the deserted plains surrounding Naissos 
(Niš), Serdica (Sofia) and Eutzoplon (Ovče Pole). The nomads would cultivate 
the land there and pay tribute, as well as provide the emperor with recruits 
if necessary. The leaders, i.e., Tyrach and 140 other men, were transported to 
Constantinople. They were received with honours, then baptized, but were not 
allowed to return to their kinsmen.163
This was the means chosen to resolve the Pecheneg question, one intended 
to transform troublesome nomads into loyal subjects of the Byzantine basileus. 
Subsequent events, which will be the subject of discussion in the next chap-
ter, showed that the expectations of the Byzantine politicians turned out to 
be unrealistic.
…
The Pechenegs’ loss of importance on the Black Sea steppe and the process 
of their gradual displacement from this area began after the collapse of the 
Khazar Khaganate. This was connected with pressure from the Uzes, but also, 
as is clearly visible in the sources, from the expansion of Kievan Rus’. In the 
times of Vladimir and Iaroslav the Wise, the Kievan foreground was strongly 
fortified and extended southwards. Moreover, the activity of Kievan Rus’ 
along the Dnieper trade route most likely also increased, and was accompa-
nied by its establishment of settlements at the mouth of the Dnieper and in 
Tmutarakan. These facts were considered by the Pechenegs to pose a threat 
to their sphere of influence, and they reacted to this by attacking Kiev repeat-
edly. The pressure they put on the capital of the principality was limited by 
160 Io.Scyl., 458–459 (v. 46–66); Wortley 2010, 429–430; Io.Zon., 642–643; Trapp 1986, 106–107.
161 Io.Scyl., 459 (v. 67–70); Wortley 2010, 430.
162 Cf. Chapter 4.4 of this work.
163 Io.Scyl., 459 (v. 70–85); Wortley 2010, 430. Io.Zon., 643; Trapp 1986, 107.
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the conflict they were simultaneously engaged in with the Uzes. In the early 
11th century, the Pechenegs suffered their first serious territorial losses, which 
forced these nomads to gradually move to the western ends of the Black Sea 
steppe. This process would soon be accompanied by an armed exploration of 
the Balkan provinces of the Byzantine Empire. For roughly a decade (1027–
1036), the Pechenegs repeated their attacks on the Byzantine themata (mainly 
Paradunavon) along the border, as a result of which they completely dis-
mantled the defence system along the empire’s Danube border. Their military 
expeditions at that time foreshadowed the great migration that would occur 
in two waves in the years 1045–47. This was undoubtedly a momentous event 
because it ended the Pechenegs’ 150-year presence on the Black Sea steppe. 
Certain events that will be described in detail in the next chapter meant that 
their migration did not mark the end of the political independence of these 
nomads. However, their departure for the Balkans severely limited their politi-
cal significance. The Pechenegs were forcibly removed from a peripheral, but 
very important steppe niche, one which criss-crossed the spheres of influence 
of neighbouring states.
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chapter 7
The Pechenegs on the Territories of the States 
Neighbouring the Steppe
The migrations that took place under Kegenes and Tyrach ended the Pechenegs’ 
existence as an independent ethnos living on the Black Sea steppe. The qual-
ity of the nomads’ lives now depended largely on their relations with the rul-
ers of the neighbouring states in which they sought shelter. These relations, in 
turn, depended on the size of the given Pecheneg group and the circumstances 
of their settling in the given state. The Byzantine Empire most likely took in 
the majority of the Pechenegs. A smaller but nevertheless visible number 
sought shelter in the Kingdom of Hungary and in Rus’. It is probable that some 
groups of Pechenegs reached Poland, but this is not well substantiated by 
source materials.
The sudden influx of nomads into the Byzantine Empire left the imperial 
administration with the difficult task of dealing with this migration. Byzantine 
policy towards the Pechenegs alternated between using violent force and 
attempting to peacefully integrate and assimilate them. Ultimately, Byzantine 
politicians opted to employ brutal force to resolve the Pecheneg question. With 
other states, the process of integration was much less tumultuous, but did not 
always lead to full acculturation. This was due not only to the aforementioned 
smaller number of Pecheneg migrants, but also to the fact that their migration 
was gradual and occurred over a fairly long period of time.
Apart from the Pecheneg groups that were incorporated into neighbouring 
states, some members most likely never left the Black Sea steppe. This hypoth-
esis is based on the very nature of ethnic migrations, during which smaller 
groups often leave the main body of the ethnos. Such groups usually choose to 
stay in their current domain, even if this means submitting to a foreign power. 
As a result, they become incorporated into a new political body, lose their sov-
ereignty, and usually disappear from written sources. It also cannot be ruled 
out that some groups of Pechenegs returned to the north bank of the Danube 
in the latter half of the 11th century. The history of the great migration in 1064 
of the Uzes, who raided the Balkan provinces of the Byzantine Empire only to 
retreat from them a short time later, suggests it is possible that the same phe-
nomenon occurred with the Pechenegs. In such a case, these smaller groups 
were most likely easily absorbed by other, stronger ethnic groups.
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However, a number of researchers assume that after the migrations that 
took place under Kegenes and Tyrach, a fairly large and powerful group 
of Pechenegs remained on the Black Sea steppe and once again became an 
active force in the late 1060s. The basis for such an assumption is data from 
Hungarian sources describing nomad raids on the Arpadian kingdom. Some 
contemporary researchers identify these nomads with the Pechenegs. They 
believe that the Pechenegs raided Hungary in 1068, 1071, and 1085. Moreover, 
researchers refer to data gathered by Anna Komnena on ‘some Scythians’ 
who crossed the Danube in 1086, as well as to the fact that John Kinnamos 
and Niketas Choniates mention the Battle of Beroia, fought in 1122 with ‘the 
Scythians’ by John Komnenos. Information from Hungarian and Byzantine 
sources will be discussed in detail in later parts of this chapter. At this point, 
it should be noted that this data is insufficient to support the thesis that there 
existed a fully sovereign and numerous group of Pechenegs on the Black Sea 
steppe and the north bank of the Danube after Tyrach’s migration.
The late 1040s therefore represents a turning point in the history of the 
Pechenegs, i.e., the period during which they became part of the states neigh-
bouring the steppe. It seems equally important that the Pechenegs, who were 
a nomadic people and heavily reliant on extensive herding, were forced to set-
tle on lands whose natural conditions differed significantly from those of the 
Black Sea steppe. This initiated a process of change in their culture and asso-
ciated social and political processes. In the case of the large Pecheneg com-
munities in the Balkans, this situation also negatively affected their external 
relations within this new environment. As a result, the former inhabitants of 
the steppe proved to be a very troublesome partner for Byzantium.
7.1 The Pechenegs in Byzantium: 1047–1091
7.1.1 The Rebellion
The solution applied to new subjects of the Empire by Constantine IX 
Monomachos and his administration, described in the previous chapter, was 
regarded as fully effective by Byzantine elites. An expression of this mood 
can be found in the writings of John Mauropous, bishop of Euchaita, who 
described events surrounding the arrival of the Pechenegs in the Balkans in 
a speech written after 21 April 1047.1 In it he described the nomads as savage 
barbarians lacking the intellectual, legal, and religious underpinnings of a 
proper social order. They were capable solely of organizing raids and seizing 
1 Io.Maur., 142–147. On the dating of the speech: Lefort 1976, 265.
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anything that had legs as booty.2 However, the rhetorician was not the only 
one who depicted the nomads as a community sine rege et lege, resembling 
a pack of wild animals rather than human beings. Other Byzantine authors 
from the 11th century who described the Pechenegs presented them in a simi-
lar way.3 Mauropous referred to the same literary trope to emphasize the role 
of Providence, the actions of which had enabled the barbarians to rid them-
selves of their innate savagery and transform from animals to humans. This 
miraculous metamorphosis was of course complemented by their baptism. In 
short, the Pechenegs became part of the Roman nation because, according to 
the rhetorician, they gave themselves to it just like a river gives its waves to 
the sea.4 In this fervent confession of faith in the omnipotence of God, who is 
capable of turning the most savage barbarian into a civilized man, lay a firm 
conviction in the great power possessed by the Roman (Byzantine) cultural 
universe. When the Pechenegs crossed the borders of the Roman politeia, they 
entered an area under the influence of this cultural universe, so it was inevi-
table that they would succumb to its effects.
This conviction was real and not merely a rhetorical declaration. In the 
mid-11th century Byzantine elites momentarily held the mistaken belief that 
calling on the former steppe-dwellers to settle in the highland and upland 
areas between Serdica and Niš, areas that were certainly far from a promised 
land for them,5 and offering the nomad leaders a place among the Empire’s 
elites would make the Pechenegs into loyal subjects. This line of reasoning 
was completely unrealistic and seems to show that the administration of 
Constantine IX clearly had no idea with whom they were dealing. The impo-
sition of sudden, rapid cultural change on the Pechenegs simply made them 
more open to a call to rebel.
Such a call came very soon.6 In 1048, due to anticipated aggression by 
the Seljuq sultan, the Byzantine ruler decided to send 15,000 horsemen to 
2 Io.Maur., 144 (§ 9, 1961).
3 Cf. Malamut 1995, 122–123; Paroń 2011, 127–130; 2018, 226–233.
4 Io.Maur., 143–144 (§ 7–8), 145 (§ 12–13). Cf. Malamut 1995, 121.
5 Schmitt 2006, 480. The researcher assumes that when the Byzantines ordered the Pechenegs 
to settle in the highlands, they hoped that the steppe-dwellers would get used to the new 
conditions by shifting from ‘vertical nomadism’ to ‘horizontal nomadism’. The latter meant 
that in summer, animals would graze in the mountains, whereas in winter they would return 
to the valleys.
6 For more on the Pecheneg rebellion and the war they waged with Byzantium in the years 
1049–1053: Vasil’evskii 1908, 15–24; Zlatarski 1934, 93–108; Diaconu 1970, 64–65, 73–76; Fine 
1983, 209–210; Malamut 1995, 124–128; Stephenson 2000, 92–93; Spinei 2003, 135–136; Curta 
2006, 296–297; Bonarek 2011, 76–86.
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Iberia.7 These forces were to be comprised of his newly acquired subjects. The 
Pechenegs were to be led by their former chiefs: Soutzoun, Selte, Karaman, 
and Kataleim, who had all been residing in Constantinople. The new units 
were well armed and their leaders were given valuable gifts by the emperor. 
The only Byzantine who is known to have accompanied the Pechenegs to the 
east was Constantine Hadrobalanos, a patrician who acted as their guide.8 
The actions taken by Constantine IX seem to prove that the emperor and his 
administration trusted the Pechenegs and did not believe they would rebel. 
This is another point that gives us reason to believe that Byzantine politi-
cians regarded the solutions adopted in the wake of the Pecheneg migration 
as fully effective. However, their hopes were quickly dashed. The troops sent 
against the Seljuqs managed to cross the Bosporus and advance a short dis-
tance to the east, but at that point, they stopped near Damatrys to deliberate 
amongst themselves. Some members of the group thought they should march 
on to Iberia in accordance with the emperor’s orders, but the majority opted 
to either renounce their loyalty, seek shelter in the mountains of Bithynia 
and repel potential attacks from there, or to return to the Balkans and join 
the remainder of their ethnos. Ultimately, they were persuaded by Kataleim to 
choose the last solution, that is, to attempt to re-unify their ethnic group. The 
Pechenegs tried unsuccessfully to kill Hadrobalanos, who managed to escape 
and return to the court.9
Separated from Europe by the Bosporus, the nomads decided to swim 
across it. They reached the opposite bank of the strait near the Monastery of 
St. Tarasios, then headed undisturbed towards Serdica, where they joined 
forces with the local tribes and made contact with Pecheneg groups that had 
settled in other regions of the Balkans. Reunited and armed with axes, scythes, 
and other iron farming tools, they marched to Philippopolis, crossed the 
Balkan mountain range, and set up camp on the Osmos River, on the Danube 
plain. Selte and his men remained in Lobitzos (Lovech), but were forced to 
withdraw under pressure from troops led by Arianitzes, sent from the thema of 
Macedonia to deal with them.10
The Pechenegs eventually settled in an area that John Skylitzes called the 
‘Hundred Hills’ (‘Εκατον βυονοί).11 The precise location of their new settlement 
is not known. Some researchers assume it was located near Preslav, the former 
7  Schmitt (2006, 481 (note 76)) believes that the number provided by John Skylitzes is too 
high and suggests lowering it radically to 1600–2000 horsemen.
8  Io.Scyl., 460 (v. 87–97); Wortley 2010, 430.
9  Io.Scyl., 460–461 (v. 3–18); Wortley 2010, 430–431; Io.Zon., 643; Trapp 1986, 106–107.
10  Io.Scyl., 461 (v. 18–42); Wortley 2010, 431–432; Io.Zon., 644; Trapp 1986, 107.
11  Io.Scyl., 465 (v. 29–34); Wortley 2010, 434–435.
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capital of Bulgaria.12 Others locate it somewhere in south Dobrudja or on the 
border between Dobrudja and north-east Bulgaria.13 Nevertheless, sources 
confirm that the ‘Hundred Hills’ contained valleys, groves, thickets, streams, 
and pastures. The presence of the latter seems to suggest that this new loca-
tion, chosen by the Pechenegs themselves, suited their traditional lifestyle 
much better. They soon began to raid neighbouring lands, with the aim of 
their expedition being the area between the Balkan mountain range, the lower 
Danube, and the Black Sea coast.
The above events came as a complete surprise to Byzantine elites. The foun-
dation of the Empire’s policy towards the Pechenegs was turned upside down. 
Writing a few decades later, Michael Attaleiates, referred to it as trying to ‘paint 
the Ethiopian white’.14 While we can agree with him that the policy was inher-
ently flawed had no chance of success, we need to note that more than one 
party was at fault, though the Byzantine author saw the situation otherwise. In 
reality, the Pechenegs were not so much offered living conditions they chose 
to reject, as much as ones they could never have accepted. This attempt to 
suddenly make a farmer out of a steppe-dweller, an individual accustomed to 
a nomadic lifestyle and the activities associated with it, made as much sense 
as trying to ‘paint the Ethiopian white’. Michael Attaleiates understood his 
metaphor differently, however, and we can assume that he was disappointed 
mostly with the attitude of the Pecheneg elites. Byzantine authors of the time 
must have regarded the behaviour of Pecheneg leaders – who had received 
lavish attention from the emperor in terms of both their material and spiritual 
needs – as ungrateful. Yet, Constantine IX Monomachos had made a number 
of serious mistakes in his relations with the nomads.
Although the rebellion of 1048 posed a serious threat, the emperor still 
had means at his disposal that could potentially pacify it. It is worth noting 
that a large majority of Pecheneg leaders, including Tyrach himself, were 
in the hands of the Byzantines. They could be used as hostages to prevent 
the rebels from acting too violently, since without their leaders, the nomads 
would be much less dangerous. Moreover, at the outset of the rebellion, 
Constantine IX could still count on the loyalty of Kegenes and his men. They 
represented a minority of the ethnic group as a whole, but in the event of a war 
with the Pechenegs, an alliance with them would be a valuable asset, especially 
in view of Kegenes’ military talents.
12  Angold 1997, 38; Curta 2006, 297; Schmitt 2006, 482; Madgearu 2013a, 213; 2013, 126 (to the 
north and east of Preslav).
13  Bromberg 1938, 9; Diaconu 1970, 66–69; Soustal 1991, 96; Spinei 2003, 135; Dudek 2007, 118.
14  Mich.Att., 54/55.
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However, the emperor soon lost the support of Kegenes’ men. When the 
nomad rebellion broke out, the Pecheneg leader had been summoned to 
Constantinople. He arrived with his troops and made camp near the capital, 
on a field called Maïtas. He never appeared before the monarch because he 
was attacked at night by three Pechenegs. The assassins managed only to cause 
him serious injuries and were quickly caught. When morning came, Baltzar, 
the older son of the injured leader, laid Kegenes down on a four-wheeled cart 
and entered the capital with the whole loyal troop. The three would-be mur-
derers were chained to the carriage. Baltzar and Goulinos, the victim’s second 
son, did not dare kill them because the assassins begged to be spared in the 
emperor’s name. The result of their meeting with Constantine Monomachos 
led to a surprising result. When the monarch asked the assassins about their 
reasons for their attempt on Kegenes’ life, they told him they did it because 
Kegenes had been critical of the emperor’s rule and was going to enter the city 
at dawn to plunder it, murder its inhabitants, and join forces with the rebel-
lious Pechenegs. The failed murderers turned out to be silver-tongued. Having 
believed their accusations, the emperor freed the assassins and imprisoned 
Kegenes and his sons.15
It is very probable the attackers were sent by the Pecheneg elites held in 
Constantinople, to whom Kegenes was a deadly threat. They most likely feared 
he would advise the emperor to put down the Pecheneg rebellion using means 
just as radical as those he proposed when the nomads had first arrived in the 
Balkans. And, in fact, murdering the elites would indeed have most probably 
made it easier to suppress the rebellion. Even if the Byzantines expressed 
moral reservations and refused to commit such brutal murder, Kegenes would 
still be very dangerous to Tyrach and the rest of the Pecheneg leaders. This was 
because he could either make use of the isolation of the elites to gain control 
over all Pechenegs or try to destroy them in cooperation with imperial troops.
The motives of the nomad elites are clear, but the behaviour of Constantine 
IX is more surprising, and must be considered a grave error. The emperor was 
clearly unnerved by what Kegenes’ would-be murderers told him. He not only 
arrested Kegenes and his sons, but also attempted to neutralize their followers 
by ordering that their horses and weapons be taken from them and that they 
be imprisoned. However, the emperor’s odd behaviour made the Pechenegs 
suspicious. They did not allow themselves be disarmed and withdrew from 
Constantinople under cover of darkness to cross the Balkan mountains 
and join the rest of the Pechenegs.16 In this way, Constantine Monomachos 
15  Io.Scyl., 465–466 (v. 36–63); Wortley 2010, 435.
16  Io.Scyl., 466 (v. 63–76); Wortley 2010, 435–436; Mich.Att., 54/55.
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strengthened the rebel forces and lost a valuable trump card that could have 
been used against them.
Meanwhile, the nomads, no longer threatened by Kegenes and his men, 
grew even bolder. They set up camp near Aulê, at the foot of the Balkans, not 
very far from Adrianople, and began carrying out plundering raids. Magistros 
Constantine Arianites, doux of the West, organized a military campaign against 
them. After defeating a few smaller Pecheneg units on his way to Dampolis 
(Yambol), he encountered the main body of their forces in the vicinity of the 
fortress. Arianites clearly underestimated his opponents. Even though his 
army was tired out from the long journey, he immediately engaged the nomads 
in battle and was defeated. Many soldiers from the themata of Thrace and 
Macedonia died in battle. Constantine Arianites himself sought shelter in 
Adrianople and from there sent word of the defeat to the emperor.17
Constantine IX appears to have been aware of the gravity of the situa-
tion, but he once again made a serious mistake. He attempted to placate the 
Pechenegs by releasing the elites being held in the capital, with Tyrach at their 
head, and lavishing them with gifts. In exchange, they promised to persuade 
their tribesmen to make peace. At the same time, however, perhaps due to 
doubts about the chances of this mission’s success, he summoned the east-
ern tagmata (regiments) back to Europe and appointed rector Nikephoros 
as their commander. He also sent against the Pechenegs Katakalon 
Kekaumenos, doux of the East, and Hervé Frankopoulos, commander of the 
Latin mercenaries.18 The duplicity of the emperor’s actions was obvious. Given 
the situation, Tyrach and the other released Pecheneg leaders had no choice 
but to warn their tribesmen about the approaching Byzantine army.19 In these 
circumstances, any attempt to encourage them to adopt a peaceful stance 
would be doomed to failure. Thus, if the Pecheneg elites had ever intended to 
keep their promise to the emperor, they were now forced to renege on it. In this 
way, the Byzantine emperor once again strengthened his opponents, this time 
on the eve of a major military confrontation.
Nikephoros, who was leading the main Byzantine army, crossed the Haemus 
through the Sidera Pass, reached Diakene, a village near the ‘Hundred Hills’, 
and set up camp, fortifying it with a strong palisade. The rector was very aggres-
sive in his actions, as evidenced by his decision to move the theatre of war 
17  Io.Scyl., 466–467 (v. 76–92); Wortley 2010, 436; Cat.Cec, 178/179 (v. 12–28). Genadii Litavrin 
identifies the battle described by Kekaumenos as the battle of Dampolis. For other 
hypotheses and discussion: Cat.Cec., note 256, 386–391.
18  Io.Scyl., 467 (v. 93–108 (8)); Wortley 2010, 436–437.
19  Io.Scyl., 468 (v. 19–22); Wortley 2010, 437.
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out beyond the Balkan mountains, to the area neighbouring the enemy’s home 
base. Nikephoros was convinced he would achieve victory and went so far as to 
bring ropes and leather bands to tie up Pecheneg captives. Against the advice 
of Katakalon Kekaumenos, he put off engaging in battle because he believed 
that carrying out an attack prematurely, before the main forces of the enemy 
had gathered, would make it impossible to destroy the Pechenegs once and 
for all. Yet, when it finally came time to do battle, it was the Byzantines who 
suffered a crushing defeat. Rector Nikephoros and Frankopoulos fled the 
battlefield with most of their army. Kekaumenos and his small force resisted, 
but during fighting the commander was severely injured and taken captive.20 
The Pechenegs did not pursue the fleeing forces; however, they acquired a 
handsome booty, because most of the goods from the Byzantine camp fell into 
their hands.21
After the two battles lost by the Byzantines in 1049, relations between the 
Pechenegs and the Empire were very much like they were before their mass 
migration. The only major difference was that the Pechenegs had previously 
lived outside the Empire’s borders and Constantinople had an ally among 
them, namely Kegenes and his followers. Due to the grave errors commit-
ted by Constantine Monomachos, the divisions that once stood in the way 
of Pecheneg unity had now ceased to exist, and the nomads’ social elites had 
been reassumed their former position. Encouraged by their previous suc-
cesses, the Pechenegs began raiding the Byzantine provinces south of the 
Balkan mountains. This led the emperor to mobilize another army, led by 
the heteriarch Constantine. In the spring of 1050, he gathered his forces – 
comprised of soldiers from both the western and eastern tagmata – in the 
area near Adrianople, where he established a camp surrounded by strong for-
tifications. The Pechenegs arrived in the area on 8 June, having crossed the 
mountain range.22 The previous actions of Constantine seem to confirm that 
he treated the Pechenegs as an enemy that undoubtedly needed to be coun-
tered. However, not all his subordinates agreed with him on this subject. While 
senior military officers were holding a meeting in the heteriarch’s tent, Samuel 
Bourtzes, a patrician and commander of the infantry, left the fortifications with 
his troops and attacked the Pechenegs without waiting for the commander’s 
signal. As a result, the entire army was drawn into a battle with the Pechenegs, 
as the remaining troops, though not fully readied, joined the fight to support 
the infantry. The Byzantines were ultimately defeated, but they did not suffer 
20  For more information on the life of Kekaumenos, see Chapter 4.4 of the present book.
21  Io.Scyl., 467–469 (v. 8–19, 22–50); Wortley 2010, 437–438; Mich.Att., 56/57–58/59.
22  Io.Scyl., 469–470 (v. 60–73); Wortley 2010, 438.
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great losses and withdrew back to their fortifications. However, several high 
ranking commanders, including patrician Michael Dokeianos and magistros 
Constantine Arianites, were killed. The Pechenegs, whose morale was lifted sig-
nificantly, immediately attacked the fortifications. They successfully filled the 
outer trench with branches and stones, but the sudden death of Soultzous, one 
of their leaders, who was struck, along with his horse, by an arrow fired from 
a catapult, curbed their enthusiasm. Moreover, relief arrived from Adrianople 
in the form of ‘the regiment of the Scholai’ led by protospatharios Niketas 
Glabas. The Pechenegs soon withdrew when they heard that Bulgarian troops 
led by syncellus Basil were en route.23 The Byzantine army was thus saved from 
a total rout.
However, Macedonia and Thrace were no longer safe, and the Pechenegs 
continued to raid them with impunity. Their boldest raids brought them to the 
foreground of the capital. One of their units even reached as far as the area of 
Katasyrtai.24 Constantine Monomachos was therefore more pressed to act than 
ever before. He once again opted to play a tried-and-true trump card. He freed 
Kegenes, most probably hoping that he would manage to bring at least some 
nomads back on board, thereby weakening the threat they posed.25 In light of 
the Pechenegs’ conflict with Constantinople and the fact that Tyrach and his 
supporters had regained control over all Pechenegs, this mission seems to have 
been a lost cause. It is hard to say what Kegenes himself expected. Perhaps as a 
true inhabitant of the steppe, he simply believed in his own charisma. He had 
survived a number of assassination attempts ordered by Tyrach, including the 
last treacherous incident just outside the walls of Constantinople. It also can-
not be ruled out that in 1050 he had received the title of magistros and archon 
of Patzinacia.26 Preserved copies of seals with these titles come from this 
period. Kegenes would thus have been granted the right from the Byzantines to 
act as the sole leader of the Pechenegs. The ‘only’ thing he required to accom-
plish this goal was the approval of his tribesmen; however, instead they treated 
him like a dangerous renegade. In 1050 or 1051, Kegenes made contact with 
a group of his fellow tribesmen who promised to do whatever he requested. 
23  Io.Scyl., 470–471 (v. 73–107 (7)); Wortley 2010, 438–439; Mich.Att., 58/59–60/61.
24  Io.Scyl., 471–472 (v. 23–27); Wortley 2010, 439–440.
25  Io.Scyl., 471 (v. 14–17); Wortley 2010, 439.
26  Cf. Madgearu 2003, 51; 2013a, 211; 2013, 123. Madgearu points out that the title of magistros, 
which appears in Kegen’s seals, was of higher rank than that of patrician. It can therefore 
be assumed that he was granted additional powers, greater than those he enjoyed imme-
diately after entering imperial service.
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Believing their assurances, he went to meet them, but when he arrived, the 
Pechenegs murdered him and cut him up into pieces.27
The treachery and ignominious death of Kegenes were largely a conse-
quence of the emperor’s mistakes. However, luckily for himself, Constantine IX 
did not base his plans solely on the mission he had entrusted to the magistros 
and archon of Patzinacia. The emperor formed new armies, but this time, bear-
ing in mind his previous experiences, he decided to change his strategy and 
tactics. The aim now was not to annihilate the enemy, but to limit raids on the 
provinces south of the Balkan Mountains. Imperial commanders were ordered 
to avoid battles with the enemy’s main forces and instructed to attack smaller 
units that had arrived in Macedonia and Thrace to plunder these lands.28 
Changes were also clearly visible in the means of fighting employed by the 
forces assembled by Monomachos. These which were meant to resemble those 
of the nomads, and to this end, he had brought 20,000 mounted archers from 
the east. Apart from this, he mobilized reinforcements comprised of Franks 
and Varangians. The patrician and ethnarch Bryennios was appointed com-
mander of these forces. He brought his army to Adrianople, where his actions 
were limited to defending nearby villages against Pecheneg raids. Another 
patrician, Michael Akolouthos, was sent with orders similar to those given to 
Bryennios. Close cooperation between the two commanders resulted in two 
victories over the Pechenegs, one in Goloe and the other in Toplitzos, a fortress 
on the Euros River. In Kharioupolis, these commanders completely surprised 
a group of nomads who were looting the thema of Macedonia. Pecheneg raids 
did not stop after these military successes, but for the next two years they were 
less much bold.29
In 1053, most likely encouraged by his recent successes, Constantine IX 
decided to try to defeat his enemy once and for all. In order to accomplish 
this, he mobilized a great army comprised of the forces from both the east 
and west. Michael Akolouthos was appointed its commander. He entrusted 
Basil the syncellus with the task of commanding the Bulgarian troops. The two 
commanders then set out to confront the Pechenegs, who had chosen to seek 
shelter in the Great Preslav once they learned of the planned military expedi-
tion. They built a palisade around their camp, forcing the Byzantine army to lay 
siege, which proved ineffective. The imperial forces were now far from a secure 
27  Io.Scyl., 472 (v. 35–37); Wortley 2010, 440.
28  Io.Scyl., 471 (v. 17–23); Wortley 2010, 440; Mich.Att., 60/61–62/63. For more on the changes 
in the Byzantines’ tactics after the defeats suffered in the years 1049–1050: Stephenson 
2000, 92.
29  Io.Scyl., 472–473 (v. 38–63); Wortley 2010, 440–441; Mich.Att., 60/61–62/63, 64/65.
341on the Territories of the States Neighbouring the Steppe
supply base, and soon began to suffer from a scarcity of provisions. These cir-
cumstances led the Byzantine leaders to jointly agree on the need to withdraw 
under cover of darkness. The Romans’ plans did not go unnoticed, however, 
and this time Tyrach proved himself to be an extremely capable commander. 
He gathered a sizeable force to pursue the retreating Byzantines and blocked 
the routes across the mountain range. The retreat turned into a chaotic route. 
Many Romans were killed or taken captive, and Basil the syncellus was killed 
as well.30
Constantine Monomachos intended to organize another expedition, but 
when the Pechenegs came to him seeking peace, he entered into a thirty-year 
peace agreement with them.31 The provisions set forth in the agreement are 
not known. We can only assume that it legitimized the status quo, for which 
the nomads had fought hard. Ultimately, it was the Pechenegs who deter-
mined the place and conditions of their settling within the Empire, thereby 
shattering the unrealistic hopes harboured in Constantinople. The conditions 
forced upon the Pechenegs in 1047 as terms for living within the empire had 
made their rebellion inevitable. However, it would have been possible to pac-
ify them at an early stage of their uprising if not for grave mistakes made by 
Constantine IX Monomachos. It could even be said that the manner in which 
he treated Kegenes and his followers made the emperor responsible for restor-
ing unity among the Pechenegs. It is difficult to determine what were the rea-
sons behind the poor judgement of the basileus. We can only speculate that 
his indecision was a consequence of rivalry between politicians or political 
parties that suggested either employing drastic measures against the nomads 
or opposed this idea and opted for more conciliatory solutions, ones that were 
more diplomatic than military. The incompetence of the Byzantine army is 
equally startling. The defeats of 1049 and 1050 can be explained by the fact 
that they underestimating their opponents, but the failure of the last expedi-
tion of 1053 comes as a real surprise; all the more so since the enemy did not 
try to disperse, which the nomads normally did, but instead decided to defend 
a fortified camp that the imperial forces failed to take. The war against the 
Pechenegs therefore revealed a crisis in the Byzantine army, one that would be 
further neglected by subsequent emperors.32
The humiliated empire had to accept the presence of the Pechenegs in the 
Balkans. For the next 40 years, the ethnos enjoyed almost total independence. 
30  Io.Scyl., 475–476 (v. 17–37); Wortley 2010, 443; Mich.Att., 64/65–68/69; Cat.Cec., 180/1–
182/3 (v. 19–30, 1–6).
31  Io.Scyl., 476 (v. 37–43); Wortley 2010, 443; Mich.Att., 74/75–76/77.
32  Treadgold 1995, 39f.
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Some researchers point to similarities between the Pechenegs and the 
nomadic Bulgars of Turkic descent. Almost four centuries earlier, they invaded 
the Empire’s territory and created an independent political entity whose cen-
tre may have been located in the same area where the Pechenegs later likewise 
chose to settle.33 The analogies here are indeed striking, but it is worth noting 
there were significant differences as well. First, it would seem that the posi-
tion of the Dulo clan, from which Asparukh and his successors descended, was 
much stronger than the that of Tyrach’s clan or that of any other Pecheneg 
noble. In addition, the Bulgars already had a monarchical tradition dating back 
to the times of Kubrat’s Great Bulgaria.34 Asparukh rose to become an absolute 
ruler mostly as a result of his successes on the battlefield in the fight against 
Byzantium. The position of Tyrach was never as strong. We see him as a leader 
mostly at times when the Pechenegs as a group were threatened. Yet he was 
always surrounded by a number of other tribal chiefs, indicating his power was 
limited. As we saw in Chapter 4, the Pechenegs, unlike the Bulgars, did not cre-
ate a strongly hierarchical political structure, but comprised a relatively loose, 
segmented political organism. Nothing indicates that this changed when they 
settled in the Byzantine Empire. Even when some Pecheneg leader rose to such 
eminence that his existence was noted by Byzantine sources, no member of 
this tribe is ever credited with attaining the status of a ruler. It is worth noting 
one additional point. After the Bulgars arrived in the Balkans and defeated the 
army of Constantine IV, they immediately began organizing their state. Around 
its centre were located vassal Slavic tribes, which most likely serve as a sort of 
buffer.35 This type of social engineering, scrupulously recorded in Byzantine 
sources, clearly indicates that the Bulgars indeed became masters of the lands 
located north of the Balkan Mountains. Nothing like this ever occurred in the 
case of the Pechenegs. We definitely cannot say they ruled over the thema of 
Paristrion. Until the 1070s, the Byzantine Empire controlled the urban cen-
tres on the lower Danube and the west cost of the Black Sea. The indigenous 
population, which had to choose between the Byzantine administration and 
the menacing nomads, who had earlier proven how aggressive they could be, 
usually opted for the Empire. This choice was also facilitated by certain steps 
taken by Byzantium, such as granting regular subsidies and maintaining trade 
relations with native groups, as a means of strengthening their loyalty.36
33  Stephenson 1999, 45; Bonarek 2011, 93–94.
34  Cf. Chapter 2 of the present book.
35  Nic.Patr., 36, 23–26 (p. 90/91); Th.Conf., 359 (v. 12–17); Mango, Scott 1997, 499. Cf. Beshevliev 
1981, 179–181; 1984, 60–61; Halperin 2007, 86; Ziemann 2007, 167–179; Paroń 2013, 238.
36  Cf. Stephenson 1999, 56; 2000, 93–96.
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The Pechenegs therefore did not have traditions that would allow them 
to follow the path chosen by the Danube Bulgars, which led towards the cre-
ation of a strong monarchical system. It indeed seems that throughout their 
presence in the Balkans, they never showed any ambitions of this sort. They 
were a difficult and unpredictable partner, but they were sufficiently powerful 
that efforts to annihilate them proved to be extremely difficult. At the same 
time, they never posed an existential threat to Byzantium, even if they were 
able to effectively undermine its security and efforts to maintain order in the 
Balkan provinces.
Byzantium was unable to rid itself of the Pechenegs, but nor could it 
ignore them. The Byzantine administration therefore undertook measures 
to appease the Pechenegs in the form of subsidies intended to curb their 
aggression.37 They were also occasionally mobilized by the Empire and took 
part in a number of military campaigns. It cannot be ruled out that some mem-
bers of the Danube fortress guard were also recruited from the Pechenegs.38 
It is difficult to say whether the Byzantines undertook missionary activity 
among the Pechenegs or merely settled for their formally adopting Christianity. 
It is confirmation, however, of an archbishopric in Dristra with five subordi-
nate suffragan dioceses, indicating that conditions for missionary work among 
the Pechenegs were favourable.39
Thus, despite all the failures suffered in the years 1048–1053, Byzantium pos-
sessed an array of tools which could over time turn the nomads into loyal sub-
jects. Financial benefits, long-term military service, and conversion to a new 
faith all clearly opened up a path for the Pechenegs’ acculturation. However, 
this would take time; and time was something the empire, which found itself 
in an ever-deepening crisis, no longer had.
7.1.2 Feigned Loyalty (1053–1072)
Six years of relative peace with the Pechenegs suggested that most of the group’s 
leaders accepted the agreement made with Constantine IX Monomachos, 
but in 1059, during the reign of Isaac Komnenos, the former steppe-dwellers 
rebelled once again.40 Their moment of opportunity coincided with a conflict 
37  Mich.Att., 76/77. Cf. Stephenson 1999, 46–47, 49.
38  Madgearu 1999, 442. This is ostensibly evidenced by a quiver and elements of a bow dis-
covered in cities on the lower Danube (Garvăn and Nufăru). See also Madgearu 2013, 
124–125.
39  Stephenson 1999, 56–57; 2000, 97.
40  For more about the events between 1053 and 1072: Vasil’evskii 1908, 25–33; Zlatarski 1972, 
110–119; Diaconu 1970, 76–81; Fine 1983, 210–211; Malamut 1995, 128–129; Stephenson 
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that broke out between the Byzantine Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary,41 
the reasons for which are unknown. The chronological proximity between the 
conflict and the Pechenegs’ rebellion suggests that opponents of the Byzantine 
Empire might have been involved.42 The rebellion did not lead to any signifi-
cant battles; Isaac Komnenos promptly headed north with his troops. After 
reaching Sofia, he met with the Hungarian diplomats who came to negotiate 
the restoration of peace. The Empire’s only opponents were the Pechenegs, 
but they soon lost interest in fighting. Most of their leaders submitted to the 
emperor’s authority; only one of them, Selte, chose to continue fighting against 
the Empire. However, his decision led to failure, as his seat, located in an inac-
cessible site somewhere on the Lower Danube, was seized and destroyed.43
Although startling, these events can be seen as logical and predictable. 
The Pechenegs must have realized a fight against the Empire without the 
help of the Hungarians had no chance of success, especially in the view of 
Isaac Komnenos’ quick intervention. Selte’s reaction exposes the ethnos’ weak 
leadership. Michael Psellos, whose accounts differ slightly from the data pro-
vided by other 11th-century authors, argues that the emperor sought to drive 
the nomads out beyond the Empire’s borders.44 While it is difficult to deter-
mine whether this is true or not, the willingness with which Isaac Komnenos 
accepted the oath of allegiance made by the Pechenegs casts doubt on the 
veracity of Psellos’ account. Returning to the events of the summer of 1059, it 
should be noted that the nomads were quite eager to cooperate with an enemy 
of the Empire. The fact that their declaration of loyalty to the emperor had 
been made under the threat of military action best illustrates the value and 
strength of this oath.
2000, 93–98; Spinei 2003, 137; 2009, 112–118; Curta 2006, 298–299; Bonarek 2011, 87–94; 
Madgearu 2013, 127–131.
41  Mich.Att., 120/121; Scyl.Cont., 106.
42  Vasil’evskii 1908, 25; Moravcsik 1970, 62–63; Shepard 1999, 69; Curta 2006, 298; Spinei 
2009, 112; Madgearu 2013, 95, 127–129. Madgearu argues that the Hungarian invasion was 
a response to Byzantine provocations organized with the help of the Pechenegs. Taking 
other sources into consideration, this interpretation seems wrong. Madgearu, relying 
on the misinterpreted accounts of Michael Psellos, assumes that another migration of 
Pechenegs from across the Danube took place in 1059.
43  Mich.Att., 120/121–122/123 (Attaleiates argues that the authority over Selte’s seat was trans-
ferred to the Byzantine strategos); Scyl.Cont., 106–107; Io.Zon., 671; Trapp 1986, 125. For a 
discussion on the location of Selte’s seat: Madgearu 2013, 129.
44  Mich.Psell., VII 70 (p. 242); Sewter 1953, 243. This information is confirmed by Matthew of 
Edessa, who argues that Isaac Komnenos allegedly crossed the Danube during his cam-
paign against the Pechenegs. Dostourian 1993, 90.
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Despite this, the following five years saw relative peace in the Balkans. This 
ended in 1064, when the Pechenegs began their invasions once again.45 These 
are mentioned in historical sources, which suggests they were significant in 
scale, but there is no information about who led them or the regions invaded.46 
Byzantine border defence forces fought with a fair degree of effectiveness, 
and managed to ward off the enemy repeatedly. Despite this, the Pechenegs 
were not defeated, while their raids were ultimately suspended as the result of 
peace agreements.
These conflicts were merely a prelude to the chaos that enveloped the 
Balkans in the autumn of 106447 as a result of a major migration by the Uzes. 
The course of these events bore a resemblance to the mass migration of 
Tyrach’s Pechenegs twenty years earlier, when an entire ethnos similarly forced 
its way onto the Empire’s territory.48 After easily defeating the Byzantine forces 
guarding the border and imprisoning their commanders, Basil Apokapes and 
Nikephoros Botaneiates the Uzes could freely plunder the western provinces 
of the Balkans, including Illyria and the areas around Thessaloniki. Some 
Uze forces reached as far as the thema of Hellas. The strength and numbers 
of the Uzes completely paralyzed the Byzantine administration. Emperor 
Constantine X Dukas did not believe it was possible to militarily defeat the 
Uzes, so he resorted to diplomacy. When this failed as well, he decided to flee 
the capital and escape the growing dissatisfaction of his subjects, taking refuge 
in Choirobakchoi, escorted by an entourage of 150 people.49
This seemingly hopeless situation had an unexpected positive ending for 
the Empire: just as suddenly as the Uzes had appeared in the Balkans, they now 
began to retreat. The reason for this withdrawal may have been illnesses that 
decimated the Uzes, like the Pechenegs years earlier. Michael Attaleiates, who 
described these events in the greatest detail, also mentions the nomads suf-
fered from famine, despite having plundered the Balkan provinces. It should 
be noted that most of the Uzes’ military activity was concentrated in the 
45  Mich.Att., 150/51.
46  It is possible that it was the Pechenegs, not the Uzes, who conquered and destroyed 
Pliska. Michael Attaleiates’ account suggests that Uzes fought mainly in the west Balkans 
(see below). The Byzantine author also states that in 1064 fighting with the Pechenegs 
occurred in close vicinity to their lands, matching the location of Pliska. For a traditional 
approach: Madgearu 2013, 89, 130.
47  Alexandru Madgearu dates the Uzes’ invasion to 1065, relying on the accounts of Matthew 
of Edessa. He does not explain, however, why he considers the frequently inaccurate 
chronology of this source as more important than Byzantine sources. Madgearu 2013, 69 
(note 55), 89, 130.
48  Mich.Att., 150/51–152/53; Scyl.Cont., 113–114; Io.Zon., 678; Trapp 1986, 129.
49  Mich.Att., 152/53–154/155.
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Empire’s western Balkan provinces. It is thus possible that the Uzes, used to life 
on the steppe, found this mostly mountainous terrain an unsuitable area for 
inhabitation.50 Those Uzes who did not make it as far as the north bank of the 
Danube were attacked by the Pechenegs and Bulgarians. The survivors of these 
attacks returned to Byzantine lands, where they were relocated to Macedonia 
with the expectation that the Empire would hire them as mercenaries in future 
military actions.51
The Pechenegs’ response to the Uze invasion generally served the interests 
of the Empire. They destroyed a significant number of the aggressor’s forces 
and were most likely one of the reasons why the Uzes decided to retreat across 
the Danube. Despite this fact, their actions should not be seen as a result of the 
influence of Byzantine diplomacy. The Pechenegs fought in their own inter-
est, annihilating their long-time enemies, whose presence in the Balkans must 
have seemed particularly dangerous for them.52 Also, having the Uzes within 
the sphere of interest of Byzantine diplomacy could not have been welcomed 
by the nomads, as there was a risk that Constantinople would use them against 
the Pechenegs.
50  A. Madgearu (2013, 130), referring to archeological finds, assumes that the Uzes were 
active only in the thema of Paradunavon. During their invasion, they were said to have 
destroyed Garvăn, Oltina (both situated on the Danube) and Pliska, which, if possible, 
seem to be the first part of the raid, concluded by the defeat of the Byzantine army 
and the capturing of its leaders. Later on, the nomads headed west, probably in search 
of booty.
51  Mich.Att., 154/5–156/7, 158/9; Scyl.Cont., 115; Io.Zon., 679; Trapp 1986, 130.
52  Madgearu (2013, 129) argues that “the finest Pechenegs” took part in the Uzes’ invasion. 
He based this hypothesis on Michael Glykas’ chronicles, mainly on the following passage: 
[…] κατὰ δέ γε τὴν δύσιν ἔθνος Οὐζικὸν (Σκύθαι δὲ οὗτοι) καὶ τῶν Πατζινακῶν οἱ εὐγενέστε-
ροι τὸν Ἴστρον διαπεραιώσαντες […]. Mich.Glyc., 605 (v. 24–26). Theoretically, Madgearu’s 
interpretation based on this passage is possible, although Glycas does not mention “the 
finest” Pechenegs but “nobler” ones. Therefore, the passage should be understood as: 
when the Byzantine Empire was struggling with the Turks on the east, “the Uzes” and 
“nobler Pechenegs crossed the Danube”. The more accurate interpretation of Glycas’ text 
identifies the comparative form “εὐγενέστεροι” to be describing the word Σκύθαι. In this 
case, the above-mentioned passage should be understood in a different way: in the west, 
the Uzes, some Scythians nobler than the Pechenegs, crossed the Ister. The information 
provided by Glycas should be compared with the earlier accounts of the continuator of 
John Skylitzes’ chronicle, who characterized the Uzes in the following way: τὸ τῶν Οὔζων 
ἔθνος (γένος δὲ οὗτοι Σκυθικὸν καὶ τῶν Πατζινάκων εὐγενέστερόν τε καὶ πολυπληθέστερον). 
Scyl.Cont., 114 (v. 1–3). In the case of the second interpretation, the author wanted to 
emphasize the supremacy of the Uzes. Although they were Scythians, like the Pechenegs, 
they were nobler and more numerous. Therefore, there is no evidence of cooperation 
between the Pechenegs and the Uzes during the invasion of the Empire in 1064.
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After the Uzes’ retreat, the Pechenegs no longer had any interest in remaining 
loyal to Byzantium. They attacked the Balkans again around 1066. According 
to the historical sources, their invasions were aimed solely at looting. It is 
hard to determine how far they reached into the Balkans. Romanos Diogenes, 
at that time a strategos stationed in Serdica, managed to stop them rela-
tively quickly, defeating a large force of Pechenegs troops. As proof of his 
victory, he sent captives and the severed heads of the nomads killed back 
to Constantinople. As a reward, he was bestowed the title of vestarches53 by 
Emperor Constantine X Dukas.
The successes of Diogenes who would soon be crowned Emperor (1068), 
presaged the changes soon to come in relations between the Empire and its 
restive subjects. During the reign of the new basileus, the Empire cooperated 
militarily with the Pechenegs a number of times. They most certainly fought 
together against the Seljuks, and in 1068, they joined Diogenes during his cam-
paign in Syria. They were also sent to requisition supplies in the vicinity of 
Aleppo and performed this task well, thoroughly plundering the enemy’s land. 
They are said to have brought to the Roman camp numerous captives of both 
sexes and herds of cattle.54 One year later, mercenaries described as ‘Scythians’ 
again appeared with Romanos Diogenes in the east. Michael Attaleiates men-
tions them in his accounts of battles fought at Kaisareia in Kappadokia, where 
they were part of the advance guard of the Empire’s army.55
‘Scythians’ also took part in the campaign of 1071, which ended with the 
battle of Manzikert. They were also responsible for foraging for supplies, such 
as when they were sent toward the fortress of Chliat.56 Their role before and 
during the battle of Manzikert is unknown. Michael Attaleiates mentions the 
desertion of one ‘Scythian’ unit led by Tamis, but this took place before the 
battle.57 This desertion induced the Byzantine Empire to ensure the remaining 
‘Scythians” loyalty by introducing a special oath. Michael Attaleiates himself 
was responsible for performing this ceremony and, according to his account, 
it was sufficiently effective to keep all the ‘Scythian’ mercenaries on the 
battlefield.58 The fact that Attaleiates took part in these events would seem to 
give his account credibility, but we also need to remember that he was judg-
ing his own actions. Matthew of Edessa, a 12th-century Armenian chronicler, 
53  Scyl.Cont., 121; Io.Zon., 684; Trapp 1986, 132–3. Cf. Madgearu 2013, 76.
54  Mich.Att., 188/9, 198/9; Scyl.Cont., 128.
55  Mich.Att., 230/231.
56  Mich.Att., 270/1, 272/3.
57  Mich.Att., 286/7.
58  Mich.Att., 288/9.
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reported that Pecheneg and Uze troops on the right flank of Romanos Diogenes’ 
army joined the sultan’s forces during the battle.59 Although the information 
provided by this Armenian author is frequently distorted or untrue, in this 
case, his accounts can be trusted, considering his close geographical proximity 
to the events described. The nomads’ betrayal was not as glaring as Matthew’s 
brief account suggests. It may have resulted from the course of the battle; 
despite some early successes, the tide began to turn against the Imperial army. 
The desertion of the ‘Scythian’ mercenaries probably took place during this 
reversal of fortunes, as the Empire began to lose the battle. It is hard to accu-
rately assess these actions, considering the dubious behaviour of some of the 
Byzantine commanders.60
In 1071, the Pechenegs took part in yet another military campaign on the 
Empire’s north-west border. According to Hungarian chronicles, the Pechenegs 
moved onto the lands of the Arpad dynasty, where the forces of Belgrade made 
no effort at resistance. After crossing the Sava River, the Pechenegs devas-
tated parts of the Kingdom of Hungary and then retreated with considerable 
booty and numerous captives.61 It is difficult to assess the role of the duke of 
Belgrade in provoking this invasion, but, Solomon, the King of Hungary, inter-
preted his actions as an act of aggression and organized a punitive expedition. 
The Byzantine fleet failed to stop the Hungarians on the Sava River, allow-
ing Solomon and his army to reach Belgrade. The garrison defending the city 
called on the Pechenegs for assistance, but their forces were annihilated by 
the Hungarians. The few survivors fled the battlefield, including the Pecheneg 
leader Kazar. The Pechenegs’ defeat sealed the fate of Belgrade’s defenders, 
who surrendered after a three-month siege.62
The Byzantine provocation, if the Belgrade garrison had indeed played a 
role in it, grew into a serious border incident, adding to the state of chaos that 
had gripped the Empire since 1071. The Arpads took advantage of the Empire’s 
growing troubles by attacking and conquering Niš.63 The tense situation in 
59  Dostourian (1993), 135. The Armenian chronicler’s information on the presence of the 
Pechenegs and the Uzes during the battle of Manzikert was confirmed by Ibn al-Athir: 
Richards 2002, 170. Cf. Bonarek 2011, 173.
60  On the second day of the battle, before its conclusion, Andronikos Dukas heard and began 
to spread rumours of Romanos Diogenes’ death. Mich.Att., 292/293; Scyl.Cont., 148–149; 
Io.Zon., 701; Trapp 1986, 143. Cf. Angold 2008, 608; Korobeinikov 2008, 703; Bonarek 2011, 
171 (note 854).
61  Chr.Hung., 369–370.
62  Chr.Hung., 370–374.
63  Chr.Hung., 377–378; Nic.Bryenn., III 1 (p. 208/9–210/1). For more about Byzantine-Hungarian 
relations between 1071 and 1075: Moravcsik 1970, 64–65; Shepard 1999, 71–79; Stephenson 
2000, 141; Bonarek 2011, 104–105; Madgearu 2013, 96–98 (Madgearu assumes that as a 
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the Balkans was further complicated by an uprising among the Slavs, led by 
Constantine Bodin, the son of Michael of Dioclea,64 though this rebellion 
was quickly crushed. The overthrow of Romanos Diogenes and crowning of 
Michael VII Dukas as emperor did not solve the country’s problems. To the 
contrary, it provided the sultan with a pretext to continue his expansion in 
Asia Minor.65 The weakness of Byzantium also had an influence on its rela-
tions with the Pechenegs, whose became more brash in their actions. Shows 
of force, like the one carried out by Isaac Komnenos, and the later victories of 
the Byzantine emperors helped to keep the nomads in line and discouraged 
them from invading and plundering the Balkan provinces. An additional and 
probably equally important means of eliminating resistance were regular or 
occasional subsidies paid by the Byzantine administration as a kind of tribute 
to buy peace. A failure to make these payments carried the risk of sparking 
a rebellion.
The level of Pechenegs’ loyalty between 1053 and 1071 was therefore rela-
tively low. Their cooperation with the Byzantine army, mentioned in various 
historical sources, resulted from converging interests rather than loyalty to the 
Empire. The Pechenegs agreed to join the Empire in its military campaigns as 
long as they could benefit from them. However, another source of booty was 
their alliances with Constantinople’s enemies and invasions of neighboring 
Byzantine provinces. Nothing suggests they had any ethical qualms that would 
have limited such actions.
Remaining within the borders of the Byzantine Empire should have led 
to the gradual acculturation of the Pechenegs. Such a process undoubtedly 
occurred. Although almost entirely independent, the former steppe-dwellers 
had to adjust to their new environment. These changes are especially visible 
in their funeral ceremonies. The ritual of burying warriors with their horses 
in prehistoric kurgans, typical of the Pechenegs from the Black Sea-Caspian 
steppe, disappeared in the Balkans. The influence of this ritual can still be seen 
in some graves, which contain elements of horse tack or even horse bones.66 
result of the events of the early 1070s the Empire maintained authority over Belgrade but 
lost Sirmium to the Arpads).
64  Eventually, he took the name of Peter, after the 10th-century Bulgarian ruler and Peter 
Delian, the leader of the Slav rebellion of the 1040s. Cf. Stephenson 2000, 141–143; 
Madgearu 2013, 96.
65  Ostrogorski 1967, 283; Treadgold 1997, 604–607; Korobeinikov 2008, 702ff.; Bonarek 2011, 
190–195.
66  Fiedler 2013, 260–267. After studying the available materials from the graves, the 
researcher notes that there are only six sites south of the Danube with inventories charac-
teristic of steppe-dwellers, probably the Pechenegs.
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However, too few archeological finds of this sort have been made to allow for 
a more exact dating of such items or determination of their ethnic origin. 
Perhaps further research and the excavation of additional archeological mate-
rial will help explain the nature of this sudden cultural change. The circum-
stances may have been prosaic, such as the decidedly poorer environmental 
conditions in the Balkans for the development of extensive herding, which in 
turn decreased the size of the nomads’ herds of horses. Thus, as more valuable 
animals, horses were less frequently sacrificed during funeral ceremonies.67
A burial site discovered in Odărci (north-east Bulgaria) comprising 
536 graves68 ostensibly provides evidence of rapid cultural change in the 
Pechenegs’ social practices. Liudmila Doncheva-Petkova has dated this site 
to 1053. As evidenced from the crosses and encolpions found in these graves, 
the decline of steppe funeral ceremonies may also have been associated with 
Christianization. However, the assignment of this burial site to the Pechenegs 
has been called into doubt, particularly by Florin Curta.69 One of the main 
arguments supporting the hypothesis of its Pecheneg origins is the presence 
of elements of horse tack typical of steppe burial sites. However, in the Odărci 
burial site, the same elements were used for a different purpose: as clothing 
adornments. This raises the question of whether these ornaments were a 
means for the Pechenegs to demonstrate their identity in their new environ-
ment, as Doncheva-Petkova argues, or an adaptation of steppe traditions by a 
local, non-nomadic community, as suggested by Curta.
In an effort to combine both interpretations, one can argue that during 
the latter half of the 11th century, new communities came into being in the 
Balkans. They may have been comprised of a combination of nomadic, not 
necessarily Pecheneg, peoples and indigenous inhabitants. In his description 
of the revolt of the vestarches Nestor, Michael Attaleiates mentions the inhab-
itants of cities on the Lower Danube, calling them mixobarbaroi.70 It can be 
concluded from his account that their ‘semi-barbarity’ derived from linguistic 
diversity accompanied by – as I see it – cultural diversity. Most of these inhab-
itants were Christians, though loosely tied culturally to the Byzantine Empire. 
This Tower of Babel was also significantly influenced by nomadic communi-
ties. Attaleiates himself mentions that ‘Scythians’ imposed their traditions on, 
or simply them brought to, the Danube cities. This process is visible also in 
archeological finds which confirm that these cities were inhabited by people 
67  Cf. general remarks: Lindner 1981, 3–19.
68  Doncheva-Petkova 2005; 2007, 643–660.
69  Curta 2013, 170–178, 180–181. See also: Fiedler 2013, 270–271.
70  Mich.Att. 372/3–374/5. Cf. Bonarek 2007, 193–200.
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with nomadic roots.71 On the other hand, the process may also have been 
reversed, meaning that nomads who had chosen to create settled communi-
ties may have adopted elements of the mixobarbaroi’s culture.
Attaleiates clearly differentiates between ‘semi-barbarians’ and Pechenegs. 
The majority of the latter, residing in the Byzantine thema of Paristrion, prob-
ably had fewer contacts with the inhabitants of the cities of the lower Danube 
or cities along the Black Sea coast. Thus limited contact with foreign cultural 
patterns imposed upon their cultural universe to a much more limited degree.
The progressive Christianization of the Pechenegs is another matter worth 
considering. The available data, including that from both written and archeo-
logical sources, is too scarce to allow for a detailed examination. The finds from 
the Odărci burial site indicate that Christian funeral ceremonies were wide-
spread. However, it has not been confirmed whether this site should be associ-
ated with the Pechenegs. Written sources provide almost no information about 
missions aimed at Christianizing these nomads. Outside of formulaic rhetori-
cal praises,72 whose grounding in reality is uncertain, there are no clear indica-
tors related to this topic. This is quite surprising, as it was the Christianization 
of the Pechenegs that made possible their ‘Byzantinization’.
This cultural change, which most likely occurred around 1053, modestly 
strengthened the nomads’ political loyalty to the Byzantine Empire. The 
events that accompanied this phenomenon presaged closer relations between 
the Pechenegs and some of the local communities described as mixobarbaroi, 
and perhaps even their integration.
7.1.3 The Pechenegs and the Empire During the Crisis of the 1070s
The year 1071, a dismal one for the Byzantine Empire, began a decade of 
crisis during which the Empire practically lost control over it lands north 
of the Balkans.73 Although there were still several enclaves controlled by 
Constantinople in the thema of Paristrion, especially in the north part of 
Dobrudja,74 the major part of the province had become independent of the 
71  Cf. note 1583.
72  An.Kom., VI 13.4 (p. 199); Sewter 2009, 182; La vie, 230. Both Anna Komnena and the 
author of The Life of St. Cyril praise emperor Alexios Komnenos. Cf. Stephenson 1999, 
56–57; Ivanov 2003, 224–247; 2008, 328–329. Ivanov suggests that the author’s praises of 
the life of St. Cyril may be associated with the period after 1091, when the Pechenegs were 
subordinate to the Empire.
73  For general information on the events of the 1070s: Vasil’evskii 1908, 33–44; Zlatarski 1934, 
154–166; Diaconu 1970, 100–111; Malamut 1995, 129–134; Stephenson 2000, 98–100; Spinei 
2003, 137–140; Curta 2006, 299–300; Madgearu 2013, 131–132.
74  It is generally considered that north Dobrudja, especially the region of Isaccea, was loyal 
to the Empire. Confirmation of this loyalty is the functioning of a local mint. Madgearu 
1999, 428; 2013, 82–83 (note 129); Curta 2006, 299.
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Empire.75 The reason for this was not only the Empire’s military weakness, but 
also changes in Byzantine policy towards Paristrion’s inhabitants, forced upon 
the Empire by a budgetary crisis. The eunuch Nikephoros, also nicknamed 
Nikephoritzes, the de facto ruler of the Empire at that time, ceased paying out 
subsidies to the Danube cities. As a result, some of them rebelled and allied 
themselves with the Pechenegs.76 Advisors to Emperor Michael VII sent Nestor, 
the katepano of the thema of Paradunavon, to the areas where the rebellion 
had broken out. He was considered to be loyal to the emperor because he had 
also served his father, Constantine X. Before heading north, he was awarded 
the title of vestarches.77
Nestor’s mission, which began in 1074, was diplomatic in character, rather 
than military. He traveled to the Danube cities along with several citizens 
of Dristra, whose role was to help him regain the loyalty of the city and the 
entire region. Once they arrived, Nestor quickly learned his task would not 
be easy. The city’s inhabitants did not want to reinstate Constantinople’s rule 
over them, and had instead entrusted authority over the Dristra fortress to a 
chief by the name of Tatus.78 His background is unclear; John Zonaras is the 
only Byzantine author who acknowledges him as a Pecheneg.79 Earlier sources 
provide no information about Tatus’ ethnic origin, which suggests that the 
12th-century chronicler determined it on the basis of his own speculations. 
The relation between the fortress’s commander and the nomads, although 
well-established, does not constitute conclusive evidence of his Pecheneg ori-
gin. Tatus may have been a nomad or a descendant of nomads who decided to 
75  Stephenson 1999, 58–60; 2000, 98–100.
76  Mich.Att., 372/3–374/5.
77  Mich.Att., 374/5; Scyl.Cont., 166; Io.Zon., 713, Trapp 1986, 150. To learn more about Nestor’s 
background and social status see Diaconu 1970, 103–104; Angold 1997, 121; Madgearu 
2003, 50–51; 2013, 80–81. Written sources call him a servant (δοῦλος) of Emperor Michael 
VII Dukas’ father and a close housemate, practically a relative (οἰκειοτάτος), of the 
emperor. Sigillography confirms this data. Nestor was a servant of the Dukas dynasty. 
His background is unknown. Attaleiates argues that he was an Illyrian. This archaic 
ethnonym is sometimes related with Serbs or Vlachs. Madgearu presumes that Nestor 
may have been a local ruler in Duklja or Macedonia and transferred his authority to 
Constantine X. Bulgarian researchers consistently recognize Nestor as a Bulgarian. Cf. 
Zlatarski 1934, 156; Tăpkova-Zaimova 1993, 99; Bozhilov, Giuzelev 1999, 405–406.
78  Mich.Att., 374/5; Scyl.Cont., 166; Io.Zon., 713, Trapp 1986, 150.
79  Io.Zon., 713: ἀρχηγός Πατζινάκων, ὅς ἐκαλεῖτο Τατούς. The reconstructed pronunciation of 
his name was *Tatu (Moravcsik 1983a, 302). Most researchers consider Zonaras’ accounts 
reliable: Vasil’evskii 1908, 34–35; Spinei 2003, 137; Curta 2006, 299; Dudek 2007a, 108; 
Madgearu 2013a, 216; 2013, 80, 82. The last author wrongly indicates Attaleiates as the 
author of the statement that Tatus was a Pecheneg. The fact that well-informed Attaleiates 
did not comment on the leader’s background is telling.
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settle in the city. Michael Attaleiates’ account on the ‘Scythians’ in the Danube 
cities supports this hypothesis, but at the same time, also excludes the possibil-
ity of Tatus being a Pecheneg leader.
Nestor, realizing that winning the loyalty of Dristra’s citizens would be 
impossible, joined the rebels. His decision may have been based on the fact 
that logothete Nikephoros had confiscated his estate and property due to his 
alleged improper administration of Empire funds.80
In 1075, the rebels, now allied with the Pechenegs, invaded Macedonia. Their 
actions were so merciless that Byzantine troops quartered near Adrianople 
did not dare oppose them. Nestor and his allies passed through Thrace 
and destroyed the Byzantine camp in Byzas. After reaching the outskirts of 
Constantinople, the rebels demanded that the Empire surrender logothete 
Nikephoros as the cause of all their misfortunes. They promised to leave the 
capital promptly afterward. The emperor refused to pay heed to such demands, 
which, in view of the lack of adequate defensive preparations, could have 
resulted in the city’s defeat. However, Nestor unexpectedly decided to leave 
Constantinople and retreat to the north. His decision was caused by his suspi-
cions that a group of Pechenegs sent to the capital as emissaries were plotting 
to kill the rebel leader.81
Nestor’s motivations are clear: he wanted to reclaim the property and posi-
tion logothete Nikephoros had stripped from him. Eliminating the influential 
eunuch would not only allow him to regain both his property and dignity, it 
would also change the Empire’s unpopular policy towards Paristrion. This 
would most likely been another of the former vestarche’s goals, especially if 
he had the support of the Danube cities’ citizenry. Nestor was not proclaimed 
emperor, but he seems never to have had any such ambitions. It is however 
possible that he hoped his close relations with the Dukas dynasty would allow 
him to easily regain the emperor’s trust and persuade him into making deci-
sions favourable to him. He may have also wanted to avoid a conflict with the 
emperor and shift the rebels’ focus to the hated eunuch.
The Pechenegs played a significant role here. Nestor planned to use them to 
implement his political plans. This type of behaviour would soon become the 
modus operandi of a number of Byzantine politicians involved in the Balkans. 
According to Hungarian sources, the precedence for this goes back to 1071 and 
duke Niketas, the leader of Belgrade’s garrison. The Pechenegs would become 
something like mercenaries whose payment would be the right to plunder 
the cities being attacked. Their loyalty to Byzantine allies was anything but 
80  Mich.Att., 374/5–376/7; Scyl.Cont., 166; Io.Zon. 713; Trapp 1986, 150.
81  Mich.Att., 378/9–382/3; Scyl.Cont., 166; Io.Zon., 713–714, Trapp 1986, 150.
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strong. Nestor witnessed this first-hand when he was forced to retreat from 
Constantinople without achieving his goals.
The Pechenegs took advantage of the weakness of the Byzantine Empire by 
organizing plundering expeditions in Thrace and Macedonia. The decade of 
the 1070s was a golden age for the nomads, who were free to loot both of these 
Byzantine provinces. The Empire’s military leaders rarely tried to repel their 
attacks. John Bryennios, brother of Nikephoros, the duke of Dyrrachion and 
pretender to the throne,82 routed groups of ‘Scythians’, most likely Pechenegs, 
a number of times. His final victory was in 1077 after his older brother had been 
proclaimed emperor.83 This success resulted in the Pechenegs becoming one 
of the usurper’s allies.
It is difficult to determine the extent of Nikephoros’ control over the 
Pechenegs. According to Michael Attaleiates, who expressed a clear dislike of 
Bryennios, a pretender to the throne, was almost their hostage. The nomads 
were said to have laid siege to Adrianople, the ancestral seat of the Bryennios 
clan, and threatened to attack the Macedonian emperor and his supporters. 
During the siege, the Pechenegs also methodically looted neighbouring areas, 
stealing herds of cattle.84 These events probably took place after the duke of 
Dyrrachion was proclaimed emperor, i.e., around the turn of 1077 and 1078. 
Nikephoros chose not to confront the enemy militarily, but instead took shel-
ter in Adrianople and paid a handsome sum to convince the Pechenegs to 
end their siege: no less than 20 talents of gold and significant quantities of 
expensive fabric and silver dishware.85 A number of significant factors seem 
to explain the restrained, if not defeatist, stance taken by the imperial pre-
tender. Nikephoros could not undertake any major military action against 
the Pechenegs so soon before he began his fight for the crown. This would 
have caused him to lose an uneasy ally and risk their attacking Thrace and 
Macedonia, which were among his bases of political support.
Although Bryennios’ show of restraint saved his alliance with the nomads, 
the citizens of Adrianople were not provided with a long-lasting peace. In the 
summer of 1078, following the defeat of Bryennios and his allies, the Pechenegs 
laid siege to the city once again, this time assisted by the Cumans. They are 
said to have set fire to the houses outside the city walls, causing the deaths of 
numerous people. According to Michael Attaleiates, the reason for this attack 
was the murder by the citizens of Adrianople of the nomads’ emissaries to 
82  Nic.Bryenn., III 4 (p. 212/3).
83  Nic.Bryenn., III 14 (p. 236/7).
84  Mich.Att., 476/7.
85  Mich.Att., 476/7–478/9; Io.Zon., 717; Trapp 1986, 153. Cf. Dudek 2009, 69–70.
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Bryennios.86 The circumstances surrounding these events remain unclear, but 
the alleged perpetrators clearly had just cause to feel hate towards the nomads, 
who after settling in the Balkans carried out numerous acts of aggression 
against the people living in the region. An interesting fact is that the Pechenegs 
did not take their revenge immediately. Instead they waited until the fall of 
Nikephoros Bryennios, perhaps because their urge for revenge was curbed by 
their alliance with the usurper.
In fact, the Pechenegs had been among those who supported him against 
Nikephoros Botaneiates during the battle of Galabrye87 (May 1078). The 
nomads showed little loyalty, however. All known accounts from the battle 
confirm their betrayal. The Pechenegs were ordered to make an attack from 
the rear on the men of Khoma, led by Constantine Katakalon. The nomads 
attacked the enemy, causing havoc and forcing Katakalon to retreat. However, 
instead of pursuing the scattered soldiers, they attacked the rearguard of 
Bryennios’ army. After looting their allies’ supply wagons and stealing their 
horses, they retreated to their own camp.88
The Pechenegs shared a role in Bryennios’ ultimate defeat, but this did not 
end the unrest in the Balkans. The new emperor, Nikephoros III Botaneiates 
was forced to suppress a rebellion led by Basilakes, the new duke of Dyrrachion. 
Like his predecessor Nikephoros Bryennios, Basilakes also tried to use the 
Pechenegs for his own purposes, but he too ended up achieving very little. 
At the same time the duke was under siege in Thessaloniki by the domestikos 
Alexios I Komnenos, the nomads, supported by the Cumans, were attack-
ing Adrianople. As mentioned above, they set the city’s outskirts ablaze, but 
retreated upon learning that Byzantine forces were approaching.89
Near the end of the 1070s, the Pechenegs entered into an alliance against 
Nikephoros III Botaneiates with Lekas, a Byzantine renegade linked to the 
nomads by marriage. Lekas ultimately submitted to the emperor’s authority,90 
but this did not mean the nomads followed suit. Nikephoros Bryennios, the 
son or grandson of the unlucky pretender to the emperor’s throne, mentions 
86  Mich.Att., 348/9; Scyl.Cont., 184. Scylitzes Continuatus attributes the Pechenegs’ death to 
Nikephoros Bryennios.
87  A town located in Thrace, 12 km north-west of Selymbria. Written sources and mod-
ern historical literature provide numerous variations of its name: Kalabrye, Galabrye, 
Kalobrye, Kalabria, Kalaure, Calavrytae, Kalavritai. Cf. Külzer 2008, 421–422; Dudek 
2009, 70.
88  On the battle and the Pechenegs’ involvement: Mich.Att., 528/9; Nic.Bryenn., IV 6–7, 9–13 
(pp. 269–279); An.Komn., I 5–6 (pp. 20–27); Sewter 2009, 17–23. For a detailed analysis of 
the course of the battle: Tobias 1979, 193–211.
89  Mich.Att., 348/9; Scyl.Cont., 184 (v. 1–5); Io.Zon., 723; Trapp 1986, 156.
90  Mich.Att., 550/1; Scyl.Cont., 184 (v. 13–21).
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in his Material for History some ‘Scythians’ who devastated the lands between 
Niš and Scupi around 1079.91 Alexios Komnenos marched against them, but 
the nomads, upon receiving word of his forces’ approach, retreated beyond the 
Balkan Mountains. In 1080, a campaign led by Leo Diabatenos momentarily 
pacified the Pechenegs and the Cumans, with both groups agreeing to enter 
into an alliance with the Empire.92
In terms of the relations between the Empire and its ‘Scythian’ subjects, the 
1070s seems to have reflected a continuation of the status quo, rather than a 
turning point. The weakness of the Empire and the chaos it was struggling with 
provided the Pechenegs with additional freedom, and as a result, an increase 
in their attacks. Both Byzantine pretenders to the throne and renegades like 
Nestor and Lekas entered into alliances with the nomads, which to some 
extent legitimized their actions. However, the Pechenegs’ loyalty to the Empire 
now was no weaker, nor stronger than during the two previous decades. It is 
difficult to assign any specific political aim to their actions. Their behavior was 
largely defined by external circumstances. Changes in these circumstances, 
like the consolidation of Nikephoros III Botaneiates’ power and the stabiliza-
tion of the political situation in the Balkans, encouraged the Pechenegs to keep 
the peace and enter into alliances with Constantinople.
As the influence of the Byzantine Empire declined, the Danube cities grew 
increasingly independent, resulting in important changes. The loss of support 
from Constantinople, meant that local leaders, backed by the surrounding 
population, assumed greater autonomy and authority. These leaders natu-
rally sought to develop friendly relations with both the Pechenegs settled in 
Paristrion and the barbarian groups living north and north-east of the Lower 
Danube. The arrival of the Cumans in the Balkans, first noted in the summer 
of 1078, was therefore not accidental. Their participation in joint raids with 
the Pechenegs would not have been possible if not for the neutrality (or even 
cooperation) of the Danube cities’ archons, who acted as intermediaries 
in contacts between these two nomad ethnic groups in the 1080s.93 We can 
assume that before this time they refrained from interfering in the affairs of 
the barbarian groups living on either sides of the Danube and made no efforts 
to impede their migration across the river. The independence of the Danube 
cities and their relations with the nomads led to the Empire losing control 
over Paristrion, which posed a danger to the rich Byzantine provinces south of 
the Balkans on the foreground of Constantinople. With the Danube no longer 
91  Nic.Bryenn., IV 30 (p. 299).
92  Scyl.Cont., 185 (v. 21–23); Mich.Att., 550/1–552/3. Cf. Arutiunova 1972, 115.
93  Cf. the following part of the present chapter.
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serving as a barrier, the Pechenegs and other nomads from the north could 
easily use the Paristrion as a starting point to invade the Byzantine territories 
south of the Balkans.
7.1.4 The Final Years (1081–1091)
It was only a matter of time before the Byzantine political elite came to under-
stand this fact. This moment most likely came when the former commander of 
the field army in the West, Alexios I Komnenos, ascended to power as emper-
or.94 Having worked at the side of Emperor Nikephoros III Botaneiates, the 
new basileus was well acquainted with the Pechenegs and their nature. He 
had fought with them several times in the late 1070s and understood that for 
the then badly truncated empire, the Pechenegs had become a serious threat. 
Following the loss of the entire Anatolian interior to the Seljuks, the Balkan 
provinces95 became the backbone of Byzantium. Anyone who violated the 
region’s security would be essentially threatening the Empire’s very existence.
Meanwhile, early in the reign of Alexios I, the Balkans had become the aim 
of expansion not only for the Pechenegs but for the Normans, as well. The lat-
ter were much more dangerous because there were not satisfied merely with 
pillaging, but also sought to bring Byzantium’s territories under its rule perma-
nently. Robert Guiscard, the Normans’ leader, who in the ill-fated year of 1071 
had conquered Bari and pushed the Empire out of southern Italy,96 made an 
initially successful attempt in 1082 to take over Byzantine Illyria by invading 
Dyrrachium.97 If this annexation had continued it would have been disastrous 
for the Empire because the Normans would have captured a key bridge-
head at the beginning of the Roman Via Egnatia, the road leading towards 
Constantinople. The spread of their expansion along this important transport 
route would mean the end of Byzantium’s rule over the Balkans, and probably 
the end of the Empire itself, as well. Alexios I therefore immediately took deci-
sive action to counteract this threat.
As fierce battles were being fought over Dyrrachium, the Pechenegs chose 
to break the peace agreement they had concluded in 1080. Some time around 
94  For a general description of the events of 1081–1091: Vasil’evskii 1908, 45–107; Zlatarski 
1934, 182–208; Diaconu 1970, 112–120, 130–133; 1978, 35–40; Malamut 1995, 134–142; 
Stephenson 2000, 101–103; Spinei 2003, 140–145; Curta 2006, 300–302; Meško 2012, 121–
223; 2013, 197–205.
95  Ostrogorski 1967, 290; Angold 1997, 129–130; Treadgold 1997, 614–615, 673–675; Lilie 2003, 
331–335.
96  Cheynet 2006a, 47; Bonarek 2011, 68–69.
97  An.Komn., I 16 (pp. 50–54), IV 1–8 (pp. 120–140); V 1 (pp. 141–143); Sewter 2009, 45–49, 
108–130. Cf. Angold 1997, 130–131; Dudek 1999, 48–54; Cheynet 2006a, 47.
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the end of 1083, they crossed the Balkans to attack the Byzantine provinces.98 
Pakourianos, the domestikos of the army of the West, managed to defeat 
them. However, his victory, mentioned in the typikon (rules) for the monas-
tery he founded in Bačkovo,99 was not complete, as Pakourianos also men-
tions being held captive by the Cumans and being ransomed by the autocrator 
Alexios I. This unintended hint seems to prove that the victory of the domes-
tikos over the Pechenegs was accompanied by a defeat suffered at the hands of 
the Cumans, though perhaps at a somewhat later time. This would mean that 
at the end of 1083 another joint invasion by both of these peoples may have 
taken place.
Pakourianos’ success did not make a lasting impression on the Pechenegs, 
as we hear about plundering raids being carried out by them in the Balkans 
the very next year. This time, the Pechenegs allied themselves with a group of 
Paulicians who had rebelled against Alexios I. These heretics had lived in the 
vicinity of Philippopolis since the tenth century. Due to their great value in 
combat, they had been brought to this area to settle by John Tzimiskes, who gave 
them the task of defending Thrace against attacks by the Bulgarians. Seeking 
to expand his forces, Alexios I recruited 3,000 Paulicians, who had been part 
of the Byzantine army beaten by the Normans at Dyrrachium in October 1081. 
Later, however, the heretics failed to carry through on their promise to provide 
military assistance, thus earning the distrust of Alexios. The emperor decided 
to take preventive measures to safeguard the Empire against the Paulicians’ 
rebellion. His decision stemmed from the location of the Paulicians seats, cen-
tred around Philippopolis, from which they could easily cut off the lines of 
communication linking the Balkan provinces with the capital.100 This posed 
a great danger to the whole of Byzantium. Alexios mustered the Paulicians 
under the guise of ordering a military inspection, then took them prisoner and 
ordered the community to be dispersed. The leaders were expelled from the 
Empire and the assets of the heretics were confiscated.101 This did not end the 
matter, however, because Traulos, a Paulician convert who had remained in 
98  On the subject of dating these events: Arutiunova 1972, 118; Doimi de Frankopan 1996, 
278–281; Stephenson 2000, 101.
99  Georg.Pak., 42/43; Jordan 2000, 526.
100 An.Komn., V 3.2 (pp. 146–147); Sewter 2009, 133. Cf. Obolensky 1948, 190; Stephenson 
2000, 101.
101 An.Komn., VI 2 (pp. 170–171); Sewter 2009, 155–156. Cf. Obolensky 1948, 191; Angold 1997, 
132. Some of the Paulicians remained, however, in the imperial service. They fought 
against the Pechenegs in the battle of Dristra. According to John Zonaras (Io.Zon. XVIII 23, 
p. 741) the Paulicians’ tagma was to be disbanded only after the battle of Lebounion Hill 
(see below).
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the emperor’s service since rising to the office of domestikos under Nikephoros 
Botaneiates, betrayed the emperor after learning about the fate of his former 
coreligionists. He then fled to Beliatova, a fortress north of Philippopolis.102
Traulos realized he could not accomplish much with the limited military 
resources at his disposal. He therefore formed an alliance with the Pechenegs 
and several independent chieftains who controlled fortresses on the Danube. 
The most powerful of these was the previously mentioned Tatus-Tatos, who 
ruled the city of Dristra.103 This alliance, in particular, posed a particularly seri-
ous threat to the interests of Constantinople. As a result, in the coming years 
successive waves of nomads would be able to cross the Danube unimpeded, 
intensifying the chaos in the Balkans.
The first of these groups appeared in the region around 1085. Anna Komnena, 
the only source to describe these events, mentions that ‘some Scythian tribe’104 
appeared on the Danube around that the time. The tribe had been forced to 
leave its former homelands under pressure from ‘Sauromatians’. After reaching 
an agreement with the commanders of the border fortifications, they crossed 
the river and entered the territory of Paristrion. These newcomers first seized 
and pillaged several fortified towns. However, they then turned to more peace-
ful activities, and began cultivating the land, sowing millet and wheat.
The account of this migration provided by Anna Komnena is rather unclear, 
allowing for a number of plausible, but mutually exclusive interpretations. It 
is usually assumed that this event took place in 1086. However, if we take into 
account that the newcomers were said to have cultivated the land during breaks 
between plundering expeditions, and considering that earlier in the same year 
they defeated a military force dispatched by the empire, and were defeated by 
another, it seems more likely that their migration might have actually occurred 
in 1085. A more important issue, however, is the identity of the immigrants. 
They are most often identified as Pechenegs. This in turn has sometimes led to 
the conclusion, one generally lacking strong support in source materials, that a 
major group of steppe-dwellers lived north of the Danube long after the migra-
tion of Tyrach.105 Indeed, in Anna Komnena’s narrative, the invasion of this 
102 An.Komn.,VI 4.2–3 (p. 174); Sewter 2009, 158–159. Cf. Soustal 1991, 197.
103 An.Komn., VI 4.4 (p. 174); Sewter 2009, 159. Cf. Obolensky 1948, 191–192.
104 γένος τί σκυθικὸν. An.Komn. VI 14.1 (p. 199); Sewter 2009, 182.
105 Meško 2012, 146; 2013, 182–187, 191–196. The researcher, following mainly the findings of 
Hungarian historians (most of all Ferenc Makk) brings the thesis about the presence of 
the Pechenegs north of the Danube to its extremes. Among other things, he admits that 
Kutesk, known to Hungarian sources, and Tzelgu, mentioned by Anna Komnena, were 
the leaders of two major Pecheneg groups, the first of which was said to be in Wallachia, 
and the second in Moldova. Apart from questionable interpretations of written sources, 
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‘Scythian tribe’ is depicted as a turning point, and more precisely as the begin-
ning of a series of events that led to an exhausting war between Byzantium and 
the Pechenegs, a war that would ultimately bring about the destruction of the 
latter. It is natural to identify these ‘Scythian’ newcomers with some Pecheneg 
fraction. Such reasoning seems all the more justified given that Komnena 
repeatedly substitutes their proper ethnonym with some archaic equivalent. 
On the other hand, it is hard not to notice that ‘Scythians’ is a very broad 
nomen collectivum that could refer to a variety of northern nomadic peoples. It 
can thus be used in cases when an author is unable to precisely determine or 
has difficulties defining the ethnic identity of the people under discussion. The 
learned princess seems to have found herself in such a situation in her account 
of the aforementioned migration. Possible evidence for this fact is her use of 
the indefinite pronoun ‘some’. In 1085 or 1086, the Danube may have been 
crossed by a nomadic ethnos other than the Pechenegs, or a union composed 
of various ethnic fractions, including Pechenegs, that had once lived on the 
Black Sea steppe. In addition, there is no reason to assume this wave of migra-
tion was particularly large. It must have been considerable, since it was noted 
by Byzantine sources, but it was certainly not on the scale of the previous great 
migrations of the Pechenegs and Uzes. Byzantium reacted only when the new-
comers, supported by Traulos and his Pecheneg allies, began to threaten the 
provinces south of the Balkans.
Alexios I sent an army led by domestikos of the West Gregorios Pakourianos 
against the aggressors. However, driven by excessive bravado, Pakourianos 
attacked an enemy force much larger than his own, resulting in the defeat of 
his army at Beliatova and his being killed in battle.106 A second army com-
manded by Tatikios managed to defeat the nomads by the Euros River (today 
the Maritsa) and regain the booty they had plundered. The Byzantine com-
mander retreated with these acquired goods to Philippopolis. He soon left 
the city, as news reached him of the approach of another Pecheneg force. This 
time no battle ensued. After two days passed with neither party attacking the 
opposing forces, the nomads withdrew through Sidera Pass.107 The difficult 
year 1086 thus ended with limited success for the Byzantines. Although they 
it is worth noting that Meško completely ignores archaeological materials that confirm 
the presence of nomads in Moldova, but at the same time shows that they barely left 
any traces in Wallachia. Diaconu 1970, 13, 39–49; Spinei 1986, 85–86; Ioniţă 2004, 469; 
2005, 110–115; 2013, 115–150. For more moderate positions regarding the presence of the 
Pechenegs north of the Danube after 1050: Spinei 2003, 117–120; Curta 2006, 306. See also 
the part of the present chapter devoted to relations between the Pechenegs and Hungary.
106 An.Komn., VI 14.3 (p. 200); Sewter 2009, 183.
107 An.Komn., VI 14. 4–7 (pp. 200–202); Sewter 2009, 183–185.
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managed to stop the Pechenegs from raiding of the themata located to the 
south of the Balkans unchecked. However, Tatikios’s victories did not lead to a 
long-lasting peace.
In the spring of 1087, the Danube was crossed by yet another group of 
nomads which, like the previous one, was composed of people of mixed eth-
nicity. Among the steppe-dwellers, there were probably Cumans, Pechenegs 
and Hungarians, all led by the latter group’s dethroned king Solomon. The 
commander of this ‘Scythian army’, as Anna Komnena refers to them, was 
Tzelgu, whose ethnicity remains a mystery to this day. He was most likely a 
Cuman or a Pecheneg. Tzelgu and his army crossed the Balkans and invaded 
Thrace, where they conquered and plundered the city of Kharioupolis (today 
Hayrabolu). At Koule (a village located between Ainos and Constantinople), 
these ‘Scythians’ were intercepted and defeated by Byzantine troops under the 
command of Marianos Maurokatalon and Bempetziotes. Tzelgu was killed in 
battle and his nomad army withdrew to the Danube.108
The above-mentioned events during the years 1083–1087 followed a very 
similar pattern, according to which the Pechenegs repeatedly invaded the 
Empire’s Balkan provinces, most often allied with other nomadic tribes (usu-
ally the Cumans) or supported by groups from within the empire that were 
at odds with Constantinople (such as the Paulicians). The position taken by 
the archons of the fortresses at crossing points on the Danube was also sur-
prising, as they either responded passively to the steppe inhabitants entering 
the Paristrion area or actively cooperated with them. Yet these were not immi-
grants, but groups of aggressors for whom the Byzantine thema represented a 
transit zone leading towards the main objective of their armed expeditions – 
the affluent regions south of the Balkans. Experience gained from this situa-
tion led the Byzantines to the conclusion that the more important provinces 
would not be safe until the Empire had regained control of Paristrion, and this 
would only happen after the Danube fortresses had been brought back under 
the control of Constantinople and the Pechenegs destroyed.109
In practice, this conclusion meant that Byzantium would have to undertake 
offensive actions in areas north of the Balkan Mountains. A military expedi-
tion of this sort had not been carried out by the imperial army since the time 
of Isaac I Komnenos, so it is hardly surprising that the decision of Emperor 
Alexios to send his troops into enemy territory was met with strong resis-
tance from senior commanders. Ultimately, however, the opinion of younger 
108 An.Komn., VII 1.1–2 (pp. 203–204); Sewter 2009, 186–187.
109 Cf. Ostrogorski 1967, 290; Angold 1997, 130, 132; Stephenson 2000, 102.
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strategoi to confront the ‘Scythians’ in Paristrion prevailed.110 The late spring 
and summer of 1087 therefore represented a turning point in the history of 
warfare between the Pechenegs and Byzantium. The objectives of Alexios’ 
campaign included both subduing the nomads and regaining control over the 
Danube fortresses. To this end, the emperor transported one part of the army 
under the command of Georgios Euphorbenos by boat to Dristra, while with 
the rest of the army was to march across the Balkans.111
Before the campaign had even begun, the Pechenegs tried to use diplomatic 
means to end it. They sent 150 emissaries to Alexios to propose a peace agree-
ment that included a promise to supply 30,000 horsemen for the emperor’s 
future military expeditions.112 This move by the Pechenegs’ recalled their 
behaviour when dealing with Isaac Komnenos in 1059. In both cases the 
Pechenegs sought to avoid armed conflict merely by offering to place them-
selves formally under the emperor’s authority. Bearing in mind his previous 
dealings with the Pechenegs, the Emperor knew that such declarations were 
of little value. Alexios thus used an anticipated partial solar eclipse, calling it 
a sign from God, as proof of the nomads’ foul intentions and justification for 
his rejecting their offer.113 Afterward, he and his army crossed the Sidera Pass, 
and after a few days’ march, reached the walls of Dristra with the intention 
of laying siege to the city.114 However, it soon turned out that he lacked suf-
ficient forces to successfully take Dristra’s two citadels. Ultimately, continually 
harassed by the Pechenegs, whose forces wiped out a number of raiding par-
ties sent out to forage and succeeded in generating fear in the imperial camp, 
the emperor decided to take the advice of some of his commanders and force 
a decisive confrontation with the nomads. The battle ended in a major defeat 
for the Byzantines, with the emperor nearly losing his life.115 The imperial army 
was now in complete disarray, which meant the nomads would be free to rav-
age the Balkan provinces with impunity. However, they failed to make use of 
their great victory. The reason for this was the arrival of the Cumans, who had 
been called in by Tatos, the commander of the forces in Dristra, to support the 
Pechenegs in their fight against the Byzantine army. Despite their late arrival, 
they demanded a share of the spoils. When the victorious Pechenegs refused 
110 An.Komn., VII 2.3,5 (pp. 205, 206); Sewter 2009, 188, 188–189.
111 An.Komn., VII 2.1–3 (pp. 204–205); Sewter 2009, 187–188.
112 An.Komn., VII 2.7 (p. 207); Sewter 2009, 189–190.
113 An.Komn., VII 2.8 (pp. 207–208), Sewter 2009, 190. This eclipse is usually dated to 1 August, 
1087. Cf. Ferrari D’Occhieppo 1974, 179–184; Malamut 1995, 136; Dudek 2009, 246.
114 An.Komn., VII 3.1–2 (pp. 208–209); Sewter 2009, 190–191.
115 An.Komn., VII 3.3–12 (pp. 209–214); Sewter 2009, 191–196.
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to comply, the Cumans attacked their would-be allies and won.116 This clash is 
quite interesting because it illustrates a kind of hierarchy that existed between 
the peoples of the steppe. Michael Attaleiates described the Cumans as a ‘most 
warlike nation’117 when writing about the invasion of Adrianople, which they 
carried out with the Pechenegs. This event, dated to the year 1078, gave rise to a 
whole series of joint plundering expeditions by these two ethne. The question 
then arises whether this refusal to divide the booty did not represent more 
than a mere rejection by the Pechenegs of an unjustified claim? Perhaps it also 
signified a breaking of the alliance between the two peoples. This assumption 
seems justified when we look at the later reports about the relations between 
the Pechenegs and Cumans, which after the incident of 1087 became distinctly 
negative in character.
For the moment, however, this rather unexpected course of events improved 
the already very difficult situation of Alexios I. After his defeat, the ruler took 
refuge in Beroia (today’s Stara Zagora), from where he made an attempt to 
ransom Byzantine prisoners in order to incorporate them back into his army. 
Meanwhile, following their defeat by the Cumans, the Pechenegs moved 
their forces to the vicinity of Markellai (Markeli), where they set up camp.118 
Their chose to encamp near the ruins of the fortress, so close to the former 
Bulgarian-Byzantine border,119 may indicate that their further plans involved 
setting out to plunder the Byzantine provinces. It is not impossible, how-
ever, that the nomads simply wanted to withdraw from regions threatened 
by Cuman attacks. Apart from the mention made by Anna Komnena, this last 
interpretation also seems to be confirmed by the Pechenegs’ choice to move 
their encampments further south in the years that followed. Their concerns 
about the return of the Cumans were also shared by Alexios I Komnenos. This 
situation ultimately prompted both sides to make peace with one another, a 
move later praised in a speech by Archbishop Theophylact of Ohrid.120 The 
resulting peace treaty, which was most likely concluded late in 1087, lasted 
until spring of the following year, when the Pechenegs, realizing they were no 
116 An.Komn., VII 5.1 (p. 216); Sewter 2009, 197–198.
117 Mich.Att., 348/9; Scyl.Cont., 184 (v. 1–5).
118 An.Komn. VII 6.1–2 (p. 218); Sewter 2009, 198–199.
119 The exact location of the Markellai fortress is under discussion. Most likely, it should be 
identified with the ruins of Hisarlŭk, near Karnobat, in today’s Bulgaria. Its location indi-
cates that its purpose was to safeguard the pass at the south-eastern edge of the Balkan 
Mountains. Swoboda 1967a, 179–180; Kazhdan 1991, 1300; Soustal 1991, 348–349.
120 An.Komn., VII 6.2–3 (pp. 218–219); Sewter 2009, 199–200; Theoph.Achr. 222–227. 
Theophylact’s speech is dated 6 January, 1088. Malamut 1995, 138–140; Stephenson 2000, 
102. For other dating, one year later: Dudek 2009, 252.
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longer threatened by an invasion by the Cumans, nor by the possibility of these 
nomads forming an alliance with Byzantium, violated their agreement with 
the Empire.121
They did so by seizing Philippopolis. Alexios did not possess sufficient forces 
to oppose the nomads in an open fight, so he adopted hit-and-run tactics. Over 
the next year, he attempted to delay the opponent’s march, prevent the cap-
ture of further strong points, and destroy smaller Pecheneg units whenever he 
could. When the two opposing armies reached Kypsella, south of Adrianople, 
the emperor sent out ambassadors to negotiate a truce with the nomads. 
They persuaded the Pechenegs to sign a new treaty, but it was quickly violated. 
In late 1088, the Pechenegs left Kypsella and seized Taurokomos, where they 
spent the winter.122 This was probably the first time in this people’s history 
when a major part of the group wintered south of the Balkan Mountains. This 
seems to confirm the assumption that the Pechenegs sought to move their 
settlements southward.
When spring finally came, the Pechenegs resumed their military actions by 
marching on Kharioupolis. Alexios I sent against them a newly formed two-
thousand-strong unit of Arkhontopouloi, i.e., the sons of fallen soldiers. They 
were supposed to strike the Pechenegs’ wagons from the rear, but instead 
of surprising the enemy they were ambushed themselves and suffered con-
siderable losses. According to Anna Komnena, 300 young Byzantines were 
killed. After this success, the Pechenegs seized Kharioupolis and then headed 
towards Apros (between Rhaidestos and Malkara), plundering everything they 
encountered along the way. Wishing to prevent them from taking another city, 
the emperor’s forces occupied them first. The unit commanded by Tatikios 
also managed to destroy one group of the Pechenegs that had been sent out at 
dawn to forage.123
This hit-and-run war probably continued throughout the year 1089 and 
even 1090 as well. Though he sought to avoid a decisive battle, Alexios tried 
to weaken his opponents’ forces and restrict their room for manoeuvre. As the 
foreground of Constantinople, Thrace remained the primary area of opera-
tions. The Emperor fought the Pechenegs first in the area of Rousion (Tur. 
Keshan), and then at Tzouroulon, 36 kilometres away from the capital. Despite 
scoring victories in both battles, Alexios failed to achieve anything more than 
121 An.Komn., VII 6.3 (pp. 218–219); Sewter 2009, 199–200. The Chronology of the Pecheneg- 
Byzantium war in the narrative of Anna Komnena is unclear, however, the winter of 
1087/88 probably brought a pause in their struggles, confirmed by the peace agreement 
that was broken in the spring of 1088. See Meško 2011, 145.
122 AnKomn., VII 6.4–6 (pp. 219–220); Sewter 2009, 200–201. Cf. Meško 2011, 145.
123 An.Komn., VII 7.1–3 (pp. 220–221); Sewter 2009, 201–202.
365on the Territories of the States Neighbouring the Steppe
a temporary halt in the enemy’s march on Constantinople, forcing them to 
retreat to the area between Little Nicaea and Boulgarophygon. The Pechenegs 
set up their encampments and spent the winter there.124
The spring of 1091 was to bring about a resolution to the situation. Nothing, 
however, indicated that the winner would be the Byzantine ruler. His situation 
had become nearly hopeless, as the nomads found a new ally in Tzakhas, the 
Emir of Smyrna. He was one of the Seljuk rulers who had received a share in 
the heritage of Suleiman, the first Sultan of Rum. Tzakhas had taken advan-
tage of the weakened state of the Byzantine Empire in the 1080s to expand his 
rule on the east coast of the Aegean Sea (including the cities of Klazomenai 
and Phocaea). He also assumed control over the islands of Lesbos, Samos and 
Chios.125 He was able to do so thanks to a fleet built for him by a resident of 
Smyrna.126 It cannot be ruled out that Tzakhas had already established a part-
nership with the Pechenegs in 1090,127 but it was only early the following year 
that, through his envoys, he called on them to conquer the Thracian Chersonese 
(today the Galipoli peninsula).128 If such a military operation were successful, 
communication between Constantinople and the Aegean Sea would be cut off. 
The Emir of Smyrna would then be free to attack from the sea. Some scholars 
assume that he would have then been able to direct his expansion towards 
the eastern shores of Greece129 or, in an extremely unfavourable scenario for 
the Empire, even to attack Constantinople itself. Tzakhas, who had once been 
held as a prisoner-of-war in the court of Nikephoros Botaneiates, understood 
that the Empire’s capital could only be successfully attacked from the sea.130 
Having realized the intentions of the emir, Alexios Komnenos tried to prevent 
him from cooperating with the Pechenegs. To this end, he occupied and forti-
fied the port of Ainos, located at the mouth of the Euros River.131 Maintaining 
control over this area allowed the basileus to prevent any communication 
between Tzakhas and the Pechenegs.
Alexios’ situation was nevertheless still very difficult. His forces were not 
strong enough to defeat the Pechenegs, and his situation was further compli-
cated soon after by the arrival of a Cuman army of 40,000 men, led by Togortak 
124 An.Komn., VII 9–11 (pp. 227–235); Sewter 2009, 207–214. Cf. Meško 2011, 147.
125 An.Komn., VII 8.1–2 (pp. 222–223); Sewter 2009, 202–203. Cf. Cahen 1948, 52; Angold 1997, 
133; Dudek 2007a, 120–122; Cheynet 2006a, 51.
126 An.Komn., VII 8.1 (p. 222); Sewter 2009, 202.
127 An.Kom., VII 8.6 (pp. 224–225); Sewter 2009, 204–205.
128 An.Komn., VIII 3.2 (p. 241); Sewter 2009, 219–220.
129 Angold 1997, 133.
130 Ostrogorski 1967, 293; Runciman 1995, 77.
131 An.Komn., VIII 3.4–5 (p. 242); Sewter 2009, 220–221.
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and Maniak. Had the Cumans combined their forces with the Pechenegs, the 
Empire’s defeat would have been certain. The emperor, however, managed to 
gain the support of the Cumans, secured with a pledge of loyalty and a number 
of hostages.132
The Pechenegs quickly realized the danger of such an alliance and 
endeavoured to have it broken. They sent envoys to Alexios with the inten-
tion of presenting him with peace proposals. The emperor held back his 
response, hoping to use the time spent in negotiations to increase his military 
potential.133 His previous experiences had convinced him that no peace treaty 
with the Pechenegs had any value. Anna Komnena wrote that the Pechenegs 
also simultaneously entered into secret negotiations with the Cumans. Despite 
their attempts at double-crossing ‘diplomacy’, they were unable to convince 
either side to break the agreement.
On 29 April 1091, the Pechenegs were forced to fight the allied armies on 
their own. The battle took place near the Lebounion Hill, on the left bank of 
the Euros River. It brought a final resolution to a war which had begun in 1083. 
The extremely fierce battle lasted one day and ended with the defeat of the 
Pechenegs. Some of them died in battle, some were murdered by Byzantine 
soldiers afterwards, and others were sold into slavery. A large group of nomads, 
including the women and children, were ordered by Alexios I to settle in the 
thema of Moglena on the Vardar (Axios) River, entrusting them with the task 
of supplying light cavalry units.134
The result of the Battle of Lebounion was surprising, especially consider-
ing previous armed encounters between the Empire and the Pechenegs. This 
people – who not long ago had threatened the Empire’s capital and managed 
to inflict a serious defeat on Alexios Komnenos – was now almost completely 
annihilated. The Byzantine soldiers and commanders participating in the bat-
tle had a similar impression, as can be seen in Anna Komnena’s narrative.135 
Admittedly, some scholars are inclined to assume that Alexios’ victories were 
not as great as the learned princess seems to assert.136 Nevertheless, it is a fact 
132 An.Komn., VIII 4.2–3 (pp. 243–244); Sewter 2009, 221–222.
133 An.Komn., VIII 5.1 (pp. 245–246); Sewter 2009, 223–224.
134 Io.Zon. XVIII 23 (p. 741), Trapp 1986, 167. Cf. Vasil’evskii 1908, 107; Angold 1997, 133.
135 An.Komn., VIII 5.9 (p. 249); Sewter 2009, 226–227.
136 Macartney 1929, 350; Zlatarski 1934, 366–367 (The researcher admits that Lebounion was 
not as terrible a defeat for the Pechenegs as Anna Komnena describes it, because some 
of them survived on the Black Sea steppe. At the same time, however, he states that they 
lost their political independence in favour of the Cumans); Diaconu 1970, 133; 1978, 40 
(Petre Diaconu represents a view similar to Vasil Zlatarski, however, he acknowledges 
that Lebounion meant the end of the threat of the Pechenegs to Byzantium). Cf. also 
argumentation described in the next paragraph of this chapter.
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that the Battle of Lebounion put an end to the existence of the Pechenegs as 
an independent ethnos.
7.1.5 Epilogue: Beroia 1122
In 1121, 30 years after this battle and in the fifth year of the reign of John II 
Komnenos, son of the victor at Lebounion, an event took place that cannot be 
omitted from a study devoted to the Pechenegs.137 According to the statements 
of John Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates, in this year a group of ‘Scythians’ 
crossed the Empire’s border on the Danube. The first of these authors states 
that a massive force of nomads invaded Macedonia. John Komnenos went 
to face them, but all fighting had to be halted due to the approach of winter 
(1121/22). The basileus stopped at Beroia (Stara Zagora) and devoted all his free 
time to preparations for a spring campaign and diplomatic efforts aiming at 
disrupting the unity of the ‘Scythians’. A battle took place in the spring of 1122, 
during which the army of the nomads was crushed. Some of the nomad sol-
diers, however, withdrew to their camp and fortified it by fastening wagons 
together and covering them with cowhides, in an effort to hold off the impe-
rial army. The troops of John Komnenos had a hard time breaking through the 
‘Scythians” defences. Only when the emperor sent Anglo-Saxon mercenar-
ies armed with axes into the battle, did they managed to break through the 
nomad’s defences and ultimately defeat them. The surviving prisoners-of-war 
were relocated within the Empire’s territory as military settlers.138
John Kinnamos’ account was confirmed by Niketas Choniates. In his highly 
sophisticated literary account of John II Komnenos’ war with the ‘Scythians’, 
he adds only two pieces of information not noted by his predecessor. 
According to Choniates, the invaders occupied Thrace and ravaged the major-
ity of Macedonia. Moreover, and much more importantly, after returning to 
the capital the emperor established a ‘Pecheneg festival’139 to commemorate 
his victory over the ‘Scythians’. This information became the basis for a quite 
common belief in modern scholarship that the mysterious nomads defeated at 
137 The mentioned events are usually dated to 1121–1122. However, some researches admit 
that the events could have taken place one year later, in 1122–1123. Cf. Ivanov, Lubotsky 
2010, 595–603.
138 Io.Cinn., I 3 (pp. 7–8); Brand 1976, 15–16. In his translation Charles M. Brand changes 
the name ‘Scythians’ to ‘Pechenegs’ without informing the reader about the original 
ethnonym.
139 Nic.Chon., 13–16; Magoulias 1984, 10–11. Τοιαύτην νίκην περιφανῆ κατὰ Σκυθῶν ὁ Ἰωάννης 
ἀράμενος καὶ μέγιστον στήσας τρόπαιον τὰς εὐχὰς θεῷ ἀποδίδωσι, τὴν τῶν Πετζινάκων λεγομένην 
ἐς ἡμᾶς τελεὴν εἰς ἀναμνηστήρια τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀποτάξας καὶ χαριστήρια.
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Beroia were, in fact, Pechenegs, or that they may have been an important, if not 
the major, part of an alliance of (ostensibly ‘Scythian’) nomads.140
Due to exceptionally fortunate circumstances, the events related to the inva-
sion in 1121 and 1122 were noted not only by the above-mentioned Byzantine 
sources, but also by a number of authors belonging to completely independent 
literary traditions. The war with the ‘Scythians’ most likely represented an epi-
sode in an ethnic migration that was noted by neighbouring political powers 
on the Black Sea steppe. In addition, the Battle of Beroia and its circumstances 
were also described in a chronicle compiled by Michael the Syrian, Jacobite 
Patriarch of Antioch, in the twelfth century, who in turn relied on the knowl-
edge of these events possessed by the Bishop of Edessa, a contemporary of 
Emperor John II Komnenos. This account in many respects corroborates the 
information provided by both Byzantine historians, but it also contains signifi-
cant differences. Michael the Syrian recalls how cautiously the Empire dealt 
with the nomads marching on Constantinople. The Emperor wanted to make 
peace with them; however, when the nomads split up and began to enter cit-
ies, including Constantinople, and the emperor’s very camp, he ordered them 
to be held captive, and he himself attacked their main camp. The siege of the 
steppe-dwellers’ camp, which had been fortified with wagons, lasted several 
days. Ultimately, the Emperor ordered his troops to storm the defenders’ posi-
tions. The camp was successfully taken, and many of the nomads were killed 
or taken captive. The most important element of the description provided 
by the Patriarch Michael, however, is the fact that the ethnos with whom the 
Byzantine Emperor fought was the Cumans.141 The credibility of this state-
ment is questioned, mainly due to the lack of confirmation by other sources 
and the allegedly incorrect location of the battle site. These circumstances are 
said to also discredit his reference to the Cumans.142
140 Kurtz 1907, 86 (explicit identification of the invaders as the Pechengs); Rasovskii 1933, 
18–19; Bibikov 1999, 199–228; Curta 2006, 312–314; Spinei 2003, 150–151; 2009, 126; Kozlov 
2011, 14–15; 2014, 93–99.
141 Mich.Syr., XV 12 (pp. 206–207).
142 Kozlov 2011, 13. The researcher acknowledges that Michael the Syrian most likely meant 
the Pechenegs, whom he mistakenly called the Cumans, as he used the ethnonym to 
describe all nomadic peoples fighting against Byzantium. Apart from the fact that this 
reasoning does not prove anything, and only expands the circle of ethne that can be iden-
tified with the term ‘Cumans’, as described by the Syrian patriarch, it should be noted that 
Kozlov himself disavowed his argument, stating that there are very few, he claims, cases 
when Michael the Syrian correctly identified the nomadic enemies of the Empire (e.g., his 
mention of the expedition of Isaac Komnenos against the Pechenegs in 1059).
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On the other hand, some scholars take a much less critical stance towards 
the information contained in a work written in honour of John II Komnenos.143 
Theodore Prodromos, the author of the epitaph, wrote it in the form of mem-
oirs in which the deceased ruler spins a tale of his achievements, including his 
military successes. In speaking about his defeated enemies, John Komnenos 
mentions a ‘western gathering of Getae’ and the ‘Scythian Chimera’.144 These 
verses are supposed to be a reminiscence of the Battle of Beroia. They are also 
the basis for the thesis that the Uzes also took part in the battle. In Middle 
Byzantine literature, the Uzes appeared sporadically under the archaic ethn-
onym of Getae.145
The invasion of 1121/1122 was most likely a consequence of ethnic migra-
tion set in motion by the Rus’ prince Vladimir Monomakh. The ruler initially 
welcomed refugees from the steppe and allowed them to settle in the territo-
ries under his control. According to accounts included in the chronicles, in 
1121 Vladimir drove out the Berendei, while the Torks (Uzes) and Pechenegs 
‘fled of their own accord’.146 The chronological concurrence of this event with 
the invasion of the ‘Scythians’ under discussion here is indeed striking. These 
exiles were forced onto the Black Sea steppe, which was then controlled by 
the Cumans, and was thus an unwelcoming environment for them. In all 
likelihood, they then departed for the lower Danube. In this respect, Dmitrii 
Rasovski’s nearly century-old interpretation remains relevant.147 All that needs 
to be changed is the incomprehensible and unjustified reluctance of some 
researchers to accept that when a group consisting of some or all of these 
refugees carried out raids on the Balkans, the Cumans were probably among 
them. As we have seen, starting in 1078 cooperation between this ethnos and 
the Pechenegs during raids is confirmed by Byzantine sources. There is also 
no significant reason to reject the information given by Michael the Syrian. 
On the contrary, it seems that the author pointed out the most important 
143 Bibikov 1999, 207–212; Kozlov 2011, 15.
144 Prodromos, XXV 35–37 (p. 336).
145 Moravcsik 1983a, 111.
146 According to the Primary Russian Chronicle, after the victories of Rus’ princes over the 
Cumans in 1103 and 1116, a certain transfer of power over the groups of the Pechenegs 
and Torks (Uzes) could have taken place, as they fought on the side of the Cumans in 
both battles. PVL 1, AM 6611 (1103), col. 279: After winning the battle, the Rus’ took over 
the camps (vezhe) of the Cumans, which were complete with livestock, possessions and 
servants, and ‘took’ (zaiasha) the Pechenegs and Torks along with their camps. Ip.Let., AM 
6624 (1116), col. 284: after two days of fighting on the Don with the Cumans, the Pechenegs 
and Torks, the last two ethne, came to Vladimir’s Rus’. Eventually, however, they left after 
the Berendeis were driven away: Ip.Let., AM 6629 (1121), col. 286.
147 Rasovskii 1933, 19. Cf. Kniaz’kii 2003, 77–78.
370 chapter 7
and strongest of the ethnic groups that jointly attacked Byzantium in 1121 and 
1122.148 John Komnenos’ victory meant that some of these aggressors were pac-
ified and settled within the Empire, but some probably retreated to the north. 
This is evidenced by information contained in the Chronicon Vindobonense, 
according to which, late in the reign of the Hungarian King Stephen II (circa 
1124), a certain chief (dux) Tartar appeared in the region. He led a group of 
Cumans (Kuni), who after suffering defeat at the hands of an unspecified 
emperor, took refuge in Hungary.149 It seems that the only emperor capable of 
defeating the Cumans in the early 1120s was John II Komnenos, and that defeat 
was the Battle of Beroia.150
The ‘Scythians’ with whom Byzantium was involved in a war in 1121 and 
1122 were not, therefore, a single ethnos, but a coalition composed of the 
Cumans and other steppe groups, probably including the Pechenegs, Uzes 
and Berendei. The mix of ethnicities in this group may explain the use of an 
archaic umbrella ethnonym.151 For Byzantine authors, the nomads were just 
various incarnations of a single people, well-known from classical literature. 
It was thus possible to use the archaic name ‘Scythians’ for each individual 
steppe ethnos, as well as for a confederation or even a temporary alliance of 
several ethnic groups. The ethnically diverse nature of the invaders also seems 
to be indicated by the wording used by Theodore Prodromos, who referred to a 
‘gathering of Getae’ and the ‘Scythian Chimera’.
148 Cf. Diaconu 1978, 62–71; Stephenson 2000, 106. Both researchers are certain that the 
invaders in 1121–1122 were Cumans.
149 Chr.Hung., 444–445; Joh.Thur., § 440 (p. 128). Cf. Vásáry 2005, 11 (note 38).
150 A distant echo of the Battle of Beroia is the story of the expedition of King Kirjalax (prob-
ably John II Komnenos) against Blokummanaland (Wallachia?) described in Heimskringla 
by Snorri Sturluson. In the area Snorri calls the Pecheneg Plains (Pezinovöllu), there was 
a battle involving the blind pagan king. Despite these mysterious names for the people 
and locations, much seems to indicate that this is probably a description of the Battle 
of Beroia. This is evidenced by Sturlusson’s information about the course of the battle, 
which in its basic points corresponds to the accounts presented by John Kinnamos and 
Niketas Choniates. Similarly to the way it was described by the Greek historian, the pagans 
were supposed to surround themselves with a wall of wagons, and the victory of John’s 
Varangian guards secured the victory for the Christians. Snorri also gives the name of 
the Scandinavian commander, Thórir Helsing. He claims that the attack by the emperor’s 
personal guard was preceded by two unsuccessful attacks, the first by Greek troops and 
the second by Franco-Flemish units. Snorri, 787–788. Cf. Diaconu 1978, 72–77.
151 Michael Attaleiates probably did likewise when he described the expeditions of Roman 
Diogenes against the Seljuks. The author, who took part in those expeditions, mentions 
some ‘Scythians’ who were then a part of the emperor’s army. These were most likely Uzes 
and Pechenegs, a fact of which Attaleiates was perfectly aware, though he still used an 
archaic umbrella ethnonym. See the above argument contained in the section ‘Feigned 
Loyalty’.
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A separate, very interesting question is the reason why the name of the 
Pechenegs was mentioned in the narration of Niketas Choniates. It is worth 
noting that the author uses it only in the final fragment of the story about 
the war of 1121 and 1122. The ethnonym was given as the name of the festi-
val established by John II Komnenos, which clearly indicates that its use was 
intended by the monarch. Why, then, when establishing a festival in honour 
of a victory over a coalition of nomadic peoples, did he distinguish one of 
them in particular, and why one that most likely did not play a major role in 
it? It seems that we are dealing here with a conscious process of building the 
dynastic ideology of the Komnenoi by the Emperor. Members of this family 
line from Asia Minor, who managed to attain imperial power, are connected by 
their successes in battle with the Pechenegs. Isaac Komnenos brought them to 
heel and imposed on them his formal authority in 1059. His nephew, Alexios 
Komnenos, achieved a much more spectacular victory by practically destroy-
ing the Pechenegs at Lebounion. Later, in 1094, he also crushed the Cumans 
and restored the Empire’s control over Paristrion, taking back the border on 
the lower Danube.152 John II, through the establishment of the ‘festival of the 
Pechenegs’, revalorized the victories of the older members of the Komnenos 
family, and pointed out that his triumph referred also to their successes, mak-
ing the Emperor the true heir of the dynasty.153 The distinction of this particu-
lar ethnos was therefore not due to its special role in the events of 1121 and 1122. 
It was rather a kind of reference to the collective memory of the Byzantines, 
whose memory of exhausting struggles with the Pechenegs from 30 years ago 
was still vivid. Their invasions of the Empire’s Balkan provinces created in the 
minds of the citizens of Byzantium, the image of a Pecheneg as the personifi-
cation of all threats originating in the north,154 even though they were not the 
only people who plundered the provinces. The victory of Alexios Komnenos 
and the subsequent restoration of the Danube border seemed to put an end to 
the dangers coming from beyond it. The triumph of John Komnenos reminded 
everyone about old threats, but at the same time, it effectively eliminated them. 
The establishment of the ‘festival of the Pechenegs’ in all likelihood served to 
strengthen the image of the Komnenos dynasty as effective defenders of the 
Empire’s borders.155
152 Diaconu 1978, 41–58; Stephenson 2000, 103–105.
153 In the aforementioned epitaph, Theodore Prodromos presents the figure of Alexios 
Komnenos, the persecutor (διώκτης) of the Celts, Scythians and Persians. Prodromos, 
XXV 9–11 (p. 336).
154 Cf. Stephenson 2000, 106.
155 The epitaph of John Komnenos also contains a depiction of the lower Danube (Ister), 
and notes the Danube was navigable for imperial ships. The river was therefore not only a 
border, but also an area controlled by the ruler. Prodromos, XXV 41–42 (p. 337).
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7.2 The Pechenegs in the Arpadian Kingdom
The early relations between the Hungarians and Pechenegs were full of drama, 
with Magyar tribes being forced twice to leave their homes because of Pecheneg 
attacks.156 These conflicts, however, are poorly reflected in Hungarian sources. 
The only trace of them seems to be a legend written down in Hungarian 
chronicles that describes countless ravenous eagles devouring the cattle and 
horses of the Magyars after they crossed the Carpathians in their quest for a 
new homeland. Since the Old Turkic term for an eagle (becse) is very similar to 
the ethnonym used in Hungarian medieval sources to describe the Pechenegs 
(Bessi, Bisseni), it is sometimes assumed that the aforementioned legend is 
a distant reminiscence of battles fought between the two ethne in the late 
9th century.157 The memory of the defeat suffered at that time and the fear of 
its perpetrators must have survived for some time among the Hungarians, but 
it did not result in eternal hostility, as evidenced by a joint raid on Byzantium 
that took place in 934.158 Hungarian sources, moreover, confirm that the 
Pechenegs settled in Arpadian Hungary relatively early. In the third quarter 
of the 10th century, during the reign of Prince Taksony (d. 972), ‘a knight from 
a ducal family’ known as Thonuzoba is said to have come from ‘the Pecheneg 
lands’. The ruler ordered him to settle in Kemey, on the left bank of the mid-
dle Tisza, in the place where the port of Obad was later built.159 Thonuzoba 
most probably did not come alone, but the long-standing claim put forward 
by Hungarian historiography that he brought with him one of the Pecheneg 
tribes160 is unsubstantiated. In all probability, this group of refugees was not 
numerous. Moreover, this migration was relatively early, so the main Pecheneg 
settlements on the Black Sea steppe were not yet at risk. This leads us to believe 
no major influx of immigrants occurred at that time.
In the 10th century, relations between the Hungarians and Pechenegs were 
relatively good. We have no information about armed conflicts being provoked 
156 Cf. Chapter 3 of the present book.
157 Chr.Hung. 286; Joh.Thur., § 203 (p. 60). Cf. Kristó 1996, 191.
158 Cf. Chapter 5 of the present book.
159 G.Ung., 116: Et in eodem tempore de terra Byssenorum venit quidam miles de ducali prog-
enie, cuius nomen fuit Thonuzoba […].
160 Fehér 1921–25, 136–139. Fehér assumes that the arrival of Thonuzoba was connected with 
the migration of one of the eastern tribes of the Pechenegs (Τζοπόν/*Čaba), which left 
its settlements as early as in the 940s due to the threat posed by the Uzes and their raids. 
Aside from the fact that Fehér based his research on a number of assumptions which are 
difficult to prove, it should be noted that the dating of the threat posed by the Uzes, which 
supposedly caused the aforementioned migration, is much too early. Cf. Rasovskii, 5–7; 
Györffy 1990, 158, 187; 1971, 200; Göckenjan 1972, 96.
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by either party. The next century brought about a change, though not an espe-
cially radical one. As we have seen, the military activity of the Pechenegs on ter-
ritories neighbouring the western fringe of the Black Sea steppe resulted from 
the fact that these nomads were gradually being forced out of lands east of 
the Dnieper.161 Apart from Byzantium, Transylvania may also have fallen prey 
to their raids. In The Life of Saint Stephen, there is mention of a Pecheneg raid 
that reached the vicinity of Alba Iulia (Alba Transsilvana).162 It is difficult to 
determine precisely when this raid took place. The nature of the sources which 
mention it makes it even harder to answer this question. One cannot help 
thinking that the authors of The Life of Saint Stephen referred to this event only 
to prove that Providence was taking special care of their devout ruler and his 
subjects. According to the story, King Stephen was warned in his sleep against 
an attack by the Pechenegs, who were approaching his land to loot the homes 
of his Christians subjects. He immediately sent to Transylvania a messenger 
who ordered the local people to seek shelter within the fortifications of Alba 
Iulia. We can assume that this raid, given that it was an actual historical event, 
took place during the long reign of Stephen I (997–1038). Any more specific 
dating would merely be speculation. György Györffy assumes the Pecheneg 
raid took place between 1015 and 1017 and had political undertones related 
to the rivalry between Poland and Hungary. Györffy suggests that supporters 
of Bolesław I the Brave used the Grand Prince of Rus’ Sviatopolk as an inter-
mediary to persuade the Pechenegs to attack the lands ruled by Stephen I.163 
It is hard to confirm this hypothesis. Relations between Bolesław I the Brave 
and the Pechenegs, as we saw in the previous chapter, were not very friendly. 
Györffy also assumes that the nomad raid must have been inspired by some 
foreign power. This is a very stereotypical interpretation based on the notion 
that the nomads’ only motivation was the desire to obtain rich booty, and that 
they were incapable of taking military action on their own. However, in this 
case, the reason for the Pecheneg raid was clearly looting, as noted in The Life 
of Saint Stephen. Therefore, there is no need to search for additional inspiration 
in the desires of outside forces to achieve their own goals. Romanian research-
ers, on the other hand, assume that the nomads raided Transylvania in 1028.164 
This later date seems to be more convincingly linked with the increased activity 
161 Cf. Chapter 6 of the present book.
162 Leg.St., 389, 423.
163 Györffy 1988, 169; 2003, 342; Zsoldos 2004, 126; Bárány 2012, 336.
164 Spinei 2009, 107. Spinei cites the chronicle of Heinrich von Mügeln, which mentions a 
raid by some Huns (Hewnen) who in 1028 invaded the country of the Bessers (this prob-
ably refers to the Pechenegs). Chr.Müg., 109–111. Despite its interesting chronology, this 
mention has nothing to do with the data in The Life of Saint Stephen.
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of the Pechenegs on the Lower Danube and in Moldavia, which indeed began 
in the second quarter of the 11th century. However, in this case as well, we are 
dealing with a hypothesis that is very difficult to verify.
Due to the turbulent events of the mid-11th century, most importantly the 
migration of the bulk of the Pechenegs to the Balkans, Arpadian Hungary 
no longer had to cope with looting raids organized by the Pechenegs. Some 
researchers assume that exactly 30 years after the death of Stephen I, i.e., dur-
ing the reign of King Solomon (1063–1074), these raids started anew. This was 
when some nomadic group broke through border fortifications (indagines) 
in the vicinity of the upper Meszes, devastated the whole of the Nyír prov-
ince, reaching as far as Bihar, a fortified city beyond the province’s borders. 
The raiders collected a significant booty, namely, a great number of male and 
female captives, as well as cattle. During their return, they were cut off by an 
army commanded by King Solomon himself, accompanied by two princes, 
Ladislaus and Géza. The main battle took place by Kerlés Mountain, located 
in Transylvania, west of the city of Bistriţa.165 The battle ended in a decisive 
victory for the Hungarians.
Many researchers believe the Pechenegs were behind this raid.166 However, 
this interpretation raises doubts. Most importantly, it needs to be noted that 
Hungarian written sources are not unanimous in their verdict. Simon of Kéza, 
who mentioned events related to the Battle of Kerlés in his chronicle, regarded 
the opponents of the Hungarians to be the Pechenegs (Bessi), but his informa-
tion about these events raises skepticism. This is in part because the chronicler 
dated the battle incorrectly and claimed it took place during the independent 
reign of King Ladislaus I (1077–1095).167
165 Near the east border of the former Szolnok-Doboka county. Cf. Göckenjan 1972, 97.
166 Györffy 1990a, 210–211; Göckenjan 1972, 97, 187 (note 90); Makk 1999, 63; Spinei 2003, 130; 
2009, 117–118; Curta 2006, 306; Meško 2013, 187; Berend, Urbańczyk, Wiszewski 2013, 232. 
Spinei cautiously takes the view that it was the Pechenegs who were behind the raid of 
1068, but at the same time, cites a very interesting remark by a chronicler from west Rus’, 
according to whom the Cumans and the Vlachs had organized a raid on Hungary which 
was repelled by Solomon and Géza. Moreover, the source explained that the Cumans 
were also called Polovtsy and Kum. The chronicler wrongly dated this incursion to 1059. 
Russ.khr., 241.
167 Sim.Kéza, 182. It seems worth reflecting on the fact that the chronicler knew nothing 
about the Pecheneg raid of 1071, which was provoked by the duke of Belgrade. As we can 
recall, it was Solomon and both princes of the blood who headed the retaliatory action 
that led to capturing the Byzantine fortress. This gives grounds to the suspicion that 
Simon of Kéza merged the two raids and turned them into one event, which he dated to 
the reign of Ladislaus I. It seems that some medieval Hungarian authors took a dislike to 
Solomon, which could also explain the chronological shift made by the chronicler. Lastly, 
we need to note that in Hungarian sources, King Ladislaus appears as the slayer of all sorts 
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Much more detailed information can be found in Hungarian Fourteenth- 
century Chronicle Composition, according to which the raid of 1068 was orga-
nized by a ethnos called the Cuni.168 It should be emphasized here that this 
ethnonym does not appear anywhere in the work of Simon of Kéza.169 This 
brings to mind strong connotations with the Cumans. Nevertheless, this iden-
tification is challenged by contemporary scholarship. It is usually pointed out 
that in the Hungarian chronicles, the Latin term Cunus meant “somebody 
coming from the east, a horse rider, a nomad”.170 In this case, it would have 
been a nomen collectivum whose range of meaning resembled Scythian, a cat-
egory known from the Byzantine literary tradition. Until the mid-12th century, 
when Cunus was replaced by Comanus, this ethnic name could have referred 
to any nomadic tribe which bordered Arpadian Hungary to the east. However, 
even though the above interpretation does extend the scope of identification, 
it does not rule out the possibility of identifying Cuni with Cumans in this par-
ticular case. The Cumans had dominated the Black Sea steppe since the 1060s, 
so they could have organized the raid on Hungary in 1068. It also needs to be 
noted that the Chronicle Composition, which describes two subsequent bar-
barian raids in 1068 and 1071, has its roots in the chronicling tradition which 
clearly distinguishes Cuni from Bisseni, i.e., the Pechenegs. According to this 
source, the latter raided Hungary three years after the Cuni.
Identifying the raiders of 1068 with the Pechenegs gives rise to other doubts 
unrelated to the quality of available sources. This includes the fact that this raid 
must have been organized by a very strong group living on the Black Sea steppe. 
The raiders first crossed the east Carpathians, then invaded Transylvania, 
engaging a large Hungarian force commanded by the King himself. These 
facts force us to consider the hypothesis that more than two decades after the 
migration led by Tyrach and four years after the wave of Uze migration, there 
still lived a very strong group of the Pechenegs in the western part of the Black 
of nomads, which also gives grounds for an assumption that Solomon’s successes were 
attributed to him because he had fought by his side.
168 Chr.Hun., 366–369; cf. Jo.Thur., § 335–341 (pp. 98–100).
169 This silence seems telling, especially if we take into account the fact that Chronica 
Hungarorum mentions three such raids which took place in the 11th century, in 1068, 
1083, and 1091. Chr.Hun. 366–369, 408–409, 412–414; cf. Jo.Thur., § 335–341 (pp. 98–100), § 
395–396 (p. 115), § 400–403 (pp. 116–117). This state of affairs gives rise to an assumption 
that Simon of Kéza, chaplain of Ladislaus the Cuman (1272–1290), could have purposely 
left out information which would have shed a bad light on those who were close to the 
ruler or on influential Cuman settlers, who were numerous in Hungary.
170 Macartney 1940, 141 (note 1); Györffy 1990a, 215–216; Berend 2001, 190–191. Cf. Németh 
1941–43, 95–107. The last researcher believes that the ethnonyms quman and qūn are syn-
onymous and explains their meaning as ‘fawn-coloured, yellow’.
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Sea steppe. They organized looting raids on Hungary, which seems to prove 
that their settlements on the steppe were not under any threat; otherwise in 
1068 they would have tried to settle in Hungary, not just plunder it. However, 
this scenario seems rather improbable. Though it is indeed possible that long 
after Tyrach led the migration to the Balkans, small groups of the Pechenegs, 
either subordinate to the Cumans or part of some sort of ethnic conglomer-
ate, lived between the steppe and the neighbouring countries. This is indicated 
by the events related to the Battle of Beroia discussed earlier. Yet such groups 
could not have organized a raid like the one in 1068 on their own. It therefore 
seems that this should be regarded as the first Cuman raid on Hungary.
The events of 1071 are a different story. The direction of the raid (the south-
ern counties of Arpadian Hungary were attacked), as well as the indirect 
involvement of the Byzantine duke of Belgrade seem to suggest that it was 
indeed the Pechenegs, who had been living in the Byzantine Balkans for 25 
years, who were behind the raid. The attack and the resultant retaliatory action 
taken by King Solomon were probably the last clashes between the Pechenegs 
and Hungarians noted by historical sources.
However, some researchers hold a different opinion. They point to the 
events of the 1080s, when the Cuman chief (dux Cunorum) Kutesk, allied with 
the deposed King Solomon, invaded Hungary.171 These events should be dated 
to 1084–1086. After some initial successes, the attackers were defeated by 
King Ladislaus I, who also recovered the booty they had taken, and Solomon 
and Kutesk were forced to flee. Based on a broad interpretation of the eth-
nonym Cuni, it is assumed that among the allies of the victorious king were 
the Pechenegs.172 However, the grounds for this identification are even weaker 
than in the case of the raid of 1068. There is no source that could connect the 
military expedition organized by Solomon and Kutesk with the Pechenegs, not 
even in some distorted form. Meanwhile, in the Chronicle Composition we can 
find an account of the expedition to the Balkans in spring 1087, also described 
by Anna Komnena. The Hungarian literary tradition confirms the participa-
tion of Solomon and his allies the Cuni.173
Relations between the Pechenegs and Arpadian Hungary did not manifest 
themselves solely in armed conflicts. It would be hard to consider the plunder-
ing raids on Hungary organized by the Pechenegs to have been extremely both-
ersome since, as we have seen, only two such raids are confirmed to have taken 
171 Chr.Hung., 408–409; Jo.Thur., § 395–396 (p. 115).
172 Makk 1999, 77; Meško 2013, 195; Berend, Urbańczyk, Wiszewski 2013, 233.
173 Chr.Hung., 409–410; Jo.Thur., § 395 (p. 115).
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place in the 11th century. Another equally important aspect of the relations 
between the two nations was Pecheneg settlement in Arpadian Hungary. The 
aforementioned Thonuzoba most likely led one of the first groups of Pechenegs 
to leave the steppe and find safe haven in Hungary. This phenomenon intensi-
fied in the 11th century. The Hungarian literary tradition dates a very intensive 
process of immigration, involving numerous European peoples, to the reigns of 
Géza (972–997) and Stephen I (997–1038).174 The Pechenegs (Bessi) are listed 
among the peoples who settled on the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary. 
This story, at least in part, appears to be an anachronism, but in this case it 
may speak to a truth. During the reign of Stephen I, some Pechenegs may have 
sought shelter in Hungary after the defeats suffered in battles with the Uzes 
and the Rus’. This process could even have intensified in the first decades of the 
11th century. This migration most likely ended by the mid-12th century. It can-
not be ruled out that the last Pechenegs arrived in Hungary with the Cumans 
led by Tatar.175
The first Arpads readily welcomed immigrants from foreign ethnic groups. 
Libellus de institutione morum [A Manual on Moral Formation], attributed to 
King Stephen I, includes the proclamation of an open ‘immigration policy’. In 
the text, the ruler instructed his son that guests (hospites), namely new set-
tlers, should be supported and treated with respect to make them more willing 
to settle in the Arpadian Kingdom, as incomers from different lands brought 
with them various traditions and skills, which strengthened the country.176 
Even if these statements were not actually formulated by Stephen I himself, 
it seems that they accurately illustrate the approach towards immigrants 
adopted by this ruler and by the Arpad dynasty as a whole. Newcomers were 
treated as a source of strength for the Hungarian monarchy; by offering safe 
haven to refugees, Hungarian rulers benefited from this foreign element, which 
was fully under their control and whose members provided their services in 
the economy and on the battlefield.
In all probability, the Pechenegs also benefitted from this policy. Their migra-
tion to Hungary was actually a gradual influx of relatively small groups over a 
long, nearly 200-year period. Therefore, it was relatively easy to achieve their 
full political subordination and social integration. Apart from the Pechenegs’ 
acting against King Solomon by supporting Prince Géza, a pretender to the 
throne, there is no information indicating any other attempts made to revolt 
174 Chr.Hung. Cf. Berend 2001, 104.
175 Cf. above.
176 Libellus, 624–625. Cf. Berend 2001, 40.
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against the monarch.177 This fact seems to prove that the Arpads’ policy 
was successful.
It is difficult to determine the number of the Pechenegs living in Hungary. 
Onomastic data seems to suggest that prior to the arrival of the Cumans, the 
Pechenegs may have been the most numerous group of settlers of foreign 
ethnicity.178 However, the nature of our sources calls for caution. Apart from 
the name of the given settlement associated with the Pechenegs, we often 
know nothing else about this place, its population, or it inhabitants. Moreover, 
the diplomatic sources from the 13th and 14th centuries that provide the ono-
mastic material available to us sometimes indicate that during the drafting of 
these documents, the settlements mentioned were abandoned.179 Finally, we 
should bear in mind that while toponyms related to the Pechenegs are rela-
tively numerous, there is no analogous data from Hungary concerning the 
Uzes-Torks. The fact that a major migration of Uzes-Torks to the Arpadian 
Kingdom very likely began in the latter half of the 11th century, and may have 
converged with a migration of the Pechenegs, gives us grounds to assume that 
the Pechenegs were over-represented in onomastic materials at the expense 
of the Uzes.
Pecheneg settlements were scattered over large sections of the Kingdom of 
Hungary, but were centred in its western and central parts. Along Hungary’s 
western frontier, Pecheneg settlements are confirmed to have existed on the 
Leitha, south and east of Lake Neusiedl (Neusiedler See/Fertő), and along 
the lower and middle Rába (the counties [comitatus] of Moson, Sopron, 
Raab-Györ, Vas, Veszprém and Zala).180 In terms the north-west border region, 
Pecheneg settlements were located mostly in what is today Slovakia. We can 
find them north of Esztergom, and on the upper Sikenica (a tributary of the 
Hron), the upper Hron, the lower Žitava, the upper Nitra, and the middle Váh 
(in the counties of Hont, Bars, Komárom, Nitra, and Trenčín).181 The sites of six 
or seven Pecheneg villages have been confirmed on Žitný Ostrov (Csállóköz, or 
Great Rye Island) on the Danube (Bratislava/Pozsony county).182 There were 
177 Cf. below.
178 Göckenjan 1972, 237–238. Göckenjan devised a list of places related to the nomadic 
peoples coming from the east, and it turned out that Pecheneg toponyms were the most 
numerous.
179 Göckenjan 1972, 100, 101, 109; Oţa, 2014, 33.
180 Rasovskii 1933, 20–24 (however, this researcher’s identifications raise doubts because he 
often considers as Pecheneg the settlements inhabited by archers (sagitarii) whose eth-
nicity is undetermined in the sources); Györffy 1990, 124–129; Göckenjan 1972, 99–102.
181 Rasovskii 1933, 25–26; Györffy 1990, 156–158; Göckenjan 1972, 111–112; Marek 2003, 196–202, 
204–206.
182 Rasovskii 1933, 26–27; Györffy 1990, 155–156; Göckenjan 1972, 112–113; Marek 2003, 202–204.
379on the Territories of the States Neighbouring the Steppe
also Pecheneg settlements in the northern border region of the Kingdom of 
Hungary by the river Sajó and its tributary, the Bodva (Borsod county).183 In 
Transylvania, major Pecheneg settlements were located near those of other 
ethnic groups, forming a defensive buffer on the eastern border of the Arpadian 
Kingdom. The Pechenegs also lived alongside Vlachs and Székelys in an area 
called Silva Blacorum et Bissenorum in the Middle Ages, located in the Cód/
Zoodt river valley.184 Pecheneg villages were likewise located west of Maros 
Vásárhely/Târgu Mures and west of Gyulafejérvár/Alba Iulia (south-eastern 
part of Bihar county, and the counties of Haromszék, Nagyküküllö, Csik and 
Kézdiszék).185 Finally, in the Kingdom of Hungary’s southern border region, 
it has been confirmed that Pechenegs settled in the area between the middle 
and lower Drava and the Danube, as well as between the Danube and the lower 
Sava (counties of Somogy, Bács, Bodrog, Baranya, and Valkó).186 It cannot be 
ruled out that some settlements located in the area of Syrmia/Szerém/Sremska 
Mitrovica could have been inhabited by the Pechenegs who until 1181 served 
as Byzantine border guards. After this area was conquered by Béla III, they 
entered the service of the King of Hungary.187
Dense Pecheneg settlement is also confirmed in areas located far from 
Hungary’s borders. We find these settlements by the Sárvíz River (in south-
ern Fejér county and northern Tolna county),188 by the Tisza and its middle 
tributaries (the counties of Heves, Borsod, and Bihar),189 and finally between 
the Tisza and the Danube (the counties of Pilis and Pest).190 According to dip-
lomatic sources, there were 34 settlements on the Sárvíz River, making it the 
largest concentration of Pecheneg settlements in all of Hungary.191
We can assume that the Pecheneg settlers in the Arpadian Kingdom were 
mainly engaged in military service. The location of their settlements seems to 
indicate that they served in the guard units defending border areas. Some also 
defended the roads leading to the border used by the military. Another duty of 
the Pechenegs was to provide contingents of light cavalry armed with bows.192 
183 Rasovskii 1933, 27–28; Györffy 1990, 159–160; Göckenjan 1972, 109.
184 Györffy 1990, 165–166; Göckenjan 1972, 106.
185 Rasovskii 1933, 30; Györffy 1990, 166–167; Göckenjan 1972, 106–107.
186 Rasovskii 1933, 31–32; Györffy 1990, 129–135, 152–153; Göckenjan 1972, 102–105.
187 Rasovskii 1933, 31; Göckenjan 1972, 104.
188 Rasovskii 1933, 39; Györffy 1990, 136–152; Göckenjan 1972, 105; Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 32.
189 Rasovskii 1933, 40; Györffy 1990, 158–159; Göckenjan 1972, 107–109; Pálóczi-Horváth 
1989, 32.
190 Györffy 1990, 153–154; Göckenjan 1972, 105–106.
191 Györffy 1971, 200; Göckenjan 1972, 105; Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 36; Hatházi 1992–1995, 
223–243.
192 Rasovskii 1933, 44; Göckenjan 1972, 113–114.
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The role of the former nomads who settled in the country’s interior must have 
differed somewhat. It is assumed that their dense settlement in the area of 
the Sárvíz and Lake Balaton resulted from their role in defending Fehérvár, an 
early royal residence of the Arpad dynasty.193 The Pechenegs from this area 
also provided cavalry contingents to support military expeditions organized 
by Hungarian rulers. According to estimates made by Hansgerd Göckenjan, 
nomads from the counties of Fejér and Tolna were capable of equipping 400 to 
600 mounted archers, 2/3 of which (200–300 riders) took part in expeditions 
led by Hungarian monarchs.194 Apart from their customary military duties, the 
Pechenegs who lived on the middle Tisza were also said to breed horses for the 
army.195 Another task that some Pechenegs performed in Hungary was collect-
ing duty for the Hungarian rulers and controlling sailing on the Danube.196
The first instances when Pechenegs fought for Arpad monarchs are believed 
to have happened in the late 10th century. In 997, they supposedly reinforced 
the troops of Stephen I while he was fighting to put down an insurrection of 
Koppány.197 Their participation in efforts to repel the invasion of Emperor 
Henry III (in 1051) is much better substantiated.198 In addition, they served 
in the army of Stephen II when he fought against Ladislaus, Duke of Bohemia 
(in 1116).199 They could also be found in the army of Géza II (1141–1162) dur-
ing his conflict with Henry, Duke of Austria (in 1146), when they fought in 
the vanguard, suffering significant loses and losing two of their commanders 
(comites).200 Géza II used the Pechenegs as expedition troops sent beyond 
the borders of the kingdom. In 1150, the Pechenegs also supported the Serbian 
revolt against Byzantium.201
The Pechenegs usually acted as scouts in the military expeditions of 
Hungarian rulers, and were skilled in guerrilla warfare. In pitched battles they 
were less effective in combat. Hungarian chroniclers complained constantly 
about their cowardice,202 but these complaints are probably unjustified. In 
193 Rasovskii 1933, 39.
194 Göckenjan 1972, 105, 190 (note 176). Göckenjan relies on estimates concerning the Székelys 
made by György Györffy.
195 Göckenjan 1972, 110.
196 Göckenjan 1972, 105–106, 112–113.
197 Györffy 1971, 209; 1988, 100.
198 Chr.Hung., 348–349; Jo.Thur., § 310–311 (p. 91). Cf. Rasovskii 21, 44; Göckenjan 1972, 98.
199 Chr.Hung., 436; Jo.Thur., § 430 (p. 125). Cf. Rasovskii, 44–45; Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 30.
200 Chr.Hung., 456; Jo.Thur.,  § 454 (p. 132); Ott.Fr.-Rah., I 33 (p. 52). Cf. Rasovskii 1933, 45; 
Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 30–31.
201 Io.Cinn., III 8 (p. 107); Brand 1976, 86. Cf. Rasovskii 1933, 45.
202 Chr.Hung., 436; Jo.Thur., § 430 (p. 125): Bisseni atque Syculi vilissimi usque ad castrum 
regis absque vulnere fugierunt. Chr.Hung., 456; Jo.Thur.,  § 454 (p. 132). Bisseni vero 
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direct confrontations with heavily-armed formations, light cavalry was gener-
ally ineffective, so after firing upon the enemy, the Pechenegs usually pulled 
back. Moreover, as has been noted, there is no evidence of any disloyalty 
toward the Arpad dynasty by the Pechenegs. In this respect, their behaviour 
contrasts with that of their fellow tribesmen who settled on the territory of 
the Byzantine Empire. Their siding with Géza I in his conflict with Solomon 
(in 1074), even though this clearly meant acting against the reigning monarch, 
was in fact a choice to choose one side in a dynastic dispute. The stance taken 
by the nomads here was probably no different than the position adopted by 
many other subjects of the Arpads. Like other supporters of the pretender, the 
Pechenegs hoped to be granted certain privileges. For this reason, they swore 
to put an end to Solomon’s raids and prevent carrying them out beyond Moson 
and Pozsony counties. However, they could not keep this promise. They were 
defeated and many of them drowned in Lake Neusiedl, while others, including 
their leader Zultan, managed to flee.203
These events bring to mind the question of the legal status of the Pechenegs 
in Hungary. The nature of their migration to the territory of the Arpadian 
Kingdom seems to rule out the existence of some unified organization the 
nomads together, which means it was impossible for all newcomers to be 
granted the same rights. Unlike the influx of the Cumans,204 usually dated to 
1239, the Pechenegs did not enter the Hungarian territory in one large group, 
but rather in many small groups, which meant that each one may have been 
settled under different conditions. Apart from the Pechenegs who voluntarily 
moved to lands belonging to Hungary and began to serve its rulers, there may 
have also been some Pecheneg captives who were settled against their will. It 
had been proven that in the counties of Pest and Pilis there were Pecheneg 
villages whose inhabitants grew wine grapes. This circumstance suggests that 
they may have been the descendants of captives who were among the group 
of serfs obliged to perform specific services to the court.205 Their status was 
most probably different than that of the nomadic groups which offered their 
military skills to the monarch upon their arrival in Hungary. This type of ser-
vice meant that they had strong ties with the ruler, who took care of them 
and granted them separate rights in exchange for fulfilling military duties. It 
is usually assumed that the Pechenegs who settled in the basin of the Sárvíz 
pessimi et Siculi vilissimi omnes pariter fugierunt sicut oves a lupis, qui more solito pre-
ibant agmina Hungarorum.
203 Chr.Hung., 395–396; Jo.Thur., § 378–379 (p. 110). Cf. Rasovskii 1933, 44.
204 Cf. Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 47–50; Berend 2001, 68–73, 87–93, 2001a, 103–104.
205 Göckenjan 1972, 105.
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(in Fejér and Tolna counties) formed a community which enjoyed significant 
autonomy. Its members held periodical meetings headed by a comes, a descen-
dent of Pecheneg steppe-dwellers. This independence continued until the 14th 
century, when during the reign of Louis I (1342–1382), the local Pecheneg elites 
became part of the nobility, though they remained under the judicial jurisdic-
tion of the župan of Fejér.206
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that all groups of military set-
tlers enjoyed a similar level of independence. This seems to be indicated by the 
unfulfilled aspirations of the Pechenegs led by Zultan. For immigrants from the 
steppe, military service to crown was a guarantee of personal freedom and a 
special legal status, but with time, as the social integration of successive gen-
erations of the Pechenegs progressed, their community became less cohesive. 
The descendants of the elites and those of common nomads went their sepa-
rate ways. The first became noblemen, whereas the latter loss their special sta-
tus and became ordinary subjects.207
The social integration of the Pechenegs in the Hungarian Kingdom must 
have been accompanied by cultural assimilation. However, this process was 
not uniform. Acculturation was most certainly faster in the case of nomads 
who settled in areas where the natural conditions differed significantly from 
those of the steppe and those who were entrusted with tasks that had little 
in common with their former lifestyle. The Pechenegs from the counties of 
Pest and Pilis, for example, were bound to the land and most likely quickly 
broke with their old traditions. Likewise, regardless of the activities carried 
out by the new settlers, cultural change was much more rapid in the upland 
and mountainous areas of Transylvania and Slovakia than on the vast plains of 
Alföld, which in many ways resembled the steppe. Yet rapid cultural assimila-
tion was not always in the interest of the Hungarian rulers, who knew it would 
result in a loss of fighting skills and a decline in some forms of economic activ-
ity (such as herding), the very reasons why the Arpads had readily welcomed 
the Pecheneg hospites and why they continued to value their presence.
Cultural change was accelerated due to strong pressures to Christianize the 
nomads, especially during and after the reign of Stephen I. One of its victims 
was said to have been Thonuzoba. He refused to be baptized, so the Hungarian 
ruler ordered that he and his wife be buried alive.208 Even though the cred-
ibility of this story is sometimes questioned, it is a very good illustration of 
the extremely harsh, not to say cruel evangelization methods practised by 
206 Györffy 1990, 136–152; 1971, 200; Göckenjan 1972, 105; Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 33; Berend, 
Urbańczyk, Wiszewski 2013, 471.
207 Pálóczi-Horváth 1972, 33; Oţa, 2014, 43–44.
208 G.Ung., 116–117. Urkund, the son of Thonuzoba, was baptized.
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King Stephen.209 The fate of Thonuzoba most probably reflects the choice that 
many representatives of the Pecheneg elites faced at that time, especially those 
close to the royal court. Christianization, a process which by its very nature 
was extremely slow and extended over several generations, surely did not 
mean that old traditions were immediately and completely rejected. However, 
because the Arpad rulers were strongly involved in conversion efforts and vig-
orously supported the Hungarian church, Christianization was most probably 
one of the main tools used to assimilate and integrate the Pechenegs. Their 
native religious practices did not survive the 11th century.210 Sources dating 
back to the 13th century no longer present the Pechenegs as pagans, whereas 
in the Late Middle Ages we find cases of strong relations between persons of 
Pecheneg descent and the Hungarian church.211
The descendants of Pechenegs who were fully integrated both socially 
and culturally were appointed to the highest state positions in Hungary. 
For instance, Magnificus Paulus Byssenus de Eorghede served as the Ban of 
Dalmatia, Croatia and Slovenia in the years 1404–1406.212 However, the price 
for such a spectacular career was a complete break with one’s former steppe 
traditions, of which a feint reminder were ethnic accents in official titles.
7.3 The Pechenegs in Rus’
Evidence for the Pechenegs’ presence in the lands ruled by the Rurik dynasty 
can be found in chronicles as well as through onomastic research, although 
the latter is based on rather sparse material when compared to that of 
Hungary. As we have already seen, starting from the latter half of the 11th cen-
tury, Rus’ chroniclers usually mentioned the Pechenegs along with two other 
steppe groups, the Torks and the Berendei. In 1146, the chronicles provide 
the first account of the so-called Cherni Klobuci,213 a community of steppe-
dwellers from southern Rus’ who lived mainly in the principalities of Kiev and 
Pereiaslavl.214 Without a doubt this community was comprised not only of the 
Torks, Berendei and several smaller nomadic groups of Turkic origin, but also 
209 Berend, Laszlovszky, Szakács 2007, 333–335, 344–346; Berend 2013, 261–269.
210 Pálóczi-Horváth 1989, 38; Berend 2001, 56.
211 In 1373, castellan Johannes Beseny de Nezda obtained permission to build a monastery. 
Cf. Györffy 1990, 134; Berend 2001, 56–57.
212 Rasovskii 1933, 50.
213 Ip.Let., col. 323.
214 For more on the Cherni Klobuci: Rasovskii 1927, 93–109; 1933, 1–66; 1940, 369–378; Pletneva 
1973; Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 1985; Golden 1996, 97–107; Kijas 2007, 145–156; Morgunov 
2010, 62–75.
384 chapter 7
of Pechenegs.215 It is not entirely clear how this community was organized. 
The name ‘Cherni Kolobuci’ translates as ‘black hats’ and refers to the pointed, 
cone-shaped headgear worn by them. The adjective ‘black’, however, may indi-
cate the subservient and subordinate, or even slave-like status of the Cherni 
Klobuci.216 Each group belonging to the Cherni Klobuci had its own leader 
and, as can be seen from archeological materials and written sources, some 
form of social stratification.217 Notwithstanding these facts, they were initially 
subordinated entirely to the Rus’ princes’ authority and did not have the right 
to carry out their own armed expeditions.218 The Cherni Klobuci’s obligations 
were limited to military service, which consisted in protecting the borders of 
Rus’, and providing contingents of cavalry during armed expeditions.219
The political break-up of Rus’, and especially the struggle for control of 
Kiev, provided a road to emancipation for the steppe-dwellers. As a prized and 
relatively numerous military force,220 the Cherni Klobuci constituted which 
they leveraged to gain advantageous concessions and privileges while offering 
in return to support individual pretenders to the Kievan throne. D. Rasovskii 
noted that they usually supported those Rurikids who descended from the 
elder sons of Vladimir Monomakh (d. 1125) and ruled the Rus’ principalities 
located on the right bank of the Dnieper River. This was motivated by the 
Cherni Klobuci’s animosity towards the Cumans who provided military assis-
tance to the rulers of the left-bank principalities, i.e. Chernigov and Suzdal. In 
the second half of the 12th century, however, the Cherni Klobuci groups were 
so prominent that each Rus’ prince had to have a somewhat stable relation 
with them in order to preserve his authority in Kiev.221 Their elites enjoyed a 
special position, especially the khans of the Cherni Klobuci who were often 
known by name. The fact that they were entrusted with the management of 
the strongholds inhabited not only by Turkic but also by Slavic people proves 
that they had considerable leverage.222 The relations between those two ethnic 
215 This is clearly indicated by entries in the Hypatian chronicle: Ip.Let., AM 6659 (1151), 
col. 427–428; AM 6670 (1162), col. 517; AM 6677 (1169), col. 533. Cf. Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 
1985, 38–41, 67; Golden 1996, 101–104; Morgunov 2010, 72.
216 Rasovskii 1933, 16 (note 85); Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 1985, 67–68; Golden 1996, 104–107.
217 The Hypatian chronicle (Ip.Let., AM 6688 (1180), col. 622) mentions the ‘better’ Cherni 
Klobuci. Cf. Pletneva 1973, 12–17.
218 Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 1985, 77.
219 Rasovskii 1927, 93–99; 1933, 57–58.
220 Dimitri Rasovskii estimated the number of the Cherni Klobuci, together with their fami-
lies, at around 100,000 (1933, 58).
221 Rasovskii 1927, 99–102; 1940, 372–377; Kijas 2007, 151.
222 Rasovskii 1933, 60.
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groups were rarely hostile. The Slavic farmers had become accustomed to the 
proximity of the nomads whom they called ‘our pagans’.223
The Cherni Klobuci’s main dwellings sprawled from south of Kiev to the Ros’ 
River. The Torchesk stronghold, the heart of their settlement, had been located 
there since the end of the 11th century. Six other strongholds, which belonged 
to the nomads serving the Kievan princes, were situated by the Ruta River, the 
left tributary of the Ros’ River.224 The Rus’ Pechenegs, who were probably con-
sidered to be a part of the Cherni Klobuci, inhabited a narrow strip of Kievan 
land between the Dnieper River, the upper course of the Karan’ and the Alta 
River. In 1142, the Rus’ chronicles recorded the Pechenegs under command of 
Lazar, holder of the Sakov stronghold.225 Eight years later, they mentioned that 
the Turpei a little-known ethnic group, lived in the same area and because of 
that they were usually associated with the Pechenegs.226 In the Principality of 
Pereiaslav, the Cherni Klobuci’s dwellings were spread south of the rampart 
surrounding its capital city.227
It seems that the Pechenegs did not have a very prominent status among the 
Cherni Klobuci. Rus’ sources portray to a greater extent the role of the Torks and 
Berendei. What is significant is that the name of the main Cherni Klobuci set-
tlement clearly referred to the Torks. Moreover, steppe-dwellers arrived in Rus’ 
in greater numbers after the death of Iaroslav the Wise, ca. 1060,228 when the 
main groups of Pechenegs had already left the Black Sea steppe. The fact that 
the Rus’ chronicles suddenly mention them after more than a half a century 
of silence is particularly puzzling. Additionally, since the end of the 11th cen-
tury, the Pechenegs had been mentioned usually together with the Torks-Uzes. 
This raises the question as to whether these are the people who, according to 
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, were separated from this ethnic group in the 
late 9th century and lived among the Uzes.229 The same group is also men-
tioned by Ahmad ibn Fadlān, who met some poverty-stricken Pechenegs while 
he was wandering through the Caspian steppes.230 However, it is difficult to 
believe they survived as a distinct group for 200 years while living under the 
leadership of the Torks-Uzes. Considering the scarcity of sources, these devel-
opments must be treated as a difficult to prove hypothesis. Nevertheless, all of 
223 Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 1985, 134.
224 Rasovskii 1933, 53–55.
225 Ip.Let., AM 6650 (1142), col. 311.
226 Rasovskii 1933, 14–15, 59; Morgunov 2010, 68.
227 Rasovskii 1933, 59–60.
228 Morgunov 2010, 68.
229 DAI, XXXVII 51–57 (p. 168). Cf. Chapter 3 of the present book.
230 ibn Fadlan: ibn Fadlan, 212; Zeki Validi Togan 1939, 33; Kovalevskii 1956, 130; Frye 2005, 42.
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the above does not change the fact that among the three main Turkic groups 
which comprised the Cherni Klobuci, the Pechenegs were the weakest and 
least numerous. As mentioned before, in the 12th century, the Rus’ chronicles 
described at length the actions of the Torks and Berendei. The toponyms in 
the Ros’ basin indicate, above all, the presence of the Torks-Uzes, Cumans, and 
even Khazars, but not the Pechenegs.231
The last reference to the Pechenegs in the chronicles comes from 1169, which 
leads us to assume that in the last third of the 12th century they were no longer 
a separate group due to the influence of the other, stronger groupings of Cherni 
Klobuci, which ceased to exist as a result of the Mongol invasion. Rashid al-Din 
was the last writer to mention them, stating that Batu Khan attacked a tribe of 
‘black hats’ in 1240.232 Their later fate is purely a subject of hypothetical specu-
lation. Mikhailo Hrushevski claimed that the Cherni Klobuci were forced by 
the Mongols to return to the steppe as their slaves.233 Other researchers have 
suggested that they might have survived in Rus’ and later became part of the 
Cossack movement.234 Finally, the Cherni Klobuci are also considered by some 
to be the ancestors of the Karakalpaks who lived by the Aral Sea.235
The presence of the Pechenegs is confirmed by place names that appear not 
only on the outskirts of Kiev and Pereiaslav, but also in other regions of the 
old Rus’. Not far from Kolomyia in the Pokutia region there is a village called 
Pechenezhyn. It is difficult to say under what circumstances this village was 
founded. The village is sometimes associated with the arrival of groups of 
Pechenegs, Torks, and Berendei to the lands of Prince Vasylko of Terebovlia, 
who later led them to attack Polish lands, as mentioned in the chronicles.236 
Pechenezhyn is believed to have been inhabited by military settlers who pro-
tected the Principality of Halych in the south from invasion by steppe-dwellers 
and guarded the road leading through the Iablunits’kii Pass.237 A ‘Pecheneg 
burial mound’ (mogila Pechenegi) is located on the border of Volhynia, near 
Zvenigorod. Dmitri. A. Rasovskii has suggested that the inhabitants of this 
settlement were tasked with guarding the road leading from Kiev to Hungary 
and securing the border between the Principality of Halych and Volhynia.238 
In the vicinity of Przemyśl there was once a village called Pecheneie,239 and 
231 Morgunov 2010, 70.
232 Rasovskii 1933, 62.
233 Grushevs’kii 1905, 551.
234 Cf. Rasovskii 1933, 63; Nagrodzka-Majchrzyk 1985, 79.
235 For a critical look at such views: Golden 1996, 98–100.
236 PVL 1, AM 6605 (1097), col. 266. Cf. Morgunov 2010, 70.
237 Rasovskii 1933, 51.
238 Rasovskii 1933, 52.
239 Grushevs’kii 1905, 585; Rasovskii 1933, 52.
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the village of Pecheniugi once existed near Novohrod-Siverskyi.240 The lack 
of additional data makes it difficult to determine the significance of these two 
settlements or how their inhabitants supported themselves.
The acculturation of the Turkic nomads living in Rus’ did not progress 
smoothly. In particular, the groups belonging to the Cherni Klobuci con-
tinued to lead a nomadic lifestyle and engage in activities characteristic of 
nomadic life. Apart from some members of the elite who moved to Kiev, the 
vast majority of steppe-dwellers remained pagans. This was possible due both 
to the landforms and ecosystems of Rus’, as its forest steppes were conducive 
to extensive herding, as well as to the Rurikids’ policies towards these people. 
It was in their interest to have at their disposal an armed force whose mem-
bers preserved the military prowess characteristic of nomads. Their seden-
tarization and cultural assimilation might have caused these advantages to 
disappear.241 On the other hand, the Rurik dynasty had neither the power nor 
the means to successfully convert nomads to Christianity in the way the Arpads 
did in the 11th-century in Hungary. This was especially true after Vladimir 
Monomakh’s death, when a fierce rivalry for the Kievan throne ensued and led 
to frequent changes in who ruled the capital city. Finally, we can only specu-
late on whether the methods of the Hungarian rulers could have been adopted 
in Rus’, which belonged to the Byzantine world, a world that was much more 
cautious than Latin Europe, almost to the point of passivity, in carrying out 
missionary activities.
7.4 The Pechenegs under Piast Dynasty Rule (?)
Polish historiographers for a long time held the opinion that relations between 
the first Piasts, especially Bolesław Chrobry, and the Pechenegs were that of 
good neighbours.242 In truth, they were neither good nor neighborly. In the pre-
vious chapter, the political dimension of the relations between the early Piast 
monarchy and the Pechenegs were analyzed in detail. It can be concluded that 
240 Rasovskii 1933, 60.
241 Rasovskii 1933, 63–64.
242 Zakrzewski 1925, 224 (‘[…] Bolesław generally had a good rapport with the Pechenegs […]’.), 
307; Bieniak 2010, 156 (The Pechenegs were already Chrobry’s allies during St. Bruno 
of Querfurt’s mission to the steppe-dwellers), 160 (The Pechenegs as participants of 
Mieszko II’s expedition against the Saxons, dated to 1028 or 1030); Tyszkiewicz 2003, 
37 (Mieszko I had already maintained intensive communication with the Pechenegs). 
Recently also: Tyszkiewicz 2014, 188. According to Tyszkiewicz, Bolesław Chrobry’s 
influence reached as far as the Dniester and the lower Dnieper, which means it actually 
spanned nearly the entire area inhabited by the Pechenegs in the early 11th century.
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these relations were episodic and limited to their participation in Bolesław 
Chrobry’s two expeditions to Rus’ (1013 and 1018). The Pechenegs were most 
likely involved in them as allies of the Rus’ prince Sviatopolk, who, as sources 
indicate, maintained political relations with the steppe-dwellers and made 
use their military support numerous times. However, there is no analogous 
data confirming the existence of any kind of formal agreement between the 
nomads and the first Piasts. It is often argued that the geopolitical situation 
supports the hypothesis of a Polish-Pecheneg alliance. The political rivalry on 
the Polish-Rus’ border would have supposedly naturally led to an alliance of 
this kind. The problem here is that what should hypothetically result from a 
geopolitical situation is not always what actually happens. Although the geo-
graphical situation of the Pechenegs and the Byzantine Empire forced them to 
coexist, relations between them were always complicated and not always the 
result of rational motivations. Constantine Porphyrogenitus’s doctrine, which 
postulated a special relationship with the Pechenegs, had a relatively short 
life, probably not much longer than the independent reign of this emperor.243 
Byzantine diplomacy at times favored other partners who were more demand-
ing, but also more predictable, as the court in Constantinople tended to per-
ceive the Pechenegs to be a sort of a political amoeba.244 However, the Empire, 
which for centuries had nomads as neighbours, was forced to take them into 
account in its policies. It is unlikely that the same was true in the case of the 
Piast monarchs, as their lands bordered the areas controlled by the steppe-
dwellers for only a very short time, i.e., in the years 1018–1031.245
A separate question is that of the Pechenegs’ presence on the lands ruled by 
the Piasts. This presence, as in the case of other states in Central and Eastern 
Europe, may have taken the form of brief armed incursions or of more perma-
nent settlement. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the steppe-dwellers 
probably carried out raids in southeastern Poland. The sources also provide 
evidence that Pechenegs settled on Polish lands. This is indicated by a group 
of five toponyms, such as ‘Pieczeniegi’ and ‘Pieczonogi’, found on the left bank 
of the Vistula, between Kraków and Staszów. They form two clusters some 80 
km apart. The first cluster consists of three settlements located near Miechów, 
north-east of Kraków. The second cluster is comprised of two villages a dozen 
or so kilometers apart: Pieczonogi, near Oleśnica, and Pieczonóg-Gacki, near 
Szydłów.246 The nature of these settlements is unclear. Polish researchers have 
243 Cf. Chapter 5.4.
244 Cf. the statements made by John Mauropous cited in the first part of this chapter.
245 Cf. the discussion in Chapter 6.1.
246 Rymut 1967, 123–124; Modrzewska 1969, 365; 1984, 32–34; Tryjarski 1975a, 616.
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sometimes claimed that these were cases of military settlement.247 Such spec-
ulation is difficult to confirm or disprove. It is more probable, though still not 
proven, that the villages were inhabited by captives who performed menial 
labour. This thesis is supported by the results of research carried out on the 
cemetery in Gorysławice, near Wiślica, i.e., at a site located in between the two 
groups of Pecheneg-derived toponyms.248 The graves found there date back to 
the latter half of the 11th and early 12th century. The human remains discovered 
there have anthropological features characteristic of so-called Eurasian types. 
Out of 20 skulls selected for analysis, 17 individuals show characteristics of a 
caucasoid-mongoloid racial mix and one of the mongoloid race. However, the 
features of this burial site do not differ from those of burial site found in other 
11th- and 12th-century cemeteries in Małopolska, and no traces of Eastern, 
steppe origns were found.249 Witold Świętosławski has also pointed out that 
steppe vegetation occurs in the area around Gorysławice.250 Taking into con-
sideration the above facts, one can assume that former nomads settled on the 
Nida River near Wiślica, but that these were not military settlers, but rather 
people living in servitude who engaged in herding.
There is no hard data indicating the Pechenegs maintained a long-term pres-
ence among the troops of the first Piasts (or rather of Bolesław Chrobry). As 
mentioned above, Thietmar’s writings do not confirm such a presence. During 
both expeditions to Rus’, the steppe-dwellers temporarily served as mercenar-
ies, whose abilities the Polish ruler did not assess highly. The occasionally dis-
covery in Poland of elements of military equipment of foreign, eastern origin, 
such as a ‘snaffle bit’ with a rigid mouth piece,251 is not evidence that Pecheneg 
warriors served the Piasts. Weapons changed hands as loot and war trophies. 
The same is true of riding tack when a horse was captured. Today researchers 
challenge the view that a bit with a rigid mouth pieces unambiguously iden-
tifies the remains as belonging to the Pechenegs. This element of equestrian 
247 Łowmiański 1975, 47–48. ‘Located along the left bank of the Vistula, the Pechenegs’ set-
tlements had to [sic! – A.P.] help contain the invasion of people from their own ethnic 
group’.
248 Recently Witold Świętosławski wrote about them (2006a, 120–121).
249 Charzewska 1963, 199–211. In a study published in the same volume, Wojciech Szymański, 
concludes that the cemetery in Gorysławice was established by the inhabitants of Wiślica 
in the latter half of the 11th century, and was in use until the beginning of the next cen-
tury. The researcher found no foreign ethnic characteristics among the deceased there. Cf. 
Szymański 1963, 190–191.
250 Świętosławski 2006a, 121 (note 17).
251 Wołoszyn 2004, 258–259; Kollinger 2014, 396.
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accoutrement is most certainly of steppe origin, and could have been used by 
the Pechenegs, but not necessarily only by them.252
The modest available source data suggests that, as in the case of political 
relations, the presence of the Pechenegs on Polish lands was very limited. 
Although they probably resided in the lands of the Piasts, their role – espe-
cially in comparison with those members of their ethnic group who settled in 
Byzantium, Hungary, and Rus’ – was minor.
252 Cf. Armarchuk 2006, 40–41; Spinei 2009, 294–295.
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Conclusion
Among the nomadic peoples who migrated to Europe, the Pechenegs seem 
to have occupied a relatively weak position. After all, they never built a great 
empire and never became a dominant force in the political relations of the 
south-eastern part of the continent. Their role and significance was smaller 
than that of their contemporaries, the Khazars. Yet this seemingly obvious 
statement is based on the false notion that the Pechenegs differed from other 
steppe ethne that could claim more spectacular achievements. This is not nec-
essarily true. Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), the Arab historian and philosopher, 
claimed that empires built by nomads tended to last no longer than 120 years. 
By the third generation, signs of decline were usually already visible. It is dif-
ficult to deny the accuracy of the Muslim scholar’s insight. It should be added, 
though, that the lifespan of some of the great states created by nomads was 
even shorter. Against this background, the over 300-year history of the Khazar 
Khaganate seems a remarkable achievement. Even the best organized nomad 
political structures usually collapsed, often due to the disintegration of the 
ethnos that had formed it. In this respect, the fate of such empire builders 
as the Huns, Avars, and Khazars was no different than that of the Pechenegs. 
After a period of strength and vitality, all of these peoples disappeared without 
a trace. As the old Rus’ proverb quoted in the introduction of the present book 
says, they all ‘perished like the Avars’. It is true, of course, that the lack of a 
strong political centre greatly influenced how the Pechenegs related to the out-
side world. Their loose, segmentary structure made them capable of defending 
their independence, but prevented effective expansion and longer-term policy 
planning. The Pechenegs’ actions were most often merely reactions to external 
political stimuli. Yet they existed as an independent ethnos despite their seg-
mentary structure for some 300 years, almost as long as the imperial Khazars. 
Over those three centuries they also enjoyed significant political importance, 
the peak of which fell in the mid-10th century. At that time, Constantine VII 
Porphyrogenitus saw them as being key to maintaining equilibrium in Eastern 
Europe. Their loose political structures should therefore be viewed as an alter-
native model of community formation that contrasted sharply with those 
found in strongly centralized nomadic states.
Previous academic studies have underestimated the strength of the 
Pechenegs’ ethnic identity. The most eminent experts on the subject have 
tended to believe they lacked a strong sense of unity and solidarity. This was 
said to be proven by the internal conflicts that arose among them. However, 
a people like the Pechenegs, who were able to defend their independence for 
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a substantial period of time, must have felt a strong community bond. The 
scarcity of available sources makes it impossible to determine more precisely 
what cultural values served to strengthen this bond. In general, we can only 
infer what comprised the content of the Pechenegs’ traditions, the influence of 
which was clearly revealed in their contacts with outsiders. This is particularly 
evident in the late period of the Pechenegs’ history. Finding themselves in a 
foreign environment – both in terms of the natural conditions and the cultural 
patterns of the majority population – they strove to preserve their individual-
ity. The consequences of this were dramatic. The Pechenegs’ continuation of 
their old way of life led to an acute conflict with Byzantium, which ultimately 
brought about the annihilation of the steppe-dwellers’ independence. Their 
situation in Rus’ and Hungary was very different – but even there, a change in 
the political loyalties of Pecheneg groups was accompanied by a demonstra-
tion of their distinctiveness.
However, the relationship between these nomads and the outside world 
cannot be described only in terms of violence. It is true, of course, that the 
Pechenegs were a warrior people, capable at times of great cruelty. Valour, 
measured by the number of enemies killed, was among the virtues they appre-
ciated most. Their aggression, however, had a rational basis and was often a 
response to the expansive actions of their neighbours. The history of rela-
tions between the Rus’ and the Pechenegs at the turn of the 10th and 11th 
centuries provides examples that support this thesis. The growth of Kiev and 
the accompanying shift in the southern border of Rus’ and the political and 
economic expansion of the Rurik dynasty clearly threatened the interests of 
the Pechenegs. Rus’ rulers disrupted the Pechenegs’ trade relations and took 
control of their trade routes. The chronicle tradition presents the actions of 
Kiev’s rulers, especially those of Vladimir the Great, as a defence against the 
aggression of the steppe-dwellers. It seems, however, that this account is heav-
ily marked by the founding myth of Rus’, according to which the Rurik princely 
dynasty was established to create the foundations for terrestrial and cosmic 
order, and to oppose the dark forces of chaos. As a group that was radically 
different culturally, the Pechenegs were well suited for the role of ‘dark forces 
of chaos’ and functioned ideally as an Other. Blame for various bloody border 
conflicts was always placed on them, though the truth was more complicated 
and much less unambiguous.
The role of the Pechenegs in trade is likewise underestimated. Among 
researchers the dominant stereotype of the Pecheneg nomads is one of a group 
whose activities contributed largely to a decline in trade. However, data from 
written sources indicate that the Pechenegs may have also played a signifi-
cant role in the conduct of trade. In the 10th century, they acted as valuable 
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intermediaries between the Byzantine Kherson and the lands adjacent to the 
steppe. They also made use of trade routes established earlier by the Khazars. 
It is worth remembering that the development of Kiev and Volga Bulgaria was 
possible due to the destruction of the Pax Chazarica and the weakening of the 
Pechenegs in the late 10th century. New political power centres in the north 
created a more favourable trade network for them, while also disrupting older 
trade relations.
The fate of the Pechenegs depended largely on the situation not only on the 
steppe itself, but also in the lands surrounding it. In the latter half of the 10th 
century, the Black Sea steppe became a niche, surrounded by strong political 
powers everywhere but in the east. Such an orientation in geopolitical rela-
tions was generally quite unfavourable to these nomads, as it precluded the 
establishment of relations with both the North (dominated by steppe-dwelling 
nomads and their hinterland) and the South (agricultural civilizations); the 
development of such a north-south alignment would have been much more 
favourable to the Pechenegs. After the steppe became a political niche, the 
role of its inhabitants rapidly diminished. Their territory was seen by neigh-
bouring states as, at best, a kind of buffer zone separating different spheres of 
influence. However, the demographic dominance of agricultural communities 
pushed nomadic groups, even forced them, to expand their area of migratory 
settlement. This could lead to the displacement of nomads from their lands, a 
process which, as the example of the Pechenegs proves, they were unable to 
halt. The transformation of the Black Sea steppe into a niche also coincided 
with the collapse of the Khazar Khaganate. This created a terrible situation 
for the Pechenegs, because the fall of the Khazar Empire also brought down 
a bulwark that had slowed the migration of nomadic peoples. As a result of 
these ethnic shifts, the Pechenegs’ Black Sea niche became boxed-in on three 
sides, making it impossible to move out of the area without crossing into the 
lands of neighbouring states. The Pechenegs were the first people in the his-
tory of Europe to face this problem. The Hungarians, who had been driven out 
by them earlier, were able to simply migrate beyond the Carpathians and, like 
the Avars had in the past, occupy steppe lowlands on the Tisza and central 
Danube. For the Pechenegs, such a flight to the west was no longer possible.
Although migration beyond the steppe theoretically did not have to bring 
about the end of their history as an independent people, it triggered processes 
that, at best, would have led to a radical transformation of the nomads’ cultural 
universe. The examples of the Hungarians and the Danube and Volga Bulgars 
show that under such conditions nomadic communities could maintain their 
independence and create strong political organisms capable of surviving for 
centuries after leaving the steppe. The price for such success, however, was the 
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complete abandonment of their former nomadic identity, and the loss of many 
of the values associated with it. Much depended on the political traditions cul-
tivated by a given ethnos. Accustomed to living in an egalitarian community, 
the Pechenegs were not able to create an early state in the Balkans, like those 
of the Bulgars or Hungarians. For them, leaving the Black Sea steppe was tanta-
mount to the end of their role as an actor in the region’s history. The Pechenegs’ 
final half century of conflicts with Byzantium was merely an epilogue to their 
story as a free people.
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Kowalczyk, Elżbieta 298 (n. 31)
Kowalski, Tadeusz 130
Kozlov, Sergei A. 368 (n. 142)
Kraków 40, 305, 316, 388
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Oster river 205, 294
Ostrogoths 62–63, 65, 68–69, 73, 84
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Strwiąż river 304
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thema of 337
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Torks, see Oghuz (Uzes)
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Transcaucasia, see South Caucasus
Transdniester Region 44
Transoxania, see Ma wara’ an-Nahr
Transvolga Region 23, 78, 89, 94, 96, 98, 100 
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steppe 38, 94
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Tyres river, see Dniester river
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Ukraine 20, 25, 43–44, 60
Ukrainian Plate, see Black Sea Plate
Ulan Bator 21
Uldis (Ulti), Hun ruler 69, 70
Ungroi, see Magyars
Unstrut river 274 (n. 133)
Ural river 36, 39, 77, 82, 95 (n. 40), 96–97, 
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Váh river 378
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Volga 
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Vorskla river 248
Vyatichians, see Viatichi
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Zajączkowski, Ananiasz 65 (n. 136), 78
Zakrzewski, Stanisław 303
Zala comitatus 378
Zenon I, Byzantine emperor 73
Zhitomyr 26, 247
Zhetysu, see Semirechie
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Zmievy Valy, see ‘Serpent’s Wall’
Zoe Karbonopsina, Byzantine empress  
259, 261–263
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